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INSTITUTE  OF  PACIFIC  RELATIONS 


HEARINGS 

BEFOBE  THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE  TO  INVESTIGATE  THE  ADMINISTEATION 

OF  THE  INTEENAL  SECUEITY  ACT  AND  OTHEE 

INTEENAL  SECUEITY  LAWS 

OF  THB 

COMMITTEE  ON  THE  JUDICIAEY 
UNITED  STATES  SENATE 

EIGHTY-SECOND  CONGEESS 

SECOND  SESSION 

ON 

THE  INSTITUTE  OF  PACIFIC  RELATIONS 


PART  10 


MARCH  4,  5,  6,  7,  10,  14,  AND  21,  1952 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary 


INSTITUTE  OF  PACIFIC  RELATIONS 

I  ^ 

'  HEARINGS 

BEFORE  THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE  TO  INVESTIGATE  THE  ADMINISTRATION 

OF  THE  INTERNAL  SECURITY  ACT  AND  OTHER 

INTERNAL  SECURITY  LAWS 

OF  THE 

COMMITTEE  ON  THE  JUDICIAEY 
UNITED  STATES  SENATE 

EIGHTY-SECOND  CONGRESS 

SECOND  SESSION 

ON 

THE  INSTITUTE  OF  PACIFIC  llELATIONS 


PART  10 


MARCH  4,  5,  6,  7,  10,  14,  AND  21,  1952 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  ou  the  Judiciary 


UNITED   STATES 
GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
88348  WASHINGTON  :   1952 


COMMITTEE  ON  THE  JUDICIARY 

PAT  AIcCARRAN,  Nevada,  Chairman 
HARLEY  M.  KILGORE,  West  Virginia  ALEXANDER  WILEY,  Wisconsin 

JAMES  O.  EASTLAND,  Mississippi  WILLIAM  LANGER,  North  Dakota 

WARREN  G.  MAGNUSON,  Washington  HOMER  FERGUSON.  Michigan 

HERBERT  R.  O'CONOR,  Maryland  WILLIAM  E.  JENNER,  Indiana 

ESTES  KEFAUVER,  Tennessee  ARTHUR  V.  WATKINS,  Utah 

WILLIS  SMITH.  North  Carolina  ROBERT  C.  HENDRICKSON,  New  Jersey 

J.  G.  SouRwiNK,  Comifiel 


Internal  Security  Stbcujimittee 

PAT  McCARRAN,  Nevada,  Chairman 
JAMES  O.  EASTLAND,  Mississippi  HOMER  FERGUSON,  Michigan 

HERBERT  R.  OCONOR,  Maryland  WILLIAM  E.  JENNER,  Indiana 

WILLIS  SMITH,  North  Carolina  ARTHUR  V.  WATKINS,  Utah 


Subcommittee  Investigating  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relatione 

JAMES  O.  EASTLAND,  Mississippi,  Chairman 
PAT  McCARRAN,  Nevada  HOMER  FERGUSON,  Michigan 

Robert  Morris,  Special  Counsel 
Ben.tamin  Mandbl,  Director  of  Research 
II 


CONTENTS 


Page 

Testimony  of  Lattimore,  Owen 3277-3674 

Appendix    I 3680-3714 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2008 


http://www.archive.org/details/instituteofpacif10unit 


INSTITUTE  OF  PACIFIC  KELATIONS 


TUESDAY,   XHARCH  4,    1952 

United  States  Senate, 
Subcommittee  To  Investigate  the 

Administration  of  the  Internal 
Security  Act  and  Other  Internal  Security 

Laws,  op  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary, 

Washington,  D.  G . 
The  subcommittee  met  at  10 :15  a.  m.,  pursuant  to  recess,  in  room 
424,  Senate  Office  Building,  Hon.  Pat  McCarran   (chairman)   pre- 
siding. 

Present:  Senators  McCarran,  Smith,  O'Conor,  Ferguson,  Wat- 
kins,  and  Jenner. 

Also  present :  Senator  McCarthy,  J.  G.  Sourwine,  committee  coun- 
sel; Robert  Morris,  subcommittee  counsel;  and  Benjamin  Mandel, 
research  director. 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 

TESTIMONY  OF  OWEN  LATTIMORE,  ACCOMPANIED  BY  THURMAN 
ARNOLD,  ESQ.,  COUNSEL— Resumed 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  the  other  day,  at  the  close  of 
the  hearing,  I  said  I  had  some  questions  to  ask  in  relation  to  the  reports 
that  came  out  of  the  Moscow  meeting. 

It  was  indicated  that  Mr.  Lattimore  did  not  know  anything  about 
these  reports  that  appeared  now  in  the  evidence. 

Is  that  still  your  contention,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  sir.  To  the  best  of  my  recollection,  I  don't 
remember  them. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  is  it  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  say  to  the  best  of  my  recollection,  I  don't  re- 
member ever  seeing  those  minutes  before. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  wrote  Ordeal  by  Slander  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  you  feel  that  you  are  responsible  for  all 
that  is  in  it  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then  I  ask  you  to  look  at  page  51.  It  is  a 
chapter  by  your  wife : 

We  had  breakfast  with  Edward  C.  Carter.  Mr.  Carter  had  been  secretary- 
general  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  when  Owen  had  edited  Pacific 
Affairs,  and  I  wanted  to  see  him  because  McCarthy's  speech  had  dealt  at  length 
with  the  IPR  and  Owen's  connection  with  it,  all  still  based  on  Kohlberg  and 
China  Lobby,  and  had  laid  great  stress  on  Owen's  one  visit  to  Moscow  where 
he  had  spent  10  days  with  Carter  on  IPR  business  in  1936. 

3277 


3278  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Now,  that  is  the  meeting  that  we  were  talking  about  the  other  day ; 
is  it  not  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore,  That  is  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then  I  read  further : 

The  present  secretary-general,  William  Holland,  and  his  family,  also  old 
friends  of  ours,  were  staying  at  the  Carters',  and  it  made  me  happy  to  know 
that  I  had  won  support  and  help  of  all  of  them.  Mr.  Carter  gave  me  copies  of 
old  reports  he  and  Owen  had  made  to  the  IPll  about  the  Moscow  visit,  and 
also  a  copy  of  a  statement  about  it  he  had  released  to  the  press  the  night 
before. 

Now,  where  are  those  reports? 

Mr.  Lati'imore.  We  have  them  in  our  file  now. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Are  they  the  same  as  this  report? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir ;  I  don't  believe  so. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Wliy  did  you  not  tell  us  before  about  these  re- 
ports ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Why  should  I? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Why  should  you? 

Mr.  Latitmore.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Were  you  not  sworn  to  tell  the  truth,  the  whole 
truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  At  the  time  of  these  hearings,  this  whole  business 
that  some  reports  that  I  had  written  at  that  time  had  been  shown  to 
my  wife  had  completely  slipped  my  mind.    It  is  in  a  printed  book. 

Senator  Ferguson.  "VVlien  we  produced  the  reports  out  of  the  files 
that  we  obtained  up  in  the  barn,  did  you  not  indicate  to  us  that  you 
were  in  no  way  responsible  for  any  of  those  reports,  and  inferred  any 
other  reports? 

Mr.  Latitmore.  I  didn't  infer  anything  of  the  kind.  Senator. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  produce  the  reports  now  that  are 
mixed  in  here? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  They  are  in  a  })rinted  book  somewhere.  I  will  try 
and  find  them  for  you  and  bring  them  to  you. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Were  they  made  from  these  typewritten  re- 
ports ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  do  you  know  that  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Because  I  remember  that  the  general  procedure 
w^as  that  when  I  came  back  from  a  trip  of  that  kind,  I  think  I  would 
write  in  a  sort  of  letter  report. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  here  wei-e  official  reports  as  if  they  were 
taken  at  the  meetings ;  is  that  not  true  ? 

The  Chairman.  Answer  audibly,  please. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  what  they  appear  to  be;  yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  did  you  not  infer  in  j^our  answers  that  you 
felt  that  we  should  not  use  that  kind  of  report,  because  you  had  no 
knowledge  of  them? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir.  All  that  I  inferred  was  that  the  state- 
ments there  made  about  what  was  being  discussed  were  reports  of 
my  words  and  were  not  a  stenographic  record  of  what  I  had  actually 
said,  and  I  also  stated  that  I  did  not  recall  ever  having  seen  those  re- 
ports. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  not  suppose  that  those  reports  were 
used  by  Carter,  at  least,  in  making  up  the  reports  ? 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3279 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  no  idea  how  Carter  made  up  his  reports. 

Senator  Ferguson.  It  says  here  that  you  and  Carter  made  them  up. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  made  a  report,  and  Carter  made  a  report,  I 
beheve. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  that  what  this  says? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  May  I  see  that? 

(A  document  was  handed  to  the  witness.) 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  give  us  the  report  that  you  made  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  will  try  and  find  the  book  in  which  it  is;  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Let  us  have  the  report.  The  report  was  not  in 
a  book ;  you  did  not  write  the  book  and  give  it  to  them  ? 

Mr.  Laitimore.  No,  sir;  I  wrote  a  report  to  the  IPR,  I  believe, 
which  was  included  in  one  of  the  IPR  publications. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  keep  a  copy? 

]\rr.  Laitimore.  When  I  wrote  it? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  may  have.    I  don't  know. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  look  and  see? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  haven't  seen  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Does  that  show  that  you  wrote  a  report  or  you 
and  Carter  wrote  a  report? 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

Mr.  Carter  gave  me  copies  of  old  reports.    *    *    * 

That  is  indicating  more  than  one  report — 

*    *    *    He  and  Owen  had  made  to  the  IPR  about  the  Moscow  visit. 

That  would  indicate  to  me  that  he  had  made  a  report  and  I  had 
made  a  report — 

And  also  a  copy  of  a  statement  about  it  he  had  released  to  the  press  the  night 
before. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  ever  see  that  press  release  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  recall  ever  seeing  it,  no. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  passed  off  rather  lightly  this  meeting  with 
Moscow  in  your  Ordeal  by  Slander ;  did  you  not  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  didn't  think  it  was  a  very  important  meeting. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  did  not  think  it  was  important.  That  is 
all  at  the  present  time.  I  will  have  further  questions  when  we  see 
your  report. 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  Mr.  Morris. 

Mr.  Sourwine,  I  think  you  drew  my  attention  to  the  fact  that  a 
question  was  pending  when  we  concluded. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  That  is  correct,  Mr.  Chairman,  according  to  my 
memory.  The  witness  had  begun  an  answer  and  had  not  concluded 
at  the  time  the  recess  was  called. 

The  Chairman.  Is  the  record  of  yesterday's  proceedings  available  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  It  will  be  here  in  a  moment,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  Mr.  Morris ;  you  may  proceed. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  will  you  receive  into  the  record  at  this 
time  the  date  of  the  Russian-Japanese  Nonaggression  Pact  that  was 
signed  in  1941  ? 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel  ? 


3280  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Mandel.  I  read  from  the  World  Almanac  of  1944,  page  36,  under 
the  heading  of  Japan:  "Signed  5  year  neutrality  pact  with  Russia 
April  13,  1941." 

The  Chairman.  What  is  the  object  of  that?  Will  you  please  con- 
nect that  up? 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  the  witness  yesterday  gave  testimony 
concerning  a  meeting  that  was  held  in  Washington  on  June  18,  1931, 
and  we  were  trying  to  determine  the  political  atmosphere  that  pre- 
vailed at  that  time. 

The  Chairman.  Proceed,  sir. 

Before  you  proceed,  I  have  here  page  5337  of  the  record  of  these 
proceedings.  Mr.  Lattimore  was  under  examination  by  Mr.  Morris. 
I  read  from  that  page  to  connect  it  up : 

Mr.  MoKRis.  Wlio  was  present  at  the  meeting? 

Does  that  give  you  a  connection,  Mr.  Lattimore  ? 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Reference  was  being  had  to  the  luncheon  with 
Rogov,  I  believe. 

Mr.  Laitimore.  I  don't  think  it  was  a  luncheon. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  That  is  correct.  You  stated  that  it  was  not  a 
luncheon.     I  am  sorry. 

The  Chairman  (reading)  : 

Mr.  SouKwiNE.  It  was  pretty  late  in  the  afternoon  to  have  a  luncheon? 
Mr.  Lattimore.  The  middle  of  the  afternoon. 
Mr.  Morris.  How  long  did  it  last,  Mr.  Lattimore? 
Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  recall. 
Mr.  Morris.  Who  was  present  at  the  meeting? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  only  person  that  I  clearly  recall  being  present,  because  I 
walked  out  with  him  afterward     *     *     * 

Do  you  wish  to  finish  that  ? 

Mr.  Latiimore.  The  only  person  I  recall  was  Mr.  C.  F.  Remer, 
who  was  at  that  time,  I  believe,  connected  with  OSS,  one  of  the  United 
States  intelligence  agencies,  and  I  believe  I  recall  commenting  to  him 
as  we  went  out  about  some  of  the  questions  that  had  been  asked  Rogov. 

I  may  say  that  I  remember  asking  Rogov  only  one  question  myself. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  how  long  did  that  meeting  last? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  know. 

Mr.  Morris.  Was  John  Carter  Vincent  present  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  remember  whether  he  was  present  or  not. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  on  our  exhibit  No.  26,  introduced  into 
the  open  hearings,  is  the  document  f  I'om  Rose  Yardumian,  of  the  Insti- 
tute of  Pacific  Relations,  to  Mr.  Edward  C.  Carter. 

The  postcript  on  that  reads : 

Rogov  and  Bill  have  been  at  the  Cosmos  Club  for  the  last  two  and  a  half  hours, 
talking  with  Lattimore,  Remer,  and  Vincent. 

That  is  the  notation  on  this  letter  which  describes  the  meeting  that 
the  witness  is  now  testifying  to.  That  is  already  in  our  record,  Mr. 
Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Does  that  refresh  your  memory? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Not  very  much. 

According  to  my  memory,  there  would  have  been  more  people  pres- 
ent than  that. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Does  it  refresh  your  memory  that  you  were  there 
for  several  hours,  two  and  a  half  hours  ? 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3281 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Not  very  clearly,  no. 

Mr.  Morris.  It  could  have  been" longer,  too,  could  it  not  have  been, 
Mr.  Lattimore  ? 

At  that  point  it  lasted  two  and  a  half  hours. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  could  have  been  longer,  or  it  could  have  been 
shorter. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  only  Vincent  that  was  indicated  there 
would  have  been  Vincent  of  the  State  Department,  would  it  not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Up  here  in  the  letter  itself  it  is:  "talked  with 
Owen  Lattimore,  Carl  Eemer,  and  John  Carter  Vincent." 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  may  point  out,  Mr.  Senator,  that  here  was  a  Kus- 
sian  who  had  been  in  Japanese  occupied  Shanghai,  and  it  was  a 
highly  proper  thing  at  that  time  for  American  Government  personnel 
to  interview  such  a  person  and  see  if  they  could  get  any  information 
out  of  him. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  there  was  not  any  doubt  about  him  being  a 
Communist,  was  there  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

Nor  was  there  any  doubt  even  of  the  fact  that  American  Government 
personnel  should  try  to  get  any  information  they  could  out  of  Japanese 
occupied  Shanghai,  in  1944. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  did  not  your  book  say  that  you  did  not 
know  any  Russians  or  Communists? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  think  if  you  will  read  the  context  of  that,  Sena- 
tor Ferguson,  you  will  see  that  it  clearly  shows  that  my  wife  was  writ- 
ing in  1950,  that  as  of  1950  I  didn't  know  any  Russians  in  this  country. 

Mr.  Morris.  When  you  say  you  didn't  know 

Senator  Ferguson.  Just  a  mhiute. 

Do  I  understand  you  want  to  convey  to  us  now  that  your  wife  was 
writing  and  you  approved  it  in  your  book  that,  as  of  the  date  that 
you  wrote  the  book,  you  did  not  know  any  Russians  or  Communists? 
In  1950  ?    Why  do  you  limit  it  to  1950  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  am  not  limiting  it  in  that  manner  at  all,  Sena- 
tor. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Wliat  did  you  mean  by  1950  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  This  was  written  in  1950.    Where  is  the  reference  ? 

The  Chairman.  Just  one  moment.  I  would  like  to  have  the  record 
read  back  there,  if  you  please. 

(The  record,  as  heretofore  transcribed,  was  read  by  the  reporter.) 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  limit  it  to  1950  because  it  was  written  in  1950,  and 
the  context  clearly  shows  that  she  was  writing  about  the  general  period 
of  1950,  and  the  McCarthy  charges. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Were  you  charged  as  of  1950  of  associating  with 
the  Communists  on  the  day  that  she  wrote  it  ?  It  does  not  say  anything 
about  1950  there. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  still  haven't  been  able  to  find  the  exact  reference. 
Mr.  Morris.  It  is  page  35,  Mr.  Lattimore.    You  will  probably  find  it 
underlined. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes ;  here  is  the  context. 
Senator  Ferguson.  Read  it. 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

McCarthy  had  replied  that  this  is  completely  untrue.  This  man  has  a  desk  at 
the  State  Department  and  has  access  to  the  files,  at  least  he  had  until  4  or  5  weeks 
ago.  He  is  one  of  the  top  advisers  on  Far  Eastern  affairs,  has  been  for  a  long 
timie,  and  they  know  it. 


3282  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Nothing  in  McCarthy's  description  fitted  Owen,  but  the  thought  crossed  my 
mind  that  Tydings'  description  did.  He  had  been  on  tlie  Reparations  Mission  to 
Japan  5  years  ago.  It  was  a  White  House  mission,  but  I  just  discovered  in  look- 
ing through  old  records  that  he  Iiad  been  paid  by  the  State  Department.  But  the 
thought  was  too  fantastic.  He  didn't  know  any  Russians  in  this  country  or  any 
Communists.  He  didn't  have  access  to  any  secret  material.  How  could  anybody, 
even  McCarthy,  accuse  him  of  being  a  spy? 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  claim  that  that  refers  only  to  the  time  that 
she  was  writing  ? 

Mr.  LA'rriMORE.  That  refers  to  the  general  period  in  which  she  was 
writing,  and  in  which  McCarthy  was  saying  that  I  was — apparently 
McCarthy  meant  at  that  time — the  top  Soviet  agent  in  this  country. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  also  does  it  not  say  that :  "He  had  been  on 
the  Reparations  Commission  to  Japan  5  years  ago"  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  that  refer  to  the  time  she  was  w^riting? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  would  mean  that  at  the  time  she  was  wanting, 
she  was  actually  stating  that  5  years  before  I  had  been  in  Japan. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  would  not  Mrs.  Lattimore  have  written 
"he  doesn't  know  any  Russians''  if  she  were  talking  about  that  present 
time  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Mr.  Morris,  I  think  this  is  a  rather  quibbling  ques- 
tion about  grammar. 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  minute. 

Mr.  Morris.  It  is  not  quibbling.  She  would  have  said  "He  doesn't 
know  any  Russians,"  to  bear  out  your  interpretation. 

Mr,  Lattimore.  She  is  writing  a  chapter  there  about  her  experiences 
before  I  got  home  from  Afghanistan,  and  slie  was  saying  that  as  of  this 
time  of  her  experiences,  before  I  got  back  from  Afghanistan,  she  was 
saying  that  I  didn't  know  any  Russians  in  this  country. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  also  she  was  writing  at  a  time,  Mr.  Latti- 
more, was  she  not,  when  you  were  coming  back,  and  you  approved 
this? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  She  was  not  writing  at  that  time.  She  was  writing 
about  it. 

The  Chairman,  Wait  until  the  Senator  finishes  his  question. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  she  w^as  also  writing,  and  putting  it  in  your 
book,  and  had  it  distributed  after  the  Tydings  hearings;  is  that  not 
right  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  did  you  not  feel  that  that  was  the  end  of 
all  hearings  on  that  question  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  certainly  hoped  it  was.  However,  I  M'as  already 
somewhat  aware  of  the  new  jjractice  of  nudtiple  jeopardy. 

Senator  Ferguson,  Do  you  call  this  multiple  jeopardy? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  sir;  I  do. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  think  this  was  all  brought  out  in  the 
Tydings  hearings  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  think  it  w^as  quite  sufficiently  brought  out  in  the 
Tydings  hearings. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  would  think  that  you  would  think  it  was  suf- 
ficiently brought  out  there,  but  we  did  not. 

Now,  the  Tydings  hearings  have  access  to  the  documents  in  reply 
to  this,  showing  that  you  did  know  Communists? 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3283 

Mr.  Lattimore.  None  of  the  documents  that  had  been  brought  out 
show  that  I  knew  Communists  in  1950,  or  Kussians,  in  this  country. 

Senator  Ferguson.  So  you  want  to  limit  this  now  to  your  activities 
in  1950? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir;  I  would  just  like  a  distinction  kept  clear 
between  the  period  that  my  wife  was  quite  obviously  writing  about 
and  the  period  ranging  up  to  10  and  more  years  previously,  covered 
by  these  various  items  from  the  IPK  files  that  Mr.  Morris  has  been 
bringing  out. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  when  did  you  leave  the  IPE,? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  When  did  I  leave  it  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  You  mean  its  employ  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  left  its  employ  in  1941. 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  did  you  cease  being  a  member  of  the 
trustees  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  believe  I  am  still  a  trustee. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  still  are  a  trustee? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  you  think  that  your  activities  as  far  as 
this  book  was  concerned,  you  were  limiting  them  to  1950? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir;  I  am  saying  that  my  wife's  statement  was 
limited  to  the  general  period  of  1950. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  did  not  become  your  statement  by  the  pub- 
lishing of  the  book? 

That  is  not  a  legal  problem  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Would  you  repeat  that.  Senator  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  it  not  become  your  statement  when  you 
published  the  book  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  became  the  statement  in  a  book  published,  of 
which  I  was  listed  as  the  author,  certainly. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  that  the  way  you  want  to  answer  the  question  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  the  way  I  want  to  answer  it ;  yes. 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  Mr.  Morris. 

Mr.  Morris.  ]\Ir.  Chairman,  in  connection  with  this  mention  of  the 
man  Rogoff  in  this  line  of  questioning,  I  would  like  to  have  a  little 
background  from  the  previous  testimony  about  this. 

Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  read  from  the  bottom  of  page  528  in  the 
Budenz  testimony  ? 

The  Chairman.  The  Budenz  testimony  is  before  this  committee? 

Mr.  Morris.  Before  this  committee,  Senator. 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  moment. 

Mr.  Budenz  w\as  then  under  oath? 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  right,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  Mandel.     (Reading)  : 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Budenz,  can  you  tell  us  of  another  meeting  you  attended  which 
Mr.  Field  reported  for  the  IPR? 

Mr.  Budenz.  That  was  a  meeting  of  1943  when  I  began  to  anticipate  and  then 
thought  of  the  1940  series  of  meetings.  At  this  meeting  of  the  political  bureau 
at  which  Earl  Browder  I  know  definitely  was  present,  and  I  believe  Robert 
William  Weiner.  His  name  strikes  me  because  he  was  not  always  present  at 
these  meetings,  and  other  members  of  the  Politburo  who  were  not  generally 
there,  including  Trachtenberg.  At  this  meeting  Mr.  Field  stated  that  he  had 
received  word  from  Mr.  Lattimore.  It  is  my  impression  that  he  had  seen  Mr. 
Lattimore  personally  just  a  day  or  two  before,  but  I  may  be  mistaken.     It  was  a 


3284  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

communication  either  iKjrsonally  or  in  some  other  way.  Mr.  Field  just  returned 
from  a  trip  and  I  set  the  impression  that  he  had  talked  to  Mr.  Lattimore  person- 
ally, and  Mr.  Lattimore  stated  that  information  comins  to  him  from  the  inter- 
national Communist  apparatus  where  he  was  located  indicated  that  there  was 
to  be  a  change  of  line  very  sharply  on  Chiang  Kai-shek,  that  is  to  say  that  the 
negative  opposition  to  Chiang  Kai-shek  was  to  change  to  a  positive  opposition 
and  that  more  stress  was  to  be  put  upon  attacking  Chiang  Kai-shek. 

Mr.  Morris.   Did  the  Communist  Party  line  change  at  that  time? 

Mr.  BUDENz.  The  Communists  took  action  to  discover  the  accuracy  of  this. 
They  were  advised  that  there  was  in  the  course  of  preparation  an  article  by 
Vladimir  Rogoff,  the  Tass  correspondent,  written  at  Moscow's  request  on  this 
question  which  would  attack  the  appeasers  in  China  and  Chiang  Kai-shek. 

The  Chairman.  The  Tass  correspondent,  you  say? 

Mr.  BuDENz.   Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.   Can  you  explain  what  Tass  was? 

Mr.  BuDENz.  Tass  was  the  official  Soviet  news  agency  in  this  country  and  so 
far  as  I  know  still  is,  but  I  knew  it  then  quite  definitely. 

Mr.  Morris.  Was  this  article  subsequently  communicated  to  the  Daily  Worker? 

Mr.  BuDENZ.  This  article  was  communicated  to  the  Daily  Worker.  The  first 
message  was  received  through  Grace  Granich  who  had  been  in  charge  of  the 
Intercontinent  News,  a  Soviet  agency,  which  had  been  put  out  of  business  by  the 
Department  of  Justice,  but  who  continued  to  maintain  her  relations  with  the 
Soviet  Embassy,  consulate,  and  other  sources  of  information,  including  commu- 
nications to  Moscow  and  we  were  advised  of  the  coming  of  this  article  and  then 
we  received  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  was  the  Communist  line  actually  changed  as  a  result  of  these 
steps  that  were  taken? 

Mr.  BuDBNz.  The  Politburo  suggested  that  someone,  and  the  name  of  T.  A. 
Bis.son  was  mentioned  in  that  connection,  be  enlisted  to  write  an  article  in  con- 
nection with  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Affairs  publication  on  this  matter  explaining 
the  democratic  character  of  the  Chinese  Communists  and  indicating  that  Chiang 
Kai-shek  and  his  group  represented  antidemocracy. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Pardon  me,  Mr.  Budenz,  but  you  mentioned  the  Institute  of 
Pacific  Affairs.  You  were  referring  to  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  and 
its  publication  Pacific  Affairs? 

Mr.  BuDENz.  That  is  correct.    I  sort  of  got  the  two  together. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  did  T.  A.  Bisson  write  an  article  for 
the  IPR  at  that  time? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  believe  he  did;  yos. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  was  the  name  of  the  article,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  recall  the  name  of  the  article.  I  recall  that 
it  was  not  published  in  Pacific  Affairs  as  implied  in  the  testimony 
just  read. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  is  the  article  by  Mr.  Bisson  which  was 
written  for  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  in  our  record  now? 

Mr.  Mandel.  It  is  in  our  record  on  page  534  of  our  hearings. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  is  the  date  of  that  article  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  The  date  of  the  article  is  July  14,  1943,  published  in 
the  Far  Eastern  Survey. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  the  Far  Eastern  Survey  an  official  publication  of 
the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations? 

Mr.  Mandel.  It  is  an  official  organ  of  the  American  Council  of  the 
Institute  of  Pacific  Relations. 

The  Chairman.  Let  me  get  this  straight,  now. 

This  article  that  you  are  about  to  read,  the  witness  says  was  not 
published  in  the  publication  Pacific  Relations? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Not  published  in  Pacific  Affairs. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  now  reading  from  another  magazine? 

Mr.  Morris.  There  were  only  two  publications  of  the  Institute  of 
Pacific  Relations,  one  Pacific  Affairs  and  the  other  Far  Eastern 
Survey. 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3285 

The  Chairman.  And  this  is  from  the  Far  Eastern  Survey. 
Senator  Smith.  AVhat  connection  did  he  have  with  that? 
Mr.  Morris.  It  is  going  to  be  brought  out,  Senator,  the  connection 
there. 
Will  you  read  the  two  passages  ? 
Mr.  Mandel  (reading)  : 

However,  tbese  are  only  party  labels.  To  be  more  descriptive,  the  one  might 
be  called  Feudal  China  ;  the  other  Democratic  China.  These  terms  express  the 
actualities  as  they  exist  today,  the  real  institutional  distinctions  between  the 
two  Chinas. 

Then  further: 

The  key  to  the  successful  mobilization  of  the  war  potential  of  so-called  Com- 
munist China  lies  in  the  extent  to  which  its  leaders  have  thrown  ofC  the  feudal 
incubus  which  has  weighed  China  down  for  centuries.  No  single  measure  can 
be  pointed  to  as  the  open  sesame  which  has  increasingly  achieved  this  objective. 
Economic  reforms  have  been  intertwined  with  political  reforms,  the  one  sup- 
porting the  other.  Basic  to  the  whole  program  has  been  the  land  reform  which 
has  freed  the  peasant — the  primary  producer  in  these  areas,  and,  indeed,  over 
most  of  China — from  the  crushing  weight  of  rent,  taxes,  and  usurious  interest 
charges  as  levied  by  a  feudal  economy. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  does  not  Mr.  T.  A.  Bisson  there  label 
Nationalist  China  feudal  China,  and  Communist  China  a  democratic 
China? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Apparently  he  does. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  that  particular  article  provoke  the  Chinese  Council 
ofthelPR? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  believe  I  have  subsequently  read  somewhere, 
maybe  in  the  transcript  of  these  proceedings,  that  it  did.  I  had 
nothing  to  do  with  the  article  at  that  lime. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  read  tlie  article? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  believe  I  did.  At  that  time  I  was  exceed- 
ingly busy  as  Deputy  Director  of  OWI  in  San  Francisco,  and  I  don't 
believe  I  was  keeping  up  with  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations'  publi- 
cations at  all. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  agree  with  that  particular  article  by  Mr. 
Bisson? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  would  have  to  read  the  whole  article  to  deter- 
mine whether  I  agreed  with  it. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Might  I  ask  a  question  ? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  You  knew  about  this  article,  did  you  not,  Mr. 
Lattimore  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  At  the  time  ? 

Mr.  Sourwine.  At  the  time  and  here,  as  of  today,  yesterday,  the 
day  before  yesterday  ? 

ikr.  Lattimore.  Subsequently  I  have  seen  it  mentioned  in  the  tran- 
scripts that  I  have  read.     I  haven't  reread  the  article. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  did  you  not  have  this  article 
so  clearly  in  mind  that  when  Senator  Ferguson  the  other  day  referred 
to  the  matter  you  corrected  him  both  as  to  the  name  of  the  author  and 
as  to  the  place  where  the  article  had  appeared  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes ;  I  remember  it  clearly  enough  for  that. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  you  knew  that  that  was  the  change  in 
policy,  did  you  not  ? 


3286  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Mr,  Lattimore.  No,  sir ;  I  knew  from  reading  tlie  transcript  of  these 
proceedings,  and  also,  I  believe,  the  Tydings  proceedings,  that  this 
had  been  referred  to  as  having  something  to  do  with  a  change  in  line. 

With  the  article  I  had  no  connection  whatever.  I  don't  know 
enough  about  the  history  of  the  Comnmnist  line  to  know  whether  that 
was  in  fact  a  switch  in  the  Communist  line;  but  whether  it  was  a 
switch  or  a  continuation  of  an  old  line,  or  whatever  it  may  be,  it  cer- 
tainly did  not  coincide  with  what  I  was  saying  and  writing  at  the 
time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  know  there  was  a  party  line,  that  the 
Communists  had  a  party  line? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  know  in  general  that  the  Communists  have  a  party 
line;  yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  would  you  say  that  you  acquired  that 
knowledge  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  would  be  impossible  to  say. 

Senator  Ferguson.  About  when  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  would  be  impossible  to  say.  The  party  line  is 
something  that  is  generally  associated  with  Communists. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  has  been  for  years,  has  it  not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  And  has  been  for  years.  I  don't  know  how  long. 
I  have  never  been  a  specialist  in  Comnmnist  politics,  and  I  have  never 
made  it  my  business  to  analyze  the  Communist  Party  line  or  the 
switches,  or  anything  of  that  kind. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  it  your  testimony,  tlien,  Mr.  Lattimore,  that  yon 
did  not  at  that  time  read  the  Bisson  article  and  that  the  Bisson  article 
was  contrary  to  things  you  were  writing  at  that  time? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  is  my  testimony  that,  to  the  best  of  my  recol- 
lection, I  did  not  read  the  article  at  that  time,  didn't  even  know  of  it 
until  some  vague  time  later,  and  most  of  my  knowledge  of  it  at  this 
moment  is  based  on  reading  the  transcripts  of  these  proceedings. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  could  it  not  coincide  with  what  you  were  saying 
at  that  time  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  If  it  is  a  line  that  says — what  is  it  supposed  to  have 
said  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  That  Nationalist  China  was  feudal  China,  and  that 
Communist  China  was  democratic  China. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  All  I  remember  is  that  as  of  1943  I  gave  a  couple 
of  lectures  down  at  Pomona  College  in  San  Francisco. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  not  an  answer. 

Will  you  read  the  question,  please,  Mr.  Reporter?  Read  Mr.  Mor- 
ris's question. 

(The  record,  as  heretofore  recorded,  was  read  by  the  reporter). 

The  Chairman.  The  question  was,  Was  it  contrary  to  the  line  you 
were  writing  at  that  time? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  I  believe  it  is  completely  contrary. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  identify  this  letter,  please? 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  is  a  photostat  of  a  document  from  the  files  of  the 
Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  on  the  letterhead  of  the  Office  of  War 
Information  at  111  Center  Street,  San  Francisco,  Calif.,  dated  July 
2(),  1943,  addressed  to  Mr.  W.  L.  Holland,  signed  "Owen,"  and  typed 
signature  "Owen  Lattimore,  Director,  Pacific  Operations." 

Mr.  Morris,  Mr.  Lattimore,  will  you  look  at  that  letter  and  testify 
as  to  whether  or  not  you  wrote  that  letter? 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3287 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  must  have  written  this  letter,  yes. 
Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  read  the  first  paragraph,  please? 
Mr.  Lattimore.     Yes,  sir.     [Reading :] 

Dear  Bill  :  Your  letter  of  July  20  arrived  just  as  I  was  reading  T.  A.  Bisson's 
article  on  China.  I  was  trying  to  formulate  for  myself  some  way  of  expressing 
an  opinion.  I  think  you  do  this  very  well.  Bisson's  terminology  will  turn  away 
a  number  of  people  whom  he  might  have  persuaded  with  use  of  a  different  ter- 
minology. Nevertheless,  I  think  his  main  points  are  as  sound  as  you  think  they 
are. 

It  is  just  Bossible  that  I  may  get  to  Washington  at  the  end  of  this  month  and 
if  so  I  hope  to  see  you  and  Carter  before  you  leave. 

Mr.  Morris.  There  is  no  use  reading  the  rest  of  it  unless  you  care 
to,  Mr.  Lattimore. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  don't  need  to.  This  apparently  indicates 
that  I  agreed  with  some  opinion  that  Mr.  Holland  expressed  at  that 
time  which  I  had  not  seen.  ^ 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  that  be  received  in  the  record  ? 

The  Chairman.  It  may  be  received  in  the  record. 

(Document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  512"  and  is  as 
follows :) 

Exhibit  No.  512 

Office  of  War  Information, 

111  Sutter  Street, 
San  Francisco,  Calif.,  July  26,  19.'f3. 
Mr.  W.  L.  Holland, 

Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  129  East  Fifty-second  Street, 

New  York  City  22,  N.  T. 

Dear  Bill:  Your  letter  of  July  20  arrived  just  as  I  was  reading  T.  A.  Bisson's 
article  on  China.  I  was  trying  to  formulate  for  myself  some  way  of  expressing 
an  opinion.  I  think  you  do  this  very  well.  Bisson's  terminology  will  turn  away 
a  number  of  people  whom  he  might  have  persuaded  with  use  of  a  different 
terminology.  Nevertheless  I  think  his  main  points  are  as  sound  as  you  think 
they  are. 

It  is  just  possible  that  I  may  get  to  Washington  at  the  end  of  this  month 
and  if  so  I  hope  to  see  you  and  Carter  before  you  leave. 

I  am  very  much  ashamed  of  having  fallen  down  on  my  review  assignment. 
I  think  I  can  assure  you  of  the  review  article  by  September  15.  However,  the 
difference  in  publication  date  is  not  serious  as  the  dating  of  the  book  itself  now 
makes  it  a  matter  of  the  historical  record  of  stages  in  Russian  opinion  about 
China,  rather  than  an  urgent  current  presentation. 

If  the  University  of  California  Press  write  to  me  for  an  opinion  on  Norin's 
manuscript,  I  shall  be  very  glad  to  give  a  recommendation. 
Yours, 

Owen  /s/ 
Owen  Lattimore, 
Director,  Pacific  Operations. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  T.  A.  Bisson  go  with  you  when  you  went  to 
Yenan  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes ;  he  did. 

Mr.  Morris.  When  did  you  make  that  trip  to  Yenan  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  was  in  the  spring  of  1937  sometime. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  arrangement  did  you  make  for  that  trip,  Mr. 
Lattimore  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  We  traveled  from  Peking  by  rail  up  to  Shansi 
Province,  then  down  south  through  Shansi  Province,  then  west  into 
Shensi  Province,  and  got  to  what  I  think  was  the  railhead  at  the  city  of 
Sian,  and  then  we  chartered  a  motor  car  and  drove  up  to  Yenan. 

The  Chairman.  You  say  we.    We  was  in  the  party  ? 

Mr.  ISIoRRis.  Who  accompanied  you  on  that  trip  ? 


3288  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Mr  Bisson  and  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Jaffe. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  confer  with  Mao  Tse-tung  when  you  were  in 
Yenan  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  We  had  an  interview  with 

The  Chairman.  The  question  is:  Did  you  confer  with  Mao  Tse- 
tung  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir;  I  did  not  call  it  conferring. 

Mr.  Morris.  How  much  time  did  you  spend  with  Mao  Tse-tung? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  remember.  I  think  there  were  a  couple 
of  interviews  at  which  he  was  asked  questions,  principally  by  Mr. 
Bisson  and  Mr.  Jaflfe.  Each  of  those  interviews  would  probably 
last  anliour  or  two.    T  am  not  sure  how  long. 

Mr.  Morris.  Where  did  you  stay?  Did  you  stay  at  the  Foreign 
Office  in  Yenan  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  We  stayed  at,  I  believe,  a  sort  of  hostel  that  they 
liad  for  visitors. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you,  Mr.  Lattimore,  confer  with  Chu  Teh  ? 
'  Mr.  Lattimore.  I  would  not  say  that  we  conferred  with  him,  no. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  speak  with  him  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  I  spoke  with  him. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  speak  with  Chou  En-lai  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  address  a  mass  meeting  in  Yenan  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  made  some  general  remarks,  yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  did  you  write  an  account  of  that  for- 
the  London  Times,  that  trip  to  Yenan  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  remember  that.    JNIaybe  I  did. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  identify  that  document,  please? 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  is  a  photostat  of  a  document  from  the  files  of 
the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  marked  in  the  corner  "F.  V.  F. 
etc."  The  title  is  "The  Strongholds  of  Chinese  Communism,  a  Jour- 
ney to  North  Shensi,"  by  Owen  Lattimore.  In  the  upper  left-hand 
corner  it  says :  "Sent  by  O.  L.  to  Times,  London  (may  not  be  published, 
of  course)." 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  recall  that  article,  Mr.  Lattimore  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  don't  recall  it,  and  I  don't  recall  whether 
it  was  published,  or  not.  I  did  occasionally  publish  articles  in  the 
London  Times. 

Mr.  Morris.  Then  does  that  recall  anything  to  you,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

The  Chairman.  You  are  referring  to  the  exhibit  identified  by 
Mr.  Mandel  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  right,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Does  not  that  purport  to  be  an  article  that  you  prepared  for  the 
London  Times,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  certainly  appears  to  be.  I  had  completely  for- 
gotten it,  forgotten  about  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  that  a  true  account  of  your  experiences  in  Yenan  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Presumably  it  is.  I  haven't  read  it  yet.  May  I 
read  it? 

Mr.  Morris.  You  may. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  This  is  headed  "One,"  indicating  that  there  may 
have  been  a  later  one.    [Reading :] 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3289 

(Exhibit  No.  513) 

Many  people  at  Nanking  will  tell  you  that  Chinese  communism  is  finished. 
The  appeal  to  class  war  has  been  drop-ped.  The  landlords  are  no  longer  being 
appropriated.  The  territory  held  by  the  Communists  is  poor  in  agriculture  and 
almost  barren  of  other  resources.  The  Communists  are  already  accepting  sub- 
sidy from  Nanking,  and  are  offering  to  accept  incorporation  into  Nanking's 
armies.  This  must  mean,  in  the  end,  the  "fading  army"  of  the  Communists  as 
a  separate  political  and  military  force,  unless  perhaps  theiy  faintly  survive  as  a 
left-wing  group  within  the  orthodox  Chinese  nationalism. 

Yet,  if  this  be  collapse,  the  Communists  are  not  in  the  least  anxious  to  cover 
it  up.  On  the  contrary,  they  claim  that  the  present  situation  is  chiefly  of  their 
own  asking.  It  was  they  who  relaxed  tlie  lockjaw  silence  of  the  Sian  crisis 
last  winter  with  the  magic  of  their  united-front  slogans.  They  did  not  inter- 
vene until  after  Marshal  Chiang  Kai-shek  had  been  made  prisoner  by  the 
mutinous  remnants  of  the  old  Manchurian  armies.  When  they  did  intervene,  it 
was  to  save  the  life  of  the  Generalissimo,  their  mortal  enemy  of  10  years  of  civil 
war.  This  they  did  to  show  that  they  were  more  eager  to  rally  the  nation  against 
Japan  than  to  triumph  over  Nanking.  The  implication  of  what  they  say  is 
that  they  do  not  intend  to  wither  away  in  the  ravines  and  loess  plateau  of  north 
Shensi.  There  is  more  than  a  hint,  in  the  assured  maneuvering  of  the  youthful 
veterans  who  led  the  Red  armies,  that  they  believe  already  that  they  have  a 
negative  control  strong  enough  to  prevent  Nanking  from  doing  what  they  do 
not  like,  which  may  yet  be  converted  into  positive  control  and  full  command 
of  the  situation. 

All  of  this  makes  north  Shensi  not  only  a  mystery,  but  a  region  in  which  i)er- 
haps  can  be  discovered  important  clues  to  the  unfolding  history  of  eastern 
Asia ;  the  struggle  for  unity  in  Cliina ;  the  forces  welding  illiterate  millions  into 
increasingly  solid  and  formidable  resistance  against  Japan;  the  convergence 
on  China,  from  different  directions,  of  Japan  and  the  Soviet  Union. 

Not  knowing  of  any  underground  tunnels  that  would  lead  me  to  north  Shensi, 
I  set  about  planning  the  journey  in  trustful  innocence.  I  sent  a  letter  to  the 
Red  capital,  by  ordinary  mail,  with  my  address  candidly  printed  on  the  back  of 
the  envelope — and  got  in  answer  a  cordial  invitation.  Accordingly,  I  went  by 
train  to  Sian,  the  capital  of  Shensi,  and  then  by  car  to  Yenan,  the  Red  capital, 
about  250  miles  to  the  north. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  may  I  interrupt  at  that  point? 

Is  tliat  a  true  account  of  your  preliminary  arrangements  to  Yenan? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  sounds  like  it.  I  liacl  completely  forgotten 
about  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  read  from  the  testimony  of  Mr. 
Lattimore,  taken  in  executive  session  before  this  committee? 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

Mr.  Morris.  I  am  reading  from  page  71 : 

Mr.  Morris.  And  before  you  went  beyond  that  line — 

That  is  the  line  separating  Communist  China  from  Nationalist 
China— 

demarkation,  it  would  be  necessary  to  have  the  Communist  authorities'  permis- 
sion; isn't  that  right? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No. 

Mr.  Morris.  You  mean  anyone  could  go  up  there? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  At  that  time,  the  Communists  were  welcoming  anybody  who 
would  go  in.  The  government  authorities  were  trying  to  stop  people  from 
goinir  in. 

Mr.  Morris.  The  Nationalist  Government? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  Nationalist  Government. 

Mr.  Morris.  So  the  only  objection  to  going  up  there  would  come  from  the  Na- 
tionalist Government? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  only  objection  came  from  the  Nationalist  Government. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  it  your  testimony  that  you  or  anybody  in  your  party  did  not 
make  any  prearrangements  with  the  Communist  Party  in  order  to  get  in? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  None  whatever. 

88348— 52— pt.  10 2 


3290  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Senator  Ferguson.  Which  is  correct? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  see  no  conflict,  Senator  Ferguson. 

Apparently,  according  to  this  account,  I  wrote  up  to  the  Reds  and 
said,  ''Would  it  be  all  right  if  I  came  up  ^"  and  they  said,  "Sure,  fine," 
and  I  went  on  up.    They  didn't  make  the  arrangements. 

And,  as  I  state  in  this  article,  which  I  had  completely  forgotten, 
I  didn't  know  about  any  underground  tunnels  leading  up  there.  I 
just  got  on  a  train  and  went. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Read  the  last  answer. 

Mr.  Morris  (reading)  : 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  it  your  testimony  that  you  or  anybody  in  your  party  did  not 
malie  any  prearrangements  with  the  Communist  Party  in  order  to  get  in? 
Mr.  Lattimore.  None  whatever. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  did  not  tell  us  about  writing  the  letter. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  had  completely  forgotten  about  it.  I  wrote 
from  Peking  and  I  didn't  consider  that  this  indicates  a  prearrange- 
ment  for  travel  arrangements  at  all. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  felt  that  you  could  not  got  in  without  the 
consent  of  the  Communists  or  you  would  have  never  written  them. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir;  I  wanted  to  have  the  whole  thing  com- 
pletely in  the  open,  so  I  wrote  a  letter  up  there  saying,  "Would  it  be 
all  right  if  I  wanted  to  come?" 

I  knew  in  general  that  all  of  the  newspapermen  were  trying  to  get 
up  there.  I  don't  know  whether  other  newspapermen  used  the  same 
method  that  I  did,  or  not. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  other  newspapermen,  whether 
they  did  get  up  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  other  newspapermen  did  get  up. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Who  did  you  take  with  you  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  went  with  Mr.  Bisson  and  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Jaffe. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  did  your  letter  state  you  wanted  them  to 
come  along? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  no  recollection  whatever.  It  may  well 
have.  I  don't  know  about  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Jaffe,  but  the  suggestion  of 
going  up  there  was,  to  the  best  of  my  recollection,  originally  made 
to  me  by  Mr.  Bisson. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Bisson  suggested  it? 

Mr.  LAT'riMORE.  I  think  so ;  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then,  when  you  wrote,  would  you  not  include 
Bisson  and  Jaffe  if  they  were  to  go  along  with  you? 

Mr.  Lati^imore.  I  don't  know.  It  depends  on  what  tiiuo  the  letter 
was  written. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  To  Avhom  did  you  address  your  letter,  Mr.  Latti- 
more, do  you  remember  that? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  no  idea,  no. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  Did  you  know  anyone  in  Yenan  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  didn't  know  anyone  in  Yenan. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then  you  would  write  to  the  government, 
would  you  not  ? 

]VIr.  Lattimore.  I  might  write  to — I  don't  know  that  I  would  have 
called  it  the  government  at  that  time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  To  whom  did  you  write,  then?  What  would 
you  write  a  letter  for  ? 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3291 

Mr.  Lattimore,  I  would  write  a  letter  to  indicate  that  I  was  not 
somebody  trying  to  sneak  in;  that  T  was  just  somebody  who  wanted 
to  come  up. 

Senator  Ferguson,  Who  would  be  inclined  to  keep  you  out?  You 
would  have  to  write  to  those  persons.    Who  would  they  be  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  would  depend,  Senator,  on  what  was  the 
terminology  being  used  at  that  time.  After  the  Sian  incident  in  De- 
cember 1936,  the  Nationalist  Government  had  given  the  Communists 
up  there  some  kind  of  status — I  don't  remember  exactly  what  it  was — 
and  I  would  presumably  write  to  whatever  aduiinistrative  organ  was 
indicated  by  the  terminology  of  the  time. 

The  Chairman.  You  wrote  a  letter  up  there,  but  you  say  now  you 
cannot  recall  to  whom  you  wrote  it;  is  that  right,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

The  Chairman.  To  whom  you  addressed  the  letter  is  something 
you  cannot  remember? 

]\Ir.  Lattimore.  That  is  right.  It  was  presumably  addressed  to 
some  sort  of  office  rather  than  a  person. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  help  me  ?  I  have  trouble  at  times  with 
your  testimony  along  this  line,  that  you  know  nothing  about  com- 
munism, and  at  other  times  it  appears  to  me  the  testimony  indicates 
that  you  know  all  about  communism. 

On  this,  will  you  know  al^out  this  comnumism  in  China? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  knew  that  there  were  Communists  in  northwest 
China,  and  I  was  very  eager  to  go  up  and  see  something  about  it. 

Just  not  long  before  that,  a  10-year  news  famine  on  the  Chinese 
Communists  had  been  broken  by  Mr.  Snow,  who  had  succeeded  in  com- 
ing up  there  and  coming  out  with  a  story  that  had  set  every  other 
newspaperman  in  China  trying  to  get  up  there. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  not  this  article  in  the  London  Times, 
whether  it  appeared  or  not,  that  you  are  reading,  did  not  the  first  part 
of  it  indicate  that  you  were  well  familiar  with  Comnmnists  in  China 
and  Communist  activities  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir;  it  indicates  that  I  was  familiar,  as  the  first 
paragraph  shows,  with  what  people  at  Nanking  were  saying  and 
thinking,  and  it  indicates,  as  the  second  paragraph  shows,  that  I  was 
familiar  with  whatever  I  was  able  to  observe  while  I  was  up  there, 
for  about  4  days. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  does  not  this  letter  that  was 
read  to  you  just  a  few  moments  ago,  July  26,  about  the  Bisson  article, 
indicate  that  you  knew  something  about  Communists  when  you  said : 

Bisson's  terminology  will  turn  away  a  number  of  people  whom  be  might  have 
persuaded  with  the  use  of  a  different  terminology. 

In  other  words,  he  was  calling,  in  that  article,  the  Communists  of 
China  the  democrats.  Did  this  not  indicate  that  you  knew  all  about 
communism  and  that  the  line  was  not  to  use  words  here  in  the  articles 
to  turn  people  away  ?    ^ 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir ;  it  indicates  that 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  was  the  terminology  that  you  were  talk- 
ing about  here  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  would  have  to  reread  the  article  to  know  that. 
Senator. 

Mr.  Morris.  May  I  see  that,  Mr.  Lattimore  ? 


3292  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

I  am  going  to  suggest  that  since  it  is  two  and  a  lialf  pages  long, 
rather  than  to  go  into  the  whole  thing,  I  would  just  like  one  more 
paragraph  placed. 

But  if  you  care  to  read  the  whole  thing 

Mr.  Arnold.  I  haven't  seen  it.  He  would  like  to  read  tlie  whole 
thing. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  the  witness  has  expressed  a  wish  to 
read  the  whole  letter. 

The  Chairman.  He  may  read  the  whole  letter. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  For  the  sake  of  continuity  of  the  record,  Mr.  Chair- 
man, may  I  ask  that  the  witness  be  permitted  to  read  it  all  the  way 
through  ? 

The  Chairman.  Beginning  at  the  first? 

Mr.  Sourwine.  No,  beginning  where  he  left  off. 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

It  took  4  days  to  get  there  from  Sian  and  6  to  get  back,  because  the  rains 
were  on  and  we  were  driving  through  the  heart  of  the  loess  country.  The 
yellow,  wind-dropped  soil  lies  hundreds  of  feet  thick  over  what  used  to  be  the 
face  of  the  earth.  Tlie  hills  are  smothered,  but  a  network  of  streams  has  cut 
down  to  the  ancient  valley  beds,  so  that  the  formation  is  now  one  of  innumerable 
plateaux,  some  of  them  higher  and  some  lower,  but  all  flat-topped  and  all  divided 
from  each  other  by  straight-sided  ravines.  "When  it  rains,  the  whole  landscape 
becomes  a  nightmare  of  rather  inferior,  pale-colored  chocolate.  The  sti-eams 
boil  up  in  flood  and  the  cubes  of  tableland  sag  and  slump.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
it  is  not  a  country  made  for  wheels  at  all.  The  local  inhabitant  prefers  pack 
mules,  when  it  is  dry,  and  when  it  is  wet,  he  gives  up  altogether,  because  even 
a  mule  skids  on  wet  loess.  Only  the  foreigner,  winching  and  flinching  from 
the  memory  of  fleas  indoors,  and  the  revolutionary,  who  has  been  trained  to 
follow  a  line  even  when  skidding,  stay  out  in  the  wet  and  strive  to  make  progress. 
It  is  not  easy,  because  the  newly  and  crudely  made  motor  road  traverses  the 
pale  chocolate  nightmare  in  appalling  ascents  and  descents.  From  each  ravine 
it  attacks  the  next  cube  of  tableland  at  a  corner,  climbing  at  angles  that  are 
difficult  even  for  trucks  with  five  gears ;  it  then  rushes  across  the  top  of  the  cube 
and  falls  over  the  far  edge  in  a  series  of  even  more  terrifying  swoops. 

In  spite  of  this,  it  has  become  a  pilgrim's  highway.  Chinese  educators  and 
students  are  going  up  by  the  hundred,  and  many  of  them  stay  to  take  courses 
in  the  Red  academy.  Foreign  visitors  are  welcomed,  and  missionaries  are  be- 
ing urged  to  come  up  and  see  for  themselves  that  their  preujises  are  undamaged 
and  the  Chinese  Christians  left  undisturbed  to  preach  in  public  or  pray  in  pri- 
vate, as  they  like.  The  only  foreign  visitors  thus  far  have  been  Americans, 
but  the  Communists  profess  impatience  to  see  representatives  of  other  nations, 
and  judging  from  the  way  tliey  talk,  the  first  Englishman  to  arrive  will  be  a 
good  deal  of  a  hero. 

There  is  in  this  a  slightly  wry  contract  with  the  history  of  the  last  10  years, 
when  missionaries  fled  at  tlie  whisper  of  a  Red  raid,  and  when  Great  Britain, 
rather  than  Japan,  was  the  bull's  eye  in  the  target  of  Communist  propaganda. 
What  does  this  reversal  mean?  Is  this  the  true  end  of  the  long  march?  When 
the  ghost  army  of  the  Reds  was  flitting  from  Kiangsi  round  by  the  fringes  of 
Tibet  to  the  uneasy  lands  of  the  partly  Muslim,  partly  Chinese,  partly  Mongol 
northwest,  a  curious  thing  became  noticeable.  Whenever  it  was  officially  re- 
ported that  a  detachment  of  the  Red  army  had  been  surrounded  and  annihilated, 
that  particular  column  invariably  turned  up,  a  little  later,  50  or  a  hundred 
miles  farther  ahead  on  its  appointed  line  of  march.  Bearing  this  in  mind  I 
was  particularly  eager,  when  the  Sung  pagoda  overlooking  Yenan  came  in  view 
to  find  out  whether  the  famed,  almost  fabulous,  leaders  of  the  Red  army  showed 
any  signs  of  that  fading-out  so  knowingly  predicted  of  them  in  tlie  best  semi- 
official quarters.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  one  of  the  first  things  I  heard  was  that 
in  a  blockhouse  on  another  hill,  opposite  the  pagoda,  built  before  the  Reds  came, 
to  defend  the  town  from  them,  there  still  stand  the  proclamations  offering  large 
rewards  for  INIao  Tse-tung  and  Chu  Te,  dead  or  alive.  The  Reds  had  never 
assaulted  the  town.  It  was  the  defense  that  laded  out,  leaving  only  the  notices 
behind  it.     Another  omen? 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3293 

Mao  Tse-tung,  the  first  of  the  leaders  that  I  met,  did  not  look  faded.  In  fact, 
they  say  he  has  put  on  a  little  weight  during  the  recent  months  of  relative  in- 
activity. It  is  absurd,  looking  at  him,  to  think  of  the  rumors  current  for 
years  that  he  was  about  to  die  of  tuberculosis.  It  would  be  equally  absurd  to 
think  of  him  as  a  ravening  bandit  or  as  a  cold  doctrinaire. 

The  Chairman.  Who  is  that  you  are  speaking  of  there  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Mao  Tse-tung. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Might  I  inquire? 

That  was  your  own  opinion?  That  was  not  what  somebody  was 
telling  you? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  was  my  opinion  at  that  time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Indicating  that  I  didn't  know  much  about  com- 
munism. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Was  he  one  of  the  revolutionary  people  that  you 
were  talking  about  following  the  line  that  you  referred  to  before  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  presume  he  would  be  generally  included,  yes. 
•    Senator  Ferguson.  You  knew  about  the  party  line,  then? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  knew  there  was  such  a  thing,  yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  you  knew  how  Communists  followed  it, 
as  indicated  in  your  remarks  in  there  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Generally  speaking,  yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  was  specific ;  was  it  not  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  What  ? 

No;  it  is  just  a  general  reference  to  the  fact  that  there  is  such  a 
thing  as  a  Communist  line,  and  that  Communists  follow  the  line  even 
when  they  skid,  or  try  to. 

Senator  Ferguson.  All  right,  proceed. 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

In  the  course  of  a  few  days  I  saw  him  in  many  moods ;  at  interviews  that 
lasted  for  hours;  at  meals,  at  the  theater  (in  the  church  of  the  English  Baptist 
Mission),  where  sketches  and  short  plays  were  being  put  on  that  substituted 
United  Front  propaganda  for  Communist  indoctrination.  One  of  my  most  vivid 
impressions  was  on  the  evening  of  my  departure.  The  room  was  full ;  Chu  Te 
and  Chou  En-lai  had  their  heads  together  over  a  statement  to  the  press;  others 
were  arguing,  laughing,  giving  verbal  and  written  messages  to  be  taken  "out" — 
for  communication  between  the  Red  world  and  the  outside  world  is  not  yet 
entirely  free.  I  happened  to  glance  at  Mao  Tse-tung,  who  was  sitting  in  the 
middle  of  it  all.  His  head  had  sunk  forward  a  little,  his  arms  hung  limp,  his 
face  was  expressionless,  and  his  eyes  without  luster.  He  had  completely 
withdrawn  himself  from  his  surroundings.  Then  someone  spoke  to  him,  and 
he  joined  in  at  once,  as  though  he  had  subconsciously  kept  up  with  all  the 
conversation  going  on  around  him. 

This  is  a  trivial  example  of  a  flexibility  that  is  really  amazing.  Mao  Tse-tung 
can  range  from  the  widest  philosophical  concepts  on  which  the  Communist 
IK)licy  is  based  to  the  narrowest  detail  of  practical  application,  without  haste, 
without  delay,  and  without  the  slightest  blurring  of  focus.  He  has  fire  and 
passion,  but  so  matured  and  tempered  that  there  seems  to  be  no  personal 
warping  of  his  thought;  and  yet,  in  a  long  extemporaneous  discussion  of  a 
complicated  subject  there  will  not  be  a  single  cliche  (and  Chinese  is  more  full 
of  cliches  than  even  English)  ;  every  phrase  has  a  personal  stamp. 

It  would  be  misleading,  however,  to  give  too  many  personal  details  about 
Mao,  Chu  Te,  and  other  leaders.  So  little  is  known  of  the  inside  workings  of 
the  Communist  movement  in  China  that  it  is  almost  always  spoken  of  in  terms 
of  its  leading  personalities.  At  Yenan  a  contrast  is  immediately  noticeable: 
The  Communists  themselves  never  speak  of  Nanking  in  terms  of  Chiang  Kai- 
shek,  or  any  other  leader.  They  stick  to  estimates  of  groups  and  movements 
and  economic,  social,  and  political  forces. 

From  this  alone  it  is  obvious  that  they  are  not  either  bandit's  preying  on 
society  or  condottieri  aiming  at  power  for  the  sake  of  power.    This  is  as  true 


3294  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

now  that  they  have  compromised  ou  a  united  front  as  it  was  when  they  were 
at  open  war  witla  Nanking.  Some  of  tlieir  more  positive  characteristics  I  shall 
try  to  describe  in  a  second  article. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  do  that  ^ 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  remember.  If  I  did,  it  must  be  in  this  file. 
I  don't  have  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  would  this  get  into  the  IPR  files? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Evidently  I  sent  it,  marked  in  the  top  corner  FVF, 
who  was  at  that  time,  I  believe,  secretary  of  the  American  Council. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Who  was  that? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Mr.  Field,  F.  V.  Field. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  have  to  have  clearance  by  Field  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Why  would  you  send  this  article  to  Field? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  was  following  the  usual  IPR  practice  of  send- 
ing articles  for  information  to  the  IPR  office,  and  since  Mr.  Field 
was  the  secretary,  he  was  the  obvious  person  to  send  it  to. 

The  Chairman.  This  instrument  that  is  being  discussed  is  not  in 
the  record.     Do  you  wish  it  in  the  record? 

Mr.  Morris.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  It  will  be  inserted  in  the  record. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  513"  and  was 
read  in  full  by  Mr.  Lattimore  beginning  on  page  3289.) 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  was  all  of  your  time  taken  by 
the  IPR? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  At  that  time? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  cannot  understand  why  you  would  be  sending 
this  to  Field,  an  article  that  you  were  trying  to  sell  to  the  London 
Times. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  was  an  article  I  was  sending  to  the  New  York 
office,  Mr.  Field  being  secretary. 

I  had  just  been  up  to  a  then  still  mysterious  and  exciting  part  of 
China  that  everybody  was  trying  to  get  to,  and  I  thought  that  my  best 
chance  of  writing  an  article  would  be  for  the  London  Times. 

But  rather  than  write  a  long  description  of  a  journey  that  I  knew 
would  be  of  interest  to  the  New  York  office,  since,  after  all,  the  IPR 
was  studying  China,  among  other  countries,  I  simply  sent  a  carbon 
copy  of  the  article.  That  would  be  my  present  reconstruction  of  what 
happened. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Were  you  paid  personally  or  was  the  IPR  paid 
on  an  article  like  this  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  On  an  article  like  this,  I  would  be  paid  personally. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  inquire? 

The  Chairman.   Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  This  goes  back  just  a  little  way,  Mr.  Lattimore: 
Did  you  find  Yenan  in  any  way  crowded  with  non-Communist 
tourists  ? 

Mr.  Latitmore.  Yes ;  I  should  say  fairly  crowded. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  You  have  said  several  times  that  everyone  was  try- 
ing to  get  up  there. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Was  everyone  able  to  get  up  there? 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3295 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No;  not  everybody.  A  number  of  people  were 
stopped  by  the  Chinese  Government  authorities. 

I  remember  in  the  papers  at  the  time  there  was  a  good  deal  of  talk 
about  the  fact  that  the  correspondent  of  the  New  York  Herald  Trib- 
une was  forced  to  leave  the  plane  on  which  he  was  trying  to  fly  up 
there. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  How  did  you  send  up  your  original  letter  asking 
if  vou  could  come? 

Mr.  Lati'IMORe.  Judging  from  the  account  that  has  just  been  read 
out,  I  stuck  it  in  the  mail  with  my  return  address  on  the  back,  and 
it  went  on  up. 

Mr.   SouRWiNE.  Were  the  mails  operating  into  Communist-held 

China? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  They  were ;  yes. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Do  you  not  say  in  this  article  that  as  you  were 
ready  to  leave,  they  were  crowding  around  to  give  you  messages, 
because  communications  were  difficult,  or  words  to  that  effect? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  know  whether  those  communications  were 
given  to  us,  or  not.  There  were,  I  think,  several  cars  leaving  at  the 
same  time. 

The  Chairman.  The  question  is :  Do  you  not  say  in  this  article  that 
they  were  crowding  around  to  give  you  messages?  That  is  the 
question. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  am  trying  now  to  throw  my  memory  back.  Let's 
see 

The  Chairman.  You  do  not  have  to  tlirow  your  memory  back.  It  is 
right  there  in  the  article. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  is  15  years  or  more. 

The  Chairman.  Read  the  article,  Mr.  Lattimore. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Do  you  want  me  to  read  that  passage  again  ? 

The  Chairman.  Yes.     Read  the  article,  Mr.  Lattimore. 

The  question  is :  Do  you  not  say  in  that  article  that  they  were  crowd- 
ing  around  to  give  you  messages? 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

others  were  arguing,  laughing,  giving  verhal  and  written  messages  to  be  taken 
out,  for  communication  between  the  Red  world  and  the  outside  world  is  not 
yet  entirely  free. 

I  suppose  that  indicates  that  the  mails  were  censored.     * 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  was  not  the  question.  The  question  was 
whether  or  not  they  were  giving  to  you  and  your  party  the  messages. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  believe  they  were. 

As  far  as  my  recollection  goes,  Mrs.  Edgar  Snow  was  up  there  at  the 
time  and  asked  us  to  take  a  letter  back  to  her  husband  for  her,  and  I 
believe — here  my  memory  is  extremely  uncertain — that  she  may  have 
also  asked  us  to  take  down  to  her  husband  some  of  the  material  that 
she  had  been  collecting  up  there  so  as  to  have  it  in  Peking  when  she 
got  back. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then,  as  I  understand  it,  there  was  one  lady. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  wrote  this  wliole  paragraph  around  the 
fact  that  Mrs.  Snow  wanted  you  to  take  a  letter  to  her  husband. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  all  that  I  remember  that  our  party  took  out. 

Senator  Ferguson.  No  ;  I  did  not  ask  you  what  you  took  out  at  all. 
I  want  to  know  what  you  were  describing  in  that  article,  and  now 


3296  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

you  leave  us  with  the  opinion  that  all  you  were  doing  was  describing 
the  fact  that  Mrs.  Snow  was  sending  a  letter  down  to  her  husband 
with  you  or  one  of  your  party. 

Mr.  Arnold.  May  he  read  the  article  again  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

But  it  is  what  he  is  telling  us  what  he  meant  by  that,  now. 

Mr.  Arnold.  I  thought  it  was  what  was  in  the  article. 

The  Chairman.  Let  him  read  the  article  again. 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

Others  were  arguing,  laughing,  giving  verbal  and  written  messages  to  be  taken 
out,  for  communication  between  the  Red  world  and  the  outside  world  is  not  yet 
entirely  free. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  The  important  thing,  Mr.  Lattimore,  is  that  ques- 
tion of  what  the  communications  between  the  Red  world,  as  you  have 
spoken  of  it,  and  the  outside  world,  were. 

I  do  not  mean  to  labor  the  point,  sir,  but  I  would  like  to  know: 
Are  you  testifying  here  that  you  sent  your  letter  to  Yenan  and 
received  an  answer  through  the  ordinary  course  of  the  mails;  that 
you  made_  no  special  arrangements  to  have  that  letter  delivered 
in  Red  China  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  Is  that  your  testimony  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  my  testimony. 

And  if  I  had  received  no  reply  to  that  letter,  I  would  have  con- 
sidered it  an  indication  of  the  extent  to  which  the  Red  region  was  still 
being  blockaded  or  sequestered,  or  whatever  you  like  to  call  it. 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  Senator  Ferguson. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Does  the  word  "others"  describe  Mrs.  Snow 
alone  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  At  this  moment,  I  have  no  recollection,  sir.  There 
were  a  number  of  people  preparing  to  leave  Yenan  at  that  time,  and 
I  was  just  giving  a  journalist's  general  impression  of  what  was 
going  on. 

I  think  the  fact  that  I  was  writing  it  for  a  London  newspaper, 
with  a  hope  of  publication,  is  a  fairly  obvious  indication  that  it  was 
nothing  that  anybody  regarded  as  surreptitious. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  you  do  not  mean  to  convey  the  idea,  do 
you,  that  when  you  were  selling  these  articles  you  were  not  writing 
the  truth? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  was  certainly  writing  the  truth  as  I  understood 
it  at  that  time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then  we  would  take  the  idea  that  it  was  more 
than  Mrs.  Snow  that  wanted  to  send  articles  out. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Presumably,  it  was.     That  is  the  way  it  reads. 

Then  I  will  distinguish  from  that  as  significant  that  the  only 
things  that  I  remember  our  party  taking  out  were  some  messages  and 
manuscripts  of  Mrs.  Snow's. 

I  think  the  way  to  settle  this  would  be  to  ask  some  of  the  other 
people  who  were  up  there  at  that  time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Where  was  this  particular  meeting  that  you  de- 
scribe Mao  sitting  in  the  meeting  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Somewhere  in  one  of  the  offices  in  Yenan,  I  sup- 
pose, or  guest  rooms,  or  hostel,  or  somewhere. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  it  was  not  a  public  place  ? 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3297 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Oh,  yes ;  everything  there  was  pretty  public. 
Senator  Fergusox.  Was  not  he  one  of  the  leaders  of  this  movement? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  he  was  one  of  the  leaders  in  the  movement. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Who  was  the  head  of  that  government  ? 

Mr.  Latitmore.  He  was. 

The  Chairman.  Referring  to  whom  ?    Mao  Tse-tung  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Mao  Tse-tung;  yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Was  not  this  in  one  of  his  residences,  or  offices  ? 

Mr.  Lattiimore.  I  don't  recall  clearly  at  the  time,  but  I  would  say 
it  was  much  more  probably  at  the  guest  hostel  where  a  lot  of  them 
came  to  say  good-by  to  people  who  were  leaving. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  a  bypath  I  would  like  to 
follow  briefly,  if  I  may,  for  2  or  3  minutes. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  You  were  with  Mr.  Bisson  in  Yenan ;  is  that  right, 
Mr.  Lattimore  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Tliat  is  right. 

Mr.  SoURWiNE.  When  you  were  in  Japan  in  the  fall  of  1945,  did 
you  see  Mr.  Bisson  there? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes ;  I  met  Mr.  Bisson  very  briefly. 

As  I  remember,  the  United  States  strategic  bomb  survey  mission 
was  arriving  in  Tokyo  just  about  the  time  the  reparations  mission 
was  leaving,  and  ]Mr.  Bisson  was  attached  to  the  strategic  bomb  sur- 
vey, and  I  saw  him  just  before  he  left  Tokyo. 

Mr.  SdURWiNE.  Did  you  travel  anywhere  with  him  in  Japan  in  the 
fall  of  1945  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Xo,  I  don't  believe  I  did. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Mr.  Lattimore,  do  you  know  Shiro  Takeda? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  don't  believe  I  do. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Do  you  know  Nobuyoshi  Nakamura  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Xo,  I  don't  believe  I  do. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Do  you  know  Teiji  Koide? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  believe  I  do. 

Mr.  SouRw^NE.  Do  you  know  who  any  of  those  three  men  are? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  cannot  place  them. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  Did  they  accompany  you  to  or  within  Japan  in 
1945  ? 

jNIr.  Lattimore.  Not  than  I  can  recall. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Did  you  make  any  trips  with  them  ? 

Mr.  LA-rriMORE.  I  don't  think  so.  Let  me  see.  I  don't  think  I  made 
any  trips  out  of  Tokyo. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Did  you  go  around  Tokyo  with  them?  Did  they 
accompany  you,  or  did  you  accompany  them  in  Tokyo  on  any  oc- 
casions ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  may  have.     I  can't  recall  it  at  the  moment. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Thank  you. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  add  into  the  record  at  this 
time  an  article  which  appeared  in  the  New  Masses  on  October  12, 
1937,byMr.  Philip  Jaffe? 

The  Chairman.  We  have  a  peculiar  situation  here  now.  You 
have  the  witness  saying  that  he  did  not  know  these  parties  named 
by  counsel. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  I  don't  recall  them.  I  don't  believe  I  met 
them. 


3298  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

The  Chairman.  And  that  they  may  have  conducted  him  around 
Tokyo. 

Do  ,you  want  to  straighten  that  out,  or  not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  would  like  to  explain,  Mr.  Chairman,  a  number  of 
times  in  these  hearings  the  names  of  people  have  been  mentioned  whom 
I  totally  failed  to  recall,  and  later  on  some  memorandum  or  other  docu- 
ment is  brought  out  which  indicates  that  I  did  meet  them.  This  is  part 
of  the  whole  procedure,  which  I  should  very  respectfully  like  to 
criticize. 

The  Chairman.  That  part  will  be  stricken  from  the  record.  You 
are  not  here  for  the  purpose  of  criticizing ;  you  are  here  for  the  purpose 
of  testifying  under  oath,  and  you  are  under  oath. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  introduce  into  the  record  the 
article  by  Philip  J.  Jaffe  who,  as  the  witness  has  testified,  was  one  of 
the  four  people  in  his  party  at  Yenan  ? 

This  appeared  in  the  New  Masses  of  October  12, 1937. 

The  Chairman.  You  had  better  listen  to  the  question,  Mr.  Lattimore. 

Senator  Smith.  Mr.  Chairman,  would  you  let  me  ask  one  question, 
before  Mr.  Morris  proceeds  ? 

The  Chairman.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Smith.  Mr.  Lattimore,  you  referred  in  your  testimony  to 
interviews  with  Mao  Tse-tung. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Smith.  How  many  interviews  did  you  have  with  him  ?  You 
mentioned  several  hours.  How  many  times  did  you  interview  Mao 
Tse-tung,  or  were  you  present  with  him  in  the  interview? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  think  I  myself  personally,  not  more  than  two. 

Senator  Smith.  Were  you  present  when  others  were  interviewing 
him? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  As  far  as  I  remember,  the  only  interviewing  was 
done  by  others. 

Senator  Smith.  Who  were  present  with  you  at  those  interviews? 
What  other  individuals  ? 

Mr,  Lattimore.  To  the  best  of  my  recollection,  Mr.  Bisson  and  Mr. 
Jaffe. 

Senator  Smith.  Were  Mrs.  Snow  and  Mrs.  Jaffe  present  at  those 
interviews  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  think  so. 

Senator  Smith.  Were  any  other  individuals  present  besides  you 
and  Mr.  Jaffe  and  Mr.  Snow  and  Mr.  Bisson  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  only  other  person  that  I  recall  was  a  young 
Chinese  who  was  acting  as  Mr.  Mao's  interpreter. 

Senator  Smith.  So  that  each  time  you  had  an  interview  with  Mao 
Tse-tung,  it  was  just  the  three  or  four  of  you? 

]\Ir.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Smith.  So  it  was  more  or  less,  then,  you  might  say,  a  private 
interview  or  private  hearing  with  Mao  Tse-tung,  was  it  not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  was. 

I  don't  know  whether  "private"  is  the  right  word  to  characterize 
it.  He  was  giving  some  foreigners  some  information  for  publication 
if  they  felt  it.     So  I  wouldn't  call  it  very  private. 

Senator  Smith.  Did  he  give  you  permission  to  publish  everything 
he  said  to  you  there  ? 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3299 

Mr.  Lattimore.  To  the  best  of  my  recollection,  that  was  the  basis 
on  which  the  interviews  were  held,  just  like  a  journalistic  interview 
which  is  for  the  purpose  of  publication. 

Senator  Smith.  At  that  time  he  was  the  commander  in  chief,  was 
h^  not,  and  the  head  man,  so  to  speak,  of  the  Chinese  Connnunists? 

jSIr.  Latomore.  Yes;  that  would  be  my  assumption.  I  don't  know 
exactly  how  the  connnittee  structure  of  the  Communists  went  at  that 
time ;  whether  he  was  regarded  as  a  member  of  a  committee  or  as  the 
individual  head. 

Senator  Smith.  Did  he  not  have  a  residence,  an  official  residence? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  He  had  a  small  mud  house  off  in  a  corner  of  the 
town. 

Senator  Smith.  You  do  not  mean  to  convey  the  impression  just 
now,  then,  do  you,  that  he  just  met  you  around  in  any  particular  public 
places  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  He  also  met  us  around  in  public  places. 

Senator  Smith.  How  many  times? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  We  were  there  4  days.  I  don't  remember  whether 
we  saw  him  each  of  those  4  days,  or  not. 

Senator  Smith.  Did  you  inquire  about  the  people  in  attendance  at 
the  Red  academy  which  you  mentioned  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Xot  in  detail ;  no. 

Senator  Smith.  Did  you  write  an  article  about  the  work  being  done 
in  the  Red  academy  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  believe  I  did,  unless  there  is  a  second  article 
for  the  London  Times  here,  in  which  I  said  something  about  it. 

Senator  Smith.  I  believe  that  is  all  at  the  moment,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  All  right ;  Mr.  Morris. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  will  you  receive  in  the  record  the  article 
I  described,  namely,  the  newspaj)er  article  of  October  12, 1937,  written 
by  Philip  J.  Jatfe,  who  was  one  of  the  party  of  four  accompanying 
Mr.  Lattimore  on  this  trip  to  Yenan,  about  which  we  have  had  testi- 
mony today  ? 

The  Chairman.  Where  do  you  get  that  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  This  is  from  the  New  Masses  of  October  12,  1937. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  it  can  be  tied  in  to  Mr.  Latti- 
more's  visit. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  read  two  passages  here 
which  relate  to  the  witness  today. 

Mr.  Arnold.  Do  you  have  a  copy  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  No  ;  we  do  not. 

Senator  Smith.  Is  the  New  Masses  a  Communist  publication  ?  Is 
it  true,  or  is  it  not? 

What  is  the  proof  you  have  up  to  now  ? 

ISIr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  give  us  the  document  on  the 
New  Masses  ? 

]Mr.  Mandel.  The  New  Masses  was  cited  as  a  Communist  periodical 
by  the  Attorney  General  Francis  Biddle  in  September  1942. 

Mr.  Morris.  I  am  now  reading  from  page  5,  column  1.  This  is  by 
Mr.  Jafl'e,  who  accompanied  Mr.  Lattimore,  according  to  Mr.  Latti- 
more's  testimony,  on  that  trip  to  Yenan : 

While  in  Yenan  our  party  which  included  beside  myself,  T.  A.  Bisson  of  the 
Foreign   Policy   Association,    and    Owen    Lattimore,   editor   of   Pacific   Affairs, 


3300  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

stayed  at  the  foreign  office.  The  building  was  soon  buzzing  with  excitement. 
We  had  barely  finished  our  first  dinner  in  Yenan,  when  guests  arrived :  Ting 
Ling,  China's  foremost  woman  writer ;  Li  Li-san,  an  old  associate  of  Dr.  Sun 
Yat-sen,  the  only  two  non-Chinese  then  in  the  region,  Agnes  Smedley  and  Peggy 
Snow,  wife  of  tlie  American  writer,  Edgar  Snow,  and  many  Communist  leaders. 
Before  long,  we  were  talking  and  singing  in  a  variety  of  languages.  In  the 
midst  of  our  animated  discussion,  somebody  entered  quietly  and  sat  down. 
''Comrade  Mao"  someone  said — Mao  Tse-tung,  the  political  leader  of  the  then 
Chinese  Soviet  Government. 

I  would  now  like  to  turn  to  page  10,  reading  from  column  2. 
The  Chairman.  The  same  article? 
Mr.  Morris.  The  same  article,  sir. 
The  Chairman.  By  whom  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  By  Philip  J.  Jaffe,  who  was  one  of  the  people  on  that 
trip. 

Our  visit  to  Yenan  was  climaxed  by  a  huge  mass  meeting,  addressed  by 
Chu  Teh— 

Who  is  now  the  head  of  the  Chinese  Communists;  is  he  not,  Mr. 
Lattimore  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  couldn't  answer  that. 

Mr,  Morris  (reading)  : 

Bisson,  Lattimore,  and  myself  and  attended  by  the  1,500  cadet  students  of  the 
People's  Anti-Japanese  Military-Political  University  and  about  500  from  other 
schools.     *     *     * 

The  Chairman.  I  would  like  to  have  you  go  back  to  the  first  excerpt 
you  read  there,  where  it  speaks  of  those  who  were  there. 
Mr.  Morris.    Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Will  you  read  it  again,  please  ? 
Mr.  Morris  (reading)  : 

While  in  Yenan  our  party,  which  included  besides  myself  T.  A.  Bisson  of  the 
Foreign  Policy  Association,  and  Owen  Lattimore,  editor  of  Pacific  Affairs,  stayed 
at  the  Foreign  Ofiice.  The  building  was  soon  buzzing  with  excitement.  We  had 
barely  finished  our  first  dinner  in  Yenan  when  guests  arrived  :  Ting  Ling,  China's 
foremost  woman  writer ;  Li  Li-san,  an  old  associate  of  Dr.  Sun  Yat-sen ;  the 
only  two  non-Chinese  then  in  the  region,  Agnes  Smedley  and  Peggy  Snow,  wife 
of  the  American  writer,  Edgar  Snow ;  and  many  Communist  leaders.    *    *    * 

The  Chairman.  I  want  to  refer  to  that  one  remark  about  the  only 
two  non-Chinese  in  the  region. 

Mr.  Morris.  "The  only  two  non-Chinese  then  in  the  region."  That 
is  in  contradiction  of  the  testimony  we  have  had  here  today ;  yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  The  witness  stated  here  today  that  there  were 
many  people  there. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Excuse  me,  Mr.  Chairman.  I  didn't  state  they 
were  there  at  the  time  I  was  there.  A  number  of  them  got  there  before 
I  was  there  and  a  number  got  there  after  I  was  there. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Mr.  Lattimore,  I  asked  you  if  you  found  the  place 
crowded  with  tourists. 

Mr.  Lattimore.   Chinese.     Chinese  are  also  tourists  sometimes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  were  you  restricted  in  any  way 
while  you  were  there? 

Mr.  Lattimore.   Yes.     I  would  say  I  was. 

Senator  Ferguson.   How? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  One  of  my  principal  interests  in  being  there  was  to 
try  to  find  out  how  the  Communists  were  dealing  with  minority  groups 
such  as  the  Chinese  Moslems  and  the  Mongols. 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3301 

This  was  near  to  Mongol  territory.  And  I  heard  while  I  was  there 
that  there  was  a  school  for  such  people  situated  just  outside  of  Yenan, 
very  close,  and  I  repeatedly  asked  to  be  taken  there  and  allowed  to 
interview  people.     But  this  was  not  permitted. 

Finally,  they  said  that  they  would  bring  in  a  delegation  from  there, 
and  they  brought  in  a  number  of  what  they  called  students  in  a  school 
for  minorities  that  they  had  there.  These  included  Moslems,  Tibetans, 
Mongols,  and  various  tribal  people  like  Lolos  and  so  forth.  And  they 
had  a  Chinese  there  in  charge  of  them,  and  he  was  an  English-speaking 
Chinese,  and  he  started  to  ask  them  various  routine  questions  in 
Chinese. 

Presumably,  part  of  their  education  in  this  school  was  that  they 
were  all  learning  Chinese,  which  he  would  then  interpret  into  English. 

Having  spotted  a  couple  of  Mongols,  I  started  talking  to  them  in 
Mongol.  They  were  delighted  to  find  someone  who  spoke  Mongol 
and  began  to  respond  very  eagerly.  But  the  Chinese  in  charge  of 
them  became  so  obviously  agitated  at  my  having  direct  access  to  them 
without  his  control  that  I  broke  it  off  for  fear  of  getting  the  poor 
boys  into  trouble. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  have  a  camera? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  I  did. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Were  you  restricted  in  taking  pictures? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  think  we  were  restricted  at  all  in  taking 
pictures. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  seem  to  have  a  very  fine  memory  on  this 
conversation  when  you  had  the  Chinese  interpreter  who  brought  in 
these  people. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Naturally.  These  Chinese  minorities  were  my 
special  subject  of  interest  and  research  study. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  did  not  mention  them,  though,  in  your 
article,  did  you,  in  the  London  Times  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  know  whether  I  mentioned  them  in  a  sub- 
sequent article,  if  there  was  one,  or  not. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  try  and  find  if  you  have  a  copy  of  that 
article  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Surely  I  will. 

The  Chairman.  Does  Mao  Tse-tung  speak  English  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Did  he  speak  Russian? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  believe  so. 

Senator  O'Conor.  IMr.  Chairman,  could  I  ask  a  question  right  there  ? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Senator  O'Conor.  Mr.  Lattimore,  was  any  conversation  had,  prior 
to  your  addressing  the  students,  as  to  under  what  circumstances  you 
would  address  them,  or  in  what  manner? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No.  There  was  an  address  of  some  sort  by,  I  think, 
Chu  Teh,  who  was  presiding.  And  he  said :  "We  have  many  visitors 
here,  including  some  foreign  visitors,  and  we  welcome  them  all,"  and, 
you  know,  that  kind  of  thing.  And  then  somebody  who  was  stand- 
ing beside  them  said,  "One  of  these  foreigners  talks  Chinese;  how 
about  having  him  come  up?"  and  there  was  a  sort  of  clamor  from  the 
crowd,  and  they  said,  "Make  the  foreigner  talk  Chinese." 

So  I,  unwilling,  scrambled  on  the  platform.  At  that  time  I  had 
never  made  a  public  speech  in  Chinese ;  I  had  nothing  prepared,  and 


3302  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

SO  I  got  up  and  made  some  remarks.  And  there  were  a  lot  of  guffaws 
because  I  used  rather  colloquial  language  instead  of  formal  lecture 
language,  and  then  I  scrambled  down. 

There  was  a  mixture  of  laughter  and  applause. 

Senator  O'Conor.  About  what  were  your  remarks? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  A  general  kind,  that  we  were  very  glad  to  be  up 
there  and  we  thanked  them  for  their  hospitality,  and  we  wanted  to 
see  what  was  going  on — that  sort  of  thing,  you  know. 

Senator  O'Conor.  How  about  Mr.  Jaffe's  and  Mr.  Bisson's  re- 
marks ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  recall  whether  they  made  remarks  or  not. 
If  they  did,  it  would  have  to  be  through  interpreters,  of  course. 

Senator  O'Conor.  Of  course,  you  noted  Mr.  Jaffe's  reference  to  the 
article  in  the  New  Masses. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  skipped  that.     Did  he  say  they  addressed  the 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes.     He  said  three  of  them. 

Senator  O'Conor.  All  three  of  them  addressed. 

Will  you  read  that  please,  Mr.  Morris  ? 

Mr.  Morris  (reading)  : 

Our  visit  to  Yenan  was  climaxed  by  a  huge  mass  meeting,  addressed  by  Clui 
Teh,  Bisson,  Lattimore,  and  myself.     *     *     * 

Senator  O'Conor.  That  is  to  what  I  was  referring. 

What  have  you  to  say  with  reference  to  their  addressing  the  group  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  no  recollection  of  what  they  were  talking 
about.  Senator.  My  recollection  is  one  of  sort  of  mingled  pleasure 
at  having  been  able  to  scramble  througli  a  speech  in  Chinese  and  em- 
barrassment in  having  made  slips  in  the  use  of  colloquial  language 
that  made  people  laugh.  So  I  was  not  psychologically  in  the  right 
mood  for  paying  close  attention  to  what  other  people  were  saying. 

Senator  O'Conor.  In  view  of  the  other  observations  that  were  made, 
as  to  the  difficulties  confronting  others  in  getting  up  there,  the  impres- 
sion is  left,  at  least  on  me,  that  you  were  not  only  welcome,  but  that 
you  were  given  more  or  less  free  rein  to  do  as  you  pleased  while  you 
were  there.     Would  that  be  correct  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Roughly  correct,  Senator. 

If  I  may  explain,  we  were  certainly  given  remarkable  opportunities 
to  interview  people  and  to  ask  questions. 

As  I  say,  I  personally  found  restriction  on  my  movements  and  op- 
portunities when  I  tried  to  get  into  the  one  thing  that  interested  me 
most. 

I  can't  answer  for  the  journalists  who  got  there  before  me  and  got 
there  after  me,  except  in  the  general  sense  that  the  newspaper  accounts 
published  by  such  people  at  the  time  all  laid  stress  on  at  least  the 
relative  frankness  and  willingness  to  talk  of  Communist  leaders  when 
interviewed  up  there. 

Senator  O'Conor.  Mr.  Lattimore,  the  only  other  question  I  would 
like  to  ask  is  this :  You  have  previously  indicated  or  stated  that  you 
are  unfamiliar  with  the  Communist  line  and  with  Communist  teach- 
ings and  precepts. 

In  the  article  in  the  London  Times,  in  your  reference  to  Mao,  you 
not  only  speak  quite  approvingly  of  him,  but  you  indicate  that  lie  was 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3303 

quite  adept  at  speaking  on  the  philosophies  and  other  things.  How  do 
you  know  that  he  was  adhering  to  those  things  of  the  Communist  line 
if  you  did  not  know  the  Communist  line  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  the  impression  that  I  got  by  sitting  by 
while  Bisson  and  Jaffe  were  interviewing  him.  And  this  was  the 
general  period  when,  by  agreement  between  both  the  Communists  and 
the  Nationalist  Government,  the  united  front  was  being  worked  out, 
and  they  were  asking  him  a  lot  of  technical  questions  about  "What  do 
you  mean  by  'united  front'?"  et  cetera,  et  cetera. 

And  my  impression,  from  listening  to  those  answers,  was  that  he 
was  in  full  command  of  exactly  what  he  meant  and  exactly  what  he 
didn't  mean. 

Senator  Smith.  Mr.  Lattimore,  did  you  have  any  form  or  type  of 
letter  of  introduction  or  credentials ;  anything  of  that  sort,  to  present 
there  to  Mao's  government,  or  Mao's  officials  when  you  arrived  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir ;  I  don't  think  we  had  anything  whatever  of 
the  kind. 

Senator  Smith.  Were  you  just  accepted  at  face  value  by  Mao  and 
his  attendants  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right.  That  was  the  practice  at  the  time. 
Senator.  They  were  accepting  any  kind  of  journalists,  particularly 
any  foreign  visitor  who  would  come  up. 

Senator  Smith.  I  thought  you  told  us  earlier,  though,  that  you 
feared  you  would  have  some  trouble  getting  up  there,  and  that  was 
the  reason  you  wrote  that  first  letter.  That  there  was  a  line  beyond 
which  the  Communists  did  not  allow  journalists  to  come,  except  by 
prearrangement. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No.  I  don't  think  my  writing  them  a  letter  implies 
that  at  all.  All  I  was  doing  was  trying  to  let  the  Communists  know 
that  I  had  the  intention  to  come  up  there  and  see  things,  if  I  was  al- 
lowed to  see  things,  and  that  I  was  not  trying,  so  to  speak,  to  sneak  in 
on  them. 

Senator  Smith.  Do  you  recall  where  you  posted  that  letter  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  think  just  in  an  ordinary  letter  box  in  Peking 
City. 

Senator  Smith.  I  missed  that. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  would 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  Mr.  Morris. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  leave  that  as  soon  as  I 
have  Mr.  Lattimore  identify  one  picture  in  this  article. 

Mr.  Lattimore,  I  offer  you  page  7  and  call  your  attention  to  the  top 
picture. 

The  Chairman.  Page  7  of  what  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  the  New  Masses  article  which  has  been  intro- 
duced into  the  record,  Mr.  Chairn^an. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Was  it  admitted,  Mr.  Morris? 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  will  you  admit  it  into  evidence? 

The  Chairman.  The  article  may  be  admitted.  It  will  have  to  be 
copied  out  of  there. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  514"  and  is  as 
follows:) 


3304  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Exhibit  No.  514 

[New  Masses,  October  12,  1937] 

China's  Communists  Told  Me — A  Specialist  in  Far  Eastern  Affairs  Inter- 
views THE  Leading  Men  of  Red  China  in  Their  Home  Territories 

(By  Philip  J.  Jaffe) 

Fifteen  clays  before  Japanese  troops  opened  fire  on  a  Chinese  garrison  near 
Peiping,  I  was  seated  in  the  one  bare  room  which  is  the  home  of  Mao  Tse-tung, 
the  political  leader  of  the  Chinese  Communist  Party.  In  the  course  of  the 
interview  Mao  Tse-tung  said  to  me:  "Japan  cannot  stop  now.  Japan  wants 
to  swallow  China.  Its  next  step  will  not  be  long  delayed.  You  ask  about  the 
future  of  the  united  front?  The  united  front  is  inevitable  because  Japan's 
invasion  farther  into  the  heart  of  China  is  inevitable." 

Twenty-four  hours  later,  in  the  military  headquarters  of  the  former  Chinese 
Red  Army,  only  two  big  rooms,  walls  covered  with  huge  military  maps,  I  asked 
the  most  famous  of  the  Communist  commanders.  General  Chu  Teh:  "Why  do 
you  think  that  General  Chiang  Kai-shek  will  have  to  accept  the  aid  of  the  Red 
Army?" 

Chu  Teh  replied :  "A  form  of  the  united  front  has  now  existed  for  several 
months  and  has  resulted  in  a  large  measure  of  internal  peace.  The  Chinese 
bourgeoisie,  however,  is  not  easily  able  to  forget  its  ten-year  tight  against 
the  Red  Army.  But  when  the  war  with  Japan  eventually  begins,  it  will  not 
be  a  question  of  what  the  bourgeoisie  wants ;  they  will  have  to  have  the  Red 
Army.  In  a  war  with  Japan,  it  will  not  only  be  a  question  of  regular  troops. 
China  must  also  depend  on  its  peasants  and  workers  whom  the  Communists 
alone  can  lead.  It  is  not  merely  the  numbers  of  the  army  which  count ;  it  is 
the  mass  population  as  well.  If  Chiang  Kai-shek  thinks  that  he  can  raise  a 
large  army  to  fight  Japan,  without  at  the  same  enrolling  the  masses  as  the 
backbone  of  the  struggle,  then  he  will  be  rudely  disappointed.  No  war  against 
Japan  can  be  successful  without  a  correct  organization  of  the  peasants  and 
workers,  and  this  only  the  Red  Army  can  successfully  carry  out." 

Two  weeks  later  I  know  that  the  prophecy  made  by  the  two  famous  leaders 
of  the  former  Chinese  Red  Army  had  been  fulfilled.  On  July  7,  Japan  invaded 
North  China.  On  August  22,  the  first  stage  of  the  united  fi'ont — that  of  military 
cooperation — was  concluded  between  the  Nanking  and  Red  Armies.  In  the 
words  of  the  official  communique  fi'om  Nanking,  "the  Chinese  government  and 
the  Communist  army  have  been  fighting  for  the  last  ten  years ;  this  is  the 
oflScial  conclusion  of  the  war."  Mao  Tse-tung  has  since  been  appointed  governor 
of  the  former  Soviet  region,  now  renamed  the  Special  Administrative  District. 
Chu  Teh  has  been  appointed  commander  in  chief  of  the  former  Red  Army,  now 
called  the  Eighth  Route  Army.  Chou  En-lai,  another  outstanding  Comumnis^t 
with  whom  I  spoke,  is  the  official  Communist  representative  on  the  general  staff 
in  Nanking. 

Mao  Tse-tuny,  political  leader. — Yenan  is  the  capital  of  the  former  Soviet 
region.  On  June  21,  after  four  days'  travel  from  Sian,  the  capital  of  Shensi 
province,  scene  of  the  Chiang  Kai-shek  incident  of  last  December,  through  semi- 
starved  villages,  on  bridgeless  rivers,  and  roads  deep  with  gullies,  we  finally 
passed  through  the  beautiful,  ancient  main  gate  of  Yenan.  We  were  greeted 
at  the  gate  by  Agnes  Smedley,  the  distinguished  American  writer  and  an  old 
friend  of  the  Chinese  people.  While  in  Yenan  our  party  which  included  beside 
myself,  T.  A.  Bisson  of  the  Foreign  Policy  Association,  and  Owen  Lattimore, 
editor  of  Pacific  Affairs,  stayed  at  the  Foreign  Ofticf ,  The  building  was  soon 
buzzing  with  excitement.  We  had  barely  finished  car  first  dinner  in  Yenan, 
when  guests  arrived :  Ting  Ling,  China's  foremost  woman  writer ;  Li  Li-san, 
an  old  associate  of  Dr.  Sun  Yat-sen  ;  the  only  two  non-Chinese  then  in  the  region  ; 
Agnes  Smedley  and  Peggy  Snow,  wife  of  the  American  writer,  Edgar  Snow ; 
and  many  Communist  leaders.  Before  long  we  were  talking  and  singing  in  a 
variety  of  languages.  In  the  midst  of  our  animated  discussion  somebody  entered 
quietly  and  sat  down.  "Comrade  Mao,"  someone  .said — Mao  Tse-tung,  the 
political  leader  of  the  tlien  Chinese  Soviet  Government. 

We  spent  many  hours  with  him  after  that  evening — at  interviews,  during 
meals,  at  the  theater — and  we  were  increasingly  impressed  by  the  complete 
sincerity  and  lack  of  ostentation  that  is  so  typical  of  him  and  of  the  other  leadei's 
we  saw.  It  was  during  these  visits  that  we  grew  to  feel  his  tremendous  force, 
a  force  likely  to  be  overlooked  at  first  because  of  the  low,  even  voice,  the  quiet 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3305 

restraiut  of  his  movemeuts,  aud  the  beautiful  bands,  almost  too  delicate  for  a 
soldier,  but  so  dextrous  with  the  writing  brush.  But  the  quiet  voice  speaks  with 
brilliance  and  authority,  the  movements  of  the  tall,  slim  body  with  slightly 
stooped  shoulders  are  sure  and  well  coordinated.  Like  all  other  Red  Army 
commanders,  Mao  wears  exactly  the  same  uniform  as  the  rank-and-file  soldiers, 
eats  the  same  food,  sleeps  on  the  same  sort  of  k'ang  (a  low,  long  bed  of  stone), 
avoids  all  social  ceremonies,  and  altogether  lives  an  extremely  simple  life.  It 
becomes  easy  to  understand  the  tremendous  personal  appeal  which  Mao  has 
as  a  leader.  This  leadership  dates  from  the  first  organizational  meeting  of  the 
committee  which  organized  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  in  Shanghai  in  1920. 
Mao  was  an  important  figure  at  that  meeting. 

Our  interviews  with  Mao  Tse-tung  were  many  and  on  a  host  of  topics :  the 
evolution  of  Nanking's  policy ;  the  inner  political  struggle  within  Nanking ;  the 
Sian  incident ;  the  united  front ;  the  student  movement ;  the  role  of  other  powers 
in  Far  Eastern  affairs ;  and  the  perspective  of  China's  future  development,  etc. 
But  since  Mao  Tse-tung  asked  me  to  transmit  a  message  to  the  American  people, 
it  is  perhaps  best  to  confine  his  remarks  to  those  concerning  America  and  its 
isolationist  policy. 

"Though  there  are  many  Americans  who  are  isolationist  in  principle,"  he 
began,  "America  is  not  and  cannot  be  isolationist.  America  is  in  this  respect 
like  other  capitalist  countries;  part  proletariat,  part  capitalist.  Neither  one 
nor  the  other  can  be  isolationist.  Capitalism  in  the  imperialist  countries  is  world- 
wide, and  so  is  the  problem  of  liberation  which  needs  the  effort  of  the  world 
proletariat.  Not  only  does  China  need  the  help  of  the  American  proletariat, 
but  the  American  proletariat  also  needs  the  help  of  the  Chinese  peai^.aits  and 
workers.  The  relation  of  American  capitalism  to  China  is  similar  to.  that  of 
other  capitalist  countries.  These  countries  have  common  interests  as  well  as 
conflicting  ones— common  in  that  they  all  exploit  China,  conflicting  in  that  each 
wants  what  the  other  has,  as  exemplified  by  the  conflict  between  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States,  as  well  as  between  Japan,  Britain,  and  the  United  States. 
If  China  is  subjugated  by  Japan,  it  will  not  only  be  a  catastrophe  for  the  Chinese 
people,  but  a  serious  loss  to  other  imperialist  powers." 

At  this  point  Mao  was  handed  a  wireless  message  announcing  both  the  fall  of 
Bilbao  and  the  resignation  of  France's  premier,  L^on  Blum.  We  discussed  the 
probable  causes  of  both  these  events.  Mao  clearly  showed  his  grasp  of  the  world 
situation,  despite  the  isolating  distance.  "We  took  time  oft"  to  answer  a  host  of 
questions,  this  time  by  him.  What  is  comparative  strength  of  the  Socialist 
and  Communist  Parties  in  America?  Did  we  know  the  life  stories  of  John  L. 
Lewis  and  Earl  Browder?  The  strength  of  the  American  labor  unions?  The 
Trotskyites?     American  official  opinion  on  the  Far  East? 

Then  Mao  Tse-tung  continued :  "The  Chinese  revolution  is  not  an  exception ; 
it  is  one  part  of  the  world  revolution.  It  has  special  characteristics,  but  funda- 
mentally it  is  similar  to  the  Spanish,  French,  American,  and  British  struggles. 
These  struggles  are  all  progressive.  Therein  lies  their  similarity.  It  is  this 
similarity  that  evokes  the  broad  sympathy  of  the  American  masses  and  their 
concern  with  the  fate  of  the  Chinese  people.  We,  on  our  part,  are  also  concerned 
with  the  fate  of  the  American  people.  Please  convey  this  message  to  your  people. 
The  difference  between  our  peoples  lies  in  this :  the  Chinese  people,  unlike  the 
Americans  are  oppressed  by  outside  invaders.  The  American  people  are,  of 
course,  oppressed  from  the  inside,  but  not  by  feudal  forces.  It  is  the  hope  com- 
mon to  all  of  us  that  our  two  countries  shall  work  together." 

Chu  Teh,  military  leader. — Though  Chu  Teh  is  known  to  the  outside  world 
for  his  military  exploits,  his  other  activities  are  many  and  varied.  We  first  met 
Chu  Teh  in  a  class  he  was  teaching  on  the  "Fundamental  Problems  of  the 
Chinese  Revolution."  Wearing  spectacles,  he  could  very  well  have  been  mis- 
taken for  a  professional  teacher.  At  the  People's  Anti-Japanese  Military  Polit- 
ical University  at  Yenan,  he  teaches  both  military  tactics  and  Marxist-Leninist 
principles.  From  1922  to  1925,  Chu  Teh  studied  political  and  economic  science, 
philosophy,  and  military  strategy  in  Germany.  As  a  result  he  speaks  German 
freely.  His  favorite  recreations  are  reading,  conversation,  horseback  riding, 
and  basketball.  The  latter  sport  is  a  subject  for  much  fun  among  the  troops. 
His  love  for  the  game  is  greater  than  his  ability  and  he  can  often  be  found  hang- 
ing about  a  group  which  is  choosing  sides.  If  he  is  not  picked,  he  quietly  moves 
on  to  the  next  court  in  the  hope  that  there  his  luck  w^ill  turn.  My  gi'eatest  dis- 
appointment ^t  Yenan  was  that  rain  ruined  an  appointment  we  had  to  play 
basketball  with  him. 

88348— 52— pt.  10 3 


3306  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Chu  Teh,  commander  in  chief  of  the  Eighth  Route  Army,  is  the  personification 
of  the  spirit  of  these  armies  which  for  10  years  have  been  continuously  victorious 
in  the  face  of  overwlielming  odds.  His  career  has  been  devoted  mainly  to  the 
military  side  of  revolutionary  activities.  Fifty-one  years  old,  he  has  taken  part 
in  the  entire  development  of  modern  China,  from  the  overthrow  of  the  Manchu 
dynasty  in  1911  to  the  pi-esent  struggle  against  Japan.  Beginning  with  August 
1,  1927,  when  together  with  another  famous  Red  commander.  Ho  Lung,  he  organ- 
ized the  Nanchang  uprising,  he  participated  in  exploits  which  have  now  become 
legend.  In  November  1931,  the  first  All-Soviet  Congress  in  Juikin,  Kiangsi,  be- 
stowed upon  him  the  title  of  commander  in  chief  of  the  army.  Even  in  Nan- 
king I  heard  many  call  Chu  Teh  the  greatest  military  genius  in  all  China. 

There  is  strength  and  assurance  in  that  square,  stocky  figure,  in  that  strong 
peasant  face,  weather-beaten  by  a  life  of  campaigning,  and  in  those  small  bright 
eyes  which  are  quite  hidden  when  he  laughs,  and  he  laughs  frequently.  We  took' 
a  picture  of  him  standing  with  legs  apart  and  hands  on  hips.     That  is  Chu  Teh. 

"The  Red  Army  in  this  region  under  our  direct  command  numbers  about  ninety 
thousand,"  he  began.  "This  force  occupies  a  contiguous  territory  extending 
from  North  Shensi  to  East  Kansu  and  South  Ninghsia.  From  Yenan  to  Sanyan 
there  are  some  partisan  troops  in  Kuomintang  uniforms.  In  this  region  pro- 
fessional full-time  partisans  number  from  ten  to  twenty  thousand.  The  number 
of  part-time  partisans  is  much  larger ;  their  duties  are  to  maintain  order  in  their 
districts. 

"Of  the  ninety  thousand  regular  troops  here,  only  twenty  to  thirty  thousand 
come  from  the  original  Kiangsi  district.  About  thirty  thousand  were  recruited 
on  the  way,  chiefly  in  Szechwan,  and  the  rest  are  from  local  areas. 

"In  other  partisan  areas  there  are  various  groups  numbering  from  one  to  three 
tliousand  soldiers,  but  it  is  hard  to  estimate  the  total  figure  ;  we  ourselves  are  not 
certain  about  this.  These  partisan  areas  are  located  in  soiithern  Shensi  (south- 
west of  Sian),  the  Fukien-Kiangsi  border,  the  Honan-Hupeh-Anhwei  border, 
northeastern  Kiangsi,  the  Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi  border,  the  Kwangtung-Hunan 
border,  the  Kiangsi-Hunan  border,  and  the  Shensi-Szechwan  border.  Connec- 
tions with  several  of  these  are  still  maintained,  but  not  with  all ;  and  these  con- 
nections are  irregular  and  uncertain."  Asked  if  we  might  publish  this,  Chu 
Teh  replied  "It  doesn't  matter.     The  fact  is  well  known  throughout  China." 

Having  seen  many  Red  troops  carrying  on  their  maneuvers  with  excellent  new 
rifles,  machine  guns,  automatic  rifles,  and  the  ubiquitous  Mausers,  we  were 
curious  to  know  how  well  armed  they  were  as  a  whole.  Chu  Teh  replied,  "Our 
regular  ninety  thousand  troops  in  the  Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia  region  are  in  gen- 
eral well  armed.  Other  equipment,  such  as  clothes,  food,  and  supplies,  is  not 
satisfactory.  Although  it  greatly  improved  after  the  Sian  incident,  it  is  still  far 
from  sufficient.  Though  we  had  established  contact  with  Chang  Hsueh-liang 
before  the  Sian  affair,  it  was  only  during  the  two  v/eeks  following  the  actual 
incident  that  any  large  quantity  of  munitions,  clothing,  and  food  reached  ns." 

As  Chu  Teh  continued  the  conversation,  punctunted  frequently  by  his  broad, 
genial  smile,  he  came  to  the  discussion  of  his  well-known  theory  of  the  military 
tactics  necessary  to  defeat  Japan,  namely,  to  avoid  decisive  engagements  in  the 
early  stages  in  favor  of  guerrilla  tactics  to  encircle  the  enemy  and  harass  it 
until  its  morale  was  shattered.  We  wanted  to  know  something  about  the  Man- 
churian  volunteers.  Were  they  really  well  organized  or  were  they  mere  hungry 
"bandits"? 

"At  first."  Chu  Teh  said,  "the  Manchurian  volunteers  were  largely  impoverished 
peasants  and  the  scattered  remnants  of  the  defeated  Manchurian  troops.  They 
operated  without  a  plan,  could  not  accomplish  much,  and  finally  were  almost 
destroyed.  The  Communist  Party  then  began  to  organize  new  peasant  detach- 
ments, who  were  later  joined  by  what  remained  of  the  original  volunteers.  As 
a  result,  most  of  these  formerly  leaderless  forces  have  been  converted  into  im- 
portant detachments  with  wide  popular  support.  This  year  there  has  been  some 
increase  in  the  number  of  volunteers  along  the  Korean  border,  in  eastern  Feng- 
tien,  and  in  eastern  Kirin.  The  increase  has  been  more  systematic  than  hitherto. 
New  groups  have  recently  been  formed  in  Jeliol  and  Chahar.  About  three  months 
ago  a  report  to  me  stated  that  the  total  number  of  Manchurian  volunteers  ranged 
from  fifty  to  sixty  thousand."  In  reply  to  a  statement  made  by  the  Japanese  to 
the  effect  that  70  percent  of  the  Manchurian  volunteers  are  Communists,  Chu  Teh 
said  that  this  was  not  an  exaggeration. 

On  the  United  Front. — Of  all  the  questions  facing  China  and  the  former  Soviet 
area  the  most  important  is  that  of  the  united  front.  No  one  in  Soviet  China 
knows  the  details  of  the  negotiations  more  intimately  than  Chou  En-lai,  vice 
chairman  of  the  Revolutionary  Military  Council,  and  second  in  importance  only 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3307 

to  Mao  Tse-tung.  It  was  he  who  carried  on  all  the  negotiations  with  Chiang 
Kai-shek.  Born  thirty-nine  years  ago  of  a  mandarin  family,  Chou  En-lai  joined 
the  revolutionary  movement  in  1911.  Upon  his  return  to  China  in  1924  fi"om 
a  stay  abroad,  he  became  chief  of  the  political  department  of  the  Whampoa 
Military  Academy  under  the  direction  of  Chiang  Kai-shek.  It  is  said  that  even 
today  the  generalissimo  has  a  great  fondness  for  Chou.  When  asked  why  the 
united-front  conversations  were  then  not  moving  very  fast,  Chou  En-lai  said : 
"The  form  of  the  Chinese  united  front  is  quite  different  from  that  in  Europe  or 
the  United  States.  In  China  two  parties  fought  each  other  for  ten  years.  The 
Communist  Party  representing  the  proletariat  and  peasantry  was  a  revolutionary 
party  with  its  own  areas  and  military  forces  as  well  as  its  own  social,  political, 
and  economic  system.  The  Kuomintang  represented  the  ruling  social  groups 
throughout  the  rest  of  China.  But  the  position  of  the  Chinese  bourgeoisie  was 
such  that  the  obstacles  arising  from  their  class  position  could  not  forever  bar 
a  united  struggle  against  Japan.  The  bourgeoisie  of  China  have  at  last  come  to 
realize  that  tlie  Japanese  invasion  harms  all  classes  and  that,  standing  alone, 
they  are  too  weak  to  safeguard  China's  freedom  and  independence." 

Up  to  the  time  of  Japan's  most  recent  invasion,  the  united-front  negotiations 
had  progressed  quite  slowly  though  not  without  positive  results.  Internal  peace 
had  been  achieved,  and  the  two  armies  no  longer  fought  each  other.  Confisca- 
tion of  land  in  the  Soviet  regions  was  abolished.  The  name  of  the  Red  Army 
was  changed.  Dramatic  troupes  began  to  tour  the  countryside  to  teach  the 
peasants  the  meaning  of  democratic  elections.  Nanking  began  to  contribute  a 
considerable,* though  as  yet  insufficient,  sum  of  money  monthly  to  the  Soviet 
area.  Technical  difficulties  made  a  complete  united  front  often  seem  impossible. 
But  Japan's  military  aggression  scattered  all  the  major  obstacles. 

The  land  proWem. — Ever  since  October  1935,  when  the  main  body  of  the  Com- 
munist armies  from  Central  and  South  China  began  to  arrive  in  north  Shensi, 
their  immediate  objectives  have  been  twofold.  First,  to  build  a  permanent  base 
for  internal  development,  and  second  and  more  important,  to  use  this  base  as  a 
spearhead  for  unifying  all  elements  in  China  for  a  successful  war  of  defense 
against  the  invading  Japanese  militarists.  Despite  the  fact  that  the  former 
Soviet  area,  the  largest  single  contiguous  territory  ever  held  under  Communist 
rule,  stated  as  one  of  the  most  economically  backward  areas  in  China,  the  wel- 
fare of  the  peasants  and  workers  has  been  improved  considerably.  There  is  not 
sufficient  room  here  to  tell  all  that  we  saw  and  heard,  but  a  few  high  spots,  in 
the  words  of  Po  K'u,  one  of  the  important  leaders  of  the  region,  will  perhaps 
shed  some  light. 

Po  K'u's  home  and  office  is  in  the  abandoned  compound  of  an  English  Baptist 
mission.  When  we  expressed  surprise  at  finding  religious  pictures  hanging  on 
his  walls.  Po  K'u  said  that  he  left  the  compound  just  as  he  found  it  in  the  hope 
that  the  missionaries  would  return. 

In  reply  to  several  questions  on  the  land  confiscation  problem,  Po  K'u  said 
in  quite  good  English:  "When  the  first  Soviets  were  established  in  1933  in 
Shensi,  all  the  good  land  along  the  river  banks  was  in  the  hands  of  rich  land- 
lords who  used  the  great  famine  of  1930  as  a  lever  for  confiscating  this  land. 
From  then  until  the  Sian  incident  in  December  1936,  all  this  land  was  divided 
among  the  peasants ;  all  taxation  and  levies  were  abolished ;  democratic  liberty 
was  extended  to  all;  peasants  built  up  their  own  armed  forces  for  their  pro- 
tection instead  of  relying  on  landlords'  forces;  and  peasants  enjoyed  the  aid 
and  direction  of  the  Soviet  government  to  increase  production,  improve  the 
land,  and  develop  constimer  cooperatives. 

"After  the  Sian  incident  when  the  unitefl-front  organizations  had  already 
begun,  the  redivision  of  land  among  the  peasants  was  stopped  in  districts  oc- 
cupied after  the  beginning  of  the  negotiations.  In  general,  the  ownership  of 
land  is  not  the  main  problem  in  this  territory.  Land  is  plentiful,  for  Shensi  is 
thinlv  populated,  with  an  average  of  one  family  to  every  thirteen  miles.  The 
form' of  exploitation  and,  therefore,  the  main  problems  are  usury  and  excessive 
interest  rates  on  money  and  cattle.  Land  rents  and  money  lending  rates, 
therefore,  have  been  reduced  drastically.  The  maximum  rent  now  permitted  in 
the  Soviet  areas  is  30  percent  of  the  land  produce,  and  peasants  can  bargain 
with  landlords  to  further  reduce  this  percentage,  while  the  money-lending 
rate  has  been  reduced  from  a  general  10  percent  monthly  rate  to  a  maximum 
of  2  percent.  Even  last  year,  when  warfare  was  still  going  on,  the  Soviet 
government  spent  one  hundred  thousand  dollars  for  ploughs,  seeds,  etc.,  while 
this  year  there  will  be  an  additional  cash  distribution  of  sixty  thousand  dollars." 

Apparently  there  has  been  a  great  deal  of  confusion  about  this  abandonment 
of  land  confiscation.     Mao   Tse-tung's  pithy   words  perhaps  explain   it   most 


3308  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

simply.  He  said :  "It  is  not  so  much  a  question  now  of  whether  our  lands  be- 
longs to  the  peasants  or  the  landlords,  but  whether  it  is  Chinese  or  Japanese." 
The  same  reasoning  is  applied  by  the  Communist  leaders  to  the  larger  question 
of  China  as  a  whole.  To  all  of  them  "it  is  not  a  qiiestion  now  of  which  general 
controls  which  province,  but  whether  the  land  will  remain  Chinese  or  come 
imder  Japanese  control.  If  the  latter  should  happen,  the  original  problem 
disappears." 

Life  in  the  Special  Administrative  District. — Our  visit,  however,  did  not  con- 
sist only  of  a  series  of  interviews.  We  visited  stores  and  shops,  noting  with 
interest  how  nmch  cleaner  and  more  orderly  they  were  than  any  we  had  seen 
<m  otir  trip,  and  how  relatively  well-stocked  they  were.  And  the  cheesecloth 
covering  the  food  for  sale  stood  in  marked  contrast  to  the  cities  in  non-Soviet 
areas  where  the  only  coverings  we  had  seen  were  armies  of  flies.  Even  the 
dogs,  the  most  miserable  of  all  living  things  in  China,  were  active  and  barking. 
Anyone  who  has  seen  the  worm-eaten,  starved,  gaunt  dogs  of  China,  too  weak 
to  move  out  of  the  way  of  a  passing  vehicle,  will  understand  the  meaning  of 
that. 

Culturally,  too,  the  Soviet  region  is  making  great  strides.  Besides  Yenan, 
the  iiresent  capital,  three  other  cities  are  being  developed  as  cultural  centers: 
Tingpien,  Yenchang,  and  Chingyang.  Anti-Japanese  academies  and  dramatic 
groups  are  the  axes  around  which  the  cultural  life  is  being  developed.  Study 
classes,  reading  room,  theatricals,  dances,  lectures,  and  mass  meetings  are 
regular  features  of  life  in  the  Soviet  territories.  We  were  amused  to  hear 
the  universal  complaint  of  all  librarians.     "They  keep  the  books  out  too  long." 

But  most  interesting  and  important  of  all  was  our  visit  to  the  theater.  A 
troupe  of  players  was  scheduled  to  go  on  the  road  the  following  day,  and  they 
graciously  went  through  their  repertoire  for  us  as  well  as  for  their  own  de- 
lighted audience.  In  a  packed  auditorium,  seated  on  low,  narrow,  backless 
wooden  benches,  before  a  crude  stage  whose  footlights  were  flickering  candles, 
we  sat  through  four  hours  of  amazingly  excellent  plays,  superbly  acted.  With 
perfect  realism  (so  different  from  the  classical  Chinese  theater)  and  delightful 
humor,  they  presented  plays  designed  to  teach  the  peasants  how  to  vote  and  how 
to  unite.  They  explained  the  value  of  cleanliness,  of  vaccination,  of  education, 
and  the  stupidity  and  danger  of  superstitions.  At  one  point,  for  instance,  one 
character  complained  of  being  tired.  "We  weren't  tired  on  our  seven  thousand- 
mile  march,"  was  the  reply.  And  the  audience  roared  as  did  Mao-  Chu  Teh, 
and  the  rest  of  the  leaders  who  sat  next  to  us,  having  as  good  a  time  as  any- 
one. The  high  spot  of  the  evening  was  a  really  professional  performance  of  a 
scene  from  Gorki's  Mother,  which  had  been  given  at  the  Gorki  memorial  evening 
celebrated  in  Yenan,  and  a  Living  Newspaper  by  the  young  people  on  such 
subjects  as  bribery,  bureaucracy,  and  hygiene.  All  these  plays  were  being  sent 
out  to  the  villages. 

Our  visit  to  Yenan  was  climaxed  by  a  huge  mass  meeting,  addressed  by  Chu 
Teh,  Bisson,  Lattimore,  and  myself  and  attended  by  the  one  thousand  five  hun- 
dred cadet  students  of  the  People's  Anti-Japanese  Military-Political  University 
and  about  five  hundred  from  other  schools.  Here  are  some  questions  asked  of 
me.  "What  is  the  position  of  woman  in  the  U.S.A.?  How  do  American  workers 
live  and  how  developed  is  their  movement?  What  are  the  results  of  Roose- 
velt's N.R.A.  campaign?  What  is  the  present  situation  in  the  Left  literary  move- 
ment in  America?  What  do  the  American  people  think  of  our  long  march 
west?"  And  innumerable  questions  concerning  America's  attitude  in  the  event 
of  a  Sino-Japanese  conflict,  the  American  attitude  toward  the  war  in  Spain, 
and  what  Americans   think  of  the  Kuomintang-Communist  cooperation. 

This  stress  on  the  role  of  the  United  States  is  altogether  typical  of  the  reac- 
tion throughout  China.  These  people  have  ti-aditionally  considered  Americans 
as  their  friends  and  they  do  not  w^ant  us  to  fail  them  now.  A  few  days  after  our 
arrival  in  Shanghai,  I  received  a  letter  from  Agnes  Smedley  which  tells  better 
than  I  am  able  how  much  hope  and  enthusiasm  the  visit  of  Americans  evoked  in 
the  former  Soviet  regions. 

"In  my  imagination  I  follow  your  journey  from  here,  and  my  friends  and  I 
speculate  as  to  your  exact  location  day  by  day,  and  your  exact  occupation.  I 
want  to  tell  on  that  you  left  behind  remarkable  friends.  I  did  not  realize  the 
effect  of  that  meeting  until  two  or  three  days  had  passed.  Then  it  began  to 
roll  in.  I  have  no  reason  to  tell  yeu  tales.  But  the  meeting,  and  your  speech 
in  particular,  has  had  a  colossal  effect  upon  all  people.  One  was  so  moved  by 
it  that  he  could  not  sleep  that  night  but  spent  the  night  writing  a  poem  in  praise 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3309 

of  you  all.  I  enclose  the  poem.  It  is  not  good  from  the  literary  viewpoint.  But 
from  the  viewixtint  of  the  emotion  behind  it,  it  is  of  value.  It  is  a  deeply  pas- 
sionate poem.  It  is  not  good  enough  to  publish,  but  it  is  good  enough  to  carry 
next  to  your  heart  in  the  years  to  come.  To  that  meeting,  it  may  interest  you 
to  know",  came  delegations  sent  by  every  institution.  Many  institutions  could 
not  cross  the  rivers.  But  they  sent  activists,  groups  of  six  to  a  dozen.  They 
later  gave  extensive  reports.  I  am  getting  those  reports  from  instructors  day 
by  day.  All  are  deeply  impressed  and  moved  and  grateful  to  you  and  all  of  you. 
There  has  never  been  anything  like  this  here  before." 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Do  you  want  me  to  read  the  caption  of  this  photo- 
graph ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Please. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  photograph  is  captioned : 

Troops  marching  through  the  main  gate  of  Yenan  to  their  drill  grounds.  The 
crouching  figure  with  the  camera  is  Owen  Lattimore,  editor  of  Pacific  Affairs. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  that  a  picture  of  you,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  As  well  as  a  man  can  identify  a  rather  distant  pro- 
file picture  of  himself,  I  would  say  so,  yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  there  any  evidence  there  of  your  being  supervised  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  There  is  no  evidence  in  that  picture,  except,  of 
course,  that  this  was  an  arranged  parade.  I  suppose  you  might  call 
that  being  supervised. 

The  Chairman.  Did  they  parade  for  you  by  arrangement? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  As  I  recall,  we  asked  if  we  could  take  some  photo- 
graphs of 

The  Chairman.  Wait  a  minute.  I  asked  if  they  paraded  for  you  by 
arrangement. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes ;  I  believe  it  was  by  arrangement. 

My  recollection  is  rather  hazy,  but  I  believe  we  asked  if  we  could 
take  some  pictures  of  troops. 

The  Chairman.  You  reviewed  them? 

Mr.  Li\TTiM0RE.  No,  sir. 

And  they  said,  "We  will  have  some  troops  out  on  the  parade  ground 
tomorrow  and  you  can  come  and  take  pictures,  if  you  like." 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  Mr.  Morris. 

Senator  Watkins.  May  I  ask  a  question? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Senator  Watkins.  Was  this  before,  or  after  you  were  adviser  to 
the  Nationalist  Government  of  Chiang  Kai-shek  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  was  long  before. 

The  Chairman.  What  was  that  question  ? 

Senator  Watkins.  I  asked  him  if  it  was  before  or  after  he  was  ad- 
viser to  the  Generalissimo. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  may  say.  Senator,  that  the  Generalissimo  was 
very  much  interested  in  my  having  been  up  there  at  that  time,  and 
we  had  quite  a  talk  about  it. 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  Mr.  Morris. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  now  to  get  back  to  Rogoflf 
and  War  and  the  Working  Class,  which  started  out  this  questioning 
aljout  the  change  in  line. 

The  Chairman.  All  right. 

jSIr.  Morris,  We  have  introduced  into  the  record,  Mr.  Chairman,  as 
our  exhibit  Xo.  26,  the  letter  from  Rose  Yardumian  to  Mr.  Edward 
Carter.    I  would  like  to  read  it  at  this  time. 


3310  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

This  is  January  20,  1944 : 

Dear  Mr.  Carter  :  I  received  your  letter  of  January  17  with  copies  of  the  tele- 
grams you  sent  Mr.  Hiss  and  Mr.  Currie.  I  called  Alger  Hiss  yesterday  morn- 
ing and  he  told  me  that  he  had  received  your  wire,  but  was  sure  that  1  would 
understand  that  he  could  not  make  the  first  advance  in  arranging  a  private  talk 
with  Rogoff.  He  mentioned  the  RogofE  articles  In  War  and  the  Working  Class 
and  that  Rogoff's  material  had  caused  considerable  controversy  in  circles 
here.     *     *     * 

Mr.  Lattimore,  is  it  your  testimony  that  you  know  nothing  of  those 
articles  in  War  and  the  Working  Class  at  that  time? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  believe  at  that  time  I  knew  nothing  about  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  So  Rose  Yardumian  knew  about  it,  but  you  did  not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  know  about  that  now ;  yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  I  mean  is  it  your  testimony  that  at  that  time,  Rose 
Yardumian,  who  wrote  this  letter,  knew  about  the  articles  of  Rogoff 
AVar  and  the  Working  Class,  but  that  you  did  not  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  would  be  my  presumption  from  the  wording 
of  the  letter  that  she  knew  about  it.  I  don't  recall  knowing  about  the 
article  at  all.  I  did  get  hold  of  the  article  later  on,  I  think  several 
years  later,  and  looked  it  up. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  know  Rose  Yardumian? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes ;  I  knew  her. 

Mr.  Morris.  She  was  the  secretary  of  the  Washington  office  of  the 
IPR,  was  she  not  ? 

JNIr.  Lattimore.  I  believe  she  was. 

I  can't  recall  now  whether  she  was  the  secretary  or  one  of  the  girls 
in  the  office,  or  what. 

Mr.  Morris.  Are  you  acquainted  with  the  testimony  before  this 
committee  that  she  was  on  the  board  of  a  Communist  piiblication  last 
year  in  Communist  China? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  don't  remember  seeing  that. 

Mr.  Morris.  You  did  not  read  that  part  of  your  testimony  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  think  so.  No.  I  read  so  nuich  testimony, 
I  am  not  sure  of  the  details. 

Mr.  Morris.  I  am  continuing  reading  now : 

*  *  *  He  said  that  if  Larry  Todd  wanted  to  bring  Rogoff  to  Hornbeck's 
office,  they  would  not  refuse  to  see  him.  I  am  not  sure  that  1  understand  the 
mechanizations  of  our  State  Department.  Bill  Johnstone  saw  no  point  in  my  try- 
ing to  get  in  touch  with  Mr.  Hornbeck  directly,  since  presumably  Hiss  had  con- 
sulted with  Hornbeck. 

Mr.  Currie  has  arranged  to  see  Rogoff  at  12  o'clock  today.  Colonel  Faymon- 
ville  is  returning  to  Washington  from  New  York  this  morning  and  is  supposed 
to  get  in  touch  with  our  office  then. 

Rogoff  visited  our  offices  yesterday  afternoon  and  Bill  and  I  had  a  little 
talk  with  him  about  the  small  meeting  which  we  had  hoped  to  hold  Thursday  at 
5 :  30.  Rogoff  said  that  he  thought  that  it  was  unwise  for  us  to  hold  the  meet- 
ing ;  that  certain  Chinese  groups  in  Washington  were  very  distressed  at  the 
fact  that  he  was  talking  so  much.  He  thinks  that  it  would  be  bad  for  the 
Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  to  have  him  speak  under  its  auspices.     *     *     * 

Do  you  understand  the  reasoning  of  Mr.  Rogoff  there,  Mr.  Latti- 
more ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  am  afraid  I  don't. 
Mr.  Morris  (reading)  : 

*  *  *  Bill  and  Anne  Johnstone  had  hoped  to  get  a  small  group  of  people 
together  at  their  home  this  evening — the  Hornbecks,  Remers,  Blakeslees,  and  a 
few  others — but  time  is  very  short  and  many  of  these  people  have  already  made 
plans  for  this  evening,  so  the  Johnstone  idea  will  probably  not  come  off.     How- 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3311 

ever,  RogofE  is  coming  into  our  office  at  2  o'cloclc  today.  Bill  is  planning  to  take 
him  to  the  Cosmos  Club  to  talk  with  Owen  Lattimore,  Carl  Remer,  and  John  Car- 
ter Vincent.  After  he  talks  with  these  people,  we  are  making  arrangements  to 
take  him  to  the  Library  of  Congress  and  a  few  other  places. 

I  am  sorry  that  our  meeting  did  not  work  out  for  him,  as  I  know  that  there 
are  many  people  hei-e  would  have  enjoyed  hearing  him. 
Sincerely  yours, 

Rose 

Rose   Yardtjmian. 

P.  S. — I  am  enclosing  a  list  of  the  Army-Navy  people  who  have  accepted  to  date. 
P.  P.  S. — Rogoft"  and  Bill  have  l^een  at  the  Cosmos  Club  for  the  last  21/2  hours 
talking  with  Lattimore,  Remer,  and  Vincent. 

The  Chairman.  To  whom  was  that  letter  addressed  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Edward  C.  Carter,  of  the  International  Secretariat. 

The  Chairman.  What  is  the  date  of  that  'I 

Mr.  Morris.  January  20,  1944. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  in  the  record,  is  it  not  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Yes,  sir. 

This  bears  on  the  knowledge  that  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Kelations 
had  with  respect  to  Eogoff's  article,  which,  according  to  testimony 
before  this  committee,  signalized  the  cliange  in  Conmmnist  Party 
thinking  in  1943. 

Mr.  Lattimore,  did  yon  know  Mr.  Vladimir  Komm  in  this  country  ? 

IMr.  Lattimore.  Yes.  I  met  him  at  the  Yosemite  Conference  of  the 
IPK  in  the  summer  of  1936,  at  which  he  was  one  of  the  two,  I  think, 
Soviet  delegates. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  meet  Mr.  Motiliev  in  this  country? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes ;  at  the  same  time, 

Mr,  Morris.  Have  you  ever  met  INIr.  Litvinoff  in  this  country? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes.  I  called  on  Mr.  Litvinoff  when  I  was  Chiang 
Kai-shek's  adviser  when  I  was  back  here  on  leave  in  1942. 

Mr.  Morris.  On  how  many  occasions  did  you  see  ^Ir.  Litvinoff? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  One,  I  think. 

Mr.  Morris.  Have  you  ever  seen  jMr.  Panyushkin,  Soviet  Ambas- 
sador in  this  country? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  think  I  have  seen  him  in  this  country.  I 
saw  him  in  Chungking. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  ever  give  him  or  his  office  something  for  the 
Soviet  pouch? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  believe  that  it  would  be  accurate  to  describe 
it  as  giving  it  to  him  for  the  Soviet  pouch.  I  wrote  to  him  stating 
that  I  would  like  to  try  to  make  a  trip  to  Outer  Mongolia  and  as  there 
was  no  Outer  Mongolian  representation  in  this  country,  I  would  ap- 
])reciate  it  if  he  would  convey  my  request  to  the  Outer  Mongolian 
Embassy,  or  whatever  it  may  be,  in  Moscow. 

Mr,  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  did  you  ever  meet  Mr.  Gromyko  in  the 
United  States  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  think  I  ever  did. 

Mr,  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  did  yon  make  an  arrangement  with 
IMr.  Gromyko  to  have  your  book  Solution  in  Asia  published  in  the 
Soviet  Union  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  think  I  did.  I  seem  to  remember  reading 
something  about  that  in  the  testimony.  Carter  may  have  suggested 
it,  or  something  of  that  sort. 

Mr.  Morris,  But  it  is  your  testimony  that  you  did  not,  is  it? 


3312  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Lattimore.  My  memory  is  very  vague  on  the  subject,  but  I 
don't  think  that  I  did  myself. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  identify  these  two  letters,  please? 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  is  a  photostat  of  a  carbon  copy  of  a  document 
from  the  files  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  dated  February 
26,  1945,  addressed  to  Mrs.  Owen  Lattimore,  Ruxton,  Md.,  with  the 
typed  signature  of  Edward  C.  Carter. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  the  second? 

Mr.  Mandel.  The  second  is  a  photostat  of  a  carbon,  a  document, 
from  the  files  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  dated  INIarch  3, 
1945,  addressed  to  Owen  Lattimore,  with  the  typed  signature  of 
Edward  C.  Carter. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  have  these  letters  read 
into  the  record  at  this  time  since  they  bear  on  the  series  of  questions 
being  addressed  to  the  witness. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

(The  documents  referred  to  were  marked  "Exhibits  Nos.  515  and 
516,"  and  were  read  by  Mr.  Mandel.) 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  read  those  two  letters,  please? 

Mr.  Mandel.  The  letter  of  February  26, 1945  (exhibit  No.  515)  : 

Dear  Eleanor:  This  is  just  to  tlianli  you  for  your  lovely  hospitality  on  Sun- 
day. Your  place  is  so  lovely,  the  food  so  good,  and  the  conversation  so  stimulat- 
ing  that  I  do  want  you  to  know  what  great  pleasure  and  profit  you  gave  me. 

I  had  a  good  talk  with  Owen  on  the  train  and  I  hope  I  can  be  of  a  little 
assistance  in  carrying  out  his  project. 

A  part  of  my  purpose  in  getting  a  number  of  low-cost  copies  of  Solution  in 
Asia  fits  right  into  the  build-up  which  is  desirable  as  preparation  for  getting 
an  invitation  from  across  the  water  for  Owen  to  go  abroad. 

I  have  discovered  that  Owen's  40-percent  discount  is  better  for  the  IPR  than 
anything  we  can  get  from  the  publisher.     I  would  be  grateful  therefore  if  you 
could  have  12  copies  sent  me  as  speedily  as  possible  to-gether  vpith  your  bill. 
Ever  gratefully  yours, 

Edward  C.  Carter. 

The  second  letter  is  dated  March  3,  1945  (exhibit  No.  516)  : 

Dear  Owen  :  Would  you  be  willing  to  do  a  review  of  Rowe's  book  China  Among 
the  Powers  for  Pacific  Affairs? 

Our  reviewers  still  have  to  do  their  reviews  as  a  labor  of  love  even  though 
they  may  have  no  burning  affection  for  the  book  to  be  reviewed.  If  you  are 
willing  to  undertake  this  task  we  would  like  to  have  your  review  by  March  27, 
but  if  this  is  impossible  and  you  could  do  it  for  us  later  we  would  prefer  to 
have  a  review  from  your  pen  in  a  subsequent  issue  rather  than  to  get  a  sub- 
stitute writer  for  the  next  issue.  If  you  will  accept  I  will,  of  course,  send 
you  immediately  a  reviewer's  copy  of  the  book. 

As  soon  as  possible  after  recepit  of  extra  copies  of  Solution  in  Asia  I  am 
going  to  descend  upon  Gromyko  and  begin  to  lay  the  plans  for  exploring  the 
feasibility  of  your  recent  proposal. 

I  felt  that  of  all  the  speakers  you  did  by  far  the  best  job  at  the  town  hall. 
Sincerely  yours, 

Edward  C.  Carter. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  what  did  Mr.  Carter  mean  when  he 
said  he  was  going  to  "descend  upon  Gromyko  and  begin  to  lay  the 
plans  for  exploring  the  feasibility  of  your  recent  proposal"  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Subject  to  the  limitations  of  being  able  to  say 
what  was  in  another  man's  mind 

Mr.  Morris.  He  is  talking  about  "your  recent  proposal,"  Mr.  Latti- 
more. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3313 

Mr,  Lattimore.  I  would  saj'  that  my  "recent  proposal"  must  have 
been  my  same  old  proposal  that  went  on  for  years  and  years,  of  trying 
to  get  into  Outer  Mongolia. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  that  bore  no  relation  to  having  a  publishing  of 
Solution  in  Asia  done  for  Soviet  internal  consumption? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  no  idea  what  that  would  be. 

Mr.  Morris.  You  have  read  ISIr.  Carter's  testimony  on  that  point, 
liave  you  not? 

Mr.  Latitmore.  Yes,  I  have  read  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  Which  is  contradictory  to  what  your  understanding- 
was  at  that  time  ? 

jVIr,  La'itimore.  No.     In  what  way  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  he  not  testify  that  there  was  such  a  project? 

Mr.  LAi^riMORE.  A  project  for 

Mr.  Morris.  Having  the  Soviets  publish  a  version  of  your  book,  a 
copy  of  your  book,  an  edition  of  your  book. 

Mr.  Laitimore.  Oh,  I  didn't  remember  that.  As  far  as  I  can  see 
from  this  present  correspondence,  he  was  trying  to  get  some  copies  of 
my  book  to  send — what  is  it  now — to  send  presumably  to  Russia,  but 
whether  the  project  included  a  translation  or  a  Russian  edition,  I 
don't  know. 

Mr.  Morris.  You  did  send  copies  of  Solution  in  Asia  to  the  Soviet 
Union,  did  you  not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  think  I  sent  them  to  Mr.  Carter.  I  don't  think  I 
remember  sending  any  to  the  Soviet  Union. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  identify  that  document? 

Mr.  ISIandel.  This  is  a  photostat  of  a  memorandum.  In  the  corner 
is  "OL.''  This  is  a  j^hotostat  from  the  documents  from  the  files  of  the 
Institute  of  Pacific  Relations.     It  reads  as  follows : 

(Exhibit  No.  517) 
Distribution  of  12  copies  of  Solution  in  Asia — 
and  these  names  are  listed : 

W.  K.  Hancoclf — for  review  3-12-45 — Mrs.  V.  L.  Pandit 

K.  P.  Clien 

Gromyko  (2) — 1  for  Ztiukov 
Kisselev — for  Kemenov  and  Voi 
Litvinoff — for  Yarga  and  Voitinsky 

3-14-45 — Stepanov — for  Mikoyan   (for  Lozovsky  and  Voitinsky??) 

The  Chairman.  What  do  you  want  done  with  that  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  from  your  knowledge  of  IPR  docu- 
ments, the  fact  that  "OL''  appears  in  the  upper  right-hand  corner 
indicates,  does  it  not,  that  you  were  to  get  a  copy  of  that  distribution 
made  of  your  book  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Presumably.  AVell,  it  w^ould  mean — I  question  that 
I  had  received  a  copy. 

Is  that  my  initial?  I  mean  did  I  initial  that  to  show  I  had  received 
it,  or  did  somebody  else  ? 

Mr.  SouR^VINE.  Look  at  the  photostat  and  see  if  those  are  your 
initials. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  the  "OL"  there  isn't  my  w^riting. 

Mr.  Morris.  But  from  your  knowledge  of  markings  of  institute 
papers,  does  that  not  indicate  to  you  that  that  meant  a  copy  of  that 
should  go  to  you  for  distribution  ? 


3314  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Very  probably;  yes.  It  might  mean  simply  that 
it  was  to  be  put  in  the  "OL"  file  in  the  IPR  office.  I  wouldn't  be  able 
to  tell  you. 

Mr.  SoDRAViNE.  Mr.  Morris,  could  you  find  out  from  the  witness  if 
he  knows  who  these  people  are  that  are  mentioned  here  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Yes. 

May  we  have  that  introduced  in  the  record  first  ? 

The  Chairman.  It  may  be  introduced  in  the  record. 
(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  517"  and  was 
read  in  full.) 

The  Chairman.  What  is  the  question? 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  know  Mr.  Lozovsky,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  don't  think  I  do. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  know  Mr.  Voitinsky  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Voitinsky  I  met  in  1936. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  know  Mr.  Stepanov? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  can't  place  him. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  know  Mr.  Mikoyan  ? 

Mr.  Lai"it]M()Re.  I  presume  he  is  the  same  Mikoyan  whose  name 
I  have  seen  in  the  press  as  a  Soviet  official. 

The  Chairman.  The  question  is  do  you  know  him? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  don't  know  him. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  know  Mr.  Zhukov  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  don't  think  I  do. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  know  Mr.  Kemenov  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  can't  place  him. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  know  Mr.  Varga  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  ^Ir.  Varga  ?  I  know  that  he  is  a  Soviet  economist, 
but  I  don't  think  I  have  met  him. 

Mr.  Morris.  But  you  know  who  these  people  are? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  Is  Gromyko's  name  in  there  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Gromyko's  name  does  appear  there ;  yes,  sir. 

Do  you  know  Mr.  Gromyko  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  don't  think  I  met  him. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  identification  of  these  men  can  be  made 
at  a  later  time. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  other  names  at  the  top  of  this  list,  Mr.  W.  K. 
Hancock,  I  don't  think  I  have  ever  heard  of  him. 

Mrs.  V.  L.  Pandit  is,  of  course,  the  recent  Indian  Ambassador  in  this 
country. 

K.  P.  Chen  is  one  of  the  leading  bankers  of  China. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  he  in  China  now? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  believe  he  is  in  Hongkong.     I  am  not  sure. 

The  Chairman.  You  may  proceed,  Mr.  Morris. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  do  you  know  that  Soviet  officials  col- 
lected information  on  economic  geography  and  statistics  from  United 
States  Government  departments  for  the  IPK  in  the  United  States  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  didn't  know  that.  At  least,  I  don't  believe 
I  ever  knew  it.  It  would  seem  to  me  to  be  quite  an  ordinary  procedure, 
if  they  did. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  here  the  minutes  of  a  meeting 
of  April  2,  1936,  and  I  am  asking  Mr.  Mandel  if  he  will  identify  this 
document. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3315 

The  Chairman.  Meeting  of  what? 

Mr.  Morris.    Meeting  in  Moscow. 

Mr.  Manclel  will  identify  it. 

The  Chairman.    Very  well. 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  is  a  photostat  of  a  document  from  the  files  of  the 
Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  headed  "Meeting,  April  2, 1936,  Moscow : 
Mr.  Carter,  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Lattimore,  H.  M.  Harondar." 

Mr.  Morris.  "H.  M."  is  different  from  Harondar ;  is  it  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  a  copy  of  that  be  made  available  to  Mr.  Lattimore, 
please? 

This  is  April  2,  1936. 

Mr.  Lattimore,  will  you  read  the  sixth  paragraph  on  the  front  page, 
which  begins  with  "Motiliev." 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  sixth  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  The  one  that  says : 

Motiliev  said  that  he  was  interested  in  receiving     *     *     *. 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

Motiliev  said  that  he  was  Interested  in  receiving  from  the  United  States  more 
material  on  the  economic  geography  of  the  country ;  the  official  publications  of 
Government  departments,  particularly  the  statistical  reports. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  did  the  IPR  serve  as  a  conduit  for  the 
Soviet  officials  to  receive  such  information  from  the  United  States? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  no  idea. 

Mr.  Morris.  I  ask  you  to  turn,  Mr.  Lattimore,  to  page  2  and  take 
up  the  second  item  there  on  the  top  of  the  page,  "II.  In  re:  Pacific 
Affairs." 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

The  discussion  of  this  point  was  postponed  until  Voitinsky  could  be  present. 

Mr.  Morris.  Why  should  that  discussion  be  postponed  until  Voitin- 
sky was  present,  Mr.  Lattimore?  Did  you  know  at  that  time  Mr. 
Voitinsky  was  the  head  of  the  far  eastern  section  of  the  Comintern? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  did  not. 

As  far  as  my  recollection  serves,  Voitinsky  was  the  editor,  or  one  of 
the  editors,  of  the  publication  which  was  regarded  as  the  official  pub- 
lication of  the  Soviet  council  of  the  IPR  and,  therefore,  would  be  a 
natural  person  to  include  in  an  editorial  conference. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  may  I  call  your  attention  to  VII  on 
page  3,  just  about  the  middle. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  "In  re  International  Secretariat  Policy"  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  What  do  you  want  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  I  want  Mr.  Lattimore  to  read  it,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

Motiliev  said  that  Voitinsky  had  not  yet  read  ECG's  report  on  the  policy.  He 
thought  that  there  would  be  no  objections  in  principle,  although  there  might  be 
some  on  details.  He  said  that  he  had  received  a  letter  from  Honolulu  criticizing 
the  policy  and  would  like  to  discuss  the  whole  question  when  Voitinsky  was  here. 

Mr.  ]MoRRis.  And  then,  finally,  Mr.  Lattimore,  I  would  like  you  to 
turn  to  the  last  page. 
Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes. 


3316  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

The  Chairman.  Who  is  "ECC"  ? 
]\Ir.  Lati'imori:.  Mr.  Edward  C.  Carter. 

Mr.  Morris.  Beginning  in  the  first  paragraph  on  the  last  page,  Mr. 
Lattimore. 
Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

Motiliev  said  that  he  would  like  to  wait  to  discuss  this — 

I  don't  know  what  "this"  is — 

when  Voitinsky  was  here.  He  said  that  he  did  not  think  there  would  be  any 
critique  of  the  general  policy  of  the  IPR.  There  would  be  definite  questions 
about  Pacific  Affairs,  not  as  to  its  policy  and  contents  but  as  to  its  juridical  posi- 
tion as  to  the  instrument  of  the  IPR.  He  said  there  would  be  discussions  and 
negotiations  in  connection  with  the  question  of  preventing  the  publishing  of 
articles  which  are  in  some  way  harmful  to  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  IPR  position. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  did  you  know  at  that  time  Mr.  Voitin- 
slry's  position  with  the  Communist  International  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  don't  believe  I  did. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  does  your  research  of  Pacific  Affairs  at 
this  period  of  time  indicate  that  anything  appeared  therein  along  the 
description  I  just  gave? 

Mr.  Mandel.  In  the  issue  of  September  1936  of  Pacific  Aifairs 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  just  shortly  after  the  meeting  you  were  dis- 
cussing, Mr.  Lattimore. 

Mr.  Mandel.  Cited  under  the  title  '"Literature  on  the  Chinese  Com- 
munist Movement"  is  the  following  notation  of  an  article  on  British 
imperialism  in  China,  from  the  Communist  International,  No.  6, 
November  1924,  and  another  article  by  Mr.  Voitinsky,  entitled  "The 
Situation  in  China,"  from  the  Communist  International,  No.  21,  April 
1925. 

This  is  taken  from  Pacific  Affairs  of  September  1936,  listing  the 
writings  of  G.  Voitinsky. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  you  were  editor  at  that  time,  were  you  not,  Mr. 
Lattimore  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Of  Pacific  Affairs;  yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  might  that  whole  document  be  received 
into  the  record  ? 

The  Chairman.  It  may  be  received  into  the  record. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  518"  and  is 
as  follows:) 

Exhibit  No.  .518 

Meeting  April  2,  1936,  Moscow:  Mr.  Carter,  Mr.  and  Mrs.  I>attimore,  H.  M. 

■  Harondar 

1.  In  re  exchange  of  books  and  periodicals. 

ECC  said  that  of  the  member  countries  those  most  interested  in  Soviet  ma- 
terials are  the  English,  Chinese,  and  American  Councils.  The  American  Council 
is  best  equipped  to  use  them.  The  two  Chinese  who  know  Russian  are  at  present 
not  in  China.  In  England  the  Russian  materials  are  used  by  some  of  the 
members  of  the  Chatham  House,  but  the  staff  is  not  able  to  make  full  use  of  them. 
Since  the  American  Council  could  best  use  the  books,  the  decision  was  to  have 
the  main  IPR  collection  in  New  York  temporarily. 

HM  explained  that  the  exchange  was  very  successful  to  date,  but  that  there 
was  difficulty  in  choosing  what  books  were  wanted  because  it  was  impossible  to 
tell  about  their  contents  without  some  kind  of  bibliographical  exchange. 

Motiliev  said  that  it  would  be  po.ssible  to  provide  almost  all  the  materials 
printed  in  the  Soviet  Union.  Since  the  American  Council  is  interested  in  books 
on  the  Soviet  Union  in  general,  it  will  be  necessary  to  work  out  a  system  for 
selection. 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3317 

Harondar  said  that  he  had  already  sent  to  New  York  the  list  of  all  the  periodi- 
cals which  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  IPR  is  receiving  for  I\Irs.  Barnes  to  choose  which  ones 
were  wanted  in  the  U.  S.  He  said  that  he  now  received  librai-y  cards  of  all  the 
books  on  pertinent  subjects,  with  a  short  resume  of  the  contents.  He  will  have 
these  sent  to  the  U.  S.  to  serve  as  a  basis  for  selection. 

Motiliev  said  that  the  annual  plan  figures  and  the  publications  of  the  statistical 
institute  would  be  sent  regularly  without  a  preliminary  exchange  of  the  bibli- 
ographical cards. 

Motiliev  said  that  he  was  interested  in  receiving  from  the  U.  S.  more  material 
on  the  economic  geography  of  the  country ;  the  official  publications  of  Govern- 
ment departments,  particularly  the  statistical  reports. 

Harondar  said  that  their  library  on  Japan,  in  English,  was  meagre  and  they 
would  like  more  books  on  this.  If  it  is  possible  to  have  sent  from  America  the 
Japanese  Government  reports  in  English,  they  would  like  to  have  them. 

ECC  said  that  Usiiibe  should  be  able  to  furnish  those. 

Lattimore  asked  if  there  were  important  materials  in  Mongolian  and  Chinese 
available  here. 

Motiliev  said  that  there  is  very  little.  There  is  a  magazine  published  in 
Mongolia  in  Russian.  There  is  also  a  Russian  newspaper  in  Buriat-Mongolia. 
There  are  ftlongolian  and  Chinese  newspapers  for  those  peoples  in  the  Soviet  Far 
East.     All  of  these  can  be  sent. 

Motiliev  said  that  there  was  very  little  use  made  of  latinized  Chinese  due  to 
the  difficulties  of  retaining  contacts  and  connections  with  older  Chinese  literature 
and  with  contemporary  publications  in  China.  The  Chinese  newspai)er  occasion- 
ally publishes  a  supplement  in  latinized  Chinese. 

Motiliev  said  that  it  was  easy  to  get  materials  on  Buriat-Mongolia,  but  more 
tlifficult  on  Mongolia.  Harondar  will  check  on  the  publications  available  here 
in  Mongolian. 

Motiliev  presented  everyone  with  a  copy  of  U.  8.  S.  R.  Handbook  published  by 
Gollanz.  He  aLso  gave  HM  the  latest  number  of  Sovietskie  Kraebedenie  which 
is  devoted  entirely  to  Buriat-Mongolia.  He  shows  Lattimore  the  new  Mon- 
golian Atlas  and  said  that  he  would  try  to  get  a  copy  for  him. 

B.  In  re  Exhibit  of  periodicals  at  Yosemite. 

ECC  explained  that  at  Yosemite  he  wanted  to  have  an  exhibit  of  the  most 
important  periodicals  appearing  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  on  the  Far  East,  the  Soviet 
Far  East,  and  on  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  in  general.  He  would  like  two  copies  of  the 
monthly  and  quarterly  magazines  and  four  of  the  weekly  magazines. 

IMotiliev  said  that  there  were  few  magazines  on  the  Far  East  as  such,  but 
many  general  magazines  that  had  important  information  on  the  Far  East. 

II.  In  re  Pacific  Affairs. 

The  di.scussion  of  this  point  was  postponed  until  Voitinsky  could  be  present. 

III.  In  re  the  appointment  of  a  Soviet  member  of  the  staff  of  the  Sec'y  GenT. 
Motiliev  said  that  this  question  could  not  be  settled  immediately,  but  he  would 

like  to  know  what  type  of  person  was  wanted. 
ECC  said  that  the  Soviet  member  should  be  able  to  do  the  following : 

1.  Visit  the  IPR  library  in  N.  Y.  to  find  out  in  what  particular  fields  it  was 
weak. 

2.  To  visit  the  other  important  libraries  in  the  country  at  universities  to 
find  out  how  far  they  are  equipped  to  supply  people  who  are  studying  the  Soviet 
Union. 

3.  To  prepare  summaries  in  English  and  descriptions  of  the  Soviet  periodicals 
for  the  exhibit  in  Yosemite. 

4.  To  meet  the  people  working  in  the  universities  on  the  Soviet  Union. 

5.  To  help  on  Pacific  Affairs. 

Motiliev  said  that  this  meant  the  Soviet  member  should  be  one  of  the  leading 
people  in  the  IPR  group  here  and  well-informed  on  the  Far  East,  etc.  This 
would  be  very  difficult,  because  the  institutions  where  such  people  are  working 
are  very  hesitant  to  let  them  go  ftu-  a  long  period.  In  principle  he  felt  that 
such  an  arrangement  would  be  a  good  thing. 

IV.  In  re  Motiliev's  visits  en  route  to  Y'osemite. 

ECC  reported  that  Liu  Yu-Wan  was  very  anxious  to  meet  Motiliev  in  Shang- 
hai. Liu  Yu-Wan  has  now  been  made  secretary  of  the  Society  for  Sino-Soviet 
Cultural  Relations,  of  which  the  Soviet  ambassador  is  one  of  the  officers. 

Motiliev  said  that  he  was  not  sure  that  he  would  get  to  Shanghai  before  Liu 
Yu-Wan  had  left. 

ECC  said  that  Liu  Yu-Wan  was  ready  to  wait  for  him.  He  also  w^ants  to 
come  to  Moscow  after  the  conference. 


3318  INSTITUTE   OF    PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

ECC  reported  the  invitation  to  Motiliev  from  Chatham  House.  Chatham  House 
suggested  that  the  middle  of  May  might  be  a  good  time  for  such  a  visit. 

iNIotliliev  said  that  it  would  be  very  difficult  for  him  to  do  it.  This  year 
is  a  very  busy  one  for  him  since  the  first  volume  of  the  Atlas  is  to  appear  during 
the  year.  Likewise  Voitiusky  is  very  busy,  as  editor  of  the  new  quarterly.  How- 
ever, it  might  be  possible  to  arrange  for  someone  else  to  visit  London.  Motiliev 
is  planning  to  finish  his  reports  during  the  end  of  April  and  May.  He  considers 
that  it  is  less  important  for  him  to  visit  England  than  China,  since  the  opinions  of 
leading  English  are  more  easily  found  in  their  articles  and  books  than  is  the  case 
with  the  Chinese. 

V.  In  re  Soviet  participation  at  Yosemite. 

(a)  Personnel :  ECC  said  that  he  was  anxious  to  have  as  large  a  delegation  as 
possible.  He  suggested  that  Romm  would  be  very  acceptable  to  the  other  coun- 
tries.    He  also  mentioned  Neymann. 

Motiliev  said  that  this  could  not  I)e  settled  immediately.  Romm  would  un- 
doubtedly represent  Izvestia,  and  might  be  a  member  of  the  delegation. 

(6)   Documentation:  Motiliev  reported : 

1.  The  Symposium  on  the  Soviet  Far  East  is  almost  ready.  The  last  articles 
are  going  to  be  received  soon.    By  the  end  of  May  it  should  be  printed  in  English. 

2.  The  Symposiixm  on  international  relations  in  the  Pacific  Area  will  be  ready 
at  the  same  time.  Most  of  the  articles  in  it  will  be  entirely  new,  but  they  may 
translate  some  of  the  articles  from  Tikhi  Okean.  He  asked  that  HM  give  an 
opinion  as  to  which  articles  would  be  more  interesting. 

3.  Nationality  Policy  in  the  Soviet  Far  East.  This  paper  was  to  be  prepared 
by  Dimanshtein.  H»^  is  very  busy  and  not  very  prompt.  His  secretary  says  that 
he  probalily  cannot  do  it  before  the  conference,  but  maybe  it  will  be  done 
afterwards. 

4.  Paper  on  Pacific  relations  in  general,  in  connection  with  the  fifth  round-table. 
This  paper  is  being  prepared  by  Motiliev.  It  should  be  ready  in  May.  He  does 
not  know  how  long  and  full  he  will  be  able  to  make  it. 

Motiliev  asked  if  May  would  be  too  late  for  the  papers. 

ECC  said  that  it  would  be  too  late  for  Australia  and  New  Zealand,  but  in  any 
case  the  most  important  use  of  the  documentation  comes  after  the  conference. 

Motiliev  said  that  It  might  be  possible  to  send  mimeographed  copies  earlier. 
He  said  that  the  two  symposiums  would  be  of  value  for  several  years  and  that 
the  Symposium  on  the  Soviet  Far  East  would  be  printed  in  50,000  copies,  since 
there  was  no  such  study  in  existence  here. 

Motiliev  said  that  part  of  the  Standard  of  Living  study  should  be  done  by  the 
conference.  This  is  being  written  by  Kravel  who  is  vice  president  of  Gosplan 
and  director  of  all  the  statistical  work. 

VI.  In  re  finance  and  budget. 

ECC  said  that  he  would  discuss  this  later  alone  with  Motiliev. 

VII.  In  re  international  secretariat  policy. 

Motiliev  said  that  Voitinsky  had  not  yet  read  ECC's  report  on  the  policy. 
He  thought  that  there  would  be  no  objections  in  principle,  although  there  might 
be  some  on  details.  He  said  that  he  had  received  a  letter  from  Honolulu 
criticizing  the  policy  and  would  like  to  discuss  the  whole  question  when  Voitinsky 
was  here. 

VIII.  In  re  HM's  visit  to  Buriat  Mongolia. 

Motiliev  said  that  he  would  be  only  too  glad  to  ari-ange  it,  but  due  to  the 
unstable  conditions  there,  it  was  impossible  to  arrange  it  at  present.  Last 
year  when  he  inquired  as  to  the  possibilities,  the  military  institutions  objected. 
At  present  Americans  are  allowed  in  Birobidjan.  With  Buriat-Mongolia  it  is 
just  a  question  of  time  until  the  conditions  become  normal.  If  HM  wants 
to  visit  other  minor  nationalities,  as  for  instance  in  the  Caucasus,  it  can  be 
arranged. 

IX.  In  re  Lattimore's  visit  to  Mongolia. 

Motiliev  said  tliat  the  same  thing  applies  to  Mongolia  as  to  Buriat-Mongolia, 
but  there  the  question  is  more  complicated  since  Mongolia  is  an  independent 
country.  Mongolia  now  is  constantly  ready  for  war  and  conditions  are  very 
unstable. 

There  is  a  Mongolian  representative  in  Moscow,  with  whom  Motiliev  spoke 
when  Lattimore  first  applied  for  permission.  This  representative  did  not  refuse, 
but  said  he  would  have  to  write  to  Ulan  Bator  for  permission  and  seemed  reluctant 
to  ti*y  to  get  permission.  Moreover,  there  would  not  have  been  sufficient  time 
to  arrange  this. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3319 

Motiliev  did  not  try  to  get  permission  through  Narkomindel.  Since  the 
U.  S.  S.  R.  IPR  is  in  no  way  connected  with  the  Narkomindel,  he  couldn't  try 
to  get  permission  from  them  witliout  the  approval  of  I>attimore  and  the  Institute. 

Lattimore  said  that  he  would  rather  not  go  by  getting  permission  via  Nar- 
komindel. 

Motiliev  said  that  it  would  then  be  necessary  to  wait  until  conditions  improved. 

X.  In  re  Soviet  critique  of  international  policy  of  IPR. 

Motiliev  said  that  he  would  like  to  wait  to  discuss  this  when  Voitinsky  was 
here.  He  said  that  he  did  not  think  there  would  be  any  critique  of  the  general 
policy  of  the  IPR.  There  would  be  definite  questions  about  Pacific  Affairs, 
not  as  to  its  policy  and  contents,  but  as  to  its  juridical  position  as  the  instru- 
ment of  tlie  IPR.  He  said  there  would  be  discussions  and  negotiations  in  con- 
nection with  the  question  of  preventing  the  publishing  of  articles  which  are  in 
some  way  harmful  to  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  IPR  position. 

Motiliev  said  that  although  there  were  few  subscriptions  to  Pacific  Affairs 
here,  it  was  read  by  many  specialists  and  they  found  it  very  interesting. 

Lattimore  said  that  he  would  also  like  to  discuss  the  institutional  position 
of  Pacific  Affairs. 

Motiliev  said  that  the  circulation  of  Tikhi  Okean  was  between  3,000  and  5,000. 
The  circulation  is  limited  by  a  lack  of  paper  rather  than  a  lack  of  readers.  "When 
he  was  in  the  Far  East  he  had  great  difficulty  in  finding  any  copies  and  it  is 
impossible  to  get  back  numbers. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  May  I  point  out  that  at  that  time,  I  don't  think 
that  my  knoAvledge  of  tlie  Russian  set-np  included  any  assumption 
that  the  fact  that  a  man  had  printed  something  for  the  Communist 
International  meant  that  he  held  a  position  on  the  Comintern. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  did  you  offer  to  supply  military  infor- 
mation to  the  Soviet  officials  of  the  Listitute  of  Pacific  Relations? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  don't  believe  I  did. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel.  will  you  identify  this  document,  please? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  before  proceeding  with  that,  I 
am  not  clear  on  one  position,  back  on  page  4. 

The  Chairman.  Of  the  last  exhibit  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

*  *  *  he  said  there  would  be  discussions  and  negotiations  in  connection 
with  the  question  of  preventing  the  publishing  of  articles  which  are  in  some 
way  harmful  to  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  IPR  position. 

In  these  previous  minutes  of  the  meeting  we  found  that  there  was 
to  be  a  line  or  policy,  and  we  find  articles  carrying  that  out. 

What  do  you  say  is  meant  by  "the  U.  S.  S.  R.  IPR  position"? 

Your  wife  just  handed  j^ou  a  paper.     Is  that  in  relation  to  it? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  in  relation  to  the  previous  questioning 
here  several  days  ago  about  the  question  of  line  in  Pacific  Affairs,  on 
which  I  should  like  to  make  some  amplifying  remarks. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  can  make  those  later. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  All  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  would  like  to  have,  though,  what  you  mean 
here,  or  what  was  meant  here  by  the  "U.  S.  S.  R.  IPR  position." 

Mr.  Lattimore,  I  have  no  recollection  of  Avhat  that  meant.  That 
is  something  I  didn't  write.  I  don't  remember  ever  seeing  these 
minutes  before,  and  it  seems  to  me  the  wording  is  rather  obscure,  but 
may  have  something  to  do  with  institutional  arrangements  at  that 
time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  does  it  not  sound  reasonable  that 
if  you  and  Mr.  Carter  were  to  make  up  reports  on  this  meeting  later — 
which  you  claim  that  you  did  and  which  was  in  your  possession  at  the 
time  you  wrote  the  book — that  you  would  get  the  minutes  that  were 
taken,  which  are  now  before  you? 


3320  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  it  doesn't,  Senator,  I  don't  think  that,  as  of 
1950,  I  knew  there  were  such  minutes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  am  not  talking  about  1950.  I  am  talking 
about  the  time  that  you  claim  the  reports  were  written. 

Mr.  Lattimore,  No  ;  I  would  write  a  report  on  my  own  recollections 
of  what  there  was  to  report  about. 

I  remember  that  at  the  Yosemite  Conference  in  1936  I  was  called 
upon  to  make  a  report  to  some  kind  of  special  committee  for  the  pur- 
pose, on  the  editorial  problems  and  policy  of  Pacific  Affairs,  and 
]:)resumably  there  was  some  reference  there  to  the  visit  that  I  had  just 
then  recently  made  to  Moscow,  the  details  of  which  were  presumably 
then  much  more  fresh  in  my  head. 

Senator  P'erguson.  But  is  it  not  clear,  from  the  minutes  of  the 
meetings  that  were  taken  by  the  IPR  and  placed  in  their  files,  that 
there  was  to  be  a  U.  S.  S.  E.  policy  line  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  do  you  explain  the  expression  that  I  read  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  expression  that  concerns  the  "preventing  the 
]:)ublishing  of  articles  which  are  in  some  way  harmful  to  the  U.  S.  S.  R. 
IPR  position." 

And  I  say  that  is  an  obscure  wording,  which  at  this  time  I  can't 
identify,  especially  as  I  didn't  write  it  and  don't  believe  I  have  ever 
seen  it  before. 

Senator  Ferguson,  But  taking  all  the  other  documents  that  we 
have  had  on  the  IPR,  your  meeting  in  Moscow,  is  it  not  a  fair  infer- 
once  that  there  was  a  policy  line  and  that  that  is  the  policy  line  that 
(hey  were  talking  about  there ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir,    I  see  no  reason  for  such  an  inference. 

May  I,  Senator  Ferguson,  at  this  moment  advert  to  the  question  of 
line,  as  it  was  discussed  the  other  day,  because  I  think  we  may  have 
been  talking 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  don't  have  any  question  now,  but  I  just  want 
to  say  that  I  cannot  agree  with  the  witness'  explanation  that  he  has 
given  at  all. 

Senator  Smith.  May  I  ask  one  question  about  this  line  ? 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  Senator  Smith. 

Senator  Smith.  Mr.  Lattimore,  where  this  memorandum,  prepared, 
l)y  Mr.  Carter,  says : 

He  said  there  would  be  discussions  aud  negotiations  in  connection  with  the 
question  of  preventing  the  publishing  of  articles  which  are  in  some  way  harmful 
to  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  IPR  position— 

does  not  that  sentence  indicate  that  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  position  and  the 
IPR  position  were  one  and  the  same,  because  it  is  in  the  singular  and 
refers  to  the  positions  of  the  two  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  wouldn't  be  my  conclusion.  Senator. 

Senator  Smith,  It  would  not  be? 

Mr,  Lattimore,  No, 

Senator  Smith,  What  would  be  your  conclusion  about  that,  then  ? 

Mr,  Lattimore,  Well,  as  I  said,  I  think  this  wording  is  very  ob- 
scure, but  it  seems  to  me  that  it  refers  to  a  U,  S,  S,  R.  and  IPR  posi- 
tion and  possibly  the  relationship  between  the  two. 

Senator  Smith,  It  does  not  say  "positions,"  Does  not  that  sentence 
indicate  that  they  are  one  and  the  same,  U,  S,  S,  R.  IPR  position? 

Mr.  Lattimore,  No,  sir. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3321 

Senator  Smith.  If  there  had  been  two,  would  not  that  have  said 
two,  phiral? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  To  put  what  I  said  before  in  a  different  way,  it 
might  refer  to  the  position  of  the  U.  S.  S.  E.  in  the  IPR. 

Senator  Smith.  Of  course,  it  did  not  say  that,  though,  did  it? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No.  That  is  what  I  say,  that  my  interpretation  is 
unauthoritative  and  I  think  the  whole  wording  is  obscure. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  was  not  there  a  new  policy  laid 
down  at  the  Moscow  meetings  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir ;  not  in  my  opinion. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  were  there  not  articles  published  in 
Pacific  Affairs  that  the  Soviet  officials  not  like  and  brought  up  with 
you? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  There  had. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  did  not  you  and  Mr.  Carter  say  that  there  had 
been  mistakes  in  publishing? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  would  have  to  review  the  transcript  at  that  point. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And,  Mr.  Lattimore,  did  they  object,  after  the 
meeting  in  Moscow,  to  any  articles  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  couldn't  recall  offliand. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  they  had  before  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  If  you  will  look  over  again  those  Moscow  memo- 
randa, one  of  the  things  that  stands  out  is  that  we  were  trying  to  get 
the  Russians  to  promise  to  contribute  articles,  which  never  came 
through. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  was  not  my  question  at  all. 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is,  you  and  Harriet  Moore  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  the  IPR. 

Mr.  Morris.  Who  was  with  you  at  the  time  ? 

Harriet  Moore  was  present,  was  she  not,  Mr.  Lattimore  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  think  she  was  one  of  those  present;  yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Was  she  a  Communist  at  that  time? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Not  to  my  knowledge. 

Mr.  Morris.  Was  Kathleen  Barnes  present  at  that  time  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  believe  so. 

Mr.  Morris.  She  was  present  at  these  meetings,  was  she  not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  think  so. 

Mr.  Morris.  Was  she  a  Communist  at  that  time,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Not  to  my  knowledge. 

Mr.  Morris.  You  know  they  both  have  refused  to  testify  before 
this  committee,  on  the  ground  that  their  answers  would  incriminate 
them,  when  asked  whether  or  not  they  were  members  of  the  Commu- 
nist Party. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  They  have  done  so,  to  my  great  astonishment  and 
distress. 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Smith. 

Senator  Smith.  Mr.  Chairman,  there  is  one  other  question  I  would 
like  to  ask  Mr.  Lattimore. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

Senator  Smith.  Mr.  Lattimore,  did  you  ever  have  a  copy  of  the 
U.  S.  S.  R.  handbook,  the  Soviet  Handbook  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  In  English,  or  Russian? 

Senator  Smith.  I  do  not  know.     Either  one. 

88348— 52— pt.  10 4 


3322  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Is  that  an  IPR  publication  ? 
Senator  Smith.  No. 

I  refer  to  the  third  paragraph  from  the  bottom  on  page  1  of  the 
exhibit — and  it  mentions  your  name  up  in  there — where  it  says : 

Motiliev  presented  everyone  with  a  copy  of  U.  S.  S.  R.  Handbook  published 
by  GoUanz.     *     *     * 

Then  it  also  refers  to  this : 

He  shows  Lattimore  the  new  Mongolian  Atlas  and  said  that  he  would  try  to 
get  a  copy  for  him. 

Do  you  remember  that  handbook  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No;  I  don't  remember  that  handbook. 

Senator  Smith.  You  do  not  have  it? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  may  have  it ;  I  don't  know. 

Senator  Smith.  All  right. 

The  Chairman.  Gentlemen,  I  think  we  will  recess  now  until  1 :  30, 
if  that  will  be  satisfactory  to  the  Senators. 

(Thereupon,  at  12:15  p.  m.,  the  subcommittee  recessed,  to  recon- 
vene at  1 :  30  p.  m.,  of  the  same  day.) 

after  recess 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order.  You  may  pro- 
ceed, Mr.  Morris. 

Mr.  Morris.  Senator,  I  had  reached  the  question,  did  you  offer  to 
supply  military  information  to  Soviet  officials  through  the  Institute 
of  Pacific  Relations,  and  the  witness,  I  believe,  had  answered  no. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  had  answered  that  I  had  no  recollection.  Since 
my  memory,  however,  is  incomplete,  if  you  have  a  document  to  re- 
fresh my  recollection  I  shall  be  glad  to  see  it. 

]\Ir.  Morris.  Have  you  identified  that  document,  Mr.  Mandel  ? 

Mr.  INIandel.  This  is  a  photostat  of  a  document  from  the  files  of 
the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  headed  "Meeting  April  6;  Motiliev; 
ECC;  OL;  FD;  Harondar;  HM,"  and  then  the  penciled  note  1936. 

Mr.  Morris.  Who  is  FD,  Mr.  Lattimore  ? 

]\Ir.  Lattimore.  I  don't  know  who  FD  was.  It  may  have  been  one 
of  Mr.  Carter's  secretaries. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  many  people  had  gone  over  to  this  meet- 
ing in  Moscow? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  My  wife  and  I  came  from  Peking,  accompanied 
by  Miss  Tyler,  who  had  been  doing  some  research  on  teaching  of 
English  in  China,  and  we  were  met  in  ISIoscow  by  Mr.  Carter,  Miss 
Moore,  and  a  secretary  of  INIr.  Carter's  whose  name  I  forget. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Could  that  be  the  name  that  has  been  given 
to  you  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  why  I  suggested  that  might  be,  FD,  yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Who  is  Harondar? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  He  was  secretary  of  the  Soviet  Council  of  the  IPR. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  you  discussed  mili- 
tary activities  at  all  at  that  meeting? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  no  present  recollection  of  it  whatever. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  will  this  be  introduced  into  the  record? 

The  Chairman.  Yes.     Have  you  identified  it  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Yes,  Mr.  Chairman,  we  have. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3323 

The  Chairman.  This  is  a  photostat  of  a  document? 

Mr.  Morris.  It  is  of  a  document  taken  from  the  files  of  the  Institute 
of  Pacific  Relations. 

The  Chairman.  And  so  testified  by  Mr.  Mandel  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  It  ma}-  be  inserted  in  the  record. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  519"  and  is 
as  follows:) 

Exhibit  No.  519 

Meeting  April  6  ;  Motiliev  ;  ECC  ;  OL ;  FD  ;  Harondar  ;  HM 

ECC  explained  about  Cressey's  proposed  study  of  Soviet  geography.  Motiliev 
said  that  in  principle  he  welcomed  the  idea,  as  there  was  so  little  work  done  in 
English  on  this  phase  of  the  Soviet  Union.  He  asked  whether  the  plan  included 
economic  geography.  ECC  answered  that  while  it  would  be  largely  physical 
geography,  some  attention  would  be  paid  to  economic  geography.  ECC  gave 
Motiliev  a  copy  of  Cressey's  outline  and  Motiliev  said  that  he  would  discuss  it 
later. 

In  re  the  preliminary  agenda  for  the  Conference:  Motiliev  said  that  the  ques- 
tions on  the  Soviet  Union  included  in  the  section  headed  "International  Implica- 
tions" reflect  a  negative  valuation  of  the  Soviet  Far  Eastern  policy.  E.  G.  the 
question  "Does  the  industrialization  of  the  Far  East  work  for  or  against  the 
Peace  Policy"  is  all  right  taken  by  itself,  but  wlien  grouped  with  many  other 
questions  of  this  nature,  the  general  impression  is  unfavorable  to  the  policy. 

Motiliev  said  that  some  of  the  questions  would  be  very  ditficult  to  answer,  since 
the  delegation  did  not  represent  Narkomindel  e.  g.  the  questions  of  the  strategic 
significance  of  industrialization  and  the  questions  on  Sinkiang. 

Motiliev  said  that  it  was  not  correct  to  lump  Sinkiang  and  Outer  Mongolia 
in  one  question.  Outer  Mongolia  is  an  independent  state  while  Sinkiang  is  part 
of  China.  The  policy  in  regard  to  Sinkiang  is  just  a  detail  of  the  general  policy 
in  regard  to  China.  It  is  true  that  Sinkiang  is  very  closely  linked  to  the  U.  S. 
S.  R.  economically  due  to  its  geographical  position,  but  it  is  part  of  China  politi- 
cally. Likewise  Outer  Mongolia  should  be  called  the  Mongolian  People's  Re- 
public to  keep  clear  the  difference  in  status  between  these  places. 

Motiliev  said  that  the  questions  reflect  the  fears  of  their  Far  Eastern  policy 
rather  than  the  real  essence  of  it. 

Some  of  the  questions  which  are  included  in  the  Soviet  section  would  be  im- 
possible for  them  to  answer,  e.  g.  the  question  of  whether  or  not  other  powers 
would  let  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  give  China  aid  in  its  reconstruction ;  question  in  re  Ger- 
man-.Tapanese  alliance  which  belongs  in  the  section  on  the  balance  of  power;  the 
question  in  re  U.  S.  recognition  (No.  47). 

In  the  questions  on  other  countries  many  of  the  real  problems  of  the  Pacific  are 
not  treated  adequately,  e.  g.  the  question  of  naval  rivalry  ;  of  English-.Iapanese- 
Chinese  relations;  of  America n-.Iapanese  relations  and  American  interests  in 
China;  of  American  public  opinion  in  re  the  Far  East  (does  the  opinion  of  the 
authors  of  Empire  in  the  East,  not  including  Pfeffer,  reflect  the  opinion  of  the 
general  people,  of  the  intelligensia,  or  of  the  controlling  groups  of  bankers,  etc.?) . 
Many  of  these  questions  need  additions  and  changes. 

Motiliev  said  that  some  of  the  more  fundamental  problems  and  analyses 
would  be  included  e.  g.  in  his  data  paper  he  was  going  try  to  show  that  Orchard's 
analysis  of  Japan  was  illogical.  (Lorwin  agreed  with  Motiliev's  criticisms  of 
Orchard.)  He  feel  that  the  analysis  is  superficial.  Orchard  finds  that  the 
density  of  population  and  the  lack  of  land  are  the  fundamental  problems  for 
Japan.  If  this  is  true  then  expansion  is  the  only  way  out,  and  this  justifies 
expansion  as  in  the  increases  of  the  whole  nation.  Orchard's  contentions  are 
not  supported  statistically.  Penrose,  for  instance  does  not  come  to  the  same 
conclusions  about  the  population.  Motiliev  will  try  to  prove  that  the  funda- 
mental problems  are  in  the  internal  structure  of  the  society  and  can  be  solved 
by  changing  that  structure.  One  of  the  main  problems  is  the  fact  that  there 
are  remnants  of  feudalism  mixed  up  with  capitalism.  For  instance  70  percent 
of  the  agricultural  population  are  tenants. 

Another  interesting  question  is  about  the  real  causes  for  the  American  with- 
drawal from  the  Philippines.  Motiliev  found  Quincy  Wright's  analysis  very 
convincing. 


3324  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Motiliev  said  that  there  were  many  articles  in  Pacific  Affairs  with  which 
they  did  not  agree.  After  the  organizational  question  of  P.  A.  has  been  dis- 
cussed, they  would  like  to  discuss  some  of  these  articles. 

In  re  question  48,  on  the  effect  of  U.  S.  recognition  of  the  U.  S.  S.  R.,  ECC  said 
that  Roosevelt  probably  thought  that  recognition  had  prevented  Japanese  in- 
vasion of  Siberia.  Motiliev  said  that  the  main  thing  that  had  prevented  that 
was  the  military  preparation  of  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  U.  S.-U.  S.  S.  R.  relations 
have  not  been  close.    They  have  been  passive  both  economically  and  politically. 

Motiliev  said  that  questions  that  have  no  direct  political  significance  should 
be  included  e.  g.  the  questions  of  the  economic  development  of  the  Aleutian 
Islands  and  Alaska,  and  the  Kurile  Islands.  Although  the  strategic  import- 
ance of  these  places  may  have  greater  significance,  it  would  be  interesting  to 
know  of  their  economic  importance.  The  Japanese  have  a  fuelling  station  very 
near  Kamachatka,  which  is  in  reality  a  military  base. 

Motiliev  suggested  that  in  order  to  prepare  the  final  agenda,  each  Coimcil 
be  asked  to  submit  proposals  and  changes.  These  suggestions  should  then  be 
sent  to  the  Councils  concerned  with  the  question  for  approval  or  disapproval. 
He  does  not  want  to  have  questions  included  which  are  embarrassing  to  any 
of  the  Councils.  ECC  said  that  previously  those  questions  were  included  which 
were  approved  by  three  or  four  Councils.  The  publication  of  the  preliminary 
agenda  in  IPR  Notes  was  done  in  an  effort  to  get  such  criticisms  and  suggestions 
from  all  the  Councils. 

Motiliev  said  that  another  interesting  question  was  whether  the  position  re- 
flected in  Empire  in  the  East  was  due  to  the  fact  that  questions  of  internal 
recovery  had  been  so  important  in  the  last  few  years.  If  this  were  so,  the 
position  might  be  just  temporary. 

Motiliev  said  that  the  British  Policy  in  the  Pacific  was  the  key  to  the  situa- 
tion. The  policy  is  very  indefinite  and  vaccilating,  just  as  in  the  European 
policy  of  England.  While  it  was  possible  to  see  the  general  line,  it  was  impossible 
to  know  what  the  policy  would  be  tomorrow.  He  asked  about  the  possibility  of 
a  renewal  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance,  and  expressed  the  opinion  that  in  the 
next  few  years  it  would  be  impossible,  and  on  the  contrary  there  would  be  grow- 
ing contradictions  between  England  and  Japan.  OL  said  that  in  an  article  by 
Asiaticus  for  PA  on  Financial  Imi>erialism  in  the  Far  East,  the  opinion  was 
expressed  that  England  was  drifting  toward  recognition  of  Japanese  pre- 
dominance in  North  China ;  consolidation  of  British  influence  and  interests  in 
South  China ;  and  the  establishment  of  a  "common  hunting  ground"  in  the 
Yangtze  valley.  At  the  same  time  Japan  will  not  recognize  a  British  sphere  in 
China,  even  if  it  is  of  much  smaller  size.  OL  said  that  there  was  great  opposi- 
tion to  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  in  England  from  the  navy,  the  interests  on 
the  China  Coast,  the  home  financial  interests,  and  from  the  Dominions.  This 
is  reflected  in  the  British  attitude  toward  the  Philippines.  Motiliev  said  that 
the  British  want  tlie  U.  S.  to  keep  the  Philippines  to  act  as  a  wall  between  Japan 
and  the  Empire. 

Motiliev  said  that  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  the  general  opinion  as  to  the  cause  of 
the  U.  S.  liberation  of  the  Philippines  was  that  they  were  very  complex.  The 
interests  of  the  sugar  industry  were  very  important  but  not  decisive.  Here  it  is 
considered  that  it  was  a  conscious  step  taken  by  the  U.  S.  government  to  bring 
greater  British  activity  in  the  Pacific.  This  is  the  idea  expressed  by  Quincy 
Wright.  Another  idea  is  that  from  the  military  point  of  view  the  U.  S.  is  glad 
not  to  have  to  protect  the  Philippines  which  are  practically  impossible  to  de- 
fend. On  the  other  hand  the  independence  is  not  real  and  for  the  next  ten  years 
the  U.  S.  has  the  right  to  defend  and  use  the  Islands  for  military  bases. 

01  asked  if  there  was  any  special  interest  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  about  the  ques- 
tion of  air  bases  in  the  Pacific.  Motiliev  said  tliat  formerly  the  Soviet  attitude 
was  that  war  in  the  Pacific  between  Japan  and  the  U.  S.  was  impossible  because 
of  the  distance  between  them.  Now  the  development  of  aviation  has  changed 
this.  The  question  of  Guam  is  considered  important  here.  Motiliev  said  that 
the  Trans-Pacific  air  service  was  considei*ed  primarily  of  military  importance 
in  the  Soviet  Press,  but  it  of  course  had  some  commercial  value.  ECC  said  that 
he  thought  the  Trans-Pacific  line  was  started  partly  to  keep  the  British  Im- 
perial line  out  of  that  service;  and  partly  because  of  the  American  idea  that 
China  was  the  great  potential  market  for  the  U.  S.  INIotiliev  said  that  at  present 
the  competition  between  different  countries  on  technical  aspects  of  aviation 
is  very  great.  The  development  of  stratosphere  airplanes  was  of  greatest  signi- 
ficance. In  April  there  is  to  be  a  conference  of  specialists  on  this  question 
here. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3325 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  will  you  read  the  last  paragraph  of  that 
document  ? 

The  Chairman.  The  last  paragraph,  did  you  say  ? 
Mr.  Morris.  That  is  right,  Mr.  Chairman. 
Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

OL  asked  if  there  was  any  special  interest  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  about  the  question 
of  air  bases  in  the  Pacific.  ^lotiliev  said  tliat  formerly  the  Soviet  attitude  was 
that  war  in  the  Pacific  between  Japan  and  the  United  States  was  impossible  be- 
cause of  the  distance  between  them.  Now  the  development  of  aviation  has 
changed  this.  The  question  of  Guam  is  considered  impoi'taut  here.  Motiliev 
said  that  the  Trans-Pacific  Air  Service  was  considered  primarily  of  military 
importance  in  the  Soviet  press,  but  it  of  course  had  some  commercial  value. 
P^CC  said  that  he  thought  the  Trans-Pacific  line  was  started  partly  to  keep  the 
British  Imperial  line  out  of  that  service ;  and  partly  because  of  the  American 
idea  that  China  was  the  great  potential  market  for  the  United  States.  Motiliev 
said  that  at  present  the  competition  between  different  countries  on  technical 
aspects  of  aviation  is  very  great.  The  development  of  stratosphere  airplanes 
was  of  greatest  significance.  In  April  there  is  to  be  a  conference  of  specialists 
on  this  question  here. 

The  Chairman.  What  is  the  next  question  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Wlien  you  dealt  with  the  Soviet  officials  in  Moscow,  Mr. 
Lattimore,  did  you  deal  with  them  as  if  they  could  possibly  be  Com- 
munist intelligence  agents? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No.  We,  at  least  I,  assumed  that  they  were  all  con- 
nected with  the  Soviet  Government  in  one  form  or  another,  but  we 
had  no  knowledge  of  the  individual  status  of  the  people  beyond  the 
way  they  described  themselves  when — you  know,  when  we  were  intro- 
duced, and  so  on. 

Of  course,  at  the  present  time,  I  would  generally  assume  that  any 
Soviet  citizen  or  subject  is  an  intelligence  agent  or  a  potential  one. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  back  when  you  were  discussing 
these  problems  with  these  people,  you  knew  that  they  were  Govern- 
ment officials? 
Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And,  therefore,  anything  that  you  told  them 
could  be  used  by  their  Government  ? 
Mr.  Lattimore,  Of  course  it  could. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well  then,  how  do  you  distinguish  between  an 
intelligence  agent  now  and  one  then  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  suppose  I  mean  in  terms  of  belonging  to  organized 
intelligence  services  of  any  country.  But,  of  course,  we  had  no  great 
concern  on  the  subject  since  nobody  connected  with  the  IPE.  had  access 
to  secret  information  of  any  kind.  We  were  entirely  an  organization 
dealing  with  published  materials  in  the  open  market,  and  international 
discussion. 

Senator  Ferguson.  "Wliy  w^ere  you  then  discussing  this  question 
of  war  bases  in  the  Pacific  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  was  asking  if  they  would  be  interested  in  an 
article  in  Pacific  Affairs  on  the  subject.  During  my  editorship  of 
Pacific  Affairs  in  those  years,  we  published  an  article  on  submarine 
warfare  as  related  to  possibilities  of  submarine  warfare,  as  related 
to  Japan.     That  was  by  an  American  author. 

We  had  an-  article  on  the  significance  of  the  Dutch  Navy  in  the 
Pacific  generally,  that  was  by  a  Dutch  naval  officer  or  former  naval 
officer.     We  had  articles  on  guerrilla  warfare  in  China,  and  so  forth. 


3326  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Senator  Ferguson.  But,  Mr.  Lattimore,  if  a  person  had  written  the 
article  that  you  had  an  interest  in  mind,  in  the  first  sentence,  he  would 
have  had  to  obtain  some  information  from  the  United  States  along 
that  line. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  wouldn't  say  so.  Senator.  That  is,  any  more 
than  we  had  to  obtain  information  from  Government  sources  for 
the  other  articles  we  wrote  on  general  questions  of  strategy  in  the 
Pacific. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Where  would  you  get  the  information  if  you 
did  not  get  it  from  our  Government? 

OL  asked  if  there  was  any  special  interest  in  tlie  U.  S.  S.  R.  about  the  question 
of  air  bases  in  the  Pacific. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Well,  Senator,  as  of  1936  I  should  say  that  the  ob- 
vious question  in  that  connection  was  Singapore,  about  which  a  great 
deal  had  been  published.  There  had  been  a  good  deal  of  discussion 
about  whether  Singapore,  as  an  air  base,  was  a  substitute  for  a  naval 
base  or  in  addition  to  its  use  as  a  naval  base,  and  so  on. 

There  was  wide  area  of  discussion  of  that  kind  of  problem. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  ever  write  any  articles  or  have  them 
written  on  this  question? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  we  never  did,  and  I  don't  believe — no,  I  think 
I  can  be  quite  sure  in  saying  that  we  didn't  even  approach  anyone 
to  write  such  an  article. 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  Mr.  Morris. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  read  another  paragraph 
here. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Is  this  from  the  same  minutes? 

Mr.  Morris.  From  the  same  minutes.  I  am  reading  now  a  para- 
graph beginning  with  "Motiliev  said  that  questions" — it  is  in  the  mid- 
dle of  page  2 : 

Motiliev  said  that  questions  that  have  no  direct  political  significance  should  be 
included,  e.  s-,  the  questions  of  the  economic  development  of  the  Aleutian  Is- 
lands and  Alaska,  and  the  Kurile  Islands.  Although  the  strategic  importance 
of  these  places  may  have  greater  significance,  it  would  be  interesting  to  know 
of  their  economic  importance.  The  Japanese  have  a  fueling  station  very  near 
Kamchatka,  which  is  in  reality  a  military  base. 

Then  there  are  other  paragraphs  here  along  the  same  nature.  Mr, 
Chairman,  the  whole  thing  is  in  the  record. 

I  would  like  to  ask  Dr.  Lattimore:  In  view  of  the  desires  being 
expressed  by  the  Soviet  officials  here,  whether  or  not  General  Bar- 
mine's  testimony  to  the  effect  that  the  Soviet  military  intelligence  was 
using  IPE  as  a  cover  shop  to  secure  military  information  from  the 
United  States  and  from  Japan  and  China,  whether  or  not  that 
becomes  plausible. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  think  it  is  absolutely  implausible.  It  seems 
to  me  that  these  are  perfectly  legitimate  questions  for  general  discus- 
sion as  possibilities  for  articles  in  an  international  publication  in  1936. 

We  did,  in  fact,  have  articles  on  the  Soviet  fisheries  in  the  North 
Pacific,  and  on  the  disputes  between  the  Russians  and  the  Japanese 
over  those  fisheries,  involving  Kamchatka  and  the  Kurile  Islands, 
and  so  on.  So  if  you  want  to  be  very  far-fetched  and  say  that  this 
kind  of  thing  was  intelligence  information,  it  was  intelligence  infor- 
mation about  the  Russians  rather  than  to  them. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3327 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  that  not  a  fact,  that  Mr.  Carter  has  already 
testified  that  when  he  returned  from  some  of  these  trips  he  reported 

toourG-2?  .  o       .       -17 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  remember  that  testimony,  Senator  J^er- 

guson. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Would  you  say  that  you  had  never  heard  that 

he  had  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  This  is  the  first  time  I  remember  hearing  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Were  you  ever  requested  to  report  to  G-2  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  been  asked  to  meet  with  various  groups  of 
people 

The  Chairman.  That  is  not  the  question. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Of  our  Armed  Forces  after  returning  from  trips ; 
not  specifically  G-2,  as  far  as  I  know. 

Senator  Ferguson.  If  it  was  not  specifically,  when  you  returned 
is  it  not  true  that  you  reported  to  some  of  our  Armed  Forces? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  was  asked  to  give  general  talks  about  my  observa- 
tions abroad  to  groups  that  included  military  personnel,  yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  did  it  not  include  G-2  officers? 

Mr.  Latitmore.  I  couldn't  be  precise  about  that  without  having  a 
list  of  the  people  who  attended. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  were  you  not  asked  questions  about  it? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  My  memory  is  very  unclear  at  the  present  time.  I 
think  that  I  was  asked  my  opinion  about  this  and  that,  yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  being  true,  did  you  not  feel  that  the  Rus- 
sian authorities  would  be  questioned  by  at  least  their  intelligence 
officers,  if  they  were  not  intelligence  officers  themselves? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir.  As  of  1936  I  had  no  feelings  of  the  kind 
because  I  didn't  have  experience  of  that  kind. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  have  had  no  feeling  about  it  atall? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  had  no  feeling  about  it  at  all.  If  questions  of  real 
military  importance  had  come  up,  I  would  certainly  have  mentioned 
them  to,  for  instance,  Colonel  Faymonville,  who  was  our  military 
attache  in  Moscow  under  Ambassador  Bullitt. 

Mr.  Morris.  Was  that  not  the  Colonel  Faymonville  who  was  sent 
back  because  he  was  too  pro-Soviet,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  know  for  what  reason  he  was  sent  back. 
I  know  that  there  is  a  tribute  to  him  in  a  book  by  former  Assistant 
Secretary  Sumner  Welles  as  being  the  best-informed  military  officer 
we  had  on  Russia. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Of  course,  that  would  not  conflict  with  the  fact 
that  he  was  pro-Russian? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  As  far  as  I  knew  Colonel  Faymonville,  I  had  no 
reason  to  consider  him  pro-Russian. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  many  times  would  you  say  that  you  had 
been  interviewed  by  our  authorities  on  the  question,  for  instance,  of 
this  trip  to  Moscow  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  On  this  trip  to  ISIoscow,  I  don't  remember  any  ques- 
tioning. I  do  remember  having  dinner  at  the  American  Embassy  with 
various  Embassy  personnel,  at  which  Colonel  Faymonville  and  others 
were  present,  and  which  the  general  subject  of  our  talks  with  the  Rus- 
sians was  a  part  of  the  topic  of  conversation. 

Senator  Ferguson.  ^Y[\o  was  the  Ambassador  at  that  time? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  William  Bullitt. 


3328  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  visit  any  high  Russian  officials  at  that 
time? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  At  Ambassador  Bullitt's  suggestion,  he  took  me  to 
see  a  Russian  official.  I  think  he  was  a  Vice  Commissar  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  or  something  of  that  sort. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  what  did  you  talk  about? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  gave  some  opinions  on  Inner  Mongolia.  May  I 
explain  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Just  about  at  this  time,  there  had  been  some  clashes 
on  the  Outer  Mongolia  frontier,  between  the  Russian  and  Mongol 
forces  and  the  Japanese.  Roy  Howard  had  just  had  an  interview  with 
Stalin,  at  which  Stalin  had  made  what  was  then  considered  a  sensa- 
tional statement  that  the  Russians  would  defend  Outer  Mongolia  in 
case  of  any  invasion. 

Li  connection  with  this,  Ambassador  Bullitt  asked  me  about  supple- 
mentary information  from  Inner  Mongolia.  I  didn't  know  Outer 
Mongolia.  But  he  was  asking  about  general  conditions  in  Inner  Mon- 
golia. And  I  told  him  what  I  knew,  and  my  opinions  about  it  as  of 
that  time,  and  I  believe  I  mentioned  the  fact  that  the  Russians  had  at- 
tacked my  publications  on  the  subject  and  had  very  strongly  insinuated 
that  I  was  pro-Japanese,  and  so  on. 

Mr.  Bullitt  said,  "Well,  I  think  what  you  are  saying  is  extremely 
interesting,  and  I  think  the  Russians  ought  to  hear  about  it.  Suppose 
I  fix  up  an  appointment.    Would  you  mind  talking  to  them?" 

I  said,  "No;  I  will  say  to  them  just  what  I  have  said  to  you,  if  you 
think  that  is  all  right." 

So  he  made  the  appointment  and  took  me  down  there  and,  in  his 
presence,  I  talked  with  the  Soviet  Vice  Commissar. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  meet  anyone  else  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  believe  we  met  anyone  else. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Just  the  one  occasion  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  know  it  was  just  that  one  occasion. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  Mr.  Chairman,  miglit  I  inquire  ? 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Is  this  Colonel  Faymonville  that  you  are  speaking 
of  here,  is  he  the  same  Colonel  Faymonville  about  whom  Mr.  Carter 
wrote  you  in  June  of  1941,  that  letter  which  went  into  the  record 
yesterday  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Are  you  saying  now  that  you  knew  Colonel  Fay- 
monville as  early  as  1936  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  first  met  him  in  Moscow  in  1936. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Do  you  know  whether  Mr.  Carter  knew  that  you 
knew  him  ? 

Mr.  Lai^iimore.  I  presume  he  did,  since  we  were  both  in  Moscow 
at  the  same  time.     He  may  have  forgotten,  of  course. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  In  his  letter  of  June  20,  1941,  Mr.  Carter  suggested 
that  if  you  had  time  in  San  Francisco  you  and  Mr.  Holland  might 
want  to  arrange  a  private  talk  with  Colonel  Faymonville,  and  he 
gave  the  headquarters,  and  then  he  described  him  to  you. 

He  said,  "He  would,  I  think,  have  been  thoroughly  at  home  and  atj 
ease  if  he  had  luncheon  with  us  at  the  Mayflower  on  Wednesday."     ■ 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3329 

That  was  that  hincheon  with  Ambassador  Oumansky,  was  it  not? 
Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  And  he  said,  "I  think  yon  get  the  idea.  It  may 
be  that  if  yon  get  the  same  favorable  impression  of  him  which  Har- 
riet Moore  and  I  have,  he  might  be  someone  who  conld  be  exception- 
ally nseful  to  yon  and  the  Generalissimo  at  some  fntnre  time  in 
Chungking." 

Would  you  take  it  from  that  that  Mr.  Carter  knew  that  you  knew 
Mr.  Faymonville  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  is  not  clear  to  me  from  that  whether  he  knew 
it  or  not.  I  would  assume  he  knew  it  since  we  were  both  in  Moscow 
at  the  same  time  and  dined  at  the  Embassy  together,  and  so  on. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  Do  you  know  definitely  whether  Mr.  Carter  knew 
that  you  were  acquainted  with  Colonel  Faymonville? 

Mr,  Lattimore.  I  don't  know  definitely. 

Mr.  SotjRwiNE.  Thank  you. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  May  I  explain  a  little  bit  more?  One  reason  why 
I  personally  was  very  much  interested  in  Colonel  Faymonville  was 
the  fact  that  he  had  started  life  as  an  expert  on  Japan  rather  than 
Russia.  He  spoke  Japanese  in  addition  to  Russian,  and  there  were 
very  few  American  military  or  civil  personnel  who  had  that  kind  of 
accomplishment.  Hence,  I  would  think  that  Faymonville's  opinions 
on  questions  in  northeast  Asia,  involving  both  Japan  and  Russia, 
would  be  valuable  opinions. 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  Mr.  Morris. 

Mr.  Morris.  Before  this  next  document,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would 
like  the  record  to  show  that  the  last  paragraph  makes  no  mention 
of  Mr.  Lattimore  supplying  an  article. 

The  first  sentence  is:  "OL  asked  if  there  was  any  special  interest 
in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  about  the  question  of  air  bases  in  the  Pacific." 

Mr.  Lattimore,  did  Soviet  officials  collect  economic  and  financial 
information  on  China  and  Japan  for  the  IPR? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  remember  whether  they  did  or  not,  but 
if  3^ou  have  a  document  on  the  subject  to  refresh  my  memoiy  I  shall 
be  glad  to  see  it. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Mr.  Morris,  are  you  about  to  leave  this  document? 

Mr.  Morris.  Yes. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Before  we  leave,  may  I  ask  a  question  ? 

You  will  recall,  Mr.  Lattimore,  that  on  a  previous  occasion  we  have 
discussed  here  the  meeting  of  the  8th  of  April. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  That  was  the  meeting  at  which  the  minutes  indi- 
cated that  you  had  spoken  of  an  article  by  a  Communist  writer  to 
be  published  in  Pacific  Affairs. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

IMr.  Sourwine.  And  we  had  some  colloquy  about  whether  you  were 
referring  to  Asiaticus.  The  memorandum  subsequently,  that  is,  in 
one  of  its  latter  paragraphs,  did  mention  Asiaticus. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  I  believe  some  point  was  made  of  the  fact  that  that 
]nention  of  Asiaticus  in  the  same  memorandum  was  quite  some  time 
subsequent  to  the  mention  of  an  article  by  the  Communist  writer. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes. 


3330  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  I  would  like  to  call  your  attention  to  the  fact  tliat 
in  this  document,  being  the  minutes  of  the  meeting  of  April  6,  there 
is  also  mention  of  Asiaticus,  and  I  ask  yon  if  you  recall  that  there 
had  been  such  mention  at  the  conference  which  this  document  pur- 
ports to  recount? 

Mr.  Lattimore,  No  ;  I  don't  recall  it. 

This,  again,  is  a  copy  of  some  minutes  that  I  don't  remember 
seeing  at  the  time  or  since.  But,  looking  over  those  previous  min- 
utes, something  has  occurred  to  me  which  might  clarify  the  questions 
you  were  asking  me  at  that  time  about  deadline  for  Pacific  Affairs, 
and  so  on. 

There  are  two  points  here :  One  is  that  I  was  not  in  control  of 
the  daedline  of  Pacific  Affairs;  that  thatw  as  all  handled  in  Wash- 
ington, and  sometimes — in  New  York,  I  mean — and  sometimes  I 
didn't  know  until  an  issue  came  out  exactly  what  was  in  it. 

The  other  thing  is  that  very  possibly,  as  subject  matter  for  these 
discussions  with  the  Kussians,  I  had  with  me  carbon  copies  of  what 
I  was  expecting  to  be  in  the  "June  issue  of  Pacific  Affairs,  and  that 
therefore  the  next  issue  would  refer  to  the  September  issue.  That 
is  a  possibility.    But  it  might  straighten  things  out. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  Mr.  Lattimore,  as  bearing  on  the  question  of 
whether  the  article  by  Asiaticus  did  appear  in  the  June  issue,  was 
in  fact  in  existence  at  the  time  of  these  conferences,  you  will  note 
that  at  the  bottom  of  page  2,  beginning  in  the  middle  of  the  para- 
graph, these  minutes  read : 

OL  said  that  in  an  article  by  Asiaticus  for  PA  on  financial  imperialism  in 
the  Far  East,  the  opinion  was  expressed  that  England  was  drifting  toward 
recognition  of  Japanese  predominance  in  north  China ;  consolidation  of  British 
influence  and  interests  in  south  China,  and  the  establishment  ot  a  "common 
hunting  ground"  in  the  Yangtze  Valley. 

That  would  indicate  that  the  article  was  in  being  at  that  time, 
would  it  not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  would  indicate  that  it  was  in  being  in  manu- 
script. 

Mr.  Sourw^ine.  At  least  in  manuscript  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  At  least  in  manuscript ;  yes. 

The  Chairman.  All  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  1  want  to  offer  at  this  time  for 
the  appendix  of  the  record  an  article  about  Gen.  Philip  R.  Faymon- 
ville,  military  aide  to  President  Eoosevelt,  who  "has  spent  15  years  in 
the  U.  S.  S.  P.  His  views  on  Soviet  aims  are  somewhat  at  variance 
with  'Red  menace'  tales." 

Tliis  is  an  article  in  the  Daily  People's  World,  Friday,  February 
18,  1949. 

I  think  this  paper  has  been  described,  has  it  not? 

Mr.  Mandel.  Yes,  sir;  described  in  connection  with  the  Senator 
Knowland  comment. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes;  the  editorial.  And  also  of  the  ad  con- 
cerning the  witness'  book. 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  described  as  a  Communist  paper? 

Mr.  Mandel.  That  is  correct. 

The  Chairman.  You  want  that  to  go  into  the  appendix  of  the 
record  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3331 

The  Chairman.  All  right. 

(The  document  referred  to  appears  in  the  appendix  of  the  record 
as  exhibit  No.  472  on  3700.) 

Mr.  Morris.  The  next  question  is,  Did  Soviet  officials  like  the  mili- 
tancy of  Amerasia  and  understand  why  Pacific  Affairs  could  not  quite 
take  the  same  line  ? 

The  ChairjMan.  Let  us  hear  the  question  again. 

Mr.  Morris.  The  question  to  Mr.  Lattimore  is,  Did  Soviet  officials 
like  the  militancy  of  Amerasia  and  understand  why  Pacific  Affairs 
could  not  quite  take  the  same  line? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  They  may  have. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  identify  this  document,  please? 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  is  a  photostat  of  a  carbon  copy  from  the  files  of 
the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  dated  July  11,  1939,  addressed  to 
Mr.  Owen  Lattimore,  with  the  typed  signature  of  Edward  C.  Carter. 

The  Chairman.  It  will  be  shown  to  the  witness. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  do  you  recall  having  received  that 
lett^^r? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  must  have  received  it.     I  don't  recall  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  that  go  into  the  record? 

Tlie  Chairman.  It  has  been  identified. 

Mr.  Morris.  I  would  like  the  witness  to  read  that  letter,  commenc- 
hig  at  the  outset. 

JNIr.  Lattimore.  Dated  July  11, 1939,  on  board  steamshijD  Aquitania. 

(Exhibit  No.  520) 

Dear  Owen  :  The  Chinese  are  more  unanimously  enthusiastic  about  Pacific 
Affairs  than  the  members  of  any  other  group. 

I  might  mention,  of  course,  that  this  means  the  Chinese  of  the 
official  Chinese  Council : 

Franklin  Ho  was  immensely  impressed  by  Guenther  Stein's  The  Yen  and 
the  Sword.  Ushiba  assured  me  that  the  office  of  the  Japanese  Council  was  taking 
seriously  your  request  for  additional  Japanese  articles.  Motylev  was  eager 
for  much  more  intimate  factual  details  giving  both  very  recent  economic  infor- 
mation and  also  personal  observations  as  to  what  is  going  on  in  China  and  Japan. 

As  you  will  see  from  the  enclosed  copy  of  my  letter  to  Jaffe,  he  likes  the  mili- 
tancy of  Amerasia.  He  recognizes  that  Pacific  Affairs  cannot  quite  take  this  line 
but  lie  still  insists  that  no  one  can  legitimately  criticize  you  if  you  do  decide 
to  adopt  his  request  to  you  of  3  years  ago  that  Pacific  Affairs  come  out  strong 
consistently  and  repeatedly  for  the  collective  system. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  may  I  interrupt  your  letter 
there  ?     Is  that  not  going  back  to  your  meeting  with  them  in  Moscow  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  going  back  to  that  meeting  and  indicating 
that  apparently  Motylev  considered  that  for  3  years  I  have  not  ful- 
filled his  suggestion  that  Pacific  Affairs  take  a  stronger  line  de- 
nouncing Japanese  aggression. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Does  it  not  also  show  the  opposite,  that  also  you 
had  agreed  at  that  time  with  the  Russians  to  take  a  line  for  the 
Russians  'I 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  it  doesn't.  It  indicates  that  at  that  time  the 
Russians  repeatedly  brought  up  the  idea  that  Pacific  Affairs  should 
take  an  editorial  line  of  characterizing  Japanese  policy  in  China  as 
aggression,  and  we  repeatedly  pointed  out  that  Pacific  Affairs  was 
controlled  by  a  number  of  National  Councils,  and  that  we  had  to  try 


3332  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

to  please  everybody,  and  usually  wound  up  by  displeasing  somebody 
in  practically  every  issue. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Had  the  Kussians  asked  you  to  use  your  maga- 
zine, the  Pacific  Affairs,  to  advocate  the  collective  system? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  What  is  clearly  meant  here  by  collective  system  is 
collective  security  system. 

The  Chairman.  Now  go  back  to  the  question,  please. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  he  request  you,  when  you  were  in  Mos- 
cow  

Mr.  Lait'imore.  I  don't  remember  that  request  in  Moscow.  As  I 
remember  just  now,  the  minutes  don't  show  it,  but  Carter  after  8  years 
apparently  feels  that  that  was  the  general  tenor  of  the  conversation. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  is  not  that  all  they  are  talking  about? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Because  characterizing  the  Japanese  policy  in 
Asia  as  aggression  would  be  one  way  of  saying,  "Well,  there  ought  to 
be  some  collective  security  measures  taken  through  the  League  of 
Nations  to  stop  it." 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  not  Eussia  enter  into  a  pact  with  Japan  on 
this  question  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  next  year. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  next  year  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Some  8  months  later. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  does  not  this  indicate  that  at  least  one 
thing  was  discussed,  that  collective  system  by  you  and  the  Russian 
people  at  the  Russian  meeting  in  Moscow  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  indicates  that  from  Mr.  Carter's  recollection 
3  years  later,  it  was  that  we  talked  about  collective  security. 

iSenator  Ferguson.  Does  it  say  collective  security  there  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  context  clearly  indicates 
collective  security. 

The  Chairman.  The  question  is:  Does  it  say  collective  security. 
Can  you  not  answer  that  question  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  What  it  says  is  "come  out  strong  consistently  and 
repeatedly  for  the  collective  system."  And  I  can  read  the  context  in 
no  other  way  than  meaning  collective-security  system. 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  Senator,  are  there  any  further  questions  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Not  at  the  moment. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Mr.  Morris,  did  you  want  Mr.  Lattimore  to  con- 
tinue reading  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Yes.  But  my  question  was — there  were  two  points 
that  I  made  there — one  of  the  questions  was  did  Soviet  officials  collect 
economic  and  financial  information  on  Japan  through  the  IPR,  and 
did  Soviet  officials  like  the  militancy  of  Amerasia  and  understand  why 
Pacific  Affairs  could  not  quite  take  the  same  line. 

Question  two  was  partly  answered  by  the  first  paragraph,  but  it 
will  not  be  answered  until  we  get  to  the  paragraph  starting: 

One  of  Motylev's  most  urgent  requests  was  for  information  regarding  Chinese 
internal  economic  and  financial  position. 

However,  if  the  witness  would  like  to  read  the  whole  letter,  I  have 
no  objection. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  answered  Senator  Ferguson  that  the  difference 
referred  to  here  between  Amerasia  and  Pacific  Affairs  can  easily  and 
clearly  be  established ;  namely,  that  Amerasia  did  repeatedly  charac- 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3333 

terize  Japanese  policy  in  China  as  imperialism,  Amerasia  being  an 
^Vmerican  magazine  published  in  America,  and  therefore  quite  able 
to  be  strong  on  such  a  subject;  whereas,  Pacific  iVffairs,  being  under 
the  control  of  a  number  of  National  Councils,  some  of  whom  objected 
to  characterizing  one  member  of  the  Institute  as  an  aggressor,  was 
always  much  milder  in  that  respect. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  ever  have  any  doubt  that  the  Amerasia 
was  a  Communist  magazine  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  never  occurred  to  me  to  think  that  Amerasia  was 
a  Communist  magazine.  If  you  will  go  back  over  the  issues  of  Amer- 
asia at  the  time  that  was  connected  with  it,  up  to  1941,  you  will  see 
that  it  could  not  be  characterized  as  even  a  left-wing  magazine  in  those 
years  [reading] : 

Both  he  and  Voitinsky  regret  that  there  is  no  evidence  of  our  having  taken 
seriously  their  request  for  this  3  years  ago.  They  feel  the  necessity  for  this  was 
never  greater  than  today.  Their  insistence  was  of  great  interest  to  me  for  two 
reasons.  First,  because  it  is  evidence  that  they  treat  the  IPR  seriously  and 
have  orderly  memories  of  their  suggestion.  Second,  because  it  contraverts  the 
assertions  of  the  reactionaries  in  Paris,  London,  and  Washington  that  the  retire- 
ment of  Litvinoff  meant  that  the  Kremlin  was  throwing  over  its  commitment  to 
tlie  collective  system. 

Could  you  use  the  present  appearance  of  Sir  Arthur  Salter's  "Security — Can  It 
Be  Retrieved?"  as  the  occasion  for  an  early  full  length  treatment  that  will  be  so 
fundamental  as  to  appeal  to  the  more  thoughtful  members  of  the  institute  in 
every  member  country  and  so  militant  as  to  convince  Motylev  and  Voitinsky 
that  we  are  responding  to  their  suggestion. 

One  of  Motylev's  most  urgent  requests  was  for  information  regarding  Chinese 
internal  economic  and  financial  position.  Happily  this  will  be  supplied  bjr 
Chi's  study  for  the  inquiry.  (You  have  doubtless  seen  his  Virginia  Quarterly 
article.)  I  am  going  to  reopen  with  Jessup  and  Angus  the  question  of  publica- 
tion of  some  Inquiry  material  in  Pacific  Affairs  when  it  is  of  such  a  nature  as 
to  fit  in  with  your  own  policy  as  editor  and  when  it  is  of  a  kind  which  will 
make  important  and  authentic  information  of  which  scholars  and  statesmen  are 
in  need  available  to  a  wide  Pacific  Affairs  audience. 

Your  many  friends  all  along  the  line  inquired  for  you  and  sent  you  their 
warmest  greetings.    All  are  asking  when  your  book  will  be  published. 

I  learned  in  one  or  two  quarters  that  Miss  Virginia  Thompson's  book  on  Indo- 
china is  not  being  taken  seriously  because  there  is  a  criticism  of  Pelliot  or  an 
implied  criticism  of  Pelliot's  position.  Do  you  happen  to  know  what  would  be 
the  basis  of  this  and  whether  scholars  in  other  countries  regard  Pelliot  with 
the  same  degree  of  infallibility  as  he  regards  himself? 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  Mr.  Morris. 

Mr.  Morris.  That  letter  is  in  the  record,  Mr.  Chairman;  is  it  not? 

The  Chairman.  Very  well,  it  is. 

(The  document,  as  previously  read  in  full  by  the  witness  beginning 
on  p.  3331  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  520.") 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  did  you  employ  Y.  Y.  Hsu  with  the 
Office  of  War  Information? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  don't  believe  I  did.  My  recollection  is  imper- 
fect on  the  subject.  If  you  have  a  document  to  refresh  it,  I  would  be 
glad  to  see  it.  But  in  the  meantime  I  can  tell  you  to  the  best  of  my 
recollection  what  the  situation  w^as. 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  minute. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  employ  Y.  Y.  Hsu  with  the  OWI  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  believe  I  didn't.  I  have  some  recollections  on  the 
subject,  but  I  don't  believe  that  they  included  my  employiiig  him. 

The  Chairman.  Can  you  say  you  did  or  you  did  not,  Mr,  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  believe  I  did  not. 


3334  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  offer  to  employ  Y.  Y.  Hsu  in  the  OWI? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  believe  I  did  not.  If  you  would  allow  me  to  state 
my  recollection  on  the  subject 

Mr.  Morris.  Go  ahead,  Mr.  Lattimore. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Then  we  will  see  if  it  corresponds  with  whatever 
documents  you  have.  ^ 

Mr.  Morris.  Please  do. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  My  recollection  is  that  the  Office  of  War  Informa- 
tion, the  New  York  office,  needed  materials  to  put  out  in  Chinese 
language  material  to  be  sent  to  China,  that  the  library  resources  for 
that  kind  of  thing  in  New  York  were  very  restricted,  and  that  a  request 
was  made  to  the  New  York  office  of  IPR  to  know  whether  OWI  could 
draw  on  the  IPR's  file  of  Chinese  materials ;  that  this  w^as  consented 
to  and  that  Y.  Y.  Hsu  was  the  man  who  was  in  charge  of  that  material 
in  the  IPR  office  at  that  time. 

Mr.  Morris.  How  well  did  you  know  Mr.  Hsu? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Eather  slightly. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  he  ever  visit  you  at  your  home  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes.     He  and  his  wife  visited  us  in  Baltimore. 

Mr.  Morris.  How  frequently  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Once,  I  think. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  ever  visit  him  at  his  home  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  We  went  and  had  dinner  with  him  and  his  wife  on 
Long  Island  somewhere  once,  I  think. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  know  at  that  time  of  his  Communist  record? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  did  not. 

Mr.  Morris.  Where  is  Mr.  Hsu  now  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  believe  he  is  in  China. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  he  an  official  of  the  Red  Chinese  Government? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  no  knowledge  on  the  subject. 

Mr.  Morris.  But  you  do  believe  he  is  in  Red  China  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  believe  he  is  in  Red  China. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  would  you  put  into  the  record  at  this  time 
Mr.  Y.  Y.  Hsu's  Communist  record  as  it  existed  in  1942  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  I  have  here  a  clipping  from  the  Daily  Worker  of 
December  14,  1929,  page  5. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  date  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  1929. 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  moment.  What  was  the  date  of  these  dinner 
parties  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  what  is  the  date  of  the  dinner  party  at 
your  home  and  Mr.  Hsu's  home  that  you  just  testified  to  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  After  the  war,  I  think. 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  sometime  subsequent  to  1945  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  think  so ;  yes. 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  Mr.  Mandel. 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  article  describes,  and  I  quote : 

Tonight  in  six  great  demonstrations  the  New  York  workers  will  protest  against 
the  butchery  of  thousands  of  thousands  of  workers  in  Haiti  and  China  and 
will  denounce  the  American  Government,  which  is  mobilizing  all  its  forces  for 
war  against  the  Soviet  Union,  fatherland  of  the  workers  of  the  world. 

Listed  as  speakers  at  these  meetings  are  the  following,  who  have 
recently  been  indicted  as  Communist  leaders.     I  read  the  name  of 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3335 

I.  Amter,  Alexander  Traclitenberg,  and,  listed  also  as  a  speaker,  Y.  Y. 
Hsn. 

I  have  here  another  clipping  from  the  Daily  Worker  of  November 
6,  1933,  which  says,  in  part,  that  38  workers'  organizations  have  en- 
dorsed the  Commnnist  Farty  ticket  and  program  in  the  New  York 
mnnicipal  elections.  Listed  as  endorsing  that  program  and  ticket 
is  Y.  Y  Hsn. 

The  Chairman.  That  was  what  date,  the  date  of  that  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  That,  Mr.  Chairman,  was  1933. 

Mr.  Mandel.  I  have  here  another  clipping  from  the  Daily  Worker 
of  August  13,  1928,  page  1,  which  describes  that  15  workers  partici- 
pated in  a  Chinese  tag  day  under  the  auspices  of  the  Committee  to  Aid 
the  Chinese  Trade-Unions,  and  it  lists  also  the  names  of  individuals 
who  were  arrested  in  connection  with  that  tag  day. 

Among  those  arrested  was  Y.  Y.  Hsu,  spelled  here  S-h-u,  secretary 
of  the  New  York  Worker  Peasant  Alliance.  A  photograph  is  given 
with  the  article. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  these  go  into  the  record? 

The  Chairman.  They  may  be  inserted  in  the  record. 

(The  documents  referred  to  were  marked  "Exhibit  No.  521"  and 
areas  follows:) 

[Source :  Daily  Worker,  December  14,  1929,  p.  5] 

Smash  Attack  on  Haiti,  U.  S.  S.  R. — Mass  Meets  Mobilize  Against 

Imperialism 

Tonight  in  six  great  demonstrations  the  New  York  workers  will  potest  against 
the  butchery  of  thousands  of  workers  in  Haiti  and  China  and  will  denounce 
the  American  Government,  which  is  mobilizing  all  its  forces  for.  war  against 
the  Soviet  Union,  Fatherland  of  the  workers  of  the  world. 

Meetings  will  be  held  at  St.  Luke's  Hall,  12.5  West  130th  St.;  Manhattan 
Lyceum,  66  East  Fourth  St.  Speakers,  H.  Benjamin,  Anna  Daman,  George 
Siskind,  James  Mo.  Bryant  Hall,  Sixth  Ave.  near  42d  St.  Speakers,  I.  Amter, 
Max  Bedacht,  Harriet  Silverman,  Joseph  Boruchowitz,  Alexander  Trachtenberg, 
T.  H.  Li,  Sam  Darey.  Rose  gardens,  1.347  Boston  Rd.,  Bronx.  Speakers,  Bill 
Dunne,  T.  Y.  Hu,  Leon  Plott,  G.  Green,  H.  Sazer.  318  Grand  St.,  Brooklyn. 
Speakers,  J.  L.  Engdahl,  Rose  Wortis,  J.  Williamson,  Y.  Y.  Hsu.  Hopkinson 
Mansions,  428  Hopkinson  Ave.,  Brooklyn.  Speakers,  M.  J.  Olgin,  Otto  Hall, 
T.  P.  Hu,  Gertrude  Welsh.  Bohemian  Hall,  Second  and  Woolsey  Aves.,  Astoria, 
L.  I.     Speakers,  A.  Markoff,  Richard  Moore,  Tong  Ping. 

Tomorrow  afternoon  at  1 :  15  New  York  workers  are  urged  to  gather  at  Park 
Row  and  Broadway  in  front  of  the  Federal  Building  to  demonstrate  against 
Wall  Street's  oppression,  aided  by  the  Washington  Executive  Council,  of  the 
Colonial  and  American  workers  and  its  attacks  on  the  Soviet  Union. 

Dozen  of  organizations  will  participate  in  these  demonstrations.  At  the 
Bryant  Hall  meeting,  which  takes  place  at  6  o'clock  instead  of  8,  as  at  other 
demonstrations,  leading  members  of  the  Needle  Trades  Workers'  Industrial 
Union  will  speak  also  on  the  organization  movement  among  the  dressmakers 
and  the  false  strike  of  the  I.  L.  G.  W.  U. 


[Source:  Daily  Worker,  November  6,  1933,  p.  2] 

Thirty-eight  Workers'  Organizations  Endorse  Communist  Party  Program — 
Party's  Fight  for  Masses'  Needs  Cited  in  Statement — Industrial  Unions, 
Unemployed,  Councils,  AVomen's  Councils  Among  Backers  of  Red  Can- 
didates 

New  York. — Thirty-eight  workers'  organizations  liave  endorsed  the  Commu- 
nist Party  ticket  and  program  in  the  New  York  municipal  elections.  No  other 
has  shown  dally  its  stubborn  and  ceaseless  fight  in  the  shops  and  streets  for  the 


3336  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

needs  of  the  masses,  says  the  statement  signed  hy  tliese  unions,  unemployed 
councils,  and  fraternal  organizations. 

Headed  by  such  fighting  unions  as  the  Marine  Workers  Industrial  Union,  the 
Needle  Trades  Workers  Industrial  Union,  the  Steel  and  Metal  Workers  Indus- 
trial Union,  the  organizations  supporting  the  Communist  Party  state : 

"Only  the  Communist  Party  as  the  party  of  the  working  class  represents  the 
interests  of  the  entire  working  iwpulation,  stands  squarely  on  the  principle 
that  the  provision  of  adequate  food,  clothing  and  shelter,  and  the  defense  of 
the  rights  and  living  standards  of  the  workers  are  the  primary  issues  in  this 
campaign." 

Among  the  organizations  signing  endorsement  for  the  Communist  candidates 
are  the  Unemployed  Councils,  Friends  of  the  Soviet  Union,  Councils  of  Working 
Class  Women,  Anti-Imperialist  League,  Workers  Ex-Servicemen's  League,  and 
the  Labor  Sports  Union. 

Needle  Trade  Industrial  Union  : 

Ben  Gold,  General  Secretary 

Louis  Hyman,  I'resident 

Irving  Potash,  Secretary 

Isadore  Weisberg,  Manager,  Dress  Dept. 

Joseph  Boruchowitz,  Manager  of  Cloak  Dept. 

Samuel  Burt,  Fur  Dressing  Dept. 

Ben  Stallman,  Org.  of  Bathrobe  Dept. 

Dominick  Montello,  Org.  of  Custom  Tailors 

Steel  and  Metal  Workers  Industrial  Union 

James  Lustig,  Organizer 

James  Matlis,  Secretary 
Marine  Workers  Industrial  Union  : 

Roy  Hudson,  National  Secretary 

Thomas  Ray,  Secretary 
Food  Workers  Industrial  Union : 

Jay  Rubin,  General  Secretary 

William  Albertson,  Org.  of  Hotel  and  Restaurant  Dept. 

Sam  Kramberg,  Org.  of  Cafeteria  Dept. 
Alteration  Painters  Union :  Morris  Kushinsky,  Secretary 
Shoe  and  Leather  Workers  Industrial  Union : 

Fred  Biedeukapp,  Organizer 

Isadore  Rosenberg,  Secretary 
Building  Maintenance  Workers  Industrial  Union :  Mort  Sher,  Secretary 
Drygoods  Workers  Union : 

Louis  Kfare,  Vice  Chairman 

Chester  Fierstein,  Chairman 
Furniture  Workers  Industrial  Union:  Morris  Pizer,  Secretary 
Independent  Cari^enters  Union  : 

Isaac  Berman,  Organizer 

Herman  Bogartz,  Secretary 

Nathan  Ellin,  Treasurer 
Taxi  Workers  Union : 

Harold  Eddy,  Organizer 

Abner  Feigin,  Financial  Secretary 
Cleaners  and  Dyers  Union :  Max  Rosenberg,  Secretary 
Laundry  Workers  Industrial  Union :  Sam  Berland,  Secretary 
Building  and  Construction  Workers  League : 

Jack  Taylor,  Secretary 

Sam  Nessin,  General  Secretary 
Trade  Union  Unity  Council : 

Andy  Overgaard,  Secretary 

Rose  Wortis,  Assistant  Secretary 

Sheppard,  Organizer 
Office  Workers  Union  :  liaura  Carmon,  Organizer 
Unemployed   Council : 

Israel  Amter,  National  Secretary 

Carl  Winter,  Secretary  of  Greater  New  York 

Richard  Sullivan,  Org.  of  Greater  New  York 
International  Labor  Defense : 

William  Lawrence,  Secretary,  New  York  District 

William  Patterson,  National  Secretary 

William  Fitzgerald,  Org.,  Harlem  Section 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3337 

Workers  International  Relief: 

Pauline  Rogers,  New  York  City  Secretary 

Alfred  Watrenkneclit,  National   Secretary 
Friends  of  the  Soviet  Union :  B.  Friedman,  Secretary 
Anti-Imperialist  League : 

William  Simons,  National  Secretary 

John  Bruno,  Secretary,  New  York 
Anti-Imperialist  Alliance:  Y.  Y.  Hsu,  National  Secretary 
Workers  Ex- Servicemen's  League  : 

Harold  Hickerson,  National   Secretary 

Joseph  Singer,  Secretary,  City  Committee 

Emanuel  Levin,  National  Chairman 

P.  Cashione 
Council  of  Working  Class  Women : 

Clara  Bodian,  Secretary 

Clara   Shavelson,  Educational  Director 

Sarah  Licht,  Org.  Secretary 
Labor  Sports  Union :  Mack  Gordon,  Secretary,  New  York  District 
International  Workers  Order : 

Max  Bedacht,  National  Secretary,  Jewish  Section 

Harry  Schiller,  New  York  City  Secretary 

Sadie  Doroshkin,  Secretary  City  Central 
Russian  Mutual  Aid :  Joseph  Soltan,  President,  New  York  District  Committee 
English  Workers  Clulis : 

J.  Landy 

Edith  Zucker 
Finnish  Workers  Federation 
Jewish  City  Club  Committee 

[Source  :  Daily  Worker,  New  York,  Monday,  August  i;^,  1928] 

Fifteen  Jailed  by  New  York  Police  in  Retjef  Collections  for  Chinese  Trade- 
Unionists — Aruests  Aided  by  Followers  of  Kuomintang — Soliciting  With- 
out Permit  Charged 

Fifteen  workers,  who  participated  in  the  Chinese  Tag  Day  under  the  auspices 
of  the  Committee  to  Aid  the  Chinese  Trade-Unions,  were  arrested  yesterday 
in  Chinatown.  They  were  charged  with  "soliciting  without  a  permit"  and  were 
released  on  $500  bail  each,  furnished  by  the  local  International  Labor  Defense. 
The  collectors  are  to  appear  at  the  First  District  Court,  White  and  Center  Sts., 
at  9  a.  m.  today  (Monday),  where  they  will  be  defended  by  Jacques  Buitenkant, 
retained  by  the  New  York  Section  of  the  International  Labor  Defense. 

Those  arrested  were  Y.  Y.  Shu,  secretary  of  the  New  York  Worker-Peasant 
Alliance ;  David  Wee,  27 ;  H.  T.  Tsiang,  28 ;  David  Kanner ;  Max  Postolsky,  21 ; 
W.  Martin,  IS;  Du  Peld,  22;  Yekelchik;  M.  Levin,  12;  I.  Kleinman,  19;  R.  Kleid- 
mann,  20 ;  B.  Winnick,  17 ;  B.  Rosenberg,  22;  and  L.  Chansik. 


[Picture  head:   Arrested  Leader] 

Above  is  Y.  Y.  Sliu,  secretary  of  the  New  York  Worker-Peasant  Alliance,  who 
was  among  the  15  workers  arrested  yesterday.  Shu  was  active  in  the  Chinese 
Relief  Tag  Days  held  yesterday  and  Saturday.  Thousands  of  dollars  were  con- 
tributed by  the  workers  of  New  York  to  aid  the  Chinese  workers  in  their  fight 
against  imperialism  and  the  Kuomintang  reactionaries.  Photo  was  taken  dur- 
ing the  recent  antiwar  demonstration  at  Union  Square. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  vvill  you  identify  these  next  two  docii- 
menis? 

Mr.  Mandfx.  Tliis  is  a  carbon  copy  of  a  letter  taken  from  the  files 
of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  dated  April  24,  1942,  addressed 
to  Mr.  Joseph  Barnes,  Coordinator  of  Information.  It  has  a  type- 
written signature  of  Yung-ying  Hsu.    It  is  dated  April  24, 1942. 

Mr.  INIoRRis.  Mr.  Chairman,  will  you  receive  that  into  the  record? 

The  Chairman.  It  has  been  identified  as  having  come  from  the 
files  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Yes,  sir. 

88348— 52— pt.  10 5 


3338  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  read  that  letter  for  us,  please '. 
The  Chairman.  To  whom  is  it  addressed  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  To  Mr.  Joseph  Barnes,  Coordinator  of  Information. 
[Reading:] 

(Exhibit  No.  522) 

Dear  Sir:  It  is  a  great  pleasure  to  receive  your  letter  of  the  21st  instant.  I 
have  just  requested  my  alma  mater,  Lelancl  Stanford  University,  for  a  transcript 
of  my  academic  records  to  enable  me  to  fill  out  the  application  blank  with 
greater  accurai-y.  The  application  will  be  sent  to  you  at  the  earliest  possible 
time. 

Under  Mr.  Edward  C.  Carter's  capable,  enlightening  and  benevolent  leader- 
ship I  find  my  work  in  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  extremely  interesting 
and  enjoyable.  However,  if  you  think  I  can  be  of  any  help  to  your  work,  I  will 
ask  Mr.  Carter  to  release  me  from  my  present  position. 

As  you  have  been  associated  with  the  Institute,  you  might  agree  with  me 
that  its  equipment  and  environment  are  a  great  asset  to  writers  either  on  or  for 
the  Far  East.  For  the  past  14  months  I  have  been  in  charge  of  the  Chinese 
collection  here.  It  might  be  beneficial  for  both  the  institute  and  the  Coordinator 
of  Information  that  part  of  the  work  of  the  latter  be  done  in  the  former.  It 
is  my  opinion  that  Mr.  Carter  would  be  glad  to  offer  the  facilities  of  his  organiza- 
tion to  the  war  effort  and  welcome  such  an  arrangement. 

Permit  me,  sir,  to  express  my  deep  appreciation  of  both  your  and  jNIr.  Owen 
Lattimore's  kindly  attention. 

Sincerely  yours. 

The  Chairman.  Who  is  it  signed  by  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  Yung-ying  Hsu. 

Senator  Ferguson,  that  is  Y.  Y.  Hsu? 

Mr.  Mandel.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  It  will  be  inserted. 

(The  previous  document  as  read  by  counsel  was  marked  "Exhibit 
No.  522.") 

The  Chairman.  Let  us  get  this  straight.  Y.  Y.  Hsu  and  Yung-ying 
Hsu  are  one  and  the  same  individual  % 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  that  right,  Mr.  Lattimore  ? 

Mr.  Lati^more.  Probably,  yes.  I  don't  know  anj^thing  about  the 
Y.  Y.  Hsu  of  the  1920's  or  1936's.    This  is  all  new  to  me. 

Mr.  Morris.  It  is  your  testimony  you  did  not  know  the  Communist 
record  of  Y.  Y.  Hsu  ? 

Mr.  Laitimore.  Yes;  that  is  my  testimony.  I  have  no  recollection 
of  it. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  receive  copies  of  the  Daily  Worker? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  That  is,  as  they  were  i.ssued  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  At  no  time? 

Mr.  Lattimorpl  At  no  time. 

The  Chairman.  You  were  not  a  contributor  to  the  Daily  Worker  ? 

Mr.  Laitimore.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Nor  a  subscriber  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  when  you  were  with  the  OWI, 
did  you  make  any  investigation  prior  to  employment  of  personnel? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir.  Investigation  of  personnel  was  the  fimc- 
tion  of  a  separate  personnel  branch  of  OWI. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  know  whether  they  made  any  examina' 
tion  or  investigation  of  personnel? 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3339 

Mr.  Latitmore.  I  believe  that  all  people  employed  by  OWI,  includ- 
ing myself,  were  subject  to  investigation  by  the  Civil  Service  Commis- 
sion which,  my  recollection  is,  was  able  to  check  with  other  investigat- 
ing agencies,  such  as  the  FBI. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Were  there  any  investigations  for  security  pui^ 
poses,  to  3'our  knowledge  ? 

j\Ir.  Lattimore.  Well,  there  was  an  investigation  of  individuals 
before  they  could  be  hired. 

Senator  P'erguson.  That  is  what  I  had  in  mind. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  along  the  security  line? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  think  every  single  person  had  to  be  investigated 
along  lo3'alty  and  security  lines. 

The  Chairman.  When  w^as  OWI  set  up  first  ?    Do  you  remember  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  know  the  precise  date.  Senator.  It  grew  out 
of  COI,  Coordinator  of  Information,  which  was  at  some  time  split  into 
OSS  and- OWL 

The  Chairman.  You  did  not  come  in  then  until  it  was  OWI  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

The  Chairman.  And  you  came  into  it  after  what  year,  or  about 
what  time  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  came  into  it,  I  think,  in  late  December  1942. 

The  Chairman.  Wliat  is  the  date  of  these  articles  in  the  Daily 
Worker? 

Mr.  Morris.  The  last  one  is  1933,  Senator,  the  latest  one  is  1933. 

Mr.  Lattimore,  I  had  asked  you  the  question  in  connection  with  that 
letter  Mr.  Mandel  read,  what  your  recollection  is  of  the  kindly  atten- 
tion referred  to  in  the  last  paragraph  that  you  showed  to  Mr.  Hsu. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  no  present  recollection  whatever.  May  I 
say  that  the  set-up  of  OWI  at  that  time,  as  far  as  Chinese  work  was 
concerned,  was  that  all  radio  transmissions 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Lattimore,  I  do  not  think  you  are  answering 
the  counsel's  question  now.  If  you  want  to  go  back,  if  you  want  to  go 
back  to  a  former  question,  that  would  be  something  else. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  am  explaining  why  it  is  difficult  for  me  to  answer 
this  question,  Senator. 

The  Chairman.  Read  the  question,  IVIr.  Reporter,  of  the  counsel, 
Mr.  Morris. 

( The  record  was  read  by  the  reporter.) 

The  Chairman.  That  was  his  answer. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  Chinese  personnel  of  the  New  York  Office  were 
under  Mr.  Barnes'  jurisdiction,  not  under  mine. 

The  Chairman.  That  does  not  belong  to  this  question.  That  be- 
longs to  another  question  asked  by  Senator  Ferguson.  If  you  want 
to  let  it  stand  that  way,  it  is  all  right,  but  it  involves  the  thing  more. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  did  you  have  any  dealings  with  Mr.  Hsu 
when  he  was,  as  he  says  there,  in  charge  of  the  Chinese  collection 
of  thelPR? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  no  direct  dealings,  as  far  as  I  remember. 

Mr.  :Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  identify  that  document,  please? 

Mr.  Mandel.  I  have  here  a  photostat  of  a  document  from  the  files 
of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  showing  a  letterhead  of  the  Office 
of  War  Information,  111  Sutter  Street,  San  Francisco,  Calif.,  dated 
March  12,  1943,  addressed  to  Mr.  W.  L.  Holland  and  signed  "Owen." 


3340  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  can  you  recall  sending  that  letter  to 
Mr.  Holland^ 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  can't  recall  sending  it  to  him,  but  obviously 
I  sent  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  Does  that  look  like  your  .signature  at  the  bottom'^ 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  it  is. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  read  that  letter,  please? 

Mr.  Mandel.  It  is  to  Mr.  W.  L.  Holland,  Institute  of  Pacific  Rela- 
tions, 129  East  Fifty-second  Street,  New  York,  N.  Y. : 

(Exhibit  No.  523) 

Dear  Blll  :  Several  weeks  ago  I  was  in  New  York,  but  only  on  Saturday  and 
Sunday,  and  saw  no  one  but  people  in  our  own  office,  except  for  the  fact  that  I 
had  lunch  in  the  Hsu's  apartment  with  old  Prof.  Chi  and  his  wife  and  Harriet  Chi. 

Anytime  that  it  would  be  useful  to  you  to  have  Hsu  working  out  here  for  the 
IPR,  we  should  be  very  glad  to  take  him  on  as  a  part-time  consultant  or  research 
man  for  our  Chinese  Section. 

Would  you  let  me  know  if  you  have  any  ideas  on  the  subject  that  I  could  help 
to  follow  up? 

We  are  enjoying  being  in  San  Francisco  again.  Feels  just  like  home  (only 
a  hell  of  a  lot  more  crowded).     David  is  taking  Chinese  lessons,  writing  and  all. 

Love  from  us  too  to  Doreen,  Mrs.  McGari-y,  and  Patricia. 
Yours, 

Owen. 

Mr.  Morris.   Mr.  Chairman,  may  that  be  inserted  into  the  record? 

The  Chairman.   It  may  be  inserted. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  523''  and  was 
read  in  full.) 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  is  that  meeting  that  you  had  in  Mr. 
Hsu's  apartment  still  another  meeting  in  addition  to  the  one  you 
testified  to  took  place  out  on  Long  Island  somewhere? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Probably  the  same,  but  I  am  not  sure. 

Mr.  Morris.  You  also  testified  the  other  was  after  the  war,  did  3'ou 
not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  thought  it  was  after  the  war ;  yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  on  Long  Island  ? 

The  Chairman.  This  is  a  different  meeting.  This  was  not  on  Long 
Island,  as  I  understand  it.     This  was  in  New  York. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  know  from  this  letter  whether  the  apart- 
ment was  in  New  York  or  on  Long  Island. 

Mr.  Sourwine.   Where  was  Mr.  Hsu's  apartment,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  recollect.  The  only  place  that  I  recollect  is 
an  apartment  on  Long  Island,  and  I  thought  I  was  there  after  the 
war. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Do  you  recollect  an  apartment  on  Long  Island  which 
was  ]\Ir.  Hsu's  apartment? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  So  that  if  Mr.  Y.  Y.  Hsu  Avas  not  living  on  Long 
Island  in  1943,  this  was  a  different  apartment  and  a  separate  and 
second  visit ;  is  that  right  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.   Presumably;  yes. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  All  right. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  you  knew  Mr.  Hsu  well  enough  for  him  to  be  the 
only  person  you  visited  for  that  Avhole  weekend  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No;  I  say  here  "saw  no  one  but  people  in  our 
office." 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3341 

The  Chairman.  Now  go  back  to  the  question  again.  What  is  your 
question  ?  Do  you  know  JNIr.  Hsu  well  enough  so  that  he  is  the  only 
one  you  visited  during  that  weekend  % 

Mr.  Morris.  In  addition  to  the  people  in  your  own  office? 

The  Chairman.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  remember  whether  I  had  lunch  outside  the 
office  with  anybodjj  else,  or  not. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  that  Harriet  Chi  mentioned  in  the  first  paragraph, 
was  she  ever  your  secretary  % 

Mr.  Lattimore.  She  was  my  secretary  for  about  2  weeks  in  1936. 

Mr.  Morris.  She  is  the  wife  of  the  Chao-ting  Chi  that  we  have 
talked  about  at  great  length  in  this  testimony,  is  she  not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  She  was  at  one  time. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  w^ill  you  accept  that  into  the  record  % 

The  Chairman.  The  one  that  has  been  read  ? 

It  is  in  the  record. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  did  you  employ  Jack  Dinichi  Kimoto 
as  a  translator  for  the  Office  of  War  Information? 

]\lr.  Latitmore.  I  have  no  recollection  of  it. 

But  if  you  have  a  document  there  to  refresh  my  memory,  I  may  be 
able  to  recall. 

]Mr.  Morris.  Xow,  INIr.  Lattimore,  have  you  ever  met  the  Chinese — 
and  here  I  am  afraid  I  must  spell  them  for  you — C-h-a  I-a-o  M-u? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Not  that  I  can  recall,  unless  he  was  one  of  the 
numerous  staff  we  had  at  OWI,  or  unless  you  have  some  document 
there  that  I  can  refresh  my  memory  with. 

Mr.  Morris.  How  about  Mr.  Kung  P-eng  ? 

Mr.  Laiitmore.  The  same  answer. 

]\lr.  Morris.  Did  you  ever  meet  those  two  gentlemen  in  China  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  In  China? 

Mr.  Morris.  Yes. 

JSIr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  believe  so ;  no. 

Mr.  Morris.  I  wish  you  would  recall,  Mr.  Lattimore,  whether  you 
ever  met  those  two  gentlemen  in  China. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  If  you  could  bring  forward  something 

Mr,  Morris.  That  is,  at  the  time  you  were  adviser  to  the  Generalis- 
simo. 

jNIr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  recall  the  names  at  all,  but  they  may  be 
people  that  I  met  in  connection  with  my  official  duties,  working  for 
the  Generalissimo. 

]\Ir.  MoRius.  Did  you  ever  pass  on  to  them  reports  and  information 
of  any  kind  ? 

^Ir.  Lattimore.  Again,  not  that  I  recall,  unless  you  can  refresh 
my  necessarily  imperfect  memory. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  ever  send  coded  messages  to  Yenan  while  you 
were  in  Chungking? 

]Mr.  Latttmore.  Coded  messages  to  Yenan  ? 

The  Chairman.  While  you  were  in  Chungking. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  wouldn't  believe  so,  unless  it  was  in  connec- 
tion with  some  of  my  official  duties. 

Mr.  Morris.  It  is  possible  that  you  may  have  done  it  in  connection 
with  your  official  duties  ? 

jVlr.  Lattimore.  I  should  say  so. 


3342  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattiniore,  after  you  sent  your  dispatch  to  Lauch- 
lin  Currie  on  November  25,  1941,  urging  a  rejection  of  the  modus 
vivendi,  will  you  tell  us  what  your  itinerary  was  through  December 
7,1941? 

On  the  25th  you  sent  to  Lauchlin  Currie,  on  the  25th  of  November 
1941,  a  dispatch  suggesting  that  the  proposed  modus  vivendi,  whereby 
a  truce  would  be  effected,  a  temporary  truce  would  be  effected,  between 
.Fapan  and  the  United  States  in  order  to  avert  a  war — you  remember 
that  dispatch,  do  you  not,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  of  course ;  I  was  not  urging  the  modus  vivendi. 

Mr.  Morris.  You  sent  the  dispatch,  did  you  not,  Mr.  Lattimore  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes;  I  was  reporting  at  the  Generalissimo's  re- 
quest.   I  was  reporting  his  action  to  that  proposal. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  will  you  tell  us  what  your  itinerary 
was  after  you  sent  that  dispatch  on  November  25,  from  Chungking, 
sir? 

Where  did  you  go  up  until  December  7,  1941  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Beginning  at  the  end  of  that,  I  remember  that  on 
December  7 — that  is.  Pearl  Harbor  day — I  was  in  Chungking,  and  I 
don't  believe  that  I  was  out  of  Chungking  between  those  two  dates. 

Mr.  Morris.  Were  you  in  Hong  Kong  at  that  time,  Mr,  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Possibly ;  no  I  wasn't. 

Mr.  Morris.  When  were  you  in  Hong  Kong  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  was  in  Hong  Kong — let's  see — I  was  in  Hong- 
Kong  once  between  July,  when  I  went  out  to  Chungking,  and  Pearl 
Harljor.  But  I  don't  memember  the  exact  time.  I  believe  it  was 
earlier  than  November — more  likely  September  or  October. 

But  my  memory  is  not  at  all  clear. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  how  about  December  8  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  December  8? 

December  8  I  was  booked  to  fly  from  Hong  Kong  on  a  clipper  ship 
which  was  sunk  at  its  moorings  in  Hong  Kong.    I  never  went  down. 

Mr.  Morris.  You  were  to  go  to  Hong  Kong  by  ship  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No;  I  was  to  fly  to  Hong  Kong  by  plane  from 
Chungking,  and  catch  the  Pan-American  Clipper  to  fly  for  home.  At 
something  like  2  or  3  o'clock  in  the  morning,  before  my  plane  was  due 
to  take  off,  one  of  the  Generalissimo's  aides  rang  me  up  and  said  the 
Japanese  have  attacked  Pearl  Harbor,  "so  your  trip  is  obviously  off." 

Mr.  Morris.  And  then  what  did  you  do  after  that,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Then  I  stayed  in  Chungking  until  I  left  for  Amer- 
ica via  Burma  and  the  "hump"  sometime  early  in  1942. 

Mr.  Morris.  Was  Mr.  Chi  over  there  at  that  time  I  He  flew  over 
with  you  when  he  went  to  the  Generalissimo's  assignment,  did  he  not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  He  and  Genei-al  Chennault  and  I  all  went  out  on  the 
same  plane ;  yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  you  frequently  saw  him  while  you  were  serving 
that  term  with  the  Generalissimo,  did  you  not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  saw  him  fairly  frequently,  because  he  was  one 
of  the  confidential  secretaries  of  H.  H.  Kung,  who  was  very,  very 
close  to  the  Generalissimo. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  all  during  that  time,  it  is  your  testimony,  is  it 
not,  that  you  did  not  know  that  he  was  a  Communist? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3343 

Mr.  Morris,  Mr.  Lattimore,  you  have  testified,  have  you  not,  that 
you  did  not  know  that  James  S.  Allen  was  a  Communist  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right.  To  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  I 
never  knew  that  he  was  a  Communist  until  quite  recently. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  testify  that  you  never  met  James  S.  Allen? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  To  the  best  of  my  knowledge  I  never  met  him. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  we  have  an  exhibit  No.  53  which  has 
already  been  introduced  in  open  session.  This  is  a  carbon  copy  of  a 
letter  from  I\Ir.  Carter  to  Mr.  Holland.  I  would  like  to  show  it  to  Mr. 
Lattimore  and  ask  him  if  reading  the  last  paragraph  of  that  will  re- 
fresh his  recollection  on  the  negative  answer  he  gave  to  the  question. 

The  Chairman.  Does  that  bear  any  identification  as  having  been 
admitted  ? 

Mr.  iNIoRRis.  That  has  been  admitted  and  is  exhibit  No.  58. 

]Mr.  Arnold.  May  we  have  a  copy? 

Mr.  Morris.  I  ask  Mr.  Lattimore  to  read  the  last  paragraph. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  last  paragi'aph  of  this  letter  from  Mr.  Carter 
to  Mr.  Holland  says : 

Last  week  we  had  a  special  meeting  on  Soviet  policy  in  the  Pacific,  made  up  of 
some  members  of  Corbett's  group,  but  it  was  an  ad  hoc  meeting.  Those  present 
were  Kathleen  Barnes,  Lockwood,  Grajdanzev,  Corbett,  Nuhle,  Bisson,  Moore, 
Field,  James  Allen.  Bill  Carter,  E.  C.  Carter,  and  Owen  Lattimore,  and  Leaning. 

Mr.  Morris.  Does  not  that  letter  indicate  that  you  and  Mr.  Allen 
met  together  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  believe  it  does,  Mr.  ISIorris.  I  have  seen 
this  before,  when  it  was  issued  as  an  exhibit,  and  I  believe  that  it  is  a 
mistake  on  Mr.  Carter's  part.  Maybe  he  had  a  list  of  people  who  had 
been  invited  to  such  a  conference,  but  I  don't  remember  taking  part 
in  it,  and  there  is  at  least  one  person  there  besides  Mr.  Allen  whom  I 
never  remember  meeting. 

I  note  that  in  this  letter  he  says :  "last  week,"  and  he  may  have  been 
writing  from  a  faulty  recollection. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  know  that  James  S.  Allen  has  testified  before 
this  committee  that  he  did  attend  that  meeting? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  didn't  know  that. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Do  you  know,  ISIr.  Lattimore,  what  the  group  is 
that  is  referred  to? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  only  a  very  imperfect  recollection  of  the  fact 
that  at  that  time,  1940,  Professor  Corbett  of  Yale,  who  is  an  expert  on 
Roman  law  and  international  law,  and  later  made  a  special  study  of 
Soviet  law,  was  conducting  some  kind  of  a  study,  I  believe,  under  the 
auspices  of  the  IPR. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  And  his  students  were  referred  to  as  "Corbett's 
group;"  is  that  what  you  mean? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No;  I  don't  know  whether  they  were  students  or 
other  people  who  took  part  in  a  discussion  group  under  the  auspices 
of  the  IPR,  or  exactly  what  the  arrangement  was. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Were  you  a  member  of  that  group,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No;  I  don't  believe  I  was. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Did  you  attend  any  meetings  of  that  group  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No ;  I  don't  remember  attending  this  or  any  other 
meeting. 

The  Chairman.  Would  you  say  that  you  did  not  attend  that  meet- 
ing that  is  referred  to  there  ? 


3344  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Lattimore.  To  the  best  of  my  recollection,  I  never  attended  that 
meeting;  no. 

The  Chairman.  The  names  there  are  all  familiar  to  you,  are  they 
not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Not  all  of  them;  no.  There  is  somebody  here 
named  Mnhle,  whom  I  can't  place  at  all. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  the  only  one  that  is  not  familiar  to  you? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  others  are  familiar  to  me,  that  is,  they  are  peo- 
ple I  know  or  know  of,  know  of  slightly. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore.  I  am  now  going  to  call  your  attention 
to  our  exhibit  455,  which  was  introduced  into  the  record  on  February 
21,  1952.  It  takes  the  form  of  a  memorandum  on  Philippine  research, 
dated  April  14,  1938,  WWL  to  ECC.  WWL  is  Mr.  Lockwood,  is  it 
not,  and  ECC  is  Mr.  Carter? 

I  ask  you  if,  in  the  course  of  your  duties  as  editor  of  Pacific  Affairs, 
which  you  were  at  that  time,  that  memorandum  would  have  been  in 
the  purview  of  the  documents  available  for  your  research  ? 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Before  that  question  is  answered,  I  think  the  ques- 
tion before  the  question  last  asked  was  not  responded  to. 

I  think  the  record  should  show  that  in  response  to  the  previous 
question,  Mr.  Lattimore  nodded,  but  made  no  sound. 

Mr.  Morris.  The  nodding  was  yes,  was  it? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  nodding  was  that  I  was  prepared  to  look  at 
this  exhibit. 

This  exhibit  I  have  also  seen,  because  it  was  previously  issued. 

Until  I  saw  it,  I  had  no  previous  recollection  of  it,  and  I  believe  that 
I  never  saw  it  before.  You  will  see  that  it  is  headed  "Research."  I 
was  not  connected  with  American  Council  Research  at  that  time,  and 
I  was  not  in  New  York  at  that  time.  I  was  living  in  California,  and 
had  not  been  in  New  York  for  a  couple  of  years. 

The  Chairman.  When  did  you  first  see  that  document  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Some  months  ago,  after  it  had  been  released  by 
this  committee. 

Mr.  Morris.  Some  months  ago,  that  is  February  21,  Mr.  Lattimore. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  February.    I  thought  you  read  February  21,  19 — — 

Mr.  Morris.  No,  1952. 

Mr.  L.\TTiM0RE.  1952? 

Mr.  Morris.  This,  Mr.  Chairman,  is  obviously  what  Mr.  Lattimore 
is  referring  to,  judging  by  the  period  of  time,  and  is  a  copy  of  the 
letter,  and  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  also  retained  a  copy 
of  this  letter.    So  a  copy  is  also  available  in  their  office. 

The  paragraph  I  would  like  to  read,  since  you  have  seen  it,  Mr. 
Lattimore,  is  the  third  paragraph  on  the  second  page. 

The  Chairman.  Let  us  go  back  and  get  the  letter  from  whom  to 
whom? 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lockwood  is  writing  to  Mr.  Carter.  This  is  in 
1938,  at  a  time  when  Mr.  Lattimore  is  the  editor  of  Pacific  Affairs. 
He  has  testified  that  in  1938  he  was  on  the  west  coast. 

The  Chairman.  All  right. 

Mr.  Morris.  The  paragraph  reads: 

Are  you  in  touch  with  James  Allen?  I  uuderstand  he  is  going  to  the  islands 
in  July  to  continue  his  investigation.  His  recent  Pacific  Affairs  article  on  the 
agrarian  question  was  n)ost  interesting  and  gave  evidence  of  heing  a  careful 
and  scholarly  piece  of  work.     His  earlier  book  on  the  Negro  problem  in  the 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3345 

United  States  was  praised  by  scholars  as  an  excellent  piece  of  research,  even 
though  his  Communist  ideology  led  him  off  into  a  proposal  for  "national  self- 
determination"  in  the  Black  Belt  which  most  people  thought  rather  fantastic. 

Does  not  that  indicate  to  you,  Mr.  Lattimore,  tliat  the  people  in 
the  New  York  office  knew  that  James  S.  Allen  was  a  Communist? 

^Ir.  Lattimore.  It  certainly  indicates  that  Mr.  Lockwood  thought 
he  had  a  Communist  ideology. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Of  course,  that  would  not  make  him  a  Com- 
munist, would  it? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Xot  necessarily  a  Connnunity  Party  memher. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  he  ask  you  anything  about  membership  I 

IVIr.  Lattimore.  I  thought  that  question  was  usually  asked  with 
regard  to  membership,  Senator. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  think  you  had  better  watch  the  questions  and 
do  not  read  into  this  "membership''  if  it  is  not  in  it. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  All  right. 

There  are,  after  all,  Senator,  many  are,  and  have  been,  many 
general  Marxist  writers  who  are  sometimes  loosely  called  Commu- 
nists who  have  never  engaged  in  Communist  organizations. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  all  right.  If  you  want  to  answer  the 
particular  question  that  way,  and  if  you  want  to  give  that  answer  as 
far  as  Allen  is  concerned,  is  that  your  opinion? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Well,  I  don't  have  enough  to  go  on  to  make  any 
opinion  one  way  or  the  other. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then  why  did  you  giA'e  us  that  answer  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Because  I  didn't  want  to  make  my  opinion  positive 
in  one  sense  or  another  when  I  don't  know  enough  about  it  to  be 
positive. 

]Mr.  Morris.  ]Mr.  Lattimore,  did  you  know  that  Mr.  Allen  at  that 
time  was  associated  with  the  Daily  Worker? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  don't  believe  I  did. 

Mr,  Morris.  Did  you  read  the  testimony  before  this  committee  that 
lie  was  an  agent  for  the  Communist  International? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  think  I  have  seen  some  reference  to  that  in  the 
transcript;  yes. 

Mr.  jNIorris.  And  do  you  not  know  that  he  had  a  byline  in  the  Daily 
Worker  for  a  long  ])eriod  during  the  war,  and  was  known  as  the 
foreign  editor  of  the  Daily  Worker? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  know  all  of  that  in  detail.  According  to 
my  recollection  at  the  time  of  the  Tydings  hearings  2  years  ago,  the 
fact  was  brought  up  that  he  had  some  sort  of  Daily  Worker  connection. 

I  don't  remember  the  details.  But  I  believe  that  that  was  the  first 
I  know  of  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  Does  it  not  show  at  least  a  lack  of  coordination,  let  us 
say,  Mr.  Lattimore,  that  the  New  York  office  should  know  that  James 
Allen  was  a  Communist,  and  that  you,  as  editor  of  Pacific  Affairs, 
for  which  he  was  writing,  should  not  know  that? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  think  no  more  lack  of  coordination  that  was 
fairly  general  around  the  IPR  office.  After  all,  we  were  not  a 
Government  office  with  chains  of  command  and  regular  protocol  on 
what  went  to  who,  when,  and  how,  and  so  on. 

]Mr.  ]Morris.  When  you  wanted  to  be  in  touch  with  Mr.  Allen,  how 
did  you  get  his  address  ? 


3346  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Presumably  I  got  it  either  from  the  IPR  or  per- 
haps he  wrote  to  me.     I  don't  know. 

Mr,  Morris.  Did  you  ever  get  his  address  from  Mr.  Field  ? 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  Mr.  Morris,  if  I  might  interpose  at  that  point: 
Your  question  was  when  you  wanted  to  get  in  touch  with  Mr.  Allen, 
"How  did  you  get  his  address?" 

I  do  not  believe  the  witness  means  to  say  that  when  he  wanted  to 
get  in  touch  with  Mr.  Allen,  Mr.  Allen  wrote  to  him. 

Is  that  what  you  meant  to  say,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

]\Ir,  Lattimore.  Mr.  Allen  may  have  written  to  me  in  connection 
with  the  fact  that  I  published  a  couple  of  articles,  and  I  may  have  had 
his  address  that  way. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  The  question  was,  when  you  wanted  to  get  in  touch 
with  Mr.  xillen,  how  did  you  get  his  address? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Well.  I  don't  remember. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  ever  get  his  address  from  Mr.  Field? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  no  recollection  on  the  subject,  but  if  you 
have  a  document  there  I  shall  be  glad  to  have  my  memory  refreshed. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  identify  that  document,  please? 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  is  a  photostat  of  a  carbon  copy  from  the  files  of 
the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  dated  April  27,  1939,  addressed  to 
Mr.  Owen  Lattimore  from  Frederick  V.  Field. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  do  you  recall  having  received  that  docu- 
ment ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  don't  recall  receiving  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  read  it,  Mr.  Lattimore?     It  is  short. 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

Dear  Owen  :  Carter's  office  reports  that  James  Allen  may  be  reached  at — 

Then  I  can't  read  this  clearly — 

*     *     *     508  West  One  Hundred  and  Thirty-ninth  Street— 

I  think  it  is — 

New  York  City. 

Sincerely  yours, 

(The  document  as  previously  read  by  the  witness  was  marked  "Ex- 
hibit No.  524,"  as  above.) 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  presume  that  Mr.  Field  was  at  that  time — when 
was  this,  1939  ? 

I  think  he  was  still  secretary  of  the  American  IPR.  So,  presumably, 
I  wrote  to  him  for  the  address. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  not  testify  several  days  ago  that  at  that  time 
you  realized  that  Frederick  Field  was  at  that  time  a  member  of  the 
Communist  Party? 

Mr.  Laiitmore.  No,  sir;  I  didn't.  I  testified  that  in  1952,  seeing 
a  letter  wa-itten  by  Field  in  1939,  I  w^ould  now  say  that  my  memory 
may  have  been  in  error  by  2  years  as  to  the  time  when  I  thought  he 
was  beginning  to  be  a  close  fellow  traveler  of  the  record. 

However,  that  projection  of  my  memory  back  from  1952  to  1939 
is  not  worth  a  great  deal. 

After  all,  the  way  people  were  writing  about  Russia  and  Russian 
policy  in  1939  was  pretty  loose. 

Senator  Ferguson.  ]\lr.  Lattimore,  did  you  not,  in  your  voluntary 
statement  that  you  brought  in  here,  say  that  you  knew  Field  was  a 
Communist  in  the  1940's  ? 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3347 

1  even  corrected  you  to  show  what  you  had  said. 

Mr.  Lattomore.  I  think  I  said  that  I  believe  that  by  the  1940's  he 
had  become  a  Communist,  or  something  of  that  sort.  I  forget  the 
exact  wording. 

Senator  Ferguson.  All  right. 

You  are  now  talking  about  1950.  Well,  then,  did  you  know  that 
in  the  lOlO's,  back  in  the  1940's,  he  was  a  Communist? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No;  as  of  the  1950's,  I  remember  that  in  the  194:0's 
I  considered  him  a  Russian  fellow  traveler,  or  possibly  a  Communist 
fellow  traveler.  But  I  don't  remember  when  I  began  to  feel  that 
way. 

The  Chairman.  You  came  in  here  with  your  statement  voluntarily. 
Do  you  recall  your  statement?  It  was  to  the  effect  that  he  was  a 
Communist  in  the  forties. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  said  in  my  statement 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  page  is  that  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Page  14 — 

I  had  no  reason  to  consider  him  a  Communist  during  the  period  when  he  was 
secretary  of  the  American  IPR  in  the  1930's,  althougli  I  have  no  doubt  he  became 
one  during  tlie  1940's. 

That  is,  I  have,  in  1952,  no  doubt  that  he  became  one  during  the 
1940's.  I  may  say  that  that  is  based  not  so  much  on  my  own  recol- 
lection as  on  some  testimony  that  I  read  in  the  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings of  Mr.  Carter  here,  much  of  which  was  entirely  new  to  me. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then  there  are  some  truths  in  this  hearing  that 
you  take  for  granted  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  My  opinion  of  Mr.  Carter  has  always  been  that 
he  is  an  extremely  honest  man. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  that  where  you  got  the  idea  "although  I  have 
no  doubt  that  he  became  one  during  the  1940"  ? 

Mr,  Lattimore.  As  I  say,  it  is  partly  from  recollection,  which  is 
very  vague,  and  difficult  for  me  to  specify  as  to  year,  but  I  also  read 
some  things  in  Mr.  Carter's  testimony  which  would  now,  in  1952, 
indicate  to  me  that  Field  definitely  became  a  Communist  in  the 
1940's. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then  it  would  indicate  that  Carter's  testimony 
shows  the  fact  to  be  that  Field  l)ecame  a  Communist  in  the  1940's? 

Mr,  Lattimore.  Not  Carter's  opinion,  but  some  of  the  facts  given  by 
Carter. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  facts  given  by  Carter.  It  would,  therefore, 
appear  that  while  Field  was  connected  with  the  Institute  of  Pacific 
Relations,  he  was  a  Communist,  and  Carter's  facts  show  it;  is  that 
correct  ? 

Mr.  Lait^imore.  As  of  1952  they  create  a  strong  presumption. 

]\Ir.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  have  you  read  the  testimony  of  Mr. 
Nathaniel  Weyl  before  this  committee,  which  was  to  the  effect  that 
Mr.  Field  became  a  Communist  in  1935? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  haven't.     Is  that  part  of  the 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  public  testimony. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Has  that  part  of  the  transcript  been  printed  yet? 

Mr.  Morris.  It  has  not  been  printed  yet.  But  you  do  read  tran- 
scripts that  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  obtains  in  New  York,  do 
you  not  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  read  some  of  them ;  by  no  means  all  of  them. 


3348  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Mr.  Morris.  But  they  are  available  to  you. 

Will  you  identify  that  letter,  Mr.  Manclel  ? 

Mr.  jSIaxdel.  This  is  a  carbon  copy  taken  from  the  files  of  the 
Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  dated  November  3,  1938,  addressed  to 
Mr.  James  S.  Allen,  care  of  American  Express  Co.,  Manila,  Philippine 
Islands.    It  has  the  typed  signature  of  Owen  Lattimore. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  I  ask  you  if  you  recall  having  written 
that  letter  to  Mr.  Allen. 

Mr.  Lati^imore.  I  don't  recall  having  written  it,  but  I  obviously 
wrote  it. 

Mr.  IMoRRis.  Mr.  Lattimore,  will  you  read  the  letter,  please? 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

(Exhibit  No.  525) 

Dear  Allen  :  Immediately  on  receipt  of  your  letter  of  which  I  herewith  en- 
close a  copy,  I  wrote  to  your  American  address.  As  I  received  no  reply,  and  the 
deadline  for  the  December  number  of  Pacific  Aifairs  was  fast  approaching,  I 
iiad  perforce  to  schedule  the  letter  for  publication  without  reply  for  you. 

That  must  be  a  misprint  for  "from  you" : 

I  added  an  editorial  note  to  the  effect  that  we  expected  a  reply  from  you 
for  our  March  number. 

Now  I  have  just  heard  from  your  wife,  giving  your  Manila  address.  Although 
it  is  too  late  for  you  to  send  a  reply  for  December  publication,  I  am  forwarding 
this  by  clipper  mail  in  the  hope  that  it  may  reach  you  before  you  leave  the 
I'hilippines.  I  hope  that  this  will  not  merely  give  you  extra  time  before  our 
March  number,  but  possibly  enable  you  to  make  a  last-minute  check-up  on  the 
data  on  which  you  founded  your  original  statements. 

As  your  article  appeared  to  me,  as  a  nonexpert,  to  have  every  external  char- 
acteristic of  careful  observation  and  reasoned  statement,  while  the  vigor  of 
the  attached  letter  of  refutation  indicates  great  confidence  on  the  part  of  the 
protesting  company,  I  shall  be  extremely  interested  in  following  up,  in  due 
course,  the  discrepancy  between  the  two  statements. 

Please  note,  by  the  way,  my  new  permanent  address,  as  given  above. 
Yours  very  sincerely. 

Mr.  Morris.  May  that  be  inserted  into  the  record,  Mr.  Chairman  ? 

The  Chairman.  It  will  be  inserted  into  the  record. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  525"  and  read 
in  full.) 

Mr.  Morris.  To  what  extent  did  you  know  James  Allen's  wife? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  never  met  her,  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  name  did  she  use  when  you  spoke  to  her? 

Mr.  L  vmMORE.  I  don't  think  I  spoke  to  her.  My  recollection  of 
this  correspondence  is  that — what  was  the  date  of  that  letter  from 
Field  giving  his  address? 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  April  27, 1939. 

Mr..  Lattimore.  April  27,  1939.  This  is  previous.  I  must  have 
written  to  Allen  care  of  IPR,  or  whatever  address  I  had  for  him,  and 
the  letter  was  presumably  forwarded  to  his  wife  who  told  me  that  he 
was  out  of  the  country. 

Mr.  Morris.  When  did  she  tell  you,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  presume  she  told  me  by  letter. 

Mr.  Morris.  How  did  she  sign  letters — Mrs.  James  S.  Allen? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  remember. 

Ml'.  Morris.  Do  vou  know  that  James  Allen  is  not  the  man's  name 
at  all? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  seen  recently  something  in  the  newspapers  to 
that  effect.     That  was  the  first  of  it  I  knew. 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3349 

Mr.  Morris.  How  did  she  identify  herself  when  she  spoke  to  you 
or  wrote  to  yon  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Presumably  as  Mrs.  Allen. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  the  man  we  have  been  discussing,  James 
S.  Allen,  has  testified  before  this  committee  and  he  stated  that  his 
name  is  Sol  Auerbach,  but  that  he  writes  in  these  various  publica- 
tions under  the  name  of  James  S.  Allen. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Incidentally,  Mr.  Morris,  I  am  all  confused  about 
this  man  Allen.  I  got  the  impression  some  time  ago — I  think  it  may 
have  been  at  the  time  of  the  trial  of  the  11  Communists  in  New  York — 
from  reading  the  press,  that  Mr.  Allen  was  a  Negro,  Now  I  am  sure, 
if  I  had  met  a  Negro  expert  on  the  Philippines,  I  would  remember  it. 

Now,  I  see  that  his  name  is  given  as  Sol  Auerbach  which  doesn't 
sound  to  me  like  a  Negro  name,  so  I  don't  know  what  he  is. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Had  you  ever  heard  the  name  Sol  Auerbach? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Auerbach,  I  don't  believe  I  ever  have ;  no. 

Mr.  Morris.  May  I  take  one  more  letter  ? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  There  has  been  identified  a  letter,  Mr.  Chairman,  as 
exhibit  49,  August  2,  1951 :  This  is  a  letter  that  Mr.  Lattimore  wrote 
to  Mr.  Allen  in  1939.     Would  you  care  to  read  it,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

This  is  to  Mr.  James  S.  Allen. 

Mr.  Lattiiniore.  It  is  dated  February  27,  1939,  addressed  to  Mr. 
James  S.  Allen,  508  West  One  Hundred  and  Thirty-ninth  Street, 
Apartment  42,  New  York  City  [reading] : 

Dear  Ali.en  :  Excuse  my  writing  to  you  by  dictaphone,  as  I  am  away  from 
my  office  and  Ivind  of  crowded  for  time. 

It  was  good  to  hear  from  you  again,  and  I  am  only  sorry  that  your  Letter  to 
the  Editor  was  not  in  time  for  publication  in  our  March  number.  It  will  have 
to  come  out  in  June.  I  am  returning  to  you  herewith  a  copy  of  the  letter  as 
set  xip  to  go  to  the  printer.  I  am  also  sending  copies  to  the  Compania  and  to 
the  Philippine  Branch  of  the  IPR. 

What  about  some  more  on  the  Philippines  sometimes?  We  are  really  rather 
hard-pressed  to  get  enough  material  that  is  not  directly  about  the  Japanese  war 
on  China.  At  the  same  time  I  needn't  apologize  for  pointing  out  to  you  that  we 
couldn't  guarantee  to  take  another  article  from  you  on  the  Philippines  right 
away,  if  it  would  look  to  the  Philippines  IPR  as  though  we  only  printed 
"radical"  stuff  on  the  islands.  Have  you  done  any  work  in  French  Indochina, 
the  Malay  Straits,  or  Netherlands  Indies? 

By  the  way,  have  you  any  ideas  that  I  could  use  in  expanding  circulation  in 
the  Philippines  for  Pacific  Affairs?  I  think  it  is  a  healthy  thing  not  to  depend 
entirely  on  the  organizational  efforts  of  the  IPR  in  each  area  for  subscriptions. 
The  more  we  can  widen  out  everywhere  by  getting  people  who  are  not  just 
members  or  joiners  to  subscribe  to  Pacific  Affairs,  the  better  for  us. 

I  may  be  in  New  York  toward  the  end  of  March.     If  so,  I  very  much  hope 
that  I  may  be  able  to  make  your  acquaintance  personally. 
Yours  very  sincerely, 

Owen  Lattimore. 

Mr.  Soitrw^ine,  May  I  inquire  ? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Mr.  Lattimore,  can  you  explain  why  you  were  con- 
cerned over  the  reaction  of  the  Philip])ine  IPR  to  your  publication  of 
fundamental  stuff  on  the  Philippine  Islands? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Was  that  the  reaction  of  the  Philippine  IPE.  I  was 
concerned  about,  or  the  reaction  of  the  tobacco  company  ^ 

Mr.  Sotjrwixe.  The  letter  said,  sir — 

at  the  same  time  I  needn't  apologize  for  pointing  out  to  you  that  we  couldn't 
guarantee  to  take  another  article  from  you  on  the  Philippines  right  away,  if  it 


3350  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

would  look  to  the  Philippines  IPR  as  though  we  only  printed  "radical"  stuff 
on  the  islands. 

I  was  asking  what  was  the  basis  for  your  feeling  that  the  Philippine 
IPK  would  be  concerned  about  your  printing  fundamental  stuff  on 
the  Philippine  Islands  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  suppose  it  was  because  of  that  protest  from  the 
tobacco  company  that  disliked  Allen's  article.  The  Philippines  coun- 
cil was  one  of  the  councils  from  which  we  had  often  tried  unsuccess- 
fully to  get  articles. 

Then  I  got  an  article  from  somebody  who  had  been  to  the  Philip- 
pines, which  raised  a  controversy  in  the  Philippines.  So  I  suppose  the 
Philippines  council  might  be  concerned  about  it. 

Incidentally,  the  tobacco  company's  criticism  of  Allen's  figures  and 
statements  had  raised  absolutely  no  question  of  his  being  a  Com- 
munist, and  as  far  as  concerns  the  conditions  that  he  dealt  with  the 
accuracy  of  his  investigation  seems  to  be  fully  upheld  by  the  report 
of  the  Joint  Preparatory  Committee  on  Philippine  Affairs  appointed 
by  the  President  of  the  United  States. 

The  Chairman.  Are  you  reading  that,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Are  you  reading  that  from  some  document  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  am  reading  that  from  some  notes  I  have  pre- 
pared. 

The  Chairman.  Why  do  you  not  answer  the  question  without  read- 
ing it  ? 

Who  presented  that  to  you ?    Where  did  you  get  that? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  asked  my  wife  for  it. 

Senator  Smith.  Is  that  a  memorandum  you  prepared  yourself,  Mr. 
Lattimore  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes ;  it  is  a  memorandum  that  I  prepared  myself. 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  did  you  prepare  that? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  In  preparation  for  these  hearings. 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  did  you  prepare  that  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  am  not  quite  sure  at  what  time.  I  have  been  pre- 
paring for  these  hearings  for  months. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Let  us  get  a  definite  answer  to  this  question : 
When  did  you  prepare  this  document  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  In  the  course  of  preparing  for  these  hearings. 
Senator. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  that  the  closest  you  can  get  to  it? 

Mr.  Lati'Imore.  That  is  the  closest  I  can  get  to  it. 

The  Chairman.  Within  how  many  months?  Within  a  period  of 
liow  many  months  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Within  a  period  of  approximately  8  months. 

Senator  Ferguson.  AVliat  made  you  think  that  you  might  be  asked 
about  this  article  and  about  Allen?  Wliat  made  you  think  that  you 
might  be  asked  about  this  article  and  Allen  ? 

Mr.  Latomore.  Because  of  previous  testimony,  both  at  the  time 
of  the  Tydings  hearings  and  before  this  committee,  for  example 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  refresh  your  memory  about  Allen,  try 
to  find  any  of  these  letters  to  him  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  looked  u])  to  see  what  I  might  have  on  the  subject 
(jf  Allen.  Then  I  looked  up  the  question  of  the  situation  at  that  time 
in  the  Philippines. 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3351 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  is  it  that  your  counsel  wants  to  call  to 
your  attention  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  entries  on  the  subject  of  Sol  Auerbach  in  the 
printed  transcript  of  this  hearing,  part  1,  July. 

The  Chairman.  What  date  ? 

Mr.  LArriMORE.  Part  1,  July  25,  26,  31 ;  August  2,  7,  1951. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  it  is  the  import  of  your  testimony  to 
the  effect  that  James  S.  Allen's  article  was  not  a  Communist  article  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  the  import  of  my  testimony. 

The  Chairman.  "VAHiat  did  you  mean  by  the  word  "radical"  in 
that? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Well,  I  meant  the  word  radical,  in  quotes,  in  the 
sense  that  as  of  that  time  any  article  which  was  contested  by  a  planta- 
tion company  about  conditions  of  plantation  labor  might  have  been 
called  radical  by  the  plantation  company. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  You  mean  you  did  not  here  use  it  in  the  sense  of 
fundamental  ? 

Mr.  Latitmore.  Here  I  did  not  use  it  in  the  sense  of  fundamental, 
and  I  had  it  in  quotes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  knowing  what  you  do  now  about  James 
S.  Allen,  do  you  think  that  he  still  could  write  an  article  that  would 
not  be  a  Communist  article  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Mr.  Morris,  I  don't  know  any  way  of  preventing  a 
Communist  from  occasionally  taking  an  intelligent  interest  in  an  im- 
portant problem.  I  should  think  that  under  certain  circumstances  a 
Communist  would  be  quite  capable  of  writing  an  article  that  could 
not  be  regarded  as  slanted  in  a  Communist  direction. 

The  Chairman.  Even  if  he  was  writing  under  an  assumed  name? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Even  if  he  was  writing  under  assumed  names. 
Other  people  also  write  under  assumed  names. 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  stand  in  recess  until  tomorrow 
morning  at  10  o'clock. 

(Whereupon,  at  3 :  15  p.  m.  the  committee  recessed,  to  reconvene  at 
10  a.  m.,  Wednesday,  March  5,  1952.) 


INSTITUTE  OF  PACIFIC  RELATIONS 


WEDNESDAY.   MARCH   5,    1952 

United  States  Senate, 
Subcommittee  to  Investigate  the 

Administration  or  the  Internal 
Security  Act  and  other  Internal  Security 

Laws,  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary, 

Washington,,  D.  C. 
The  subcommittee  met  at  10  :15  a.  m.,  pursuant  to  recess,  in  room 
424,  Senate  Office  Building:,  Hon.  Pat  McCarran,  chairman,  presiding. 
Present :  Senators  McCarran,  Eastland,  Smith,  CConor,  Ferguson, 
und  Watkins,  and  Jenner. 

Also  present :  J.  G.  Sourwine,  committee  counsel ;  Robert  Morris, 
subcommittee  counsel;  Benjamin  Mandel,  research  director. 
The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 

TESTIMONY  OF  OWEN  LATTIMORE,  ACCOMPANIED  BY  THURMAN 

ARNOLD— Resumed 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  do  you  have  a  copy  of  the  letter  that 
you  mentioned  in  the  article  to  the  London  Times  yesterday,  of  per- 
mission to  go  to  Yenan? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  don't  have  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  You  do  not  have  a  cop}'  of  that. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  did  you  ever  express  disagreement  with  the  policy 
of  the  United  States  Government,  that  all  aid  to  China  should  go 
through  the  accredited  Chinese  Nationalist  Government? 

Mr.  Latiimore.  I  have  no  recollection  of  that,  but  my  recollection 
isn't  complete.     If  you  have  a  document  I  would  be  glad  to  discuss  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  ever  recommend  or  protest  that  aid  should 
be  given  to  the  Chinese  Communists  lest  the  United  States  appear 
partisan  in  withholding  aid  from  the  Chinese  Communists? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  remember  that,  either,  but  again  my  recol- 
lection isn't  complete. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  ever  prepare  a  j^rotest  to  an  article  written 
by  Max  Eastman  and  J.  B.  Powell,  in  the  Reader's  Digest,  in  1945, 
wdiich  was  destined  for  the  New  York  Times,  over  the  signature  of 
Thomas  Lamont? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes;  I  participated  in  that. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  explain  what  happened  at  that  time,  Mr. 
Lattimore  I 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Mr.  Eastman  and  Mr.  Powell  had  printed  in  the 
Reader's  Digest  which  cast  slurs  on  me  and  others.  I  wrote  to  the 
Reader's  Digest  and  asked  for  an  opportunity  to  reply,  received  what 

88348— 52— pt.  10 6  3353 


3354  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

I  considered  a  very  curt  and  rude  reply,  and  a  little  bit  later,  I  be- 
lieve, Mr.  Carter  wrote  to  me  and  suggested  that  a  letter  be  published, 
be  offered  to  the  New  York  Times  for  publication.  He  believed  that 
Mr.  Thomas  Lamont  might  sign  such  a  letter,  and  suggested  that  I 
draft  it  so  that  what  I  considered  the  relevant  material  would  be  in  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  So  the  views  in  that  memorandum  were  your  views? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  know  about  the  final  state  oi  it.  I  pre- 
pared a  draft. 

The  Chairman,  The  question  is,  are  the  views  in  that  draft  your 
views  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  In  the  views  in  my  original  draft  were  my  views; 
yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  ever  read  the  letter  that  actually  ap- 
peared in  the  New  York  Times  ? 

Mr.  Lat^tmore.  I  don't  think  a  letter  did  appear  in  the  New  York 
Times. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  it  appear  anywhere? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  believe  so. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  identify  these  documents, 
please  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  is  photostat  of  a  carbon  copy  of  a  letter  from 
the  files  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  dated  Jime  14,  1945, 
addressed  to  Owen  Lattimore,  with  the  typed  signature  of  Edward 
C.  Carter. 

Attached  thereto  is  a  photostat  of  a  letter  to  the  editor  of  the  New 
York  Times,  consisting  of  five  pages.     It  is  unsigned. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  I  ask  if  you  will  look  at  that  and  an- 
swer whether  or  not  that  letter  is  addressed  to  you,  whether  that 
is  a  copy  of  a  letter  addressed  to  you,  and  whether  the  draft  therein 
is  your  draft. 

(A  document  was  handed  to  the  witness.) 

The  Chairman.  As  I  understand  it,  all  of  this  matter,  a  photo- 
static copy  of  which  was  presented  to  the  witness  here,  was  taken 
from  the  files  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations;  is  that  correct, 
Mr.  Mandel  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  letter  from  Mr.  Carter  to  me  is  clearly  writ- 
ten by  him  and  received  by  me.  If  I  may  just  look  at  this  draft 
here — 

I  do  not  believe  the  di-aft  is  entirely  my  draft.  I  think  it  is  probably 
a  combined  draft  of  some  sort. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Whose  work  besidee  yours? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  know,  unless  it  was  Mr.  Carter  or  if  he 
asked  somebody  else  in  New  York  to  help  him. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  Mr.  Lamont  know  anything  about  this 
subject  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  I  believe  there  was  some  correspondence  be- 
tween Mr.  Carter  and  Mr.  Lamont  on  the  subject. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  did  he  know  anything  personally  about 
it,  or  was  he  merelv  the  mouthpiece  for  you  and  Mr.  Carter? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Mr.  Lamont  had  long  been  interested  in  China. 

Senator  Ferguson.  He  had  been  ? 
_  Mr.  Lattimore.  I  believe  he  had  long  been  interested  in  China;  yes, 
sir. 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3355 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  do  you  say  is  in  this  document  that  is  not 
yours  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  is  impossible  for  me  to  recall  at  this  time  ex- 
actly what  phrases  were  mine  and  what  phrases  were  somebody  else's. 

The  Chairman.  Is  it  a  matter  of  phrases,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Maybe  partly  a  matter  of  phrases,  partly,  perhaps, 
a  matter  of  paragraphs. 

The  Chairman.  Is  it  a  matter  of  substance? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  May  I  read  it  out,  Mr.  Chairman  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Before  doing  that,  you  will  be  given  that  opportunity, 
Mr.  Lattimore;  I  would  like  to  ask  a  few  questions  beforehand. 

Will  you  read  that  letter  that  accompanies  the  draft  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

(Exhibit  No.  526) 

Dear  Owen  :  Although  last  night's  suggestion  for  ghost  writing  for  a  down- 
town big  shot  has  certain  attractive  features,  my  second  thought  is  that  my 
original  suggestion  should  not  be  lightly  discarded. 

You  are  a  pretty  big  shot  yourself  and  a  great  many  people  will  listen  to  you. 

If  on  further  thought  you  think  that  there  would  be  even  greater  advantages 
in  the  proposal  advanced  last  evening,  I  am  willing  to  exploiv  the  possibility 
of  it,  but  my  original  suggestion  still  is  my  first  choice. 
Sincerely  yours, 

Mr.  Morris.  At  this  point,  Mr.  Chairman,  will  you  receive  both 
the  draft  and  the  letter  into  evidence? 

The  Chairman.  The  draft  and  the  letter  have  been  identified  as 
having  been  taken  from  the  files  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations 
and  will  be  received  in  evidence. 

(Documents  referred  to  were  marked  "Exhibit  No.  526,"  which  was 
read  in  full  above,  and  "Exhibit  No.  527,"  which  is  as  follows:) 

To  the  Editor  of  the  New  York  Times  : 

The  San  Francisco  Conference  has  shown  us  that  Soviet  Russia  is  a  country 
with  which  we  can  cooperate.  The  statesmanship  of  the  Russian  delegates,  and 
concessions  made  by  the  Soviet  Government,  have  contributed  to  this  fortunate 
outcome.     Tensions  have  eased,  especially  in  Europe. 

On  the  other  hand  there  is  cause  for  uneasiness  in  a  new  trend,  which  is  now 
developing,  toward  criticism  of  Soviet  motives  and  Soviet  policies  in  Asia.  We 
shall  be  well  advised  to  consider  this  trend  now,  in  advance  of  President  Tru- 
man's first  Big  Three  meeting  with  Mr.  Churchill  and  Marshal  Stalin.  When 
that  meeting  is  held  public  interest  and  public  comment  and  si^eculation  will 
inevitably  he  drawn  toward  Russia's  position,  and  Russia's  relationship  to  us, 
in  Asia  and  the  Pacific.  We  shall  do  well  to  prepare  now  for  the  thinking  which 
will  absorb  our  interest  then.  Should  we  prepare  ourselves  for  this  occasion 
by  hardening,  within  our  minds,  the  assumption  that  Soviet  and  American  in- 
terests in  Asia  are  inherently  in  conflict  with  each  other?  Ought  we  not  rather 
to  search  for  a  larger  framework  of  policy  within  which  American  and  Soviet 
interests  can  be  accommodated  to  each  other"? 

An  example  of  anticipatory  alarm  about  Russia  is  to  be  found  in  the  influential 
magazine  Reader's  Digest,  under  the  title  "The  Fate  of  the  World  Is  at  Stake  in 
China,"  by  Max  Eastman  and  J.  B.  Powell.  In  this  article  it  is  suggested  that 
there  is  a  danger  that  American  policy  might  disastrously  "sell  out"  President 
Chiang  Kai-shek  to  the  Chinese  Communists,  and  "bring  under  totalitarian  regi- 
mentation 450  million  people."  To  bolster  the  case,  the  article  casts  doubts  on 
the  authoritativeness  of  several  of  those  Americans  who  have,  in  fact,  contributed 
most  authoritatively  to  a  clear  American  understanding  of  contemporary  China 
and  Contemporary  Russia— including  Owen  Lattimore,  Harrison  P'orman,  and 
EMgar  Snow.  The  publication  of  such  an  article  invites  a  review  of  both  Ameri- 
can and  Soviet  policy  in  China.  In  making  such  a  review,  w^e  should  examine 
American  policy  just  as  closely  as  Soviet  policy,  and  make  (Mir  criticisms  where 
they  are  due. 


3356  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Under  Pearl  Harbor,  the  American  policy  was  to  support  China  while  avoiding, 
as  far  as  possible,  a  direct  challenge  to  Japan.  Since  Pearl  Harbor,  our  policy 
has  been  to  give  China  the  maximum  aid  permitted  by  difficulties  of  transport  and 
the  demands  of  other  theaters  of  war.  We  have  also,  until  quite  recently,  en- 
couraged political  unity  in  China,  in  order  to  facilitate  the  most  effective  resist- 
ance in  Japan. 

Soviet  Russia  has  followed  a  parallel  policy.  Even  during  the  period  when  there 
was  a  danger  that  Russia  might  be  attacked  from  two  sides  by  Germany  and 
Japan,  the  Soviet  Government  accepted  whatever  risk  there  might  be  in  giving 
aid  to  China.  Moreover,  Soviet  aid,  like  American  aid,  encouraged  political  unity 
in  China.  No  attempt  was  made  to  channel  Soviet  aid  toward  the  Chinese  Com- 
munists. All  aid  was  delivered,  with  no  restrictions  attached,  to  the  National 
Government  lieaded  by  Generalissimo  Cliiang  Kai-shelc.  After  the  German 
invasion  of  Russia  the  flow  of  aid  understandably  decreased  ;  but  Madame  Chiang 
has  given  us  an  authoritative  statement  of  the  extent  and  significance  of  Soviet 
aid  up  to  1941.     Writing  in  Liberty  magazine  (January  21,  1941)  she  said  : 

"Intellectual  honesty  constrains  me  to  point  out  that  throughout  the  first  three 
.years  of  resistance,  Soviet  Russia  extended  to  Cliina,  for  the  actual  purchase  of 
war  materials  and  other  necessities,  credits  several  times  larger  than  the  credits 
given  by  either  Great  Britain  or  America.  Both  these  countries,  indeed,  cii'cum- 
scribed  tlieir  advances  with  conditions  which  prevented  even  one  cent  of  the 
money  from  being  used  for  badly  needed  munitions,  equipment,  or  war  materials 
of  any  kind  *  *  *  when  Japan  protested  through  the  Ambassador  at  Moscow 
that  the  aid  extended  was  a  breach  of  neutrality,  Russia  did  not  wilt,  or  surren- 
der, or  compromise,  but  continued  to  send  supplies  of  arms  to  China.  It  will 
doubtless  be  said  that  Russia  has  been  aiding  China  for  selfish  interests.  In 
reply  to  this  I  may  point  out  that  Russian  help  has  been  unconditional." 

Russian  and  American  policy  in  China  can  be  made  parallel,  and  we  know  from 
experience,  not  by  guesswork,  tliat  the  Russians  are  capable  of  contributing,  at 
the  very  least,  an  equal  share  in  making  the  policies  of  the  two  countries  parallel. 

At  the  present  moment  there  is  a  danger  that  the  parallel  policy  may  not 
continue.  This  danger  has  not  yet  arisen  from  Russian  policy,  but  it  has  arisen 
from  American  policy.  Whereas  Russian  policy  has  never  yet  demanded  the 
inclusion  of  the  Cliinese  Communists  in  the  benefits  of  Russian  aid  to  China, 
American  policy  has  recently  explicitly  excluded  them  from  the  benefits  of  Ameri- 
can aid.  Recent  statements  by  General  Hurley,  our  Ambassador  to  Chungking, 
and  General  Wedemeyer,  the  ranking  American  officer  in  the  theater,  have  re- 
stricted the  benefits  of  Lend-Lease  to  the  forces  politically  identified  with  Presi- 
dent Chiang  Kai-shek,  and  have  restricted  American  personnel  from  acting  in 
ways  that  might  benefit  forces  other  than  those  politically  identified  with  Presi- 
dent Chiang. 

As  a  result,  American  aid  to  China  is  now  confined  to  such  politically  limited 
channels  that,  while  we  continue  to  aid  China  the  nation,  our  aid  now  favors  one 
political  group  against  all  others  and  is  withheld  from  one  major  group,  the 
Chinese  Communists,  which  has  armed  forces  in  combat  with  the  Japanese. 
American  aid  to  China  has  thus  become  politically  partisan  at  a  time  when  the 
Russians  are  still  scrupulously  refraining  from  partisan  activity.  If  this  diver- 
gence of  policy  should  create  a  strain  in  Russian-American  relations,  the  blame 
cannot  be  thrown  upon  the  Russians.  On  the  contrary,  if  the  Russians  should 
in  the  future  begin  to  extend  direct  aid  to  the  Chinese  Communists,  they  could 
justify  themselves  on  the  groimd  that  they  were  merely  following  an  American 
precedent. 

Many  issues  are  here  involved.  Not  the  least  of  them  is  the  possibility  of  a 
complete  reversal  of  the  time-honored  American  policy  of  supporting  the  terri- 
torial and  political  integrity  of  China.  American  aid  to  one  party  in  China, 
leading  to  Riissian  aid  to  another  party,  could  easily  result  in  inflicting  on 
China  a  terrible  civil  war,  following  more  tban  eight  years  of  heavy  sacrifice  in 
a  war  for  national  survival.  American  policy,  which  traditionally  has  always 
opposed  the  partition  of  China,  might  thus  actually  precipitate  a  partition  by 
making  the  government  of  part  of  China  dependent  on  American  control  and 
virtually  compelling  political  opponents  of  that  government  to  look  for  foreign 
support  elsewhere. 

To  those  who  can  think  of  American  policy  only  in  terms  of  an  anti-Russian 
coalition,  like  the  authors  of  the  article  in  Reader's  Digest  from  which  I  have 
quoted,  such  a  prospect  may  seem  to  be  only  a  bold  move  in  power-politics.  It 
is  ironical  to  recall  that  one  of  them,  Mr.  Eastman,  was  long  a  supporter  of 
Leon  Trotsky,  and  is  the  translator  of  his  works.     Were  Leon  Trotsky  in  the 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3357 

Kremlin  today,  and  not  Marshal  Stalin,  the  prospect  of  the  division  of  China 
between  Russia  and  America,  setting  the  stage  for  a  world  war  between 
Communism  and  capitalism,  might  well  be  enticing  to  American  Communists  of 
the  Trotskyist  persuasion. 

To  other  Americans  it  should  be  alarming  to  contemplate  the  possibility  of 
an  irrevocable  reversal  of  historic  American  policy  in  China,  leading  to  irre- 
mediable antagonism  between  us  and  Soviet  Russia,  threatening  the  foundations 
of  world  security  that  have  been  laid  at  San  Francisco  with  Russian  aid,  and 
luaking  America  responsible  for  a  new  world  phase  of  the  politics  of  hostility. 

The  safeguard  against  these  dangers  lies  not  in  limited  support  of  one  nation, 
or  one  party  within  a  nation,  but  in  wider  and  better-balanced  cooperation  with 
China,  with  Russia,  and  with  Great  Britain.  Mr.  Owen  Lattimore,  in  his  recent 
Solution  in  Asia,  has  wisely  warned  against  an  American  policy  which  would 
make  the  Chinese  Government  "dependent  on  us  to  the  point  where  it  cannot 
deal  with  other  governments  without  our  backing,"  and  has  urged  that  "it  is 
essential  that  America  should  cease  to  lie  so  conspicuously  the  main  link  between 
China  and  the  United  Nations.  Our  interests  are  great,  but  they  are  not  isolated. 
China  policy  must  be  brought  into  proper  liaison  with  our  Soviet  and  British 
policies." 

Our  interest — and  it  can  be  made  a  common  interest  with  Great  Britain  and 
Russia — is  that  China  should  be  strong,  united,  and  independent.  Only  a 
China  which  is  strong  because  it  is  united,  and  therefore  capable  of  true  inde- 
pendence, can  inspire  the  permanent  confidence  of  the  American  people  and 
provide  the  conditions  for  expanding  investment  and  trade  which  are  needed 
by  the  rest  of  the  world  almost  as  much  as  they  are  needed  by  China  herself. 

At  President  Truman's  forthcoming  meeting  with  the  others  of  the  Big  Three 
the  necessary  adjustments  can  and  should  l)e  made,  and  they  should  have  the 
widest  support  throughout  tlie  American  Nation.  American  policy  should  be 
brought  back  to  its  traditional  support  for  a  politically  and  territorially  united 
China,  and  this  paramount  requisite  for  the  future  stability  of  Asia  should  not 
be  jeopardized  by  factious  attacks  on  any  of  our  allies. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  Might  I  ask  a  question  there,  Mr.  Chairman? 
Mr.  Morris.  We  are  still  on  the  same  subject. 
The  Chairman.  Yes ;  yon  may. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Mr.  Lattimore,  would  von  look  at  page  3  of  this 
draft? 

This  is  the  draft  of  the  article? 

Mr.  Latiimore.  Yes. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  The  paragraph  at  the  bottom  of  that  page. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  It  says : 

As  a  result,  American  aid  to  China  is  now  confined  to  such  politically  limited 
channels  that,  while  we  continue  to  aid  China  the  nation,  our  aid  now  favors 
one  political  group  against  all  others  and  is  withheld  from  one  major  group,  the 
Chinese  Communists,  which  has  armed  forces  in  combat  with  the  Japanese. 
American  aid  to  China  has  thus  become  politically  partisan  at  a  time  when 
the  Russians  are  still  scrupulously  refraining  from  partisian  activity.  If  this 
divergence  of  policy  should  create  a  strain  in  Russian-American  relations,  the 
blame  cannot  be  thrown  upon  the  Russians.  On  the  contrary,  if  the  Rusisans 
should  in  the  future  begin  to  extend  direct  aid  to  the  Chinese  Communists,  they 
could  justify  themselves  on  the  ground  that  they  were  merely  following  an 
American  precedent. 

Can  you  say  Avhether  that  is  one  of  the  portions  of  the  draft  which 
is  yours? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  believe  that  was  probably  mine ;  yes.  This  is  in 
line  with  the  thinking  that  was  very  common  at  the  time,  of  w^hich  I 
was  aware,  as  I  said  in  my  statement,  prepared  statement  for  this 
committee,  on  page  44 : 

Some  experienced  observers  were  already  beginning  to  believe  the  Chiang  Kai- 
.^hek  part  of  free  China  was  In  danger  of  being  completely  conquered  by  the 
Japanese.     Some  of  these  observers,  including  American  military  officers,  even 


3358  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

felt  that  the  Aniericau  Governmeut  ought  to  assert  its  i-ight  to  seud  supplies  to 
the  CoDimunist  areas  of  resistance. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  Did  you  believe  what  you  wi-ote  here  in  this  para- 
graph that  I  have  just  read  ? 

Mr.  Laitimore.  Why,  certainly,  I  believed  it  at  the  time;  yes. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Did  j'ou  realize  that  this  paragraph  includes  the 
statement  that:  "*  *  *  the  Russians,"  at  this  time,  which  was 
1945 ;  "*  *  *  ai-e  still  scrupulously  refraining  from  partisan 
activity"  ? 

Did  you  believe  that? 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  moment,  Mrs.  Lattimore. 

The  Chair  has  borne  with  you  now  for  several  days  in  what  appears 
to  be  your  whispered  answers  to  the  witness  on  the  stand.  If  it  oc- 
curs again,  the  Chair  will  be  constrained  to  have  you  moved  from 
your  position.  I  do  not  like  to  do  that.  I  want  to  be  as  courteous  to 
you  as  I  can.    The  Chair  is  not  going  to  endure  tliis  much  longer. 

That  is  an  end  to  it,  and  that  is  all. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Your  question,  Mr.  Sourwine  ? 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Do  you  realize,  Mr.  Lattimore,  that  that  paragraph 
infers  the  statement  that  at  the  time,  that  is,  in  June  of  1945,  the  Rus- 
sians were,  to  use  the  words  of  the  article :  "Still  scrupulously  re- 
fraining from  partisan  activity." 

Did  you  believe  that  at  the  time  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  believed  that  at  the  time,  and  I  should  like  to  ask 
permission  to  read  a  note  on  the  subject  in  a  printed  book  by  General 
Chennault. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Mr.  Chairman,  if  I  might  pursue  this  for  just  a 
moment  before  we  have  any  extraneous  matter  put  in  ? 

The  CiL\iRMAN.  Vei-y  well. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Did  you  not  testify  here,  sir,  I  believe  the  day  be- 
fore yesterday,  that  you  have  believed,  and  now  believe,  since  1940, 
the  Russians  were  supporting  and  have  been  supporting  the  Chinese 
Communists? 

]\Ir.  Laitimore.  I  cleai'ly  remember  making  that  statement.  The 
support  of  the  Russians  to  the  Chinese  Communists  during  the  war 
period,  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  then  and  at  this  time,  was  j)roga- 
ganda  support,  moral  support,  anything  except  direct  support  in  the 
way  of  arms  and  supplies. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Do  you  think,  sir,  that  that  support,  such  as  you 
speak  of,  even  it  was  confined  to  moral  support,  propaganda  support, 
and  all  of  the  other  support  short  of  arms,  do  you  think  that  meets  the 
description  "scrupulously  refraining  from  partisan  activity?" 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  I  believe  it  does,  Mr.  Sourwine.  I  believe  the 
Russian  support  of  those  years  emphasized  the  need  for  continuing 
unity  in  China,  and  not  resorting  to  civil  war  at  a  time  when  all  Chinese 
ought  to  be  fighting  the  Japanese. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Do  you  believe,  Mr.  Lattimore,  that  the  Russians 
were  strictly  impartial  as  between  the  Chinese  Communists  and  the 
Chinese  Nationalist  Government? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  no  doubt,  Mr.  Sourwine,  that  the  Russians 
were  not  impartial.  But  whatever  their  reasons,  they  were  at  that 
time,  as  far  as  I  know  to  tliis  day,  scrupulously  following  an  inter- 
national policy  of  supporting  the  joint  Chinese  resistance  to  the 
Japanese. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3359 

Mr.  SoURWiNE.  Is  that  what  you  meant  when  you  said  the  day 
before  yesterday  that  the  Chinese  Communists  were  being  supported 
by  Russia? 

Mr.  LATriMORE.  That  is  what  I  meant,  yes.  I  did  not  mean  military 
support  or  support  of  supplies. 

I  should  like  at  this  moment  to  read  tliis  citation  from  General 
Chennault,  which  I  found  quite  recently  when  I  was  looking  over  the 
I'ecords. 

The  Chairman.  Refer  that  to  the  counsel,  please. 

Mr,  Morris.  What  relevancy  does  that  have,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

The  Chairman.  Before  we  go  into  that,  just  refer  it  to  the  counsel, 
please. 

Have  you  got  it  with  you  i 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  I  think  I  have  it. 

The  Chairman.  Let  us  have  it,  please. 

Now  you  may  pursue  your  questions.  You  may  read  it  at  a  later 
time. 

Mr.  Morris.    Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  identify  that  last  document? 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  is  a  carbon  copy  of  a  letter  which  was  taken  from 
the  files  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  dated  June  19,  1945,  ad- 
dressed to  Owen  Lattimore,  with  the  typed  signature  of  Edward  C. 
Carter. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  I  ask  if  you  recall  having  received  that 
letter. 

(A  document  was  handed  to  the  witness.) 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  don't  recall  receiving  it,  but  obviously  I  did. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  will  you  receive  it  into  the  record? 

The  Chair3Ian.  It  has  been  established  as  having  come  from  the 
files  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Lattimore,  will  you  read  that  letter,  please  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  This  one? 

Mr.  Morris.  Yes,  the  one  I  just  handed  you. 

This  is  already  introduced,  I  understand,  as  exhibit  29,  in  the 
printed  hearings,  before  this  committee. 

Mr.  SouRW^iNE.  Could  we  have  an  extra  copy  for  Mr.  Arnold? 

Mr.  Arnold.   Thank  you. 

Mr.  Morris.  Would  you  read  that,  Mr.  Lattimore,  please? 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

Dear  Owen  :  Here  is  a  typed  copy  of  the  draft  you  handed  me  yesterday.  Late 
last  evening  I  went  up  to  One  Hundred  and  Sixty-sixth  Street  and  saw  the  son.  I 
discovered  that,  alas,  his  father  left  yesterday  for  Maine  and  probably  will  be 
gone  all  summer. 

I  explained  the  general  situation  to  the  son  and  said  that  I  would  like  his 
advice  as  to  who  would  be  the  best  single  person  or  group  of  three  or  four  to 
sign  such  a  letter.  He  made  some  academic  suggestions  and  then  finally  sug- 
gested the  possibility  of  his  father. 

He  thought  it  would  be  better  for  me  to  approach  him  than  for  him  to  do  so, 
though  he  said  the  chances  weren't  very  good  because  his  father  is  fatigued  and 
doesn't  usually  like  to  take  on  extra  burdens  during  his  holiday. 

;Mr.  Morris.  Excuse  me,  Mr.  Lattimore.  Who  is  the  person  he 
referred  to  there  as  the  son  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  know  of  my  own  knowledge,  Mr.  Morris.  I 
presume,  from  reading  the  transcript  of  these  hearings,  that  it  is  Mr. 
Corliss  Lamont,  the  son  of  Mr.  Thomas  Lament. 


3360  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Mr.  Morris.  At  the  time  you  received  this  letter  from  Mr.  Carter, 
he  presumed  that  you  knew  who  the  son  would  be  when  he  wrote 
this  letter,  did  he  not? 

Mr.  Laitimore.  I  presume  so. 

Mr.  Morris.  So  it  is  your  testimony  that  you  may  have  known  that 
the  son  at  that  time  was  Corliss  Lamont,  but  at  least  the  testimony  to 
date  has  refreshed  your  recollection  on  that  score  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  testimony  to  date  has  refreshed  my  recollection 
on  that  score,  and  I  presume  that  I  knew^  at  the  time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  there  any  doubt  about  that,  that  you  knew 
who  the  son  was  ? 

Mr.  La'itimore.  No,  I  presume  there  was  no  doubt  about  it,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  Why  was  Mr.  Carter  using  the  cryptic  language  em- 
ployed there? 

]\Ir.  Lait-imore.  You  would  have  to  ask  Mr.  Carter  that. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  continue  reading,  Mr.  Lattimore  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

He  also  confirmed  what  I  suspected,  that  the  father  likes  to  do  his  own  writing. 
I  am,  however,  prepared  in  2  or  3  days  to  send  the  draft  to  him,  with  as  strong 
and  tactful  a  letter  as  I  can  write  on  the  off  chance  that  he  might  be  willing  to 
do  something. 

There  is  just  one  section  of  your  draft  that  I  question  slightly,  and  this  is 
at  the  bottom  of  page  3  and  top  of  page  4. 

Is  that  the  same  3  and  4  that  is  on  this  mimeographed  copy? 

This  possibility  is  precisely  what  your  critics  are  always  advancing.  They 
say  tiiat  the  Soviet  Union  is  definitely  going  to  annex  Manchuria,  et  cetera,  while 
you  put  it  in  reverse. 

I  would  hate  to  have  your  critics  pounce  on  this  and  announce  that  even  Latti- 
more admits  that  Manchuria  is  to  become  a  pai't  of  the  Soviet  Union.     Do  you 
see  any  way  of  avoiding  this? 
Sincerely  yours, 

Edward  C.  Carter. 

P.  S. — May  I  make  one  more  suggestion,  that  is,  that  you  add  a  final  paragraph 
in  which  the  author  puts  in  a  plea  for  a  strong,  united,  independent  China,  a 
China  which  would  in.spire  confidence  of  the  American  people  in  general,  and -a 
Cliina  which  would  give  confidence  to  those  American  businessmen  who  seek 
mutually  advantageous  trade  between  the  United  States  and  China? 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  I  show  you  that  original  of  the  draft 
again,  and  the  paragraph  questioned  about,  the  paragraph  Mr.  Sour- 
wine  questioned  you  about. 

It  does  appear  at  the  bottom  of  page  3  and  the  top  of  page  4. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Of  the  original  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Of  the  one  that  we  have  been  discussing. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Does  not  that  appear  to  be  the  same  paragraph? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right,  yes.  That  is  page  3  of  the  mimeo- 
graphed copy. 

Mr.  Morris.  And,  Mr.  Chairman,  to  complete  this  episode,  I  would 
like  to  put  into  the  record  the  answer  of  Mr.  Thomas  Lamont,  wdiich 
he  w^'ote  on  July  5,  1945,  wherein  he  declined  the  invitation  of  Mr. 
Carter  to  publish  the  draft  over  his  signature  in  the  New  York  Times. 

Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  identify  that  document? 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  is  a  photostatic  copy  of  a  letter  dated  July  5, 
1945,  addressed  to  Edward  C.  Carter  from  Thomas  W.  Lamont,  on  his 
letterhead. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3361 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  receive  that  into  the  record,  Mr.  Chairman  ? 
The  Chairman.  It  is  a  j^art  of  the  files  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific 
Relations '? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Could  the  whole  letter  be  read  into  the  record? 
Mr.  Morris.  It  reads  as  follows : 

(ExHiBrr  No.  528) 

Many  thanks  for  yours  of  Jmie  29.  You  are  too  flattering  about  my  casual 
letters  to  the  New  York  Times.  I,  too,  have  been  concerned  over  the  steady 
drip  against  Russia  by  various  commentators.  ]Max  Eastman  has  always  been 
a  weather  cock,  veering  from  pro-Trotsky  to  bitter  anti-Soviet.  Powell  I  had 
thought  better  of. 

I  iiave  read  the  Reader's  Digest  article  and  have  gone  over  with  care  your 
memorandum.  In  effect  I  think  you  are  suggesting  that  I  write  to  the  Times 
a  letter  urging  our  Government  to  alter  its  apparent  present  policy,  and  to 
make  available  lend-lease  supplies  to  the  so-called  Communist  armies  in  north- 
west China.  Quite  aside  from  any  question  of  transport  to  such  a  remote 
region,  the  principle  involved  seems  to  be  that  I  should  assume  knowledge  of 
the  situation,  and  of  the  proper  policy  to  be  drawn  from  same,  more  adequate 
than  our  Government  has. 

Of  course,  I  have  no  such  knowledge  and  could  not  justify  myself  in  attempt- 
ing to  correct  the  policy  adopted.  My  way  would  always  be  first  to  seek 
information  from  the  department  at  Washington.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  even 
in  my  letters  to  the  Times  when  any  possible  question  of  current  policy  was 
involved,  I  have  first  shown  the  letters  to  the  Department  of  State,  not  for 
approval,  but  for  clearance  as  to  any  question  of  crossing  wires. 

You  know  your  China  better  than  I  do,  for  my  stay  there  was  hardly  more 
than  a  month  or  two.  But  we  both  realize  how  exceedingly  complicated  the 
situation  is  and  is  bound  to  be.  Chiang's  government  now  loosely  rules  all 
eastern  and  southern  China  (subject  to  Japanese  occupation).  The  area 
includes  all  the  great  cities.  Now.  if  Chiang  has  his  doubts  as  to  the  effec- 
tiveness of  the  Chinese  Comnunust  armies  against  the  .lapanese,  and  such 
question  has  been  many  times  raised,  and  if  Chiang  is  fearful  that  once  Japan 
is  ousted,  then  those  northern  armies  will  turn  on  him,  perhaps  he  is  justified 
in  feeling  that  the  meager  supplies  available  for  China  should  be  furnished 
for  his  armies,  and  not  for  the  other  boys.  In  your  memorandum  you  point 
out  that  Russia  has  been  scrupulous  to  send  supplies  to  Chiang  alone.  Well, 
if  that  be  true,  why  is  that  not  additional  argument  for  iis  to  do  the  same? 

I  am  really  discussing  things  about  which  I  have  no  first-hand  information. 
And  in  reading  your  memorandum  I  may  well  have  just  been  stupid.  Am  I  all 
wrong? 

With  personal  regards. 
Sincerely  yours, 

T.  W.  Lamont. 

The  Chairman,  It  will  be  inserted  into  the  record. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  528,"  and 
was  read  in  full.) 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  after  hearing  that  read  do  you 
now  say  that  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  was  not  trying  to  in- 
fluence public  opinion? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir;  I  do  not  say  that. 

I  say  that  I  had  been,  I  and  others  had  been,  attacked  in  a  grossly 
distorted  article  in  the  Reader's  Digest,  that  I  had  tried  to  get  space 
for  a  reply  and  had  been  refused. 

Senator  Ferguson.  IVlio  refused  you? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  editors  of  the  Reader's  Digest,  to  whom  I 
wrote  directly. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you  copies  of  those  letters? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  haven't  found  them,  but  I  remember  the  incident 
very  clearly. 


3362  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Mr.  Carter  then,  as  an  individual,  suggested  to  me  that  there  might 
be  a  Tray  of  finding  publications  somewhere  else.  He  suggested  that 
I  write  a  letter  myself  as  is  clear  here  from  his  letter  to  me  of  June 
14. 

My  feeling  was  that  I  was  disgusted  with  the  whole  business,  and 
that  if  the  Reader's  Digest  wouldn't  allow  me  space  for  reply,  I  didn't 
want  to  go  to  the  New  .York  Times  individually,  but  if  ]SIr.  Carter 
thought  that  there  was  an  individual  or  possibly  a  ^oup  of  individuals 
who  would  put  forward  the  view,  or  part  of  the  view  that  I  shared,  I 
would  not  mind  making  a  draft  of  material. 

That  is  a  question  of  individual  action  and  not  a  question  of  the 
action  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations. 

Senator  Fekguson.  Was  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  attacked 
in  any  way  in  the  article  in  the  Reader's  Digest? 

Mr.  Lathmore.  That  I  don't  recall. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Was  not  your  book.  Solution  in  Asia,  which 
the  testimony  in  this  record  now  shows  from  one  witness,  used  as 
Communist  propaganda,  for  the  line  here  in  America  by  the  Com- 
munist Party? 

Is  that  not  a  fact  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir,  Senator.  I  believe  you  are  in  error.  I 
believe  there  has  been  testimony  here  that  Communist  bookshops 
sold  my  book  along  with  other  non-Communist  books  as  background 
reading. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  not  the  question. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  not  my  question.  You  heard  the  testi- 
mony read  here  of  the  witness  who  said  that  it  was  used  as  the  back- 
ground for  Communist  line  in  America,  and  that  book  was  being  at- 
tacked in  this  article  in  the  Reader's  Digest.    Is  that  not  a  fact? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Senator,  I  don't  believe  that  the  record  shows  tJiat 
anybody  testified  that  it  was  being  used  as  a  background  for  the  Com- 
munist-line propaganda. 

I  believe  the  testimony  shows  that  it  was  sold  as  background  read- 
ing.   The  book  was  also  criticized  in  Communist  publications. 

The  Chairman.  You  distinguish  between  background  reading  and 
backgi'ound  what? 

Senator  Ferguson.  For  the  Communist  line? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Certainly  I  do. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Wliat  is  the  difference?  Wliat  is  the  difference 
between  backgi-ound  reading  for  a  Communist  and  Communist-line 
reading  ? 

Mr.  LATriMt)RE.  The  difference  in  this  case  is  that  my  book  was  sold 
in  a  gi^eat  many  bookshops  besides  Connnunist  booksliops,  and  that 
Communist  publications  criticized  by  views. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  read  testimony  at  this  point  into 
the  record  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  wish  you  would  read  what  the  witness  said 
about  the  Communist  line. 

Mr.  Morris.  This  is  the  testimony  of  Mr.  Matusow  taken  in  executive 
session  on  February  13,  1952.  Mr.  Mandel  is  interrogating  Mr. 
Matusow  [reading]  : 

Mr.  Mandel.   Did  the  bookshop — 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3363 

lliat  is,  the  Communist  bookshop — 

ever  promote  any  of  the  publications  of  Owen  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Matusow.  Yes,  it  did. 

Mr.  Mandel.  Will  you  tell  us  about  that? 

Mr.  Matusow.  The  book,  Solution  in  Asia,  by  Owen  Lattimore,  published  by 
Little  Brown  &  Co.— 

Mr.  Mandel.  AVhat  year? 

Mr.  Matusow.  1945 — it  was  one  of  the  books  used  in  the  bookshop  and  sug- 
gested reading  for  a  background  of  the  party  line,  the  Communist  Party  line, 
in  Asia. 

Mr.  Mandbx.  What  do  you  mean  by  suggested  reading? 

Mr.  Matusow.  You  see,  this  was  the  Jefferson  School  Book  Shop,  and  there 
were  many  courses  conducted. 

During  this  period,  as  I  said,  the  war  in  China,  the  Communist  revolution  in 
China,  was  taking  place,  and  many  people  professed  a  great  interest  in  that,  and 
the  party,  the  Communist  Party,  line,  as  disseminated  had  not  caught  up  with 
the  tide  of  events,  we  might  say.  The  party  had  been  caught  for  a  while  flat- 
footed  in  the  terms  of  the  actual  literature  put  out  by  the  Communist  Party 
interntaional  publishers. 

Things  were  moving  too  fast  for  them.  The  State  education  committee  got 
together  and  decided  which  books  would  be  good  background  material,  and  which 
supported  the  Communist  Party  line. 

They  came  out  with  a  decision  that  Solution  in  Asia  was  one  of  those  books 
which  could  give  a  Communist  Party  member  a  correct  line,  a  Communist  line, 
on  the  Asiatic  situation  in  China  and  China  specifically. 

That  is  the  end  of  the  pertinent  testimony. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Was  the  IPK  concerned  with  this  dispute  in  the 
Reader's  Digest  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  recall.  Senator. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then  what  did  Mr.  Carter  have  to  do  with  it? 
Why  did  you  not  defend  yourself  instead  of  using  the  ruse  of  having 
Laniont,  as  if  it  was  something  for  the  IPR  to  be  concerned  with? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  attempted  to  put  my  point  of  view  before  the 
editors  of  the  Readers  Digest  and  was  refused  an  opportunity. 

Mr.  Carter  then  took  the  initiative  in  suggesting  that  some  other 
way  be  found  of  publishing  the  vie^v  which  I  and  many  others  held 
at  that  time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Were  you  an  employee  of  the  Government  of  the 
L^nited  States  at  the  time  this  was  going  on  ? 

INIr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  believe  so,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  gave  as  your  address  on  June  20,  1945,  the 
OWI  here  in  Washington,  If  you  Avere  not  a  member  what  were  you 
doing  in  the  OWI  ? 

]Mr.  Laitimore.  June  20,  1945? 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  wnll  get  the  exact  date  here.  On  June  20, 
1945,  you  wrote  a  letter  to  Matthew  Connelly,  the  secretary  of  the 
President,  and  you  gave  tele])hone  OWI,  Washington,  REpublic  7500, 
Extension  72228. 

If  you  were  not  an  employee,  what  were  you  doing  in  the  OWI  ? 

Mr.  Laitimore.  At  that  time  I  was  an  occasional  consultant  to  the 
OWI.  and  if  I  had  been  in  Washiuiiton  cm  any  day  which  Mr.  Con- 
nelly telephoned  me  at  my  home  in  Ruxton  and  couldn't  find  me,  he 
could  have  very  likely  have  found  me  at  OWI. 

Senator  Ferguson".  Then  you  were  an  employee  of  the  United 
States  Government  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  was  an  occasional  considtant,  which  meant  that  I 
was  an  employee  on  any  day  that  I  actually  worked  there  to  act  as 
consultant. 


3364  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  much  did  you  receive  a  day  as  being  a 
consultant. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  recall.     The  records  will  show,  doubtlessly. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Were  you  or  were  you  not  on  the  payroll  of 
the  United  States  Government  while  this  was  going  on  with  Mr. 
Lamont  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir;  I  was  an  independent  citizen  who  was 
occasionally  consulted  and  on  the  days  when  I  was  consulted  I  re- 
ceived a  consultant's  fee,  or  whatever  you  like  to  call  it,  from  the 
United  States  Government. 

It  had  absolutely  no  limiting  effect  on  my  expressing  my  own  views 
as  a  citizen. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  much  did  you  draw  from  the  United 
States  Treasury  in  1945  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  know,  sir.  I  am  sure  that  the  records  would 
show. 

Senator  Ferguson.  We  will  get  that  and  put  it  in  the  record,  if  it 
is  not  one  of  those  matters  that  is  a  secret  and  we  cannot  obtain  it. 

It  may  be  the  question  that  your  employment  was  that  way,  as  you 
indicate  now. 

Mr.  Arnold.  If  there  is  any  question  of  secrecy,  we  will  waive  it, 
Senator. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  want  to  ask  you  this :  I  was  asking  you  the 
other  day  about  the  article  of  Bisson,  where  the  party  line  was  changed 
in  relation  to  China  in  1943.  That  has  been  discussed  quite  a  bit  in 
this  record. 

The  question  came  up  as  to  changing  the  line  and  calling  the  Com- 
munists of  China  democrats,  and  that  their  government  was  the  de- 
mocracy, and  that  the  Nationalist  Government  was  the  feudal  system. 

Now,  I  ask  you  whether  that  was  not  the  same  kind  of  a  question 
that  was  raised  in  the  article  in  the  Reader's  Digest,  and  I  ask  you  to 
read,  on  page  15,  ''Deception  No.  1."  See  whether  the  IPR  was  in- 
volved.    Kead  it  out  loud. 

The  Chairman.  What  page  is  that,  Senator? 

Senator  Ferguson.  15. 

Mr.  Morris.  May  that  whole  article,  and  it  is  only  nine  pages,  go 
into  the  record  at  this  point? 

( See  exhibit  No.  549,  p.  3498,  for  article. ) 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Senator  Ferguson,  may  I  say  first  that  I  never  dis- 
cussed the  Bis.son  article  with  anybody  as  a  change  in  the  Communist 
line ;  did  not  consider  it  to  be  anything  of  the  kind. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Your  memory  is  becoming  much  better  on  the 
Bisson  article  as  we  go  along. 

Now,  will  you  read  this  "Deception  No.  1"? 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

Deception  1 :  That  Russia  is  a  "democracy"  and  that  China  can  therefore 
safely  be  left  to  Russian  "influence." 

Owen  Lattimore  is  perhaps  the  most  subtle  evangelist  of  this  erroneous  con- 
ception. Mr.  Lattimore  appraised  the  net  result  of  the  Moscow  trials  and  the 
blood  purge  by  which  Stalin  secured  his  dictatorship  in  1936-39,  as  a  "triumph 
for  democracy."  He  now  urges  our  Government  in  a  book  called  Solution  in 
Asia  to  accept  cheerfully  the  spread  of  "the  Soviet  form  of  democracy"  in  central 
Asia. 

Senator  Ferguson.  AVill  you  read  it  so  as  to  give  the  quotes  out  of 
your  book,  so  that  we  can  tell  what  is  a  quote  and  what  is  not  a  quote? 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3365 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

to  accept  cheerfully  the  spread  of  "the  Soviet  form  of  democracy"  in  Central 
Asia.     His  publishers  thus  indicate  the  drift  of  his  boolv  on  its  jacket. 

He  [Mr.  Lattimore]  shows  that  all  the  Asiatic  peoples  are  more  interested  in 
actual  democratic  practices,  such  as  the  ones  they  can  see  in  action  across  the 
Russian  border,  than  they  are  in  the  sign  series  of  Anglo-Saxon  democracies 
which  come  coupled  with  ruthless  imperialism. 

This  deception  was  set  going  in  Moscow  in  1936,  when  a  new  constitution  was 
filled  with  jazzed-up  phrases  from  our  Bill  of  Rights  so  that  it  could  be  advertised 
as  more  academic  than  ours.  Instead  of  establishing  popular  government,  how- 
ever, it  legitimized  the  dictatorsliip  of  the  Russian  Communist  Party  (article 
126).  Stalin  himself,  addressing  tlie  Congress  which  I'atified  the  draft  of  the 
constitution,  frankly  stated  this  fact : 

"I  must  admit  that  the  draft  of  the  new  constitution  actually  leaves  in  force 
the  regime  of  the  dictatorship  of  the  working  class  and  preserves  unchanged  the 
present  leading  position  of  the  Communist  Party.  In  the  Soviet  Union  only 
one  party  can  exist,  the  party  of  Communists"  (Pravda,  November  26,  19.36). 

In  the  "elections"  held  under  this  constitution  in  1937  and  1938,  only  one 
candidate's  name  appeared  on  each  ballot.  He  had  been  endorsed  by  the  party 
and  the  "voting"  consisted  of  assenting  to  the  party's  choice.  The  ceremony 
has  not  been  repeated  and  would  make  no  difference  if  it  had.  The  constitu- 
tion is  merely  a  facade  for  dictatorship,  and  anyone  who  protests  the  fact  is 
shot  or  sent  to  a  concentration  camp.  In  Siberia  full  regions  are  given  up 
to  these  concentration  camps,  where  from  15  to  20  millions — 

Footnote : 

Alexander  Barmine,  former  brigadier  general  in  the  Red  army,  estimates  that 
the  number  is  about  12  million.  Boris  Souvarine,  French  historian  of  Bol- 
shevism, estimates  15  million.  Victor  Kravchenko,  recently  resigned  from  the 
Soviet  Purchasing  Commission  in  Washington,  who  has  visited  many  camps 
and  had  official  relations  with  their  managements,  says  these  estimates  are  low 
and  puts  the  figure  at  20  million. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Would  you  let  me  liave  it  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore,  I  cite  this  as  an  example  of  an  extremely  unfair 
attack  on  me,  wliicli  makes  one  brief  quotation  from  what  I  wrote  en- 
tirely out  of  context.  It  says  that  I  recommended  that  the  United 
States  cheerfully  accept  something  which  I  did  not  recommend  that 
the  United  States  cheerfully  accept,  then  ties  it  in  with  a  whole  lot 
of  extraneous  matter  which  has  no  concern  whatever  with  me. 

It  was  against  that  kind  of  treatment  that  I  protested  to  the  edi- 
tors of  the  Header's  Digest. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  it  was  this  that  you  were  trying  to  answer 
by  getting  Mr.  Lamont,  over  his  own  signature,  to  write  your  let- 
ter? 

Mr.  Latitmore.  I  was  not  trying  to  get  ]\Ir.  Lamont  over  his  own 
signature  to  answer  my  own  letter.    I  was  acceding 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  say  that  this  record  does  not  show  that? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  do,  Senator.  The  record  shows  that  I  was  acced- 
ing to  a  request  from  Mr.  Carter. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  did  Mr.  Carter  have  to  do  with  it  ? 

Mr.  Latti3iore.  Mr.  Carter  wrote  to  me  and  made  some  suggestions, 
to  which  I  acceded. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you  a  copy  of  his  letter,  Carter's  letter  to 
you  ?    Is  that  the  one  that  was  read  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  This  is  the  one  that  was  read. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Who  approached  Carter  first?  Did  he  ap- 
proach you,  or  did  vou  approach  him  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  %ly  distinct  recollection  is  that  he  approached  me. 
I  am  sure  you  can  check  that  by  asking  him. 


3366  ixstitutp:  of  pacific  relations 

Seiiiitor  Ferguson.  Who  else  did  you  contact  on  one  of  the  dis- 
putes, as  to  wliether  or  not  America  should  furnish  aid  to  the  Com- 
munists, direct  aid  to  the  Communist  army  and  not  through  the  Na- 
tional Government  or  the  Government  of  Ohina  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  remember  consulting  anybody. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  consult  anybody? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  remember  consulting  anybody. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  will  ask  you  whether  or  not  you  did  consult 
anyone.    Think  about  it. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  remember  consulting  anybody,  Senator. 

Senator  Ferguson.  This  was  just  about  the  time  that  you  were 
talking — what  is  the  date  on  that  ?    The  19th  of  June? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  14th  of  June  and  19th  of  June,  from  Mr.  Carter; 
yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  10th  of  June  was  when  you  Avrote  the  first 
letter,  as  I  recall  that  letter.  Did  the  fact  that  you  wanted  to  go  and 
see  the  President  have  anything  to  do  with  this  dispute  you  were 
having? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir;  it  had  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  this 
dispute.  At  that  time  I  held  certain  views  on  China.  The  whole  sub- 
ject of  China  was  a  subject  of  very  keen  public  discussion  at  the  time. 

I,  like  others,  was  reading  and  talking  about  it.  I,  like  others,  was 
writing  or  trying  to  write  on  the  subject.    My  views  were  my  own. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  give  us  some  of  the  others  that  were 
talking  along  the  same  line  that  you  advocted,  of  giving  aid  to  the 
Communists  in  China  and  building  them  up  ? 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  understand  the  question,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

If  not,  we  will  have  it  read  back  to  you. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  I  understand  the  question,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Are  you  ready,  Senator  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes,  I  am  ready. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  cannot  possibly  recall  offliand  as  of  1952  exactly 
who  was  writing  and  discussing  these  subjects  in  1945.  I  M'ould  be 
glad  to  look  up  the  record  for  you,  if  you  are  intei-ested. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  reason  I  ask  that  question,  in  one  of  your 
letters — I  think  it  was  the  one  to  Mr.  Matt  Connelly — you  said:  "The 
views  I  represent." 

Wliose  views  did  you  represent? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  My  own. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  mean,  when  you  said  the  "views  I  rep- 
resent," your  views  alone? 

Ml-.  Lattimore.  I  can't  recall  exactly  what  I  meant  7  or  8  years  ago 
in  writing  that  letter.  I  presume  I  meant  my  own  views  and  pos- 
sibly—  don't  want  to  quibble  about  it — I  may  have  represented  what 
I  considered  to  be  a  body  of  views  then  current. 

Senator  Ferguson.  A^Hiose  views  were  they  outside  of  yours? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  know  at  this  time.  I  have  pointed  out  in 
the  statement  I  prepared  for  this  committee  that  these  views  were 
held  by  many  of  the  American  observers  in  China,  including  military. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  advocate  that  the  Soviet  tJnion  take 
over  and  annex  Manchuria? 

Mr.  Latpimore.  No,  I  don't  believe  I  did. 

The  Chairman.  Can  we  have  an  answer  to  that  ?  That  seems  to  be 
a  clear-cut  question. 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3367 

Mr.  Arnold.  I  wish  you  would  read  the  record  back.  I  think  we 
answered  it. 

The  Chairman.  I  want  an  answer.  Did  you  or  did  you  not^  He 
did  not  answer.     He  answered  "I  don't  believe  I  did." 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  will  change  that  answer,  Senator. 

I  am  sure  I  didn't. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  what  Mr.  Carter  was  then  talking 
about  ? 

There  is  just  one  section  of  your  draft  that  I  question  slightly  and  this  is  at 
the  bottom  of  page  3  and  top  of  page  4.  This  possibility  is  precisely  what  your 
critics  are  always  advancing.  They  say  that  the  Soviet  Union  is  definitely  go- 
ing to  annex  Manchuria  and  so  forth,  while  you  put  it  in  reverse.  I  would  hate 
to  have  your  critics  ijounce  on  this  and  announce  that  even  Lattimore  admits  that 
Manchuria  is  to  become  a  part  of  the  Soviet  Union.  Do  you  see  any  way  of 
avoiding  it? 

Mr.  Lati'uviore.  Apparently,  Mr.  Carter  thought  my  wording  was 
unclear  and  ought  to  be  made  clear. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  question  is,  did  you  discuss  with  Carter  the 
question  of  Manchuria  becoming  a  part  of  Russia  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Xo.  I  am  certain  I  didn't.  Senator. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  3"ou — do  you  know  anyone  else  besides  your- 
self that  was  advocating  the  sending  of  material.  Army  equipment  and 
so  forth,  to  the  Communists  in  China  and  not  have  the  Nationalist 
Government  take  care  of  the  government  in  China  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  was  a  view  that  was  quite  prevalent 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  know  anyone  else? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  the  American  military,  or  a  large  part  of  the 
American  military  in  China. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Were  you  in  touch  with  the  State  Department 
policy  at  this  time  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir ;  not  particularly. 

The  Chairman.  In  any  way  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  what  our  policy  was? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  As  far  as  it  could  be  seen  from  the  newspapers  and 
so  on,  I  knew  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  was  our  State  Department's  policy  as  of 
June  10  on  this  question  ? 

The  Chairman.  Wliat  year? 

Senator  Ferguson.  1945. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Subject  to  an  imperfect  recollection,  Senator,  I 
believe  that  this  was  a  period  of  controversy  in  which  statements  were 
being  made  by,  I  think.  General  Hurley  and  others,  which  resulted 
in  a  great  deal  of  public  discussion  and  a  general  belief  that  State 
Department  policy  as  of  that  moment  was  unclear. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Prior  to  going  to  the  "Wliite  House,  did  you 
give  any  information  to  any  Communist? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  I  was  going  to  do  so,  you  mean? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  don't  believe  I  did. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  talk  to  any  radio  commentators? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Not  that  I  can  recall.  I  frequently — no,  not  fre- 
quently— I  occasionally  saw  radio  commentators  and  newspapermen 
at  that  time. 


3368  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

The  Chairman.  Senator,  I  think  the  date  of  that  Wliite  House 
matter  should  be  in  the  record. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  date  of  July  3  was  the  date  that  you  went 
to  the  Wliite  House  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  have  the  documents  before  me,  Senator. 
I  will  accept  your  date. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Was  the  draft  of  the  memorandum  that  you 
left  with  the  President  the  day  you  were  there  dated  July  3  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Was  it  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  draft  that  you  left  with  the  President,  it  is 
dated  the  3d. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  is  dated  the  3d,  yes,  the  3d  of  July. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  that  the  day  you  were  there  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  presume  so ;  yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  what  day  of  the  week  you  were 
there  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No;  I  don't  recall  what  day  of  the  w^eek  it  was. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  of  anybody  having  knowledge, 
outside  of  the  White  House  and  you,  that  you  were  going  to  the  White 
House  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  recall  at  this  moment.  I  wouldn't  have 
]-egarded — yes,  I  do.  I  know  that  I  talked  with  President  Bowman, 
of  Johns  Hopkins,  about  the  whole  idea  of  writing  to  the  President, 
and  asking  for  an  opportunity  to  speak  with  him. 

I  quite  likely  talked  to  other  people  about  it.  There  was  no  secrecy 
about  the  subject. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  talk  to  any  radio  conunentators  as  to 
anything  that  you  would  take  up  with  the  President? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  may  have.  My  recollection  doesn't  include  it. 
The  manner  of  your  questioning,  Senator,  suggests  that  maybe  you 
know  I  did. 

The  Chairman.  That  will  be  stricken.    He  says  he  does  not  recall  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  I  am  at  least  fair  on  the  question  suggesting 
that  you  might. 

I  will  be  a  little  more  explicit. 

Did  you  have  any  conversation  or  any  direct  or  indirect  communi- 
cation with  Drew  Pearson  before  you  went  to  the  White  House? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  don't  believe  so,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  know  that  the  night  before  you  went 
to  the  White  House,  or  at  least  before  you  went  to  the  White  House, 
it  was  announced  by  Drew  Pearson  as  to  one  thing  that  you  would 
take  up  at  the  IVliite  House? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No;  I  didn't  know  that. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  did  not  know  that? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  ever  hear  it  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  don't  think  I  did. 

The  Chairman.  Pardon  me.  Senator. 

Mr.  Reporter,  will  you  read  back  the  last  two  or  three  questions  and 
answers?    My  attention  was  taken  away. 

(Thereupon,  the  portion  of  the  record  referred  to,  as  heretofore 
recorded,  was  read  by  the  reporter.) 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  may  have  heard  later,  of  course. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3369 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  know  Drew  Pearson  at  that  time  ? 

Mr.  Lat^i'imoke.  I  don't  think  I  had  ever  met  him.  I  may  have, 
but  I  doubt  it,  at  that  time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  1945  ;  right  before  June  3^ 

Mr.  Lattimore.  July  3. 

Senator  Ferguson.  July  3.    Thank  you  for  correcting  me. 

JNIr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  don't  think  at  that  time  I  knew  Drew  Pear- 
son, 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  you  went  to  the  White  House,  was  there 
any  member  of  the  State  Department  present  at  the  meeting? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir.  I  believe  it  was  only  the  President  and 
myself. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  know  David  Karr,  a  leg  man  for  Drew 
Pearson  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir;  I  don't  believe  I  ever  met  him. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  know  any  representative  prior  to  that 
time  of  Drew  Pearson  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir;  I  didn't,  to  the  best  of  my  recollection. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  how  Drew  Pearson  would  know 
that  you  were  going  to  the  White  House  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Senator,  I  think  a  lot  of  people  would  like  to  know 
how  Drew  Pearson  knows  a  lot  of  things. 

The  Celvirman.  That  answer  will  be  stricken.  The  question  is 
did  you  know  how  he  knew  that  you  were  going  to  the  White  Housed 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir;  I  don't  believe  he  could  possibly  have 
known  from  me. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  quote  him  quite  elaborately  in  your  Ordeal 
by  Slander,  do  you  not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  You  mean  that  I  quoted  him  5  or  6  years  later  about 
something  quite  different,  yes,  I  did.  Senator. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  now,  you  say  there  was  no  member  of  the 
State  Department  present  at  your  conversation  when  the  President 
was  there  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  To  the  best  of  my  recollection  it  was  only  the 
President  and  myself. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  President  knew  in  advance  what  you 
wanted  to  discuss  with  him  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  In  general,  yes,  in  the  letter  I  had  written  to  him 
sometime  before.  The  memorandums  that  I  left  with  him  had  not 
been  submitted  to  him  before. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  will  ask  you  whether  or  not,  while  you  were 
in  the  White  House,  you  saw  any  member  of  the  State  Department  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  but  I  had  a  very  brief  conversation  with  Mr. 
Joseph  Grew,  at  that  time,  I  think.  Under  Secretary  of  State  or  Assist- 
ant Secretary,  or  something  of  that  kind,  who  was  waiting  in  the 
anteroom  to  see  the  President,  and  who  came  over  to  speak  to  me. 

Senator  Ferguson.  AYell,  now,  did  you  talk  to  him  before  you  saw 
the  President? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  forget  whether  it  was  before  I  saw  the  President, 
or  after.  I  didn't  really  talk  to  him.  He  came  over  and  asked  me 
one  question  which  I  answered. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  was  the  question? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  question  was  whether  I  had  ever  lived  in 
Japan  for  any  consecutive  period,  and  the  answer  was  "no." 

88348 — 52— pt.  10 7 


3370  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Senator  P^erguson.  And  what  did  he  say? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  He  said,  to  the  best  of  my  recollection,  he  said,  "I 
thon*iht  so." 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  that  the  only  conversation  you  had  with  the 
Under  Secretary  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  tlie  only  conversation. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  was  that  before  you  went  in  to  the  Presi- 
dent, or  after? 

Mr.  T^iATriMORE.  As  I  say,  I  forgot  whether  it  was  before  or  right 
after. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  discuss  Ambassador  Joseph  Grew  with 
the  President  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Was  his  name  mentioned? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  know  that  Drew  Pearson  announced 
on  the  radio,  I  think  it  was  the  night  before  or  a  few  days  before, 
if  you  went  in  Monday  morning  which,  I  think,  was  the  f3rd  of 
July — I  may  be  incorrect  on  that  date — that  Drew  Pearson  announced 
that  you  were  going  to  the  A^^iite  House  to  ask  the  President  not  to 
appoint  Ambassador  Joseph  Grew  as  an  adviser  in  the  Far  East  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  recall  that.  If  Mr.  Pearson  said  that,  he 
was  completely  in  error,  wdiich  sometimes  happens  with  even  om- 
niscient columnists. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  you  think  he  is  one  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Well,  I  think  it  is  a  mark  of  the  trade  of  col- 
umnists to  appear  to  be  as  omniscient  as  possible. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  wnll  ask  you  who  you  had  in  mind.  Do  you 
have  a  copy  of  your  memorandum  to  the  President  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  I  have  a  copy  of  it  here. 

Senator  Ferguson.  No  ;  it  is  the  copy  of  the  letter. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  copy  of  the  letter  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  last  paragraph. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  the  letter  to  the  President? 

Senator  Fercjuson.  Yes,  the  letter  to  the  President  dated  the  10th 
of  June  1945 : 

With  the  utmost  earnestness,  I  venture  to  urge  you  to  have  America's  policy 
toward  China  impartially  reviewed  by  advisers  who  are  not  associated  with 
either  the  formulation  or  the  implementation  of  that  policy  as  recently  practiced. 

Who  were  you  talking  about  ? 

Mr.  Latomore.  I  was  talking  about  advisers  who  are  not  associated 
with  the  formulation  or  the  im|)lementation  of  that  policy  as  re- 
cently })racticed.     I  had  nobody  particularly  in  mind. 

I  remember  quite  clearly  that  part  of  the  occasion  of  my  asking 
for  this  interview  was  that  American  policy  in  the  Far  East,  and 
particularly  with  regard  to  China,  was  becoming  controversial  in  the 
papers,  and  I  thought  it  was  a  good  moment  for  an  impartial  review. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Was  Joseph  Grew  one  of  the  people  you  were 
talking  about? 

Mr.  Lai^tmore.  As  an  impartial  adviser? 

Senator  Ferguson.  In  that  paragraph,  is  he  ojie  of  the  |)eople  that 
you  were  talking  about  ? 

Mr.  La'itimore.  Well,  Mr.  Grew  at  that  time  was,  as  I  say,  an 
associate — no ;  an  assistant  or 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3371 

The  Chairman.  That  is  susceptible  of  an  answer  of  "Yes"'  or  "No," 
and  then  yon  may  explain,  Mr.  Lattiniore.  The  question  calls  for 
an  answer  of  "Yes"  or  "No." 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  answer  was  "Yes";  Mr.  Grew  was  one  of  those 
who  were  concerned  with  American  policy  in  the  Far  P^ast. 

I  don't  know  Avhether  he  was  concerned  with  policy  toward  China. 

Senator  Fergi'son.  Was  he  one  of  the  formulators  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  can't  answer  as  to  the  internal  structure  of  the 
fornudation  of  ])olicy  at  that  time,  Mr.  Senator. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Was  he  one  of  the  implementers  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Neither  can  I  answer  that  question,  except  that  he 
was  a  high  executive  officer  of  the  State»Department. 

Senator  Ferguson.  He  had  been  in  China  in  the  Far  East ;  had  he 
not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  He  had  been  in  Japan.     I  don't  know  about  China. 

Senator  Ferguson.  He  had  been  in  Japan  and  had  been  the  Am- 
bassador to  Japan? 

Mv.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Was  Vincent  one  of  the  formulators  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  couldn't  tell  you  that.  Senator. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Was  he  one  of  the  implementers  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  couldn't  tell  you  that,  except  that  he  had  a  posi- 
tion in  the  State  Department  at  that  time.  As  I  say,  I  don't  know 
what  the  chain  of  command  in  the  State  Department  was  at  that 
time  as  between  policy  formulation  and  policy  implementation. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  knew  Ballantine ;  did  you  not  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes;  I  knew  Mr.  Ballantine. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  his  name  Joseph  or  Thomas  ? 

ISIr.  Lattimore.  Joseph. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Was  he  one  of  the  formulators  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  remember,  Senator,  whether  Ballantine 
had  at  that  time  already  retired  from  the  State  Department,  or  not. 

Senator  Ferguson.  He  had  not  at  this  time. 

Mr.  I^ATTiMORE.  He  had  not  at  that  time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  AVas  he  one  of  the  implementers  ? 

Mr.  LA'rriMORE.  Again  I  don't  know-  enough  about  the  internal 
structure  of  the  State  Department  to  answer. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Who  were  you  talking  about  here,  that  you 
were  telling  the  President  in  a  letter? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Senator,  I  was  not  talking  about  wdio,  I  was  talk- 
ing about  what.  I  was  saying  that  I  thought  it  would  be  a  good 
idea  to  have  America's  policy  toward  China  impartially  reviewed. 

And,  as  an  extension  of  impartially  reviewed,  I  didn't  think  that 
a  policy  could  be  impai-tially  reviewed  by  those  wdio  had  been  recently 
making  or  practicing  it. 

Therefore,  I  suggested  that  outside  people  who  had  not  recently 
been  concerned  be  called  in  for  such  an  impartial  review. 

The  Chairman.  I  think  the  excerpt  should  be  read  again  to  the 
witness,  Senator. 

Senator  Ferguson  (reading)  : 

With  the  utmost  earnestness,  I  venture  to  urge  you  to  have  America's  policy 
toward  China  impartially  reviewed  by  advisers  who  are  not  associated  with 
either  the  formulation  or  the  implementation  of  that  policy  as  recently  prac- 
ticed. 


3372  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Mr.  Laitimore.  I  think  that  is  quite  a  clear  suggestion,  Senator. 

I  should  say,  to  anybody  in  Government,  that  would  be  a  suggestion 
that  a  question  of  policy  be  reviewed  by  some  kind  of  a  board,  the 
individual  members  of  which  had  not  recently  been  connected  with 
the  question  to  be  reviewed. 

I  believe  that  is  not  unknown  practice  in  the  conduct  of  government. 

Senator  Ferguson.  All  right. 

Now,  will  you  state,  Mr.  Lattimore,  what  the  policy  was  that  you 
describe  as  "recently  practiced"  ? 

What  was  the  policy? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  think  I  was  somewhat  unclear  on  the  subject, 
Senator,  or  I  wouldn't  have  suggested  a  review.  I  thought  that  I, 
myself,  and  a  good  many  other  people,  could  do  with  some  clarifi- 
cation. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  wanted  people  that  had  nothing  to  do 
with  the  policy,  and  you  now  tell  us  that  you  did  not  know  what  the 
policy  was  ? 

The  Chairman.  He  said  he  was  unclear  on  it. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  said  I  was  unclear  on  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Tell  us  what  you  knew  about  the  policy  that 
you  were  objecting  to,  that  you  wanted  reviewed,  and  you  were  telling 
the  President  that  he  ought  to  get  people  who  had  nothing  to  do 
with  the  policy. 

That  would  indicate  it  was  a  very  erroneous  policy,  would  it  not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Not  necessarily,  Senator.  I  think  that  is  quite 
clearly  stated  in  the  second  paragraph  of  my  letter  to  the  President. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Tell  us  what  the  policy  was. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  May  I  read  that? 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  want  an  answer  to  the  question  as  to  what 
the  policy  was. 

The  Chairman.  What  was  the  policy  to  which  he  was  objecting; 
is  that  right? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

You  said  that  policy  "as  recently  practiced." 

The  Chairman.  Confine  yourself  to  the  question,  will  you,  please, 
Mr.  Lattimore  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Senator,  I  cannot  at  this  moment  give  you  an 
accurate  statement  of  what  I  thought  in  1945  the  policy  was. 

But  my  letter  to  the  President,  and  the  second  paragraph  of  my 
letter  to  the  President,  clearly  shows  what  I  thought  made  review 
and  discussion  desirable. 

May  I  read  that  article? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Just  a  moment. 

You  said  in  the  article  that  you  wanted  Lamont  to  write,  that  one  of 
the  policies  was  that  they  were  not  furnishing  arms  to  the  Communists, 
and  you  wanted  a  change  in  that  policy,  did  you  not  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  May  I  consult  my  own  statement  on  that  ? 

Senator  Ffjjguson.  Yes. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  Senator  has  just  restated  what  he  thinks  was 
my  opinion.  Senator  McCarran,  and  I  should  like  to  see  what  my 
opinion  was. 

The  Chairman.  I  understood  he  has  quoted  from  the  Lamont  letter. 

Mr.  Laitimore.  He  has  paraphrased  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  paraphrased  it. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3373 

The  Chairman.  All  right.  What  do  you  want  to  read  from,  the 
Laniont  letter? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  From  the  proposed  draft  for  a  letter  by  Mr.  La- 
mont;  yes.     Following  page  3  of  the  mimeographed  copy  [reading]  : 

As  a  result,  American  aid  to  China  is  now  confined  to  such  politically  limited 
channels  that,  while  we  continue  to  aid  China  the  nation,  our  aid  now  favors 
one  political  group  against  all  others  and  is  withheld  from  one  maj<n'  group,  the 
Chinese  Communists,  which  has  armed  forces  in  combat  with  the  Japanese. 
Amei'ican  aid  to  China  has  thus  become  politically  pai'tisan  at  a  time  when  thei 
Russians  are  still  scrupulously  refraining  from  partisan  activity.  If  this  di- 
vergence of  policy  should  create  a  strain  in  Russian-American  relations,  the 
blame  cannot  be  thrown  upon  the  Russians.  On  the  contrary,  if  the  Russians 
should  in  the  future  begin  to  extend  direct  aid  to  the  Chinese  Communists,  they 
could  justify  themselves  on  the  ground  that  they  were  merely  following  an 
American  precedent. 

I  think  this  shows  concern,  Senator,  that  American  policy  should 
not  furnish  the  Russians  with  a  pretext  for  direct  intervention  in  the 
internal  policies  of  China. 

Senator  FerCxUSon.  Do  you  say,  Mr.  Lattimore,  that  that  paragraph 
did  not  convey  the  idea  that  you  were  favoring  aid  to  the  Communists 
as  well  as  to  the  Nationalists? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  This  paragraph.  Senator,  clearly  shows  that  I  be- 
lieved that  the  Comminiist  armies,  as  armies  in  combat  with  the 
Japanese,  could  be  of  greater  use  if  some  of  the  American  supplies  to 
China  were  used  by  them. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  going  to  your  letter  of  June  10 
to  the  President,  do  you  not,  in  other  words,  say  the  same  thing  in  this 
paragraph  [reading]  : 

Until  quite  recently,  great  care  was  taken  to  avoid  any  inference  that  America, 
in  aiding  China  as  a  nation,  was  committing  itself  to  all-out  support  of  one  party 
in  China's  domestic  affairs.  There  now  appears  to  be  a  fundamental  change. 
Public  statements  by  men  regarded  as  spokesmen  for  American  ix)licy  encourage 
many  Chinese  to  believe  that  America  now  identifies  the  Chinese  Government  with 
one  party  and  only  one  party,  connuits  itself  to  the  maintenance  of  that  party, 
'and  may  in  the  future  support  that  party  in  suppressing  its  rivals. 

The  Chairman.  What  is  your  question  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  is  the  diiference  between  the  two  state- 
ments, the  paragraph  that  you  read,  begining  with,  "As  a  result  xlmeri- 
can  aid  to  China  is  now  confined  to  such  politically  limited  channels," 
and  so  forth  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  two  paragraphs.  Senator,  state  or  restate,  in 
somewhat  different  ways,  my  concern  about  the  same  primary  question ; 
namely,  that  our  aid  to  China,  as  a  nation  and  an  ally,  should  not  be 
allowed  to  involve  us  in  partisan  support. 

It  has  always  been  my  belief  that  one  of  the  mistakes  of  American 
policy  was  to  treat  China  in  that  way,  differently  from  the  way  in 
which  we  treated,  say  Great  Britain.  We  never  in  Great  Britain  spec- 
ified aid  in  terms  of  the  Conservative  Party  or  the  Labor  Party. 

At  the  end  of  the  war,  when  the  British  had  an  election  and  the 
Labor  government  came  in  instead  of  Churchill,  we  did  not  attem])t 
to  affect  that  election  by  saying  that,  "Unless  Churchill  is  reelected, 
we  won't  play." 

I  believe  that  a  great  deal  of  damage  was  done  by  creating,  in  fact, 
an  impression  that  China  was  committed  not  to  a  nation,  but  to  a 
party. 


3374  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  that  your  explanation  as  to  the  difference 
between  these  two  paragraphs^ 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  my  explanation  as  to  the  similarity  between 
these  two  paragra])hs. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  May  I  ask  one  question,  Mr.  Chairman  ? 

The  Chairman.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Go  ahead. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Mr.  Lattimore,  did  you  regard  the  Chinese  Nation- 
alists and  Chinese  Communists  as  just  two  eom])eting  political  parties 
iu  China? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  regarded  them  as,  among  other  things,  two  com- 
peting parties  in  China. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  You  would  have  had  them  treated  on  the  basis 
of  two  comj)eting  jiolitieal  parties,  as  we  treated  the  competing  politi- 
cal parties  in  England,  which  you  used  as  an  example;  is  that  right? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  In  terms  of  the  war  against  Japan,  I  was  in  favor 
of  using  any  forces  that  would  fight  the  Japanese  and  thereby  diminish 
American  casualties. 

As  regards  domestic  politics,  I  was  afraid  that  support  for  one  party 
against  another  party  in  Chinese  domestic  politics  would  lead  to 
failure  rather  than  success. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  going  now  to  your  letter  of  June 
10, 1945,  in  the  first  ])aragraph,  about  the  policy  which  you  were  talk- 
ing about  in  the  last  paragraph,  you  say  there : 

There  appears  now  a  major  change  in  our  iwlicy.     *     *     * 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  was  the  policy,  and  what  was  the  change? 
Mr.  Lattimore.  The  policy  is  stated  in  the  first  sentence  of  the 
letter : 

When  Generalissimo  Chiang  Kai-shels,  on  the  recommendation  of  President 
Koosevelt,  appointed  me  his  political  adviser  in  1941,  the  policy  of  the  United. 
States  was  to  support  a  United  China.  There  appears  now  to  be  a  major  change 
in  our  policy,  which  may  invite  the  danger  of  a  political  and  even  a  territorial 
division  of  China  and  the  further  danger  of  conflict  and  rivalry  between  America 
and  Russia. 

I  have  not  looked  up  the  context  of  the  Times  in  the  newspapers  of 
the  day,  but  I  believe  I  am  correct  in  stating  that  this  refers  to  state- 
ments that  were  beginning  to  be  made  in  the  press  at  the  time  by — I 
ho])e  I  am  not  quoting  him  incorrectly — General  Hurley  and  others, 
indicating  that  thei'e  was  a  conflict  of  opinion  among  top  American 
personnel  on  tliis  subject. 

And  I  though  that  if  there  were  such  a  conflict,  it  would  be  sound 
]n'actice  to  have  an  impartial  review  of  American  policy  by  people  not 
lecently  involved  in  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  you  indicated  in  one  of  your 
answers  tliat  you  tliought  I  drew  the  wrong  conclusion  about  that  you 
were  advocating  aid  to  the  Comnnniists. 

I  want  to  read  from  the  Lamont  letter,  in  the  second  paragraph: 

*  *  *  in  effect,  I  think  you  are  suggesting  that  I  write  to  the  Times  a  letter 
urging  our  Government  to  alter  its  apparent  i)resent  policy  and  to  make  available 
lend-lease  supplies  to  the  so-called  Communist  armies  in  Northwest  China. 

Did  not  Mr.  Lamont  understand  your  article  to  mean  that  you  were 
advocating  that  they  send  lend-lease  supplies  directly  to  the  (>)nnnu- 
nists,  as  a  government? 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3375 

The  Chairman,  Listen  to  the  question,  Mr.  Lattimore. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  not  Mr.  Laniont  draw  the  conclusion  that 
you  Mere  asking  him  to  write  a  letter  to  the  Times  under  his  name,  for 
your  benefit,  in  a  dispute  that  you  were  having  with  some  men  that 
wrote  an  article  in  the  Reader's  Digest,  that  you  were  advocating  a 
change  in  America's  policy  of  only  giving  lend-lease  to  the  National- 
ists of  China,  being  the  Government  of  China,  and  that  you  were  advo- 
cating that  the  lend-lease  goods  go  directly  to  the  Communists  as  well 
as  to  the  Nationalists  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Senator  Ferguson,  I  believe  that  if  you  will  read 
that  letter  as  a  whole,  you  will  see  that  Mr.  Lamont  was  stating  a  tenta- 
tive opinion,  which  he  carefully  modified  by  saying  tliat  he  had  been 
out  of  touch  for  some  time. 

Senator  Fer(;uson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  had  you  ever  used  any  other  man 
or  woman  as  you  were  trying  to  use  Lamont  in  this  letter  to  the. New 
York  Times  ? 

]Mi'.  Laitimore.  Senator,  I  was  not  trying  to  use  Mr.  Lamont,  and 
1  don't  believe  that  I  have  made  it  a  usual  practice  to  ask  other  people 
to  write  for  the  papers  for  me. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  did  not  ask  you  whether  you  inade  it  the  usual 
practice ;  I  asked  you  whether  you  ever  did  it. 

Mr.  Latitmore.  I  don't  recall  anything  of  the  kind,  Senator. 

I  would  like  to  emphasize  at  this  moment  that 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Lattimore,  do  you  think  that  if  you  did  you 
would  recall  it? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  should  think  it  would  be  quite  likely.  It  would 
depend  on  how  serious  the  matter  was. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  how  many  memorandums  did 
you  leave  with  the  President? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  left  him  2  one-page  memoranda,  which  are  in  the 
mimeographed  exhibit  here  run  together  like  one  memorandum;  one 
on  Japan  policy  as  related  to  China,  and  one  on  China  policy. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  tell  us  in  your  statement,  on  page  33, 
where  you  mentioned  going  to  the  President,  that  you  had  left  any 
memorandum  with  him? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  don't  think  I  did. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Why  not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  see  why  I  should  have.  I  said  that  I  tried 
to  see  the  President,  and  I  think  it  is  quite  the  usual  practice  when 
one  goes  to  see  the  President,  to  leave  a  memorandum  of  what  the  inter- 
viewer would  like  to  talk  about. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  say,  then,  that  you  did  not  feel  that  in 
this  statement  you  should  give  us  anything  other  than  the  fact  that 
you  had  written  a  letter,  "I  wrote  to  the  President  expressing  my 
views  on  China  policy"? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Ferguson,  "And  the  President,  in  response,  asked  me  to 
come  to  see  him,  and  I  did." 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  "Our  conference  lasted  about  3  minutes." 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Tliat  is  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  "Neither  my  letter  nor  my  visit  had  the  slightest 
effect  on  American  policy." 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 


3376  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  was  the  policy  that  you  tried  to  affect,  so 
that  we  can  ascertain  whether  or  not  it  had  any  effect  on  the  American 
policy  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  policy,  as  I  have  thought  I  saw  it  at  the  time, 
was  to  drift  into  a  position  of  appearing  to  take  sides  in  Chinese 
domestic  politics,  which  I  thought  was  an  alarming  drift. 

Senator  Ferguson.  It  was  not  to  furnish  material  to  the  Com- 
munists ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  In  my  interview  with  the  President  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  stated  it  in  your  letter  when  you  asked  him 
to  aid  both  sides. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  was  not  thinking  of  that  as  aid  to  the  Com- 
munists ;  I  was  thinking  of  that  as  prosecution  of  the  American  policy 
of  not  promoting  a  divided  China  and  of  prosecuting  the  war  against 
Japan  as  actively  as  possible. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  were  you  not  trying,  at  the  exact 
time,  to  influence  American  public  opinion  by  getting  Mr.  Lamont  to 
write  a  letter  to  the  New  York  Times  so  that  it  would  be  published  to 
the  world  under  his  name,  to  get  aid  to  the  Communists  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Mr.  Ferguson,  I  was  not  trying  to  get  Mr.  Lamont 
to  do  anything. 

The  Chairman.  You  can  answer  that  "Yes"  or  "No." 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  answer  is  "No." 

I  was  acceding  to  Mr.  Carter's  request,  suggestion  to  furnish  some 
material  for  a  letter  to  be  signed  by  Mr.  Lamont,  which  he  could  accept 
or  reject,  and  which  he  finally  rejected. 

It  was  my  opinion  at  that  time  that  part  of  avoidance  of  a  dis- 
astrous split  in  China,  as  the  end  of  the  war  was  approaching,  was  to 
spread  American  aid  over  all  forces  fighting  the  Japanese  and  avoid 
creating  a  pretext  for  the  Russians  to  take  a  hand  in  Chinese  internal 
politics. 

Senator  Ferguson,  Did  Carter  know  that  you  were  going  to  the 
White  House  ? 

Mr,  Lattimore.  No,  sir;  I  am  sure  he  didn't. 

Senator  Ferguson,  So  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  had  noth- 
ing to  do  with  this  visit? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  review  the  policy  after  you  had  been 
to  the  White  House? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  To  know  whether  or  not  you  had  influenced  it. 

Mr.  Latitmore.  Oh,  I  am  speaking  simply  from  my  general  recol- 
lection, which  I  think  has  been  tested  over  a  good  many  years,  that 
I  have  never  had  any  influence  on  American  policy. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  think  that  a  man  who  had  written  a 
book  entitled  "Solution  in  Asia"  might  have  an  influence  on  the  Pres- 
ident if  he  went  to  see  him  personally  and  left  a  memorandum  with 
him,  particularly  where  he  advocates  getting  a  new  set-up  in  the  State 
Department  to  review  the  policy? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

When  I  asked  for  that  interview  I  was  not  thinking  of  myself  as 
the  author  of  any  particular  book.     I  was  thinking  of  myself  as  a 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3377 

person  who  had  been  familiar  with  President  Koosevelt's  policy  in 
China  at  the  time  that  Generalissimo  Chiang  Kai-shek  appointed  me 
as  his  adviser. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  yon  ever  have  a  conversation  with  anyone 
connected  with  the  State  Department  along  this  line,  of  the  change  in 
policy,  or  the  policy? 

Mr.  Lati^imore.  I  don't  recall,  nnless  I  casnally  talked  with  State 
Department  people  as  I  did  with  newspaper  people,  people  back  from 
China,  everybody  who  was  interested  in  the  snbject  at  the  time. 

As  I  say,  this  was  a  subject  of  very  general  discussion  at  the  time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  With  whom  would  j'ou  say  you  had  talked 
about  it  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  At  this  time,  Senator,  I  couldn't  possibly  tell  you. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Ion  did  not  have  a  very  long  conversation  with 
Mr.  Grew  about  it,  did  you? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No;  I  didn't. 

Senator  Fp^rguson.  Mr.  Ballantine  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Dooman  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Dooman  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Dooman  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  it  not  true  that  after  you  went  to  see  the 
President,  that  within  a  short  time  Mr.  Grew  left  the  Department; 
was  replaced  ? 

Mr,  Lattimore.  I  couldn't  tell  you  today,  Senator  Ferguson,  when 
Mr.  Grew  resigned. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  it  not  true  that  shortly  after  you  went  to  the 
White  House,  that  Mr.  Ballantine  was  replaced  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  recall  the  calendar  of  events  in  that  con- 
nection. Senator. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  not  know,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  that  after 
you  went  to  the  White  House,  that  in  a  short  time  ]Mr.  Dooman  was 
replaced,  Eugene  Dooman  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  recall  that  there  was  a  change  at  that  time.  I 
believe  that  these  were  senior  personnel  who  were  reaching  normal 
retirement  age  in  any  case. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  do  you  not  know  that  afte'r  you  went  there, 
that  your  friend  that  you  placed  so  highly  in  your  statement  here  to 
this  committee,  Mr.  John  Carter  Vincent,  was  promoted  and  took  over 
the  work  of  the  Far  East  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  remember  that  Mr.  Vincent,  after  his  return  from 
China,  was  promoted  in  the  State  Department,  which  at  that  time  I 
would  certainly  have  regarded  as  an  excellent  promotion ;  yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  do  you  not  know  that  it  took  place  after  you 
had  been  at  the  "\Miite  House  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Until  I  looked  up  these  memoranda.  Senator,  I 
wouldn't  have  recalled  which  came  first. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  is  it  not  a  fact  that  it  did  take  place,  that  the 
three  replacements  happened  after  you  were  there,  that  the  promotion 
of  Mr.  Vincent  and  the  others  took  place  after  you  were  there? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Senator,  you  seem  to  be  trying  to  impute  to  me 
power  that 


3378  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

The  Chairman.  Cannot  you  answer  "Yes"  or  "No"  ? 

Please  answer  it.    Do  not  argue  with  the  Senator. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Senator,  you  are  now  saying  that  these  promotions 
took  place  subsequently. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  the  record  shows  it. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  So  you  say.    I  haven't  looked  up  the  record. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  being  a  fact,  how  can  you  tell  the  world 
tliat  you  did  not  have  any  influence  on  the  policy  ? 

Mr.  Lat^'imore.  I  don't  think  I  had  the  slightest  influence  on  the 
policy.  Senator. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  what  the  Marshall  mission  was  to 
China '^ 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  know  that  General  Marshall  went  out  to  China ; 
yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  know  what  was  in  his  instructions? 

The  Chairman.  The  question  is  Did  you  know  what  was  in  his 
instructions  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  didn't  know  at  the  time,  no.  I  know  very  roughly 
now. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  do  you  want  to  tell  this  com- 
mittee, this  Senate,  that  you,  as  a  private  citizen,  after  having  this 
dispute  with  the  Reader's  Digest  in  the  writing  of  the  memorandum 
for  Lamont  and  the  writing  of  the  letter  to  the  President  and  the 
urging  to  the  President,  that  you  had  to  see  him,  in  fact,  before  he 
went  to  Potsdam ;  that  after  you  had  been  there,  you  failed  or  neglected 
to  look  into  the  State  Department  or  its  policies  after  that  date  and 
you  cannot  tell  us  what  happened  ?  Is  that  what  you  want  to  leave 
with  this  committee? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  Senator.  What  I  want  to  leave  with  this  com- 
mittee is  that  this  extremely  brief  interview  with  the  President  had 
no  consequences  whatever,  as  far  as  I  ever  knew. 

Nobody  in  the  White  House  or  in  the  State  Department  called  me 
back  to  consult  me  on  any  steps  that  were  about  to  be  taken. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  doesn't  answer  my  question,  Mr.  Latti- 
more. 

Mr.  Latitmore.  Well,  I  don't  believe  that  this  very  brief  interview 
of  mine  with  the  President  had  any  consequence  at  all. 

Senator  Ferguson.  We  are  having  gi-eat  difficulty  in  getting  from 
you  this  morning  what  policy  you  wanted  changed.  What  1  want  to 
know  is  why  you  tell  this  committee  in  your  statement  that  what 
you  wanted  done  and  what  you  presented  to  the  President,  had  not  the 
slightest — and  you  use  the  word  "slightest" — etfect  on  American  policy, 
and  you  never  followed  it  up  to  know  what  the  Marshall  mission  to 
China  w^as. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Senator,  I  don't  believe  that  my  interview  with 
the  President  or  uiy  letter  to  him  or  the  meuioranda  that  I  left  with 
him  had  the  slightest  effect. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  can  you  tell  us  whether  it  had  the  slightest? 
Mr.  Lattimore.  I  am  not  telling  you  whether  it  had  the  slightest. 
Senator  Ferguson.  Yon  did  in  your  statement.    You  told  the  whole 
world  that  it  had  the  slightest  effect,  on  the  top  of  page  34. 
Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  believe  it  had  the  slightest  effect. 
Senator  Ferguson.  Read  your  statement  of  what  you  told  us. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3379 

Mr.  La'itimore.  "Neitlier  my  letter  nor  my  visit  had  the  slightest 
effect  on  American  policy." 

I  believe  that  is  a  true  statement. 

Senator  Fercuson.  Is  not  there  in  issue  today  before  tliis  com- 
mittee the  (|uestion  as  to  \vhether  or  not  you  had  any  influence  on  our 
American  foreign  policy? 

Mr.  Lattimork.  If  you  choose  to  put  it  that  ^vay,  Senator. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  it  not  in  issue  as  to  whether  or  not  the  In- 
stitute of  Pacific  Relations,  of  which  you  were  a  trustee  at  this  time, 
had  any  influence  on  the  foreign  policy  of  America? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Senator,  I  think  that  my  brief  contact  with  the 
President  on  this  occasion  had  no  effect  whatever  on  American  policy, 
and  it  certainly  had  no  connection  with  the  Institute  of  Pacfic  Rela- 
tions. 

The  CiiAiRMAx.  Again,  that  is  not  an  answer  to  the  question. 

Read  the  question,  Mr.  Reporter. 

(The  pending  question,  as  heretofore  recorded,  was  read  by  the 
reporter,  as  follows:) 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  not  there  in  issue  today  before  this  committee  the  ques- 
tion as  to  whether  or  not  you  had  any  influence  on  our  American  foreign  policy? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  your  statement  of  the  issue.  Senator. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  I  am  not  willing  to  allow  you 
to  draw  the  conclusion,  and  have  it  become  final,  as  to  whether  or 
not  you  had  the  slightest  influence  on  American  policy. 

That  is  why  I  am  asking  these  questions. 

And  I  am  sorry  it  is  taking  so  long. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Senator.  I  am  sorry.  I  can  say  that,  to  the  best  of 
my  knowlege  and  belief 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  moment. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  the  reason  why  it  is  taking  so  long  here. 
You  gave  us  many  conclusions.  We  discovered  many  of  them  were 
based  purely  upon  hearsay  and  that  you  asked  this  connnittee  to  draw 
those  conclusions  with  you. 

I,  for  one,  as  a  Senator,  am  not  willing  to  take  your  conclusions 
when  I  think  there  are  outstanding  facts,  and  I  want  to  question  you 
about  those  facts. 

]\Ir.  Lattimore.  Go  ahead  and  question.  Senator. 

Senator  Fergison.  Let  us  take  the  memorandum  that  you  left  with 
the  President.  You  say  that  you  did  not  go  there  for  the  purpose  of 
influencing  him. 

I  would  like  now  for  you  to  answer  why  you  went. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Did  I  say  that  I  did  not  go  there  for  the  purpose 
of  influencing  him  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  the  inference  you  leave. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  go  there  for  the  purpose  of  influencing 
the  President  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  go  there  for  that  purpose  ? 

The  Chairman.  Answer  that  "Yes"  or  "No,"  now,  and  then  make 
an  explanation. 

Did  you  go  there  for  the  purpose  of  influencing  the  President? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes ;  of  course,  I  did. 


3380  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  write  the  Lamont  letter  with  the  in- 
tent that  you  were  going  to  try  to  influence  the  State  Department, 
the  President,  and  the  public  ? 
Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 
Senator  Ferguson.  What  was  its  purpose? 

Mr.  LAT'riMORE.  I  acceded  to  Mr.  Carter's  request  to  draft  some 
material  for  a  letter  by  Mr.  Lamont  for  the  specific  and  limited  pur- 
pose of  correcting  gross  distortions  of  my  views  which  had  appeared 
in  the  Eeader's  Digest. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  say  that  the  Reader's  Digest  raised  the 
question  about  your  advocating  the  sending  of  lend-lease,  or  any  other 
materiel,  to  the  Chinese  Communists  as  a  government?  Was  that 
raised  in  the  Reader's  Digest  issue? 

Mr.  Lat'I'imore.  I  have  not  recently  read  the  Reader's  Digest,  and 
I  can't  answ^er  for  their  editorial  intentions.  I  can  only  speak  to  the 
point  that  I  considered  that  what  they  published  was  grossly  unfair 
to  me. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  they  publish  anything  that  was  grossly 
unfair  to  you  about  your  advocating  the  sending  of  lend-lease  or  any 
other  materiel  to  the  Chinese  Communists  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  believe  that  they  said  that  I  advocated  that. 

Did  they? 

Senator  Ferguson.  No  ;  I  do  not  think  so.  I  wondered  wh}^  put  it  in 
the  Lamont  letter. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Because  the  Reader's  Digest  had  misrepresented 
my  views,  and  I  wanted  to  make  a  statement  of  what  my  views  ac- 
tually were. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  would  your  views  in  the  letter  that  you 
gave  to  Lamont,  to  be  under  his  signature,  how  would  they  get  to  the 
]:)ublic  as  your  views  ?  You  do  not  say  in  the  Lamont  letter  than  "Owen 
Lattimore  advocates  this."  You  wanted  Thomas  Lamont  to  advo- 
cate it. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  May  I  take  a  moment  to  look  at  this  Lamont  draft? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes ;  I  wish  you  would. 

The  Chairman.  What  is  it  that  you  want  to  look  at  now,  Mr.  Latti- 
more ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  would 

Senator  Ferguson.  He  wants  to  look  whether  he  advocated  Thomas 
Lamont  to  advocate  that  he  had  advocated. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Carter  had  asked  me  to  provide  him  with  some 
material.    My  reference  to 

The  Chairman.  What  are  you  reading  from  now? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  From  this  draft  that  I  sent  to  i\Ir.  Carter. 

The  Chairman.  To  Mr.  Carter  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  To  Mr.  Carter ;  yes.    I  didn't  send  it  to  Mr.  Lamont. 

Senator  Ferguson.  He  had  a  man  take  it  to  Lamont. 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

To  bolster  the  case,  the  article  casts  doubts  on  the  anthnritativeness  of  several 
of  those  Americans  *  *  *  inchulins  Owen  Lattimore.  Harrison  Forman, 
and  Edsar  Snow.  The  publication  of  such  an  article  invites  a  review  of  both 
American  and  Soviet  policy  in  China. 

The  Chairman.  What  is  the  question,  Senator?  Do  you  want  the 
question  read? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  that  the  answer  ? 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3381 

Mr.  LA'rriMORE.  That  is  the  answer. 

Senator  Fergusox.  Did  tlie  Dio:est  article  raise  the  question  of  your 
advocating  the  furnishing  of  tliis  material  to  Communist  China? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  Digest  article,  as  you  will  see  from  that  extract 
that  I  recently  read  into  the  record,  describes  me  as  advocating  that 
the  American  Government — I  think  the  words  were — cheerfully 
accept  things  which  I  did  not  advocate  the  American  Government 
cheerfully  accepting. 

The  Chairmax.  That  does  not  answer  the  question  of  the  Senator. 
I  want  tliat  question  read  to  the  witness  again. 

And  I  ask  you,  Mr.  Lattimore,  to  answer  it,  if  you  please,  if  you  care 
to  answer  it.     If  you  do  not,  you  may  say  so.. 

Read  the  question  of  the  Senator  from  Michigan. 

(The  pending  question,  as  heretofore  recorded,  was  read  by  the  re- 
porter, as  follows :) 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  would  your  views  in  tlie  letter  that  you  gave  to  La- 
niont,  to  be  under  his  signature,  how  would  they  get  to  the  public  as  your  views? 
You  do  not  say  in  the  Laniont  letter  that  "Owen  Lattimore  advocates  this.'' 
You  wanted  Thomas  Lamont  to  advocate  it. 

Mr.  Arnold.  Mr.  Chairman.  I  submit  that  is  responsive. 
The  Chairman.  The  Chair  does  not  think  so. 
Mr.  Arnold.  Well,  then,  try  and  answer  it. 
Mr.  Lattimore.  Will  you  read  it  again? 

(The  pending  question,  as  heretofore  recorded,  was  again  read  by 
the  reporter,  as  follows:) 

How  would  your  views  in  the  letter  that  you  gave  to  Lamont,  to  be  under  his 
signature,  how  would  they  get  to  the  public  as  your  views? 

The  Chairman.  That  is  the  gist  of  the  question. 

Mr.  Arnold.  I  would  like  to  have  read  the  balance  of  the  question. 

The  Chairman.  Read  the  whole  thing, 

Mr.  Arnold.  I  do  not  want  to  say  much  here. 

Would  you  read  the  answer  back?  Because,  with  all  due  respect, 
I  believe — — 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Would  you  read  my  previous  answer  back. 

Tlie  Chairman.  Read  that  entire  portion  of  the  record. 

(The  portions  of  the  record  referred  to,  as  heretofore  transcribed, 
were  read  by  the  reporter  as  follows  :) 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  woiild  your  views  in  the  letter  that  you  gave  to  La- 
mont, to  be  under  his  signature,  how  would  they  get  to  the  public  as  your  views? 
You  do  not  say  in  the  Lamont  letter  that  "Owen  Lattimore  advocates  this."  You 
wiinted  Thomas  Lamont  to  advocate  it. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  ]\Iay  I  take  a  moment  to  look  at  this  Lamont  draft? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Y'^es,  I  wish  .vou  would. 

The  Chairman.  What  is  it  that  you  want  to  look  at  now,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  would 

Senator  Ferguson.  He  wants  to  look  whether  he  advocated  Thomas  Lamont 
1o  advocate  that  he  had  advocated. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Carter  had  asked  me  to  provide  him  with  some  material.  My 
reference  to 

The  Chairman.  What  are  you  reading  from  now? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  From  this  draft  that  I  sent  to  Mr.  Carter. 

The  Chairman.  To  Mr.  Carter? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  To  Mr.  Carter,  yes.     I  didn't  send  it  to  Mr.  Lamont. 

Senator  Ferguson.  He  had  a  man  take  it  to  Lamont. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  "To  bolster  the  case,  the  article  casts  doubts  on  the  authorita- 
tiveness  of  several  of  these  Americans     *     *     *     including  Owen  Lattimore, 


3382  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Harrison  Forman.  and  Edgar  Snow.  The  publication  of  such  an  article  invites 
a  review  of  both  American  and  Soviet  Policy  in  China." 

The  Chairman.  What  is  the  question,  Senator?  Do  you  want  the  question 
read? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  that  the  answer? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  the  answer. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  will  put  another  question  to  you  along  the 
same  line. 

You  were  asking  Mr.  Lamont  to  raise  an  issue  in  the  letter  to  the 
New  York  Times  that  was  not  raised,  you  say,  in  the  Digest  article, 
and  tliat  issue  was  America's  policy  being  changed  to  send  annnuni- 
tion,  lend-lease,  and  military  aid  of  any  description  to  the  Commun- 
ist government  in  China. 

Now  I  ask  you,  in  your  raising  that  new  issue,  as  to  whether  or  not 
you  were  asking  Mr.  Lamont  to  raise  it,  not  in  your  name,  but  in  his 
name;  that  that  was  his  opinion,  that  it  should  be  done  so  as  to  influ- 
ence the  President  of  the  United  States,  the  State  Department  offi- 
cials, and  tlie  American  public? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir.  I  think  that  is  a  complete  mis- 
construction. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Why  were  you  advocating  it,  then,  in  the 
Lamont  letter? 

Mr.  LAi^riMORE.  In  the  first  place,  I  was  not  advocating  a  change  in 
American  policy;  I  was  advocating  a  continuity  of  American  policy 
of  supporting  united  Chinese  resistance  as  a  whole  to  the  Japanese. 

Mr.  Carter  had  suggested  that  I  write  a  letter  myself  to  the  New 
York  Times.  I  didn't  want  to  do  it  because  I  was  disgusted  with  the 
wliole  subject. 

The  Chairman.  That  has  been  gone  over  now.  I  do  not  see  why 
we  should  go  over  it  again. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  realize,  Mr.  Lattimore,  that  Mr.  Carter 
twisted  your  aim  and  finally  compelled  you  to  write  the  memorandum 
to  Lamont. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  let  us  get  back  about  this  policy. 

You  say  that  you  did  not  advocate  the  change.  Then  1  ask  you  why 
you  say  there  in  your  letter  that  there  now  appears  to  be  a  funda- 
mental change,  and  in  the  last  paragraph  you  say : 

Witli  the  utmost  earnestness,  I  venture  to  urge  you  to  have  America's  i>olicy 
toward  China  impartially  reviewed  by  advisers  who  are  not  associated  with 
either  the  formulation  or  the  implementation  of  that  policy  as  recently  practiced. 

That  indicates  clearly  that  tliere  was  a  change  in  the  policy. 

Senator  SMrrH.  Is  that  the  letter  to  tlie  President,  Senator?  You 
did  not  say  what  letter  it  is. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  letter  to  the  President  dated  June  10,  1945. 

Now,  do  you  say  there  never  was  a  change  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir;  I  did  not  say  there  never  was  a  change.  I 
said  I  did  not  advocate  a  change,  that  I  advocated  the  maintenance  of 
the  continuity  of  American  policy. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  you  indicated  in  the  letter  that  America  had 
changed  its  policy,  and  you  wanted  them  to  go  back  to  the  old  policy; 
is  that  right? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir.    I  think  that  is  not  quite  correctly  stated. 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3383 

I  indicated  in  my  letter  to  the  President  that  a  change  was  coming 
about  in  America  policy. 

I  thought  that  such  a  change,  if  it  finally  took  place,  would  raise 
very  serious  questions,  and  I  advocated  an  impartial  review  of  the 
whole  subject.    I  was  not  myself  advocating  a  change. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  you  claim  now  you  AVere  trying  to  do  was 
to  prevent  a  change. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir.  I  was  saying  that  before  any  change  was 
made  there  should  be  an  impartial  review  of  policy. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  we  not  have  a  policy  not  to  furnish  aid  to 
the  Communists  as  such? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir.  I  don't  believe  our  policy  was  formulated 
in  those  terms. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  was  it? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Our  policy  was  formulated  in  terms  of  aid  to  the 
nation  of  China  and  in  terms  of  not  encouraging  any  form  of  split  or 
civil  war  in  China  while  the  really  very  desperate  war  for  survival 
against  Japan  was  going  on. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Now  let  us  get  to  the  letter  or  memorandum  that 
you  left  with  the  President.  Is  this  the  only  memorandum  that  you 
left  with  the  President? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  the  only  one. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  this  memorandum 
was  ever  sent  to  the  State  Department? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir;  I  have  no  knowledge  whatever. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  know  as  to  whether  or  not  Mr.  Vincent, 
who  was  promoted  to  take  over  the  far-eastern  work  of  the  State  De- 
partment, ever  saw  your  memorandum  ? 

•Mr.  Lattimore.  I  doubt  it  very  nnich,  indeed,  but  I  have  no  personal 
knowledge. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  ever  talk  to  him  about  it  ? 

Mr.  Lat'itmore.  I  don't  believe  I  did. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Let  us  examine  it. 

Senator  Watkins.  I  would  like  to  know :  Is  the  witness  undecided 
on  that?     He  said.     "I  don't  believe  I  did." 

You  would  know,  would  you  not,  whether  you  did  or  did  not  talk 
on  a  matter  as  important  as  this  ? 

The  Chairman.  We  will  get  that  answer. 

Senator  Watkins.  I  am  a  little  disturbed  on  the  witness  having  a 
keen  memory  on  so  many  things  and  how  his  answer  is  "I  don't  be- 
lieve I  did.'' 

The  Chairman.  I  am  trying  to  get  him  to  answer  "Yes"  or  "No"  for 
4  days,  and  I  still  get  that  answer. 

Mr.  Watkins.  I  would  like  to  know  if  he  answers  "Yes"  or  "No'' 
on  that. 

The  Chairman.  I  did  not  know. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Senator,  I  can't  answer  "Yes"  on  that. 

Senator  Watkins.  Can  you  answer  "No"? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  can't  answer  "No"  on  that,  either. 

This  was  a  period  of  acute  and  active  discussion  all  over  America  at 
that  time  on  questions  of  foreign  policy.  I  would  certainly  talk  to 
anybody  whom  I  met  in  those  days  about  my  duties. 

Senator  Watkins.  Were  you  meeting  ]Mr.  Vincent? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  met  him  occasionally. 


3384  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Senator  Watkins.  Did  you  talk  with  him  about  our  foreign  policy 
durino;  that  period  of  time? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No. 

Senator  Watkins.  How  can  you  remember  that,  if  you  cannot  re- 
member the  other  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Because  I  remember  that  Mr.  Vincent,  like  all  the 
State  Department  people  I  know,  was  an  extremely  correct  member 
of  the  Foreign  Service,  who  would  talk  with  people  outside  the  Gov- 
ernment only  in  extremely  restricted  terms  of  getting  information 
from  them,  but  not  giving  information  to  them. 

Senator  Watkins.  You  do  admit,  however,  during  that  period  of 
time,  or  about  that  time,  that  you  did  have  conversations  with  him  ? 

Mr.  Latitmore.  Yes,  I  had  conversations  with  him  in  that  general 
period,  and  in  those  conversations  I  would  certainly  express  my  views, 
as  I  have  always  expressed  my  views — completely  openly,  whether 
po])ular  or  not. 

But  what  I  can't  guarantee,  and  what  I  think  extremely  unlikely, 
is  that  I  ever  talked  to  anybody  in  terms  of  a  complete  repetition  of 
the  memorandum  that  I  left  with  the  President. 

The  natural  course  of  events  would  be  that  I  would  talk  about  what- 
ever topic  seemed  to  me  to  be  of  iiiterest,  wdiich  would  naturally  over- 
lap with  the  subject  matter  of  memoranda  like  this. 

But  I  can't  say  that  I  ever  discussed  with  anybody  these  matters  in 
precisely  the  terms  or  the  words  that  I  presented  them  to  the  President. 

Senator  Watkins.  Did  you  have  conversation  with  him  prior  to 
presenting  the  memorandum  to  the  President? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  certainly  had  conversations  prior,  in  time,  to  this 
memorandum. 

Senator  Watkins.  Is  it  not,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  very  likely  that  if 
you  met  him  at  all,  this  subject  was  on  your  mind  ?  You  felt  it  was 
so  important  that  you  wanted  to  take  it  to  the  President,  that  you 
would  discuss  it  with  your  friends  in  the  State  Department,  a  man 
that  you  knew? 

JVfr.  Lattimore.  In  terms  of  going  to  see  the  President,  no. 

Senator  Watkins.  Before  you  went  to  the  President,  would  you 
not  discu!-s  it  with  them  first,  before  you  finally  went  to  him  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  In  terms  of  my  interest  in  the  subject 

The  Chairman,  He  did  not  ask  you  about  t^rms  of  anything. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  thought  he  did. 

Senator  Watkins.  I  did  not  ask  about  terms.  Did  you  discuss  it 
with  them  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  talked  of  this  whole  tojiic  of  policy  in  China  and 
controversy  beginning  to  rise  over  policy  in  China  with  all  and  sundry. 

Senator  Watkins.  You  were  very  nuich  alarmed  about  it,  as  a 
matter  of  fact ;  were  you  not? 

Mr.  Latitmore.  I  wouldn't  say,  perha])s,  very  much  alarmed.  I 
don't  want  to  quibble.    I  would  say  very  much  concerned. 

Senator  Watkins.  You  thought  it  of  enough  importance  to  take 
it  to  the  President ;  did  you  not  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Certainly  I  was  very  much  concerned. 

Senator  Watkins.  You  "would  not 'take  it  to  the  President  unless 
you  were  somewhat  alarmed  at  the  drift  that  American  policy  was 
taking  at  that  time :  would  you  ? 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3385 

Mr.  Lattimcre.  I  will  accept  your  word,  Senator.  My  own  word 
ATonld  have  been  "concerned."' 

Senator  Watkins.  "What  I  want  to  find  out  is  the  basis  for  yonr 
statement  that  you  do  not  believe  you  discussed  it  with  him  when  you 
said  you  were  discussing  it  with  all  and  sundry. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  no.  That  I  discussed  the  actual  memorandum 
with  him. 

Senator  Watkins.  You  could  not  discuss  that  because  it  had  not 
been  prepared  beforehand.  I  am  talking  about  your  conversations 
immediately  prior  to  your  going  to  the  President. 

Mv.  Lattijiore.  No. 

Undoubtedly,  my  conversations  with  all  and  sundry  touched  on  this 
general  field. 

Senator  Watkins.  And  if  you  talked  to  Mr.  Vincent  you  probably 
talked  to  him  about  it? 

Mr.  Laitimore.  And  I  probably  mentioned  what  I  thought  about 
it,  yes. 

Senator  "Watkins.  But  you  say  you  do  not  believe  you  did  not. 
You  said  awhile  ago  you  did  not  believe  you  did  not. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

I  want  to  make  it  quite  clear,  and  not  to  get  confused  by  the  ques- 
tioning, that  I  am  trying  to  distinguish  between  talking  with  State 
Department  people  and  other  people  about  the  general  topic  of  in- 
terest— which,  of  course,  I  would  do  at  that  time — but  that  I  do  not 
believe  that  I  discussed  with  anybody  a  project  for  leaving  a  memo- 
randum with  the  President,  or  the  words  in  which  I  should  draw  up 
that  memorandum. 

The  Chairman.  State  Department  people  do  not  come  into  the  term 
"all  and  sundry." 

Senator  "Watkins.  I  thought  they  were  Americans  and  they  would 
come  in  with  the  rest  of  them. 

Mr.  Arnold.  Do  you  think  they  come  in  with  "sundry"  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Not  all.  but  ])erhaps  sundry. 

Senator  Watkins.  As  I  recall.  Mr.  Lattimore,  you  have  at  great 
length  pointed  out  how  close  a  friend  Mr.  Vincent  was  and  other 
people  in  the  State  Department,  particularly  three  of  them  that  you 
felt  so  keenlv  about  here  a  few  days  ago,  and  it  seems  to  me  that  if 
vou  knew  them  that  well,  it  would  only  be  a  natural  thing  that  you 
would  discuss  with  them,  if  they  were  available  at  all,  this  thing  you 
had  in  mind,  this  thing  you  felt  was  really  dangerous  to  the  country 
and  it  would  be  to  the  best  intrests  of  the  country  if  you  had  a  change 
in  that  policy. 

That  is  what  I  wanted  to  know:  If  you  did  not  discuss  with  them, 
prior  to  going  to  the  President,  the  very  project  you  had  in  going 
there  and  leaving  that  memo  with  him. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  :  I  did  not  discuss  that  very  project. 

And  I  Avant  again.  Senator  Watkins,  if  I  may.  to  make  very  clear 
my  admiration  of  the  training  and  disci]:)line  which  enables  State 
Department  men.  when  talking  with  members  of  the  general  public, 
always  to  restrict  their  contribution  to  the  conversation  to  such  mat- 
ter as  are  generallv  known  in  the  press,  so  that  they  don't  reveal  the 
inside  workings  of  the  State  Department  while,  at  the  same  time, 
as  good  State  Department  men  should,  they  acquire  a  knowledge  of 

88348— 52— pt.  10 8 


3386  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

both  the  factual  kiiowle(l<i:;e  and  the  opinions  of  others.  That  is  ex- 
actly the  way  the  certain  State  Dejiartnient 

Senator  Watkins.  If  yon  did  talk  with  them,  yon  did  not  get  any 
sympathy  from  them,  any  support  or  encouragement;  did  you? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  never  got  from  them  any  inside  dope. 

Senator  "Waticins.  But  shortly  after  yon  had  been  there,  at  least 
one  of  those  men  was  ap]winted  to  a  very  important  position:  Mr. 
Vincents 

Mr.  Lattimoke.  AVhich  1  think,  Senator,  was  clearly  in  the  cards 
at  the  time,  in  terms  of  his  special  knowledge,  seniority,  regular 
process  of  people  going  up. 

Senator  Watkins.  You  say  it  was  in  the  cards.  Did  you  not  have 
in  inind  when  yon  went  to  the  President 

Mr.  Lai-toiore.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Watkins.  To  get  such  a  change? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  In  my  memorandum  to  the  President.  I  pointed 
out 

The  (^HAiRMAN.  The  (juestion  is,  Did  you  not  have  that  in  mind? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  wanted  to  show  what  T  did  have  in  mind,  Senator. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  could  I  interrupt  just  a  moment? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  These  letters  and  memorandum  were  made  part 
of  the  record  and  not  actually  received  in  evidence. 

I  do  not  know  wdiether  or  not  they  have  been  distributed.  I  now 
move  that  they  become  officially  part  of  the  record. 

We  have  been  reading  from  them,  and  I  move  they  be  distributed 
because  I  know  it  is  difficult  for  the  press  to  follow  this.  It  is  the 
only  medium  we  have  for  the  public  to  know  what  is  going  on. 

The  Chairman.  I  will  have  to  have  them  designated. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  will  designate  them  as  follows: 

They  refer  to  his  testimony,  pages  33  and  34. 

The  first  is  the  letter  dated  June  10,  1945,  from  Owen  Lattimore  to 
the  President,  and  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  473." 

The  second  is  a  copy  of  a  letter  from  the  White  House,  tlie  Presi- 
dent, on  June  14,  1945,  to  Mr.  Lattimore. 

The  third  is  a  Western  Union  wire  from  Matthew  A.  Connelly, 
Secretary  to  the  President,  to  Mr.  Owen  Lattimore. 

Next  is  a  copv  of  a  letter  from  Owen  Lattimore  to  the  Presi- 
dent, dated  June  20,  1945. 

Next  is  the  memorandum  for  the  President,  which  was  left  with 
the  President  in  two  parts,  but  is  now  as  one  in  this  memorandum; 
interview  of  the  3d  day  of  July  1945. 

Last  is  a  letter  dated  June  20,  1945,  from  Owen  Lattimore  to 
Matthew  Connelly. 

That  is  where  I  cited  the  OWI  address. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  ask  that  they  be  inserted  in  the  record? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes,  made  part  of  the  record. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well;  they  will  be  inserted  in  the  record. 

Mr.  SouRw^NE.  I  might  say,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  these  were  offered 
for  the  record  several  days  ago,  subject  to  the  Chair's  determination. 

The  (Chairman.  That  is  correct.  At  that  time  they  had  not  been 
referred  to  in  the  record. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3387 

(The  documents  referred  to  were  marked  "Exhibits  Nos.  530-A, 
530-B,  530-C,  530-D,  530-E,"  and  are  as  follows:) 

Exhibit  No.  530-A 

The  White  House, 
Washiiif/ton,  June  I4,  1945. 

Mr.  Owen  Lattimore, 

The  Johns  Hopkhis  Unircr.sity, 

Baltimore,  MJ. 
My  Dear  Mr.  Lattimore:  I  appreciate  very  imich  yours  of  .Imie  tenth. 
The  Chinese  situation  is  developing-  alrinht.     The  polic-y  has  been  definitely 
outlined   to   the  Chinese.      The  Russians   and   the   British   and   ourselves  have 
reached  an  agreeinent  which  I  think  is  in  the  best  interest  of  China. 

I  would  be  glad  to  discuss  it  with  you  sometime,  if  you  feel  inclined. 
Sincerely  yours, 

[s]   Harry  Truman. 

Exhip.it  No.  r.3(1-P. 

[  Telegram  ] 

WA21(il7— GOVT— Washington.  D.  C,  29  52  9P. 
Dr.  Owen  Lattimore, 

The  Johns  Hopkins  Universiti/,  Ball i more,  Md.: 
The  President  will  be  glad  to  see  you  11 :  30  a.  m.,  Tuesday,  July  3.     Please 
confirm.    Regards. 

Matthew  A.  Connexly. 
Secretary  to  the  President. 


Exhibit  No.  .".30-C 

June  20,  1945. 
Hon.  PIarry  S.  Truman, 

President  of  the  United  States, 

The  White  Hou^e,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Dear  Mr.  President:  I  most  sincerely  appreciate  your  letter  of  June  14,  and 
the  opp<n-tunity  you  offer  me  for  a  discussion  of  policy  in  China. 

If  the  views  which  I  earnestly  wish  to  place  before  you  for  your  consideration 
.should  be  of  any  value  to  you,  they  would  be  of  more  value  before  your  forth- 
coming meeting  with   Prime   Minister   Churchill  and   Marshal   Stalin. 

In  the  hope  of  causing  the  mininuim  inconvenience  in  taking  up  some  of  your 
heavily  burdened  time,  I  am  writing  to  your  secretary,  Mr.  Connelly,  asking 
if  it  will  be  po.ssible  to  arrange  an  appointment  soon  after  your  return  from 
San  Francisco. 


Yours  very  sincerely, 
OL :  ec. 


[s]   Owen  LATTiitoBE. 


Exhibit  Xo.  530-D 


Intei'view  of  July  3,  1945. 
;Memorani)u.\i   for  the  President 

Japan  Policy  as  Related  to  China  Policy 

Japan,  politically,  now  banks  everyting  on  the  hope  of  peace  terms  that  will 
make  possible  a  come-back  and  another  war.  The  only  possible  come-back  is  as 
leader  of  an  Asiatic  coalition  under  the  racial  battle  cry  of  '"down  with  the  white 
man."  Therefore,  unlike  Germany,  where  the  principal  Nazi  underground  will 
be  in  Germany,  the  Japanese  underground  nuist  be  largely  in  other  parts  of 
Asia.    China  is  the  key  to  this  problem. 

Like  Germany,  Japan  must  also  do  its  best  to  pit  the  Western  Allies  against 
Russia.     China  is  also  the  key  to  this  jiroblem. 


3388  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Therefore,  in  China  the  Japanese  problem  is  not  Whether  they  are  going  to 
be  defeated,  but  How  to  manage  the  process  of  beinK  defeated  to  their  own  future 
advantage.  The  Japanese  have  already  begun  to  handle  this  problem  by  seeing 
to  it  that  their  defeat  contributes  to  both  the  political  and  the  territorial  disunity 
of  China.  Where  they  can  manage  to  retreat  in  favor  of  Chiang  Kai-shek  and 
not  in  favor  of  Communist  guerrillas,  they  do  so.  Where  there  are  no  Commu- 
nists, they  try  to  retreat  in  favor  of  provincial,  regional,  or  war-lord  troops, 
instead  of  Chiang  Kai-shek  troops,  so  as  to  contribute  to  territorial  disunity. 
They  hope  that,  if  China  can  be  led  into  both  ideological  civil  wars  of  landlords 
against  peasants  and  regional  civil  wars  of  provinces  against  the  Central  Gov- 
ernment, Japan  will  not  be  eclipsed  during  its  years  of  postwar  weakness. 

To  counteract  this  Japanese  policy,  the  American  policy  in  China  must  work 
steadily  for  peace,  unity,  and  modern  political  foi-ms. 

At  the  same  time  Japan  hopes  that  fear  of  Russia  will  induce  Britain  and 
America  to  be  "soft"  with  "antirevolutionary"  Japanese  big  business  and  to  wink 
at  the  fact  that  big  business  in  Japan  is  as  militarist  as  the  militarists. 

To  handle  American  policy  in  the  new  phase,  it  is  necessary  to  make  adjust- 
ments to  the  fact  that  China,  rather  than  Japan,  is  now  the  key  to  Far  Eastern 
policy  as  a  whole.  In  most  government  agencies  at  the  present  time  the  tendency 
is  to  find  Japan-trained  men  in  higher  policy-making  posts  than  China-trained 
men,  simply  because  Japan  used  to  be  a  more  important  Great  Power  than  China. 

CHINA  POLICY 

There  are  two  alternatives  in  China  : 

1.  Division  of  the  country  between  Chiang  Kai-shek  and  the  Communists  :  This 
would  mean,  for  Chiang,  a  permanent  policy  of  getting  American  support,  for 
which  he  would  give  anything  America  wants ;  and,  for  the  Communists,  a 
similar  policy  of  getting  Russian  support,  with  similar  results.  The  eventual 
consequences  would  almost  inevitably  be  war  between  America  and  Russia. 

2.  A  unified  China  :  To  unify  China,  there  must  be  a  settlement  between  Chiang 
and  the  Communists  and  simultaneously  an  agreement  between  America,  Russia, 
and  Britain  to  build  up  China  as  a  whole.  The  Comnuuiists  would  have  to  accept 
minority  standing  as  a  long-term  status ;  but  Chiang  would  have  to  give  them 
real  power  within  a  coalition  government,  propoi'tionate  to  their  real  strength, 
not  just  token  representation. 

In  other  words,  we  can  have  either  a  divided  China,  with  Chiang  having  dic- 
tatorial power  in  his  territory,  subject  to  acting  as  an  instrument  of  American 
policy ;  or  we  can  have  a  whole  China,  at  the  price  of  pretty  drastic  political 
change,  including  limitation  of  the  personal  power  of  Chiang. 

Unless  he  is  certain  of  American  policy,  Chiang  would  rather  have  imlimited 
power  in  a  small  China  than  limited  power  in  a  larger  China.  He  still  thinks 
that  America  is  on  the  fence,  but  will  be  stampeded  into  jumping  down  on  his 
side,  against  Russia,  if  he  hits  the  right  timing  in  a  civil  war  against  'the 
Bolshevik  menace."  Influential  advisers  tell  him  that  America  is  headed  for  a 
long-term  conservative  trend,  with  Republican  ascendance,  and  that  Henry  Luce, 
Walter  Judd,  etc.,  have  guessed  the  trend  correctly. 

The  basic  American  interest  is  represented  by  policy  No.  2.  It  can  be  success- 
fully worked.  Chiang  is  tenacious  but  has  shown  in  the  past  that  he  knows 
when  to  give  in  and  try  a  new  policy.  But  he  will  only  play  ball  if  America  and 
Russia,  with  Bi'itish  approval,  make  it  plain  that  they  are  going  to  be  joint 
umpires.  America  alone  cannot  either  coax  or  bluff  Chiang  into  a  settlement 
with  the  Communists  involving  real  concessions ;  but,  if  Washington  and  Moscow 
agree,  both  Chungking  and  Yenan  will  carry  out  the  agreement. 


Exhibit  No.  530-E 

June  20,  1945. 
Mr.  Matthew  Connelly, 

Secretary  to  the  President, 

The  White  House,  Washinrjton,  D.  C. 
Dear  Mk.  Connelly  :  On  June  14  the  President  wrote  to  me  that  he  would  be 
glad  to  discuss  with  me  some  questions  of  policy  in  China  which  I  had  ventured 
to  raise  in  a  letter  to  him  on  June  10. 

Since  I  am  most  anxious  that  the  views  which  I  represent  should  be  laid  before 
the  President  for  his  consideration  before  his  forthcoming  meeting  with  Prime 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3389 

Minister  Churcliill  and  Marshal  Stalin,  I  hope  very  much  that  you  will  find  it 
possible  to  arrange  an  appointment  for  me  as  soon  as  possible  after  the  President's 
return  from  San  Francisco.    I  can  l)e  reached  through  the  following  points : 
Home  address  (postal)  Ruxton,  Md. 
Telephone  (home)  Towson  846. 

Telephone  (Johns  Hopkins  University,  Baltimore)  University  0100,  Ext.  72. 
Telephone  (OWI,  Wasliingtou)  Republic  7500,  Ext.  72228. 
Yours  very  sincerely, 

[s]     Owen  Lattimore. 
OL :  ec. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  had  many  more  questions,  Mr.  Chairman,  but 
1  tliink  perhaps  Senator  Watkins  Avoukl  want  to  continue. 

Senator  WATiiiNs.  I  will  let  it  go  now. 

Senator  Fergusox.  I  would  like  to  recess.  I  have  no  questions  on 
the  document  itself. 

The  Chairman.  What  is  the  pleasure  of  the  committee  about  re- 
convening ( 

Senator  Ferguson.  Any  time  the  Chair  desires,  I  will  come  back. 

I  would  also  like  to  put  in  the  record,  for  your  information,  Mr. 
Lattimore,  the  fact  on  the  Clubb  case  that,  as  I  understand,  Mr.  Ache- 
son,  at  a  press  conference,  now  said  that  he  did  reverse  the  board  in 
the  Clubb  case  and  reinstated  Mr.  Clubb ;  that  his  finding  was  opposite 
to  the  board. 

That  is  for  your  information.  I  asked  you  about  it,  and  you  seemed 
to  know  nothing  about  it  the  other  day. 

I  will  put  that  press  release  in. 

The  Chairman.  We  will  recess  now  until  1 :  30. 

(Thereupon,  at  12  noon,  the  committee  recessed,  to  reconvene  at 
1 :  ?>0  p.  m.,  same  day.) 

after  recess 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 

Mr.  Arnold.  Mr.  Chairman,  the  witness  had  a  quotation  from 
General  Chennault's  book  which  you  said  we  would  read  later. 

The  Chairman.  I  do  not  know  Avhether  it  is  a  quotation  or  not. 
There  is  an  excerpt  here  which  was  handed  to  me ;  and,  without  the 
opportunity  to  present  it  to  the  committee,  I  withheld  action  on  it. 
It  presents  certain  phases  that  I  should  think  would  be  for  the  con- 
sideration of  the  committee. 

Mr.  Arnold.  It  is  very  short,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  It  is  short. 

Mr.  Arnold.  And  you  can  strike  it  if  you  think  so.  Could  it  be 
read  subject  to  being  stricken? 

The  Chairman.  No.  I  will  submit  it  to  the  committee  just  as  soon 
as  I  get  the  opportunity. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  might  I  proceed? 

The  Chairman.  This  presents  a  phase  of  quoting  an  excerpt,  pre- 
sumably quoting  an  excerpt,  from  a  publication  by  a  party  who  is 
not  present,  not  subject  to  cross-examination  or  to  inquiry.  But 
those  phases  will  be  presented  to  the  committee. 

Mr.  Arnold.  I  would  appreciate  it  because  many  such  quotations 
are  in  the  record. 

Senator  Ferguson.  May  I  proceed  ? 

The  Chairman.  You  may  proceed. 


3390  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Senator  Fek(;usox.  Mr.  Lattiiiiore,  if  von  will  place  before  your- 
self the  letter  to  Times  by  Mr.  Laniont. 

Mr.  IMoRRis.  Designed  for  Mr.  Lamont. 

Senator  Fergusox.  Designed;  yes;  written  by  you  to  be  placed  in 
the  Times,  if  possible,  by  ]\Ir.  I^amont.  The  second  paragraph  is 
what  I  am  interested  in.    1  want  to  go  back  to  this  change. 

You  seem  to  know  in  these  letters  much  al)out  the  policy,  but  I 
do  not  find  it  in  the  ansAver  that  you  are  making  here.  Let  us  take 
one  of  these  quotes : 

On  the  other  hand,  there  is  causp  for  uneasiness  in  a  new  trend,  which  is 
now  developin.i;  toward  criticism  of  Hoviet  motives  and  Soviet  iiolicies  in  Asia. 
We  shaU  be  well  advised  to  consider  this  trend  now,  in  advance  of  President 
Trnnian's  first  Bii;-  Three  meeting  with  Mr.  Churchill  and  Marshal  Stalin. 

What  was  that  trend,  and  who  was  responsible  for  the  new  trend 
that  you  are  talking  about? 

ISIr.  Lattimore.  May  I  say  that  I  have  not  loo^ced  up  the  newspaper 
record  of  the  period.  I  assume  that  it  was  part  of  the  trend  toward 
feeling  that  Russia  was  not  a  country  we  could  cooperate  with,  wdiile 
there  was  also  at  the  same  time,  the  general  period  of  the  San  Fran- 
cisco conference,  a  very  strong  feeling  among  many  people  that  post- 
war cooperation  would  be  possible. 

I  thouglit  that  as  much  public  discussion  of  that  as  possible  w^ould 
contribute  to  a  well-informed  i)ublic  opinion. 

Senator  Fer<;uson.  And  it  was  ]iublic  opinion  you  were  trying  to 
sway?  V/hat  you  call  a  well-informed  public,  but  it  w-as  public 
opinion  that  you  wanted  to  sway  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  wanted  to  contribute  to  public  opinion. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  not  want  to  sway  it  any  way  ? 

Mr,  Lattimore.  I  wanted  to  advocate  my  own  opinions  and  to  have 
them  honestly  discussed  like  anybody  else's  opinions,  and  I  resented 
the  manner  in  Avhicli  my  opinions  had  been  misrepresented  in  the 
article  in  the  Reader's  Digest. 

Senator  Fercjuson.  You  claim  to  be  an  authority  on  China  aiul  the 
Far  East,  did  you  not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  1  claim  to  be  a  person  who  has  studied  China  and 
the  Far  East  for  many  years.  I  do  not  and  have  never  claimed  to  be 
an  exclusive  authority. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  did  not  ask  you  wdiether  it  was  an  exclusive 
authority.  That  would  be  another  question.  But  were  you  an 
authority? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  think  that  would  be  a  (juestion  for  somebody 
else's  judgment,  Senator. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Your  counsel  suggests  that  you  are  too  modest. 
I  could  only  suggest,  maybe,  that  you  are  not  truthful  enough  on  it, 
and  I  want  to  read  something  for  that. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Senator,  may  I  say  that  I  resent  it? 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  may  resent  it,  but  let  me  ask  you  to  read 
now.  where  you  have  not  been  modest,  when  you  printed  it  under 
another  man's  name.    Read  the  last  paragraph. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  On  this  J^age? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

An  example  of  anticipatory  alarm  about  Russia  is  to  be  found  in  the  influen- 
tial magazine  Reader's  Digest,  under  the  title  "The  Fate  of  the  World  Is  at  Stake 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3391 

in  China."  by  Max  Eastman  and  J.  B.  Powell.  In  this  article  it  is  suggested  that 
there  is  a  danger  that  American  policy  might  disastrously  "sell  out"  President 
Chiang  Kai-shek  to  tlie  Chinese  Communists,  and  "'bring  under  totalitarian  regi- 
mentation 4.")0,000,()00  people."  To  bolster  this  case,  the  article  casts  doubts  on 
the  authoritativeness  of  several  of  tliose  Americans  who  have,  in  fact,  contrib- 
uted most  authoritatively  to  a  clear  American  understanding  of  contemporary 
China  and  contemporary  Russia — including  Owen  Lattimoi'e,  Harrison  Forman, 
and  Edgar  Snow.  The  publication  of  such  an  article  invites  a  review  of  both 
American  and  Soviet  policy  in  China.  In  making  sucli  a  review,  we  should  exam- 
ine American  policy  just  as  closely  as  Soviet  policy,  and  make  our  criticisms 
where  they  are  due. 

Senator  FERGuyox.  You  were  perfectly  willing-  to  have  Mr.  Thomas 
Lamont  call  you  an  authority. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  This  was  something  that  I  had  submitted  to  INIr. 
Carter  at  his  request  to  be  submitted  to  Mr.  Lamont. 

Senator  Fergusox.  I  have  heard  that  a  dozen  times. 

The  CnAiRMAX.  Answer  the  question. 

Senator  Fergusox.  We  will  move  along  quickly  here  if  you  will 
keep  to  the  answer. 

You  were  perfectly  willing  to  have  Mr.  Thomas  Lamont  tell  the 
public  that  you  were  an  authority. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  If  he  approved  of  the  wording,  he  could  do  so. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  not  request  him  to  approve  through 
your  agent,  Mr.  Carter  ? 

]Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir;  I  made  no  such  request.  I  submitted  a 
rough  draft  of  a  memorandum. 

Senator  Fergusox.  Why  did  you  put  your  name  in  there  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Because  my  reference  was  to  Eeader's  Digest  and 
the  article  in  the  Reader's  Digest,  and  my  name  was  a  part  of  it. 

Senator  Fergusox.  And  you  did  not  hesitate  to  say  that  you  were 
an  authority  as  well  as  Mr.  Forman  and  Mr.  Fdgar  Snow  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No ;  I  didn't  hesitate. 

Senator  Fergusox^  Going  to  this  sentence : 

We  have  also,  until  quite  recently,  encouraged  political  unity  in  Cliina  in 
order  to  facilitate  the  most  effective  resistance  to  Japan. 

What  was  the  change  there  that  you  were  talking  about  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  May  I  ask  where  that  quotation  is  from  ? 

Senator  Fergusox.  The  next  paragraph  after  the  one  you  com- 
pleted reading,  on  page  2. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes. 

Senator  Fergusox.  I  suppose  the  word  "Under''  is  "Before,"  "Be- 
fore Pearl  Harbor,"  or  is  that  "after"  ? 

Yes;  because  the  next  sentence  says  "Since,"  so  that  word  appar- 
ently, instead  of  "Lender  Pearl  Harbor" 

INlr.  Lattimore.  It  probably  is  "L'ntil  Pearl  Harbor." 

Senator  Fergusox^  It  is  in  that  paragraph. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes.     [Reading:] 

Since  Pearl  Harbor,  our  policy  has  been  to  give  China  the  maximum  aid  per- 
mitted by  difficulties  of  transport  and  the  demands  of  other  theaters  of  war. 
We  have  also,  until  quite  recently,  encouraged  political  unity  in  China  in  order 
to  facilitate  the  most  effective  resistance  to  Japan. 

Senator  Fergusox.  What  was  the  chano-e? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  change,  as  I  recall  it,  in  the  discussion  of 
the  period — I  repeat,  I  have  not  looked  up  the  newspaper  record  of 
the  time — was  that  it  was  being  advocated  that  we  should  restrict 


3392  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

aid  entirely  to  Chiang  Kai-shek's  own  armies  while  other  people  be- 
lieved that  as  we  approached  the  coast  of  China,  as  we  w^ere  nearing 
Japan,  made  direct  contact  with  the  Chinese  armies  on  the  mainland, 
we  should  also  be  entitled  to  cooperate  with  the  Communists  and 
Communist-led  guerrillas. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  these  letters  and  this  memoran- 
dum were  written  prior  to  the  end  of  the  war  between  the  United 
States  and  Japan? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  They  were  written  as  the  end  of  the  war  was 
rapidly  approaching,  yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  know  that  it  was  rapidly  approach- 
ing? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  it  was  the  general  opinion  at  the  time  because, 
through  General  MacArthur's  island-hopping  campaign,  in  combina- 
tion with  the  United  States  Navy,  we  were  getting  wnthin  reach  of 
both  the  home  islands  of  Japan  and  the  mainland  of  China. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  knew,  then,  that  the  war  was  about  over? 

Mr.  Laitimore,  I  didn't  know.  My  feeling  was  that  the  war  was 
approaching  an  end. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  it  not  true  that  during  the  war  there  were 
battles  between  the  Chinese  Communists  and  the  Chinese  Nationalists  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  There  were  some  clashes,  yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  many  divisions  or  armies  did  Chiang  Kai- 
shek  have  to  put  on  his  border  up  at  the  Communist  border  to  pre- 
serve the  integrity  of  his  rule  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  recall  the  figure.  Senator,  but  I  do  recall 
that  in  the  opinion  of  some  of  the  American  diplomatic  and  military 
representatives  in  China,  some  of  those  troops  were  being  unneces- 
sarily immobilized. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  was  not  my  question.  My  question  was 
how  many  did  he  use  on  the  border? 

Mr.  Laitimore.  I  don't  know. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  he  use  any  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  There  were  troops  at  the  corner  of  northwest  China 
where  Chiang  Kai-shek's  free  China  and  the  Communist-held  part  of 
China  joined. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  it  is  your  contention  now  that  they  were  not 
there  to  keep  the  Conmiunists  from  moving  into  the  Nationalist  terri- 
tory ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  it  is  my  contention  that  many  of  the  Americans 
in  the  field  at  the  time  considered  that  the  blockade  of  the  Com- 
munists was  unnecessarily  large  and  severe,  immobilized  an  uneces- 
sarily  large  number  of  Chiang's  troops. 

Senator  Fergi  son.  But  they  did  inunobilize  some  of  his  troops? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  at  the  very  time  that  at  least  Chiang  Kai- 
shek  felt  that  it  was  necessary  to  preserve  his  own  army  to  keep  the 
Communists  back,  you  were  advocating  arms  and  supplies  and  muni- 
tions to  the  Communists  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir;  you  are  talking  about  two  different  situa- 
tions. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Please  do  not  tell  me  what  I  am  talking  about. 
1  am  just  asking  you  the  question. 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3393 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Well,  in  my  opinion,  then,  Senator,  there  were  two 
different  situations.  One  was  during  the  period  when  the  United 
States  had  no  access  and  no  hope  of  immediate  access  to  the  coast  of 
China. 

The  second  was  the  period  when  we  were  rapidly  approaching  the 
coast  of  China  and  when  many  people  thought,  as  was  discussed  in 
the  press  at  the  time,  I  remember,  that  the  Japanese  would  withdraw 
from  the  home  islands  of  Japan  and  make  a  last  stand  in  Manchuria, 
in  Avhicli  case  the  question  of  combined  American-Chinese  operations 
on  the  mainland  against  Manchuria  would  have  been  very  important. 

Senator  Ferguson.  All  right.  Now  let  us  go  back  to  the  question 
I  Avas  asking. 

In  June  of  1945  was  it  not  true  that  Chiang  Kai-shek  had  im- 
mobilized some  of  his  troops  against  Japan  and  in  order  that  he  may 
protect  his  army  from  the  Chinese  Communist  Army? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  is  true,  Senator,  that  he  had  immobilized  part 
of  his  army.  It  is  also  true  that  in  the  opinion  of  many  American 
observers  there  at  the  time  it  was  unnecessary. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  we  are  not  going  to  get  through 
today  unless  we  can  get  the  answers  to  these  questions.  I  can  stay 
over  here  as  long  as  you  can  stay  over  there. 

Mr.  Arnold.  Mr.  Chairman,  he  is  answering. 

The  Chairman.  Jnst  a  minute,  counsel.  I  told  the  counsel  when 
he  first  commenced  this  hearing  as  to  what  their  limitations  were. 
When  he  wants  advice,  he  can  ask  you  for  advice.  You  will  not  par- 
ticipate in  the  proceedings. 

Mr.  Arnold.  I  am  sorry.  Senator.  He  permitted  me  to  read  the 
answer  to  the  question  before,  and  I  thought  I  could  be  helpful  in  the 
proceedings  by  merely  striking  out  the  last  part  of  that  answer. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  what  I  think  ought  to  be  stricken  out, 
and  if  he  will  just  stick  to  the  answers  he  and  I  will  get  along. 

The  Chairman.  You  just  tell  the  witness  to  answer  the  question, 
and  you  will  give  him  some  pretty  good  advice. 

Mr.  Arnold.  I  think  he  is  trying,  Senator. 

Mv.  Lattimore.  I  think  the  trouble  here.  Senator  Ferguson,  is 
merely  that 

Senator  Ferguson.  Are  you  answering  my  question? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  All  right. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  cannot  accept  your  statement  of  the  question  as 
if  it  were  my  opinion  on  the  question. 

Senator  Ferguson.  It  was  a  fact,  therefore  you  would  have  to  know. 
Did  you  or  did  you  not  know  whether  or  not  Chiang  Kai-shek  was 
demobilizing  or,  as  you  called  it  that,  part  of  his  troops  between  his 
part  of  China  and  the  Communist  part  of  China,  to  protect  his  part 
of  China  from  the  Communists  ? 

Mv.  Lattimore.  I  knew  that  he  was  immobilizing  part  of  his  troops 
in  that  area,  and  I  also  knew  that  many  Americans  in  China  con- 
sidered that  he  was  immobilizing  in  excessive  number. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  no  part  of  the  answer.  That  is  another 
part. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman.  That  was  in  June 
1945? 


3394  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Mr.  La'fiimoke.  Generally  speaking  in  that  period ;  yes, 

Senator  Febguson.  Yes.  And  that  was  the  very  time  that  you  were 
advocating  Mr.  Lamont,  over  his  signature,  to  advocate  that  we 
furnish  to  the  Communists  in  China  munitions  and  arms.  You  can 
answer  that  question  "Yes""  or  "No."' 

Mv.  Lattimore.  I  don't  think  that  question  is  susceptible  to  a  "Yes" 
(u-  "No"'  answer.  Senator. 

llie  Chairman.  Do  you  want  to  answer  it  "Yes"  or  "No,""  or  not 
answer  it  ?    Just  say  whether  you  do  or  do  not. 

jNIr.  Lati^imore.  No;  I  don't  want  to  answer  it  "Yes"  or  "No." 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then  I  will  take  it  for  granted  that  the  two 
documents  speak  for  themselves,  the  answer  before  and  the  documents. 

Mr.  Lat'I'imore.  I  should  like  to  explain.  Senator,  that  I  am  referring 
to  a  new  situation,  not  an  old  one. 

The  Chairman.  If  you  say  you  cannot  answer  the  question,  there  is 
no  explanation,  if  you  cannot  answer  it  "Yes"'  or  "No."'  If  you  cannot 
answer  it,  you  cannot  answer  it. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  May  I  not  explain  why  I  can't  answer  it.  Senator? 

Senator  Ferguson.  No;  I  did  not  ask  you  that  question,  to  explain 
why. 

Mr.  Lattimore,  we  will  go  to  the  document  that  you  wrote  for  the 
President.  I  will  just  take  the  China  part.  The  Japanese  part,  I 
think,  speaks  for  itself,  at  the  present  time  [reading]  : 

Division  of  tlie  country  between  Chiang  Kai-shek  and  the  Communists.  This 
would  mean,  for  Chiang,  a  permanent  policy  of  getting  American  support,  for 
which  he  would  give  anything  America  wants  :  and  for  the  Communists,  a  similar 
policy  of  getting  Russian  support,  with  similar  results.  The  eventual  consequence 
would  almost  inevitably  be  war  between  American  and  Russia. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  prefaced.  Senator,  by  the  statement,  "There 
are  two  alternatives  in  China." 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes.     That  was  one  of  them.     Is  that  true? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  was  one  of  them;  yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Wliat  made  you  think  that  if  America  gave 
Chiang  Kai-shek  support,  Russia  would  give  the  Communists  support? 

Mr.  LAT-riMORE.  I  was  not  certain  of  it.  I  thought  that  this  was  a 
]n'obability  or  one  of  the  alternatives,  and  I  so  stated  it.  Obviously, 
I  had  no  positive  knowledge.     I  was  stating  a  theory  or  opinion. 

The  Chairman.  This  is  the  memorandum  to  the  Presiclent  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes ;  the  memorandum. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

The  Chairman.  This  was  advice  to  the  President? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes ;  that  this  is  what  would  ha]:)pen. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Might  I  ask  a  question,  Mr.  Cliairman? 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  At  that  point,  Mr.  Lattimore,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
did  you  not  then  know^  that  the  Russians  were  supporting  the  Chinese 
Communists  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Mr.  Sourwine,  I  did  not  know  that  they  were  sup- 
porting them  in  any  sense  of  giving  them  arms,  and  I  don't  believe  that 
at  that  time  they  were  giving  them  arms. 

We  have  been  over  that  previously.  I  certainly  considered  that  the 
Communists  had  the  moral  and  political  support  of  the  Russians. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  know  that  Russia  was  supporting  them? 
That  is  the  question. 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3395 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  know  that  Russia  was  supporting  them  in  that 
sense,  but  not  in  the  sense  of  arniino;  them. 

Senator  Fkrguson.  Going  back  to  your  Lamont  letter,  I  read  you 
this: 

At  the  present  moment,  there  is  a  danger  that  the  parallel  policy  may  not 
continue. 

You  are  talking  about  the  previous  paragraph,  where  it  says: 

Riissian  and  American  policy  in  China  can  he  made  parallel,  and  we  know 
from  exiierieiice,  not  hy  .uuesswork,  that  the  Russians  are  <-upahle  of  contrihutini; 
at  the  very  least  an  etjual  share  in  makinii"  the  policies  of  the  two  countries 
liarallel. 

AAliere  did  you  get  that  information;!  That  was  from  experience 
and  not  from  guesswork. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  From  exj)erience  and  from  my  work  with  Chiang. 
Kai-shek  1  knew  that  Russia  and  America  had  followed  a  parallel 
])olicy  in  China  of  encouraging  united  resistance  to  the  Japanese, 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  did  you  cease  being  adviser  to  Chiang 
Kai-shek? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  In  1942 ;  at  the  end  of  1942. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Going  to  the  next  paragraph : 

At  the  present  moment  there  is  dancer  that  the  parallel  policy  may  not  con- 
tinue. This  danger  has  not  yet  arisen  from  Russian  policy,  but  it  has  arisen 
from  American  policy. 

What  change  did  we  make  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  was  referring  again  there,  Senator,  to  the  changes 
t  hat  I  thought  I  saw  coming  about  from  statements  in  the  press  at  the 
time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  next  sentence : 

Whereas  Russia's  policy  has  never  yet  demanded  the  inclusion  of  China  Com- 
numists  in  tlie  benefit  of  Russian  aid  to  China.  American  policy  has  recently 
explicitly  excluded  them  from  the  benefit  of  American  aid. 

Where  did  you  get  that  information? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  From  the  press,  I  believe. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Was  it  a  fact? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  believe  so.  Reference  to  the  press  of  the  time 
would  show. 

Senator  Ferguson.  So  up  to  that  time  Conmiunist  Russia  was  not 
asking  that  Communist  China  be  included  in  its  aid? 

Mr.  La'itimore.  I  believe  that  is  true.  That  is  supported  by  that 
quotation  from  General  Chennault  written  after  the  end  of  the  war, 
which  I  wished  to  read  into  the  record. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  know  you  want  to  get  that  in,  but  we  will  get 
that  in  later. 

In  your  statement  to  the  President  you  said,  "For  the  Communists 
a    similar    policy    of    getting    Russia's    support    with    similar    re- 
sults    *     *     *."" 

Wliy  did  3'ou  say  that  their  policy  would  not  continue  to  give  aid 
to  Cliiang  Kai-shek?  Was  it  for  the  reason  that  they  were,  at  that 
time,  able  to  have  the  Yalta  agreement  where  we  were  to  give  them 
certain  benefits  out  of  China,  and  was  it  that  they  were  about  to 
make  a  treaty  with  Chiang  Kai-shek,  recognizing  Chiang  Kai-shek 
us  the  real  i:-overnment  of  China  ? 


3396  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Was  that  their  reason  for  not  stipulating  or  not  saying  that  they 
wanted  to  aid  the  Communists  in  China  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  no  means  of  knowing  what  their  policy  was 
at  that  time,  Senator, 

My  paragraph  clearly  refers  to  anticipation  of  a  future  situation. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Your  paragraph  does  not,  if  I  might  go  back  to 
it.  "Whereas  Russia's  policy  has  never" — you  are  telling  Mr.  Lamont 
that  the  Russian  policy  has  never  yet  demanded  the  inclusion  of  Com- 
munists, Chinese  Communists,  in  the  benefit  of  Russian  aid  to  China. 

America's  policy  has  recently  explicitly  excluded  them  from  the  benefit  of 
American  aid. 

Mr.  Latomore.  On  which  page  is  that  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  On  page  3. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  undoubtedly  believed  that  was  true  at  the  time, 
and  I  believe  it  is  true,  too. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then  you  knew  it? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No;  I  say  that  Russian  policy  has  never  yet  de- 
manded the  inclusion  of  the  Chinese  Communists,  et  cetera.  That  is 
obviously  stated  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge  at  the  time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  were  going  to  ask  Mr.  Lamont  to  put  it  in  a 
statement  over  his  signature  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir ;  I  was  not  going  to  ask  Mr.  Lamont  to  put 
it  in  a  statement  over  his  signature. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  were  just  going  to  ask  Mr.  Carter,  who  w^ent 
to  Mr.  Lamont's  son  in  order  that  they  may  get  it  put  over  his  signa- 
ture, is  that  the  way  you  want  to  leave  it  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir.  I  was  supplying  some  material  which  could 
be  considered,  used,  or  rejected  by  Mr.  Lamont,  according  to  his 
judgment. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  know  what  Mr.  Lamont's  son's  thinking 
was? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Had  you  ever  heard  about  it? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  had  heard  about  him  vaguely. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Just  vaguely? 

Mr.  Lattimore,  Just  vaguely. 

.  Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  talk  to  Mr,  Carter  after  you  received  his 
letter  mentioning  the  son? 

Mr,  Lattimore.  I  don't  believe  I  did.  There  w^as  just  this  cor- 
respondence, and  then  I  believe  Mr.  Carter  sent  me  a  copy  of  Mr. 
Lamont's  letter  to  him,  and  there  the  matter  dropped. 

In  other  words,  Mr.  Lamont  had  exercised,  according  to  his  own 
judgment,  exactly  the  option  that  was  implied  in  my  submitting  any 
material  at  all. 

Senator  Ferguson,  Why  did  you  not  go  to  see  Mr.  Lamont? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  didn't  know  Mr.  Lamont.  The  idea  was  not 
mine.    The  whole  idea  came  from  Mr.  Carter. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  state  to  Mr.  Carter  to  tell  Mr.  Lamont 
that  you,  as  an  authority,  were  writing  this  article  foi-  the  New  York 
Times,  and  to  tell  Mr.  Lamont  who  was  writing  it  ? 

]\rr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir,  Mr.  Carter  asked  me  for  a  draft,  and  I 
gave  him  a  draft. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  whether  he  represented  it  as 
your  thinking  or  as  Carter's  thinking? 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3397 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  no  idea. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  wliether  or  not  Laniont  knew 
that  you  prepared  the  draft  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  do  not. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Let  us  take  the  next  statement  in  your  China 
policy. 

A  unified  China  :  To  unify  Cliina,  there  must  be  a  settlement  between  Chiang' 
and  the  Connuunists  and  simultaneously  an  agreement  between)  America, 
Russia,  and  Britain  to  build  up  China  as  a  whole. 

At  that  very  time  that  you  were  wa'iting  to  the  President,  you 
said  that  up  to  that  time  Russia  showed  no  desire  or  requirement, 
let  me  put  it  that  way,  that  there  was  to  be  a  unification  between  the 
Communists  and  the  non-Comnninists  in  China.  Is  that  not  true? 
That,  is,  to  at  least  require  her  aid  to  be  gjiven  only  to   the  one? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Fer(;uson.  You  said  Russia's  policy  has  never  yet  de- 
manded  

Mr.  Lattimore.  Has  never  yet  demanded,  that  was  true  to  the 
best  of  my  knowledge. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  the  Lamont  article? 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  the  Lamont  article. 

At  the  same  time,  you  were  telling  the  President  this : 

To  unify  China,  there  must  be  a  settlement  between  Chiang  and  the  Com- 
munists and  simultaneously  an  agreement  between  America,  Russia,  and  Britain 
to  build  up  China  as  a  whole.  The  Commimists  will  have  to  accept  minority 
standing  as  a  long-term  status ;  but  Chiang  would  have  to  give  them  real  power 
within  a  coalition  government,  proportionate  to  their  real  strength,  not  just  token 
representation. 

You  wrote  that  ? 

]\Ir.  Lattimore.  I  wrote  both  of  those,  one  referring  to  the  past, 
and  one  referring  to  a  problem  that  I  anticipated  in  the  future. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  you  were  then  advocating  to  the  President 
a  coalition  government  ? 

Mr.  Laitimore.  No,  sir,  I  was  stating  to  the  President,  as  I  believe, 
an  alternative.     Let  me  see,  I  supported  the  second  alternative. 

Senator  Ferguson.  So  you  were  telling  the  President  that  the 
Communists  would  have  to  accept  a  minority  standing  as  a  long- 
term  status,  but  Chiang  would  have  to  give  them  real  power  within 
a  coalition  government  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  proportionate  to  their  real  strength,  not 
just  token  representation. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right.  That  was  my  assessment  of  the 
situation  that  I  thought  was  coming  up. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  that  not  exactly  what  General  Marshall  went 
to  China  to  do  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  believe  that  is  roughly  what  w^as  indicated  in  the 
directive  to  General  Marshall,  yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  that  not  what  Mr.  Carter  gave  as  one  of  the 
ways  of  solving  the  problem  when  he  got  the  first  memorandum  out 
on  the  Marshall  mission  ?    It  is, Vincent  that  I  mean. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  remember  that  memorandum. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  have  seen  the  Vincent  testimony? 


3398  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Mr.  Laitimoke.  I  liave  read  througli  it,  yes.  There  was  a  great 
deal  of  it,  and  I  don't  remember  every  bit  of  it  in  detail. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  yon  remember  the  memorandum  of  Decem- 
ber 9,  1945? 

Mr.  LAT'nMORE.  No;  I  don't.  I  would  like  to  see  it  to  refresh  my 
memory. 

The  Chaikman,  That  is  by  Vincent? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes,  Vincent. 

The  Chairman.  And  Vincent  was  then  in  what  position  ( 

Senator  Ferguson.  He  had  been  promoted  to  what  position,  Mr. 
Lattimore  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  couldn't  tell  you  exactly,  at  that  time,  whether 
he  was  head  of  the  China  desk  or  of  the  whole  Far  Eastern  Division. 
1  believe  it  was  one  or  the  other. 

The  Chairman.  He  was  head  of  the  Far  East,  was  he  not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  1  am  not  sure,  sir,  when  he  was  promoted  from 
head  of  the  China  desk  to  head  of  the  Far  Eastern  Division. 

Mr.  Morris.  He  was  head  of  the  Far  Eastern  Division  on  Decem- 
ber 7,  1945. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  He  was? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  read  the  memorandum? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  This  seems  to  be  signed  "J.  F.  B." 

Senator  Ferguson.  On  the  other  side  it  is  "Fe :  Vincent."  Wlio  is 
J.  F.  B.? 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  James  F.  Byrnes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  it  was  written  by  Vincent. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Is  tliat  what  the  notation  indicates? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes,  that  is  what  it  indicates.    Will  you  read  it? 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading  from  exhibit  No.  389  of  hearings  before 
this  committee)  : 

The  President  and  the  Secretary  <if  State  aie  hoth  anxious  that  the  uniticatiou 
of  China  l)y  peaceful,  democratic  uietliods  lie  achieved  as  soon  as  possible. 

At  a  public  hearing  before  the  Foreign  Relations  Coniniittee  of  the  Senate 
on  December  7.  the  Secretary  of  State  said  : 

"During  the  war  the  immediate  goal  of  the  Tinted  States  in  ("hina  was  to 
promote  a  military  union  of  the  several  political  factions  in  order  to  bring 
their  combined  power  to  liear  upon  our  common  enemy,  Japan.  Our  longer-range 
goal,  then  as  now,  and  a  goal  of  at  least  equal  importance,  is  the  development 
of  a  strong,  united,  and  democratic  China. 

"To  achieve  this  longer-range  goal,  it  is  essential  that  the  Central  Govern- 
ment of  China  as  well  as  the  various  dissident  elements  approach  the  settlement 
of  their  differences  with  a  genuine  willingness  to  compromise.  We  believe,  as 
we  have  long  believed  and  consistently  demonstrated,  that  tlie  government  of 
(Jeneralissimo  Chiang  Kai-shek  affords  the  most  satisfactory  liase  for  a  de- 
veloping democracy.  But  we  also  lielieve  tiiat  it  must  be  liroadened  to  include 
the  rei)resentatives  of  tliose  large  and  well-organized  groups  who  are  now  with- 
out any  voice  in  the  Government  of  China. 

"This  problem  is  not  an  easy  one.  It  requires  tact  and  discretion,  patience, 
and  restraint.  It  will  not  be  solved  by  slogans.  Its  solutitm  depends  primarily 
upon  the  good  will  of  the  ('liinese  leaders  themselves.  To  the  extent  that  our 
intiuence  is  a  factor,  success  will  depend  upon  our  capacity  to  exercise  that 
influence  in  the  light  of  shifting  conditions  in  such  a  way  as  to  encourage  con- 
cessions by  the  Central  Government,  by  the  so-called  Communists,  and  by  the 
other  factions." 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  that  not  just  what  you  were  saying  in  your 
second  letter,  that  the  Communists  would  have  to  accept  a  minority 
standing  as  a  long-term  status,  but  Chiang  would  have  to  give  them 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3399 

real  power  within  a  coalition  g:overnment  proportionate  to  their  real 
strength,  not  just  token  representation  ? 

The  Chairman.  That  is  the  memorandum  to  the  President  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  indicates  close,  similar  thinking. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  read  the  next  paragraph  ( 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

The  President  has  asked  General  Marshall  to  go  to  China  as  his  special  rei>- 
reseiitative  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  to  bear  in  an  appropriate  and  practieable 
manner  the  influence  of  the  United  States  for  the  achievement  of  the  ends  set 
forth  above. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  the  end  of  the  coalition  government  ? 
Mr.  Lattimore.  Presumably.     [Reading:] 

Specifically,  General  Marshall  will  endeavor  to  influence  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment to  call  a  national  conference  of  representatives  of  the  major  political 
elements  to  bring  about  the  unification  of  China  and,  concurrently,  effect  a 
cessation  of  hostilities,  particularly  in  north  China. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Would  that  not  indicate  that  your  second  al- 
ternative, a  unified  China,  was  exactly  what  the  State  Department 
and  the  President  were  doing? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  indicates  that  my  thinking  was  similar  to  that 
which  led  the  State  Department  or  the  State  Department  and  the 
Armed  Forces  in  combination  to  that  decision.  I  see  no  cause  and 
etl'ect  relationship. 

The  Chairman.  This  memorandum  had  been  placed  liefore  the 
President  before  General  Marshall  was  sent  abroad  ( 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes,  by  almost  6  months. 

How  can  you  then  say,  with  this  in  mind,  Mr.  Vincent  writing  it, 
that  youhad  not  the  slightest  effect,  or  your  memorandum  did  not  have 
the  slightest  effect  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  am  convinced.  Senator,  that  it  did  not  have  the 
slightest  effect.  1  saw  the  President  for  about  3  minutes.  1  got  a 
Presidential  brush-off  in  a  nice,  polite  way,  and  I  went  out. 

I  should  say  it  is  much  more  likely  that  the  State  Department  formed 
its  o])inions  from  the  material  gathered  in  the  field  in  China,  where  I 
had  not  been  recently,  from  its  own  representatives,  and  from  military 
representatives. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  this  the  first  time  that  you  told  us  you  had  a 
brush-off'  from  the  President  ? 

Mr.  Lattoiore.  I  had  said  that  I  had  seen  the  President  for  about 
3  minutes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  left  a  memorandum  with  your  arguments 
in  it? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  think  that  is  included  in  the  classification  of  a 
polite  brush-off. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  get  for  the  witness  a  copy  of  the  white 
paper  ? 

(Document  handed  to  witness.) 

Mr.  Lattimore.  :May  I  at  this  moment.  Senator,  read  into  the  record 
the  President's  letter  to  me  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  mean  the  first  letter  where  he  stated  the 
policy  was  already  formed  ? 

JSIr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 


3400  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes ;  you  can  read  that. 

The  Chairman.  It  is  in  the  record  already. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  "Well,  may  I  refer  to  the  fact  that  tlie  President  had 
already  told  me  that  atfairs  in  China  were  well  in  hand? 

The  Chairman.  In  the  meantime,  Mr.  Vincent  had  been  promoted  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Grew  was  put  out,  Mr.  Ballantine  was  put 
out,  and  Mr.  Dooman  was  put  out. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  In  the  meantime  of  what,  may  I  ask? 

The  Chairman.  In  the  meantime  between  the  time  you  left  the 
memorandum  with  the  President  and  the  time  Marshall  was  sent  to 
Asia.   Is  that  right  ? 

INIr.  Lattimore.  Also  in  the  meantime  the  President  was  telling  me 
that  affairs  concerning  China  were  well  in  hand. 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  you  in  all  earnestness,  utmost  earnestness, 
told  him  to  have  the  Amei'ican  policy  in  China  impartially  reviewed 
by  advisers  "who  are  not  associated  with  either  formulation  or  imple- 
mentation of  the  policy  as  recently  practiced.'' 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  Senator,  that  indicates  that  I  thought  that  an 
impartial  review  would  be  more  authoritative  and  have  results  than 
any  personal  opinions  of  mine. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Let  us  look  at  page  10  of  the  letter  of  transmittal 
by  Mr.  Acheson. 

By  the  way,  what  was  Mr.  Acheson's  position  with  the  State  De- 
partment when  you  went  to  see  the  President  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  couldn't  tell  you,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  He  was  in  the  State  Department,  was  he  not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  my  general  recollection.  I  can't  tell  you 
exactly. 

Senator  Ferguson.  He  held  a  high  position  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  suppose  so. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well  now,  there  was  a  letter  of  transmittal  of 
the  wliite  paper,  and  if  you  will  turn  to  page  10  of  that,  which  is  signed 
l)y  Dean  Acheson,  you  may  start  and  read  what  he  says  on  the  letter 
of  transmittal  of  the  white  paper  to  the  public. 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

When  peace  came,  the  United  States  was  confronted  with  tliree  possihle  al- 
ternatives in  China  : 

1.  It  could  have  pulled  out  lock,  stock,  and  barrel. 

2.  It  could  have  intervened  militarily  on  a  major  scale  to  assist  the  Nationalists 
to  destroy  the  Communists. 

8.  It  could,  while  assisting  the  Nationalists  to  assert  their  authority  over  as 
much  of  China  as  possible,  endeavor  to  avoid  a  civil  war  by  working  for  a 
compromise  between  the  two  sides. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Riglit  there,  is  that  not  exactly  what  you  told 
the  President  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  indicates  similai*  thinking  but  no  cause  and 
effect. 

Senator  Ferguson.  No  cause  and  effect.  Woidd  you  think,  then, 
that  the  only  way  Ave  could  get  a  cause  and  effect  would  be  for  the 
President  to  say,  or  have  Dean  Acheson  say  in  here,  "This  was  the 
policy  proposed  by  Owen  Lattimore,  the  authority  on  the  far  eastern 
affairs"? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir;  I  don't. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3401 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  would  you  get  it  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  think  one  of  the  gaps  in  our  knowledge  here  is 
whether  the  President  ever  transmitted  my  memoranda  to  the  Depart- 
ment of  State,  or  whether  they  were  ever  considered  or  accepted.  I 
have  never  heard  they  were. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  do  you  think  that  the  President 
would  submit  your  memorandum  if  he  had  any  intentions  of  following 
it  to  the  men  who  were  responsibile  for  that  policy  in  the  State  De- 
partment, with  the  expression  in  the  letter  that  you  wanted  them  all 
taken  out  of  the  authority  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Senator,  I  don't  know  how  matters  were  handled, 
matters  of  policy  were  handled,  at  that  time  between  the  White  House 
and  the  State  Department. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  read  on,  Mr.  Lattimore,  from  Dean 
Acheson's  letter,  the  Secretary  of  State.    It  is  on  page  10,  continuing. 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

The  first  alternative  would,  and  I  believe  American  pnblic  opinion  at  the 
time  so  felt,  have  represented  an  abandonment  of  our  international  respon- 
sibilities and  of  our  traditional  policy  of  friendship  for  China  before  we  had 
made  a  determined  effort  to  be  of  assistance. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  after  the  war  and,  naturally,  that  would 
not  be  included  in  your  suggestion  to  the  President  because  you  were 
talking  as  to  when  the  war  was  on.     Is  that  not  correct  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  correct. 

Senator  Ferguson.  All  right.     Continue  reading. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  was  talking  while  the  war  was  on,  but  looking 
forward  to  postwar  situations. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Mr.  Latitmore  (reading)  : 

The  second  alternative  policy,  while  it  may  look  attractive  theoretically  and 
in  retrospect,  was  wholly  impracticable.  The  Nationalists  had  been  unable  to 
destroy  the  Communists  during  the  10  years  before  the  war.  Now,  after  the  war, 
the  Nationalists  were,  as  indicated  above,  weakened,  demoralized,  and  unpopu- 
lar. They  had  quickly  dissipated  their  popular  support  and  prestige  in  the 
areas  liberated  from  the  Japanese  by  the  conduct  of  their  civil  and  military 
officials.  The  Communists,  on  the  other  hand,  were  much  stronger  than  they 
had  ever  been,  and  were  in  control  of  most  of  North  China. 

Senator  Ferguson.  There,  if  thev  had  followed  in  June  of  1945  your 
suggestion  of  giving  arms  to  the  Communists,  they  would  have  been 
even  stronger  than  they  were  as  Acheson  found  them,  is  that  not  true  ? 

The  Chairman.  That  is,  the  Communists  would  have  been  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  not  necessarily  true,  Senator.  I  was  looking 
forward  to  a  final  phase  of  the  war  when,  like  many  other  people,  I 
expected  that  there  might  be  considerable  fighting  on  the  mainland 
of  China  for  the  recovery  of  Manchuria  in  case  the  Japanese  made 
a  last  stand  there,  and  I  think  it  is  highly  hypothetical  what  might 
have  come  out  of  that  one  way  or  another.  It  is  something  that  never 
happened  and  therefore  one  could  not  tell  what  the  results  would  have 
been. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Would  you  say  now  that  they  would  not  have 
been  stronger  if  they  had  received  the  arms  that  you  suggested  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  say  I  have  no  way  of  knowing. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  think  the  committee  can  draw  that  conclusion. 
Go  on  and  read  the  next  part. 

88348— 52— pt.  10 9 


3402  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

Because  of  the  ineffectiveness  of  the  Nationalist  forces,  which  was  later  to  be 
tragically  demonstrated,  the  Comnuinists  probably  could  have  been  dislodged 
only  by  American  arms.  It  is  obvious  that  the  American  people  would  not  have 
sanctioned  such  a  colossal  ccmimitment  of  our  armies  in  194:i  or  later.  We 
therefore  came  to  the  third  alternative  policy,  wliereunder  we  faced  the  facts 
of  the  situation  and  attempted  to  as.sist  in  working  out  a  modus  vivendi  which 
would  avert  civil  war  but,  nevertheless,  preserve  and  even  increase  tlie  in- 
fluence of  the  Nationalist  Government. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  really  what  yon  were  advocating  in  the 
nnified  China. 

Mr.  Lati'imore.  That  indicates  a  similar  line  of  thought,  but  not 
cause  and  effect. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  explain  what  you  mean  by  cause  and 
effect  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  does  not  indicate  that  the  policies  adopted 
were  based  on  any  recommendation  of  mine,  and  I  submit  that  it  was 
an  obvious  probability  that  the  State  Department  based  its  policy 
on  its  own  information  and  military  information  from  the  field  in 
China. 

Senator  FeR(;uson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  why  are  you  disclaiming  so 
vehemently  that  you  had  any  influence  on  the  State  Department  when 
their  policy  did  follow  the  line  that  you  suggested  ?  Is  there  a  rea- 
son ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  There  is  a  reason.  Senator. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  is  it? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  reason  is  that  there  was  a  general  category  of 
thinking  along  this  line  at  the  time,  that  I  participated  in  it,  and 
that  I  think  it  would  be  an  absurd  exaggeration  for  me  to  claim  that 
I  molded  policy. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then  it  is  only  because  you  would  feel  it  would 
be  an  exaggeration  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Exaggeration  is  a  relative  word.  I  put  before  it 
absurd,  an  absurd — if  you  prefer,  I  will  say  an  absurd  invention. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes.  But  you  had  in  the  Lamont  memorandum 
said  that  you  were  one  of  tlie  authorities  on  the  Far  East.  You  sought 
the  President's  audience.  You  took  the  memorandum  and  left  it 
there. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  not  intend  to  influence  him  as  an  au- 
thority? 

Mr.  Latitmore.  I  hoped  to  influence  the  President  primarily  toward 
an  impartial  review  of  problems  of  policy  as  they  then  stood. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  know  any  way  that  you  could  have 
put  this  proposition  up  to  the  President  in  any  stronger  language 
or  way  than  you  did? 

Mr.  LA-miMORE.  I  stated  my  oj^inions  to  the  President  as  clearly 
as  I  could,  based  on  the  best  knowledge  available  to  me  at  the  time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  read  now  the  rest  of  your  letter.  I 
want  to  ask  you  some  questions  about  it,  about  your  argument  in 
your  memorandum  to  the  President. 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

In  other  words,  we  can  have  either  a  divided  China,  with  Chiang  having 
dictatorial  power  in  his  territory,  subject  to  acting  as  an  instrument  of  American 
policy ;  or  we  can  have  a  whole  China,  at  the  price  of  pretty  drastic  political 
change,  including  limitation  of  the  personal  power  of  Chiang. 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATION'S  3403 

Shall  I  go  on '? 

Senator  Fkrguson.  That  was  part  of  your  argument  telling  him 
tliat  the  unified  China  was  what  you  were  asking  him  for? 

Mr.  Lati'imore.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  that  we  would  have  to  insist  upon  pretty 
drastic  political  changes,  including  the  limitation  of  the  personal 
power  of  Chiang.  That  meant  a  coalition  government,  did  it  not, 
taking  the  Communists  in? 

Mr.  Lattim(^re.  That  meant  a  coalition  government,  yes.  That 
ineant  recognition  of  the  fact  that,  in  my  opinion,  the  Communist- 
controlled  |)art  of  China  could  not  be  conquered  by  the  force  available 
to  Chiang. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Up  until  that  time,  had  you  ever  known  a  gov- 
ernment that  had  survived  when  it  took  in  the  Communists  and  made 
a  coalition  government  ? 

]\Ir.  Laitimore.  I  don't  recall  that  there  was  a  previous  example, 
Senator. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  not  think  that  communism  was  such  at 
that  time  that  it  was  impossible  to  have  such  a  coalition  government 
and  have  it  successful,  without  it  becoming  a  Communist  government? 

Mr.  Lai^more.  No;  I  did  not  think  so.  If  I  thought  so,  I  would 
have  made  different  proposals. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  read  the  next  paragraph? 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

Unless  he  is  certain  of  American  policy,  Chiang  would  rather  have  unlimited 
j)ower  in  a  small  China  than  limited  power  in  a  larger  China.  He  still  thinks 
that  America  is  on  the  fence,  hut  will  he  stami>ede(l  into  jumping  down  on  his 
side,  against  Russia,  if  he  hits  the  right  timing  in  a  civil  war  against  the  "Bol- 
.shevik  menace."  Intluential  advisers  tell  him  that  America  is  headed  for  a  long- 
term  conservative  trend,  with  Republican  ascendance,  and  that  Henry  Luce 
Walter  .Judd,  et  cetera,  have  guessed  the  trend  correctly. 

Senator  Ferguson.  There  you  were  warning  the  President  that 
Chiang,  if  he  got  aid  from  America  alone,  and  there  was  not  aid  going 
to  tlie  Communists,  and  there  was  not  a  coalition  government,  that  he, 
in  a  civil  war,  would  be  against  the  Communists,  the  Bolshevik  menace, 
jind  you  [nit  that  in  quotations,  is  that  correct? 

Mr.  L.\nTiM()RE.  That  is  correct.  I  mean,  that  is  correct  as  far  as 
it  being  in  quotations.  It  is  not  correct  so  far  as  your  interpretation 
of  wliat  I  was  saying. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Why  did  you  put  it  in  quotations? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  know  why  I  put  it  in  quotations  at  that 
time.  Senator. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  must  have  believed  that  it  was  not  quite  ac- 
curate, the  Bolshevik  menace,  or  you  would  not  have  put  it  in  quotes. 

Mr.  Latfimore.  No;  my  general  opinion  at  the  time  was  that  com- 
munism in  China  could  be  contained,  so  to  speak,  and  that  the  Gen- 
eralissimo could  maintain  the  ascendancy. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Even  in  a  coalition  government? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Even  in  a  coalition  government,  or,  in  fact,  the 
oidy  way  he  could  would  be  through  a  coalition  government. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  did  you  think  to  be  the  diiference  between 
the  Republican  policy  on  that  and  the  President's  policy,  when  you 
say  "influential  advisers  tell  him  that  America  is  headed  for  a  long- 
term  conservative  trend"  (  AAHiat  do  you  mean  there  by  ''conservative 
trend"? 


3404  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  know  exactly  what  I  meant  by  conservative 
trend  in  1945,  but  it  is  clearly  here  in  connection  with  Republican 
ascendance  and  the  mention  of  what  I  identified  at  that  time  as  the 
opinions  on  China  policy  of  Mr.  Luce  and  Congressman  Judd. 

The  Chairman.  He  was  predicting  the  election  of  Stassen,  perhaps, 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  was  saying  that  that  was  the  way  that  Chiang's 
advisers  were  talking  to  him. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  did  you  learn  that  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Well,  I  knew  some  of  Chiang's  advisers  quite  well. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Where  did  you  get  this  information,  in  this 
country  or  in  China  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore,  My  latest  information  on  the  subject  was  in  this 
country. 

Senator  Ferguson.  "Wlio  gave  it  to  you  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  A  Chinese  connected  with  the  Chinese  Government. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Who  was  he  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  One  man  w^hom  I  recall  particularly  was  one  of 
Chiang's  oldest  and  closest  associates,  a  Mr.  Tseng  Yang-fu. 

Senator  Ferguson.  "N^-liere  is  he  now  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  know  where  he  is  now. 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  was  the  last  you  saw  of  him  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  last  I  saw  of  him  was  when  he  was  in  this 
country  in  1945,  received  medical  treatment  at  the  Johns  Hopkins 
Hospital,  and  then  stayed  with  me  for  several  days  before  going  back 
to  China. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  he  in  China  or  Formosa  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  presume  he  is  in  Formosa. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you  heard  from  him  in  Formosa  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  May  I  ask  my  wife? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes ;  you  may  inquire  from  your  wife. 

Mr.  Laitimore.  The  last  I  heard  of  him — no,  this  is  previous. 
This  is  just  before  he  came  here,  so  I  don't  remember  when  I  heard 
from  him  last. 

Senator  Ferguson.    May  we  see  the  memorandum? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Surely.     [Document  handed.] 

Senator  Ferguson.  Read  the  next  paragraph. 

The  Chairman.  The  next  paragraph  of  what? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Of  the  memorandum  to  the  President:  "The 
basic  American  interest  is  represented  by  policy  No.  2." 

That  is  the  one  that  appears  to  be  at  least  the  same  line  as  was 
carried  out  in  the  white-paper  letter  of  transmittal;  is  it  not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  the  one  that  indicates  that  I  belong  to  that 
general  school  of  thinking ;  yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  "It  can  be  successfully  worked,"  you  say. 
"Chiang  is  tenacious,  but  has  shown  in  the  past  that  he  knows  when 
to  give  in  and  try  a  new  policy." 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Ferguson  (reading)  : 

But  he  will  only  play  ball  if  America  and  Russia,  with  British  approval,  make 
it  plain  that  they  are  going  to  be  joint  umpires. 

Is  that  right? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3405 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  you  wanted,  then,  was  a  policy  where 
Russia  and  America,  and  with  at  least  the  consent  of  Britain,  were  to 
be  umpires  in  running  China  'I 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  believe  not  the  umpires  in  running  China.  I  be- 
lieved that  the  situation  coming  up  at  the  end  of  the  war  in  China  was 
one  that  the  United  States  would  not  be  able  to  control  single-handed. 
I  thought  it  had  to  be  part  of  a  general  international  agreement. 

Seiuitor  Ferguson.  What  do  you  mean  by  joint  umpires? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Joint  umpires  in  the  sense  that  primarily,  if  the 
Communists  accepted  a  minority  position  in  a  coalition  government, 
it  would  have  to  be  seen  to  that  they  didn't  try  to  get  away  with  any 
monkey  business. 

Senator  Fergusox.  And  you  think  that  America  should  have  stepped 
in  and  Russia  would  have  stepped  in,  to  keep  the  Communists  in  line? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  thought,  as  I  said  in  the  final  sentence  here : 

America,  alone,  cannot  either  coax  or  bluff  Chiang  into  a  settlement  with  the 
Communists  involving  real  concessions;  but  if  Washington  and  Moscow  agree, 
l)oth  Chungking  and  Yenan  will  carry  out  the  agreement. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  it  not  true  that  at  Yenan  the  Communists 
would  have  had  to  have  carried  it  out,  if  Russia  had  said  so? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  know  that  I  could  have  said  so  authorita- 
tively at  that  time,  Senator,  and,  at  the  present  time,  the  degree  of  in- 
dependence of  the  Chinese  Communists  from  the  Russians  is  a  matter 
of  considerable  debate. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then  you  are  not  one  of  those  observers  that 
believe  that  the  Communists  in  Korea  today  are  under  the  control  of 
the  Communists  in  Moscow? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  no  final  answer  on  that.  Senator.  All  I  am 
aware  of  is  that  there  is  one  school  of  thought  that  believes  the  situation 
is  primarily  controlled  by  the  Chinese  Communists,  and  another  school 
of  thought  that  believes  that  the  whole  thing  is  dictated  from  the 
Kremlin. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  do  j^ou  think  about  it  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  have  sufficient  information  to  make  a  strong 
declaration  of  opinion  in  either  direction. 

Senator  Ferguson.  At  least  you  do  not  think  they  are  controlled  by 
Russia,  you  do  not  have  any  evidence  that  they  are? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  My  opinion  is  that  they  are  more  allies  of  Russia 
than  subordinates  of  Russia,  and  I  believe  that  the  Russians  would 
have  considerable  difficulty  in  running  China  completely. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then  it  may  be  that  Russia  could,  in  your  opin- 
ion, act  as  a  neutral  in  any  truce? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir.  The  whole  wording  here  does  not  indicate 
neutrality.  It  indicates  an  agreement  between  the  great  powers  of 
America,  Russia,  and  Britain  and,  therefore,  an  agreement  between 
interested  parties. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  know  that  in  1946  Mr.  Acheson,  Secre- 
tary of  State — and  which  was  just  about  a  year  after  the  memorandum 
was  given — took  somewhat  the  same  line  before  the  House  Foreign 
Affairs  Committee  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  didn't  know  it,  Senator.  I  shouldn't  be  surprised. 
As  I  say,  this  was  part  of  a  general  school  of  thought,  to  which  I  was 
a  minor  adherent,  and  not,  I  think,  a  shaper  of  that  school  of  thought. 


3406  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  at  this  time,  I  would  like  to 
make,  as  a  part  of  the  record  here,  the  memorandum  and  the  press 
release;  that  is,  the  memorandum  to  (xeneral  Marshall  out  of  the 
white  paper  that  is  set  forth  in  our  record,  and  the  letter  of  trans- 
mittal, so  that  it  would  all  be  in  and  not  be  taken  out  of  context. 

I  would  like  to  have  the  testimony  of  Dean  Acheson  before  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  as  of  June  19,  1946,  a  hearing  on 
H.  R.  6795,  become  a  part  of  the  record. 

Mr.  Morris.  Tliat  portion  of  the  testimony  relating  to  the  subject, 
Senator  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes,  relating  to  the  subject.  I  would  like  to 
have  that  read  into  the  record  at  this  time. 

The  Chairman.  It  may  be  read. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  w^ould  like  to  have  it  read  at  least  down  to 
page  5,  if  Mr.  Mandel  would  read  it  into  the  record. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

Mr.  Mandel.  Testimony  of  Dean  Acheson  before  the  House  Foreign 
Affairs  Committee,  June  19,  1946,  hearings  on  H.  R.  6795  [reading]  : 

Chairman  Bloom.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Secretary. 

Mr.  Johnson.  Mr.  Secretary,  your  statement,  coupled  with  that  of  Secretary 
Patterson  and  that  of  General  Marshall,  I  think  constitutes  not  only  a  reason, 
but  shows  the  necessity  for  the  enactment  of  this  legislation.  So  I  shall  ask 
no  questions. 

Chairman  Bloom.  Dr.  Eaton. 

Mr.  Eaton.  In  my  judgment,  I  consider  the  association  with  China  in  the 
future  as  probably  of  more  importance  to  the  destiny  of  the  Nation  and  the 
world  than  any  other  single  relationship.  That  is  wliy  I  am  strongly  in  favor 
of  this  legislation. 

I  notice  on  page  3  of  your  statement,  Mr.  Secretary,  that  General  Marshall 
arranged  for  the  training  by  our  American  people,  with  the  use  of  American 
equipment,  of  certain  Communist  leaders  who  are  to  become  incorporated  into 
the  National  army.  Are  those  fellows  now  fighting  the  National  army  in  Man- 
churia ? 

Mr.  Acheson.  No.  I  think  the  situation  is  this,  Mr.  Eaton :  I  do  not  believe 
that  any  such  training  has  gone  on  in  the  past,  or  is  now  going  on.  What  Gen- 
eral Marshall  was  asked  to  do  and  agreecl  to  do,  and  what  is  necessary  to  be 
done,  is  that  when  the  plan  for  the  amalgamation  of  the  two  armies  is  accepted 
and  begins  to  go  into  effect,  those  units  of  the  Communist  army  which  are  going 
to  be  amalgamated  with  the  National  army  will  receive  a  period  of  training  from 
60  to  90  days  before  they  march  out  to  join  their  opposite  numbers  in  the  other 
army.  The  plan  roughly  contemplates  that  a  certain  number  of  months  from 
the  day  on  which  it  is  to  go  into  effect  certain  divisions  of  the  Communist  army 
and  certain  divisions  of  the  National  army  will  be  amalgamated.  When  that 
occurs  it  is  essential  that  the  troops  from  the  Communist  side  which  go  into 
the  troops  of  the  new  Chinese  Army  have  a  mininnim  of  the  same  sort  of  train- 
ing that  their  compatriots  have  had.  Some  of  the  divisions  in  the  present 
National  army  have  been  trained  by  United  States  forces.  These  American 
training  forces  that  we  are  talking  about  will  be  forces  that  will  take  a  Com- 
munist outfit  which  is  to  be  amalgamated  with  the  new  army  and  put  it  in 
shape  so  that  it  can  readily  go  into  the  outfit.    That  is  the  program. 

Mr.  Eaton.  The  objective  of  General  Marshall's  plan  is  that  when  tlie  Com- 
munist forces  are  taken  into  the  National  army,  he  will  then  have  a  Nationalist 
army,  not  an  army  composed  of  two  parts,  one  Nationalist  and  one  Communist. 
What  guaranty  have  we,  since  history  has  taught  us  a  few  lessons,  I  hope, 
that  that  will  be  the  actual  situation? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Who  asked  that  question? 
Mr.  Mandel.  Mr.  Eaton.  [Reading:] 

Mr.  Acheson.  You  know  better  than  an.vone  in  the  world.  Dr.  Eaton,  there 
is  no  guaranty  about  anything  in  human  affairs ;  but  the  problem  they  are 
facing  in  China  is  one,  at  the  present  time,  of  having  two  armies  separated 
in  organization,  space,  and  everything  of  that  sort.     Now,  if  those  armies  can 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3407 

he  amalgamated  unit  by  unit — not  trying  to  take  one  whole  army  and  put  it 
with  the  other,  but  by  taking  separate  units  of  each  army  and  integrating 
them  in  one  force — then  the  chances  of  division  are  tremendously  reduced. 

Mrs.  Rogers.  Mr.  Secretary,  how  many  Communists  is  it  anticipated  will  be 
trained  under  the  proposed  plan? 

Mr.  AcHESoN.  I  think  that  they  will  try  to  take  all  the  units  that  are  going  to 
be  put  into  the  new  army  immediately  preceding  their  joining  the  new  army 
and  give  them  a  60-  or  90-day  schooling. 

Mrs.  Rogers.  But,  can  you  give  us  any  approximate  number  that  will  be 
trained? 

Mr.  AcHESON.  I  do  not  know.  If  the  total  size  of  the  army  is  going  to  be 
60  divisions,  I  do  not  know  what  proportion  of  the  personnel  would  be  Communist. 

Mrs.  Rogers.  Could  you  get  that  proportion  for  us? 

Mr.  Acheson.  The  information  that  I  have  had  handed  me  is  that  of  the  60 
divisions  which  are  contemplated  the  personnel  which  would  l)e  equivalent  to 
50  divisions  will  come  from  the  national  army  and  the  personnel  which  would 
be  equivalent  to  10  divisions  will  come  from  the  Communist  army. 

Mrs.  Ro<",ers.  That  question  will  be  asked  on  the  floor.  That  is  the  reason 
I  wanted  to  have  that  information. 

Mr.  Acheson.  Five-sixths  will  be  taken  from  the  national  army  and  one-sixth 
from  the  Communist  army. 

Chairman  Bl(X)M.  Mr.  Chiperfield. 

Mr.  CHiPEKFiEi.D.  Mr.  Secretary,  besides  the  assistance  this  country  gave  to 
China  which  you  have  recited  in  your  statement,  did  not  the  United  States  also 
furnish  credit  amounting  to  $900,000,000? 

Mr.  AcHESON.  I  presume  you  are  referring  to  the  $500,000,000  loan  made  in 
1942. 

Mr.  Chiperfiet.d.  There  was  not  any  particular  reason  for  not  mentioning 
that ;  it  was  simply  because  you  were  referring  to  the  military  assistance? 

Mr.  Acheson.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Chipekfield.  I  have  no  questions  now,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mrs.  Rogers.  Do  you  think  that  China  will  turn  to  Russia  if  we  do  not  offer 
the  assistance? 

Mr.  Acheson.  I  have  no  views  cm  that  subject.  I  am  sure  that  we  will  assist 
China.    I  do  not  think  I  want  to  speculate  on  what  would  happen  if  we  did  not. 

Mrs.  Rogers.  Is  there  any  way  we  could  have  an  agreement  with  China 
whereby  she  would  not  use  our  arms  against  us? 

Mr.  Acheson.  Well,  I  suppose  we  have  that  in  the  United  Nations  Charter. 
There  all  the  nations  agree  that  they  will  not  employ  force  against  any  country 
except  in  accordance  with  the  principles  and  under  the  procedure  of  the  Charter. 
Under  the  principles  and  procedure  of  the  Charter,  if  anyone  wished  to  employ 
force  against  us,  I  am  sure  that  we  would  veto  that.  They  will  not  do  it.  That 
is  the  technical  and  legal  answer  to  your  question. 

I  think  we  can  rest  assured  that  the  Chine.se  will  not  do  that. 

Mrs.  Rogers.  I  suppose  a  fight  could  start  before  that  was  decided,  could 
it  not? 

Mr.  Acheson.  Do  you  mean  that  the  Chinese  would  attack  us?  I  do  not  think 
so. 

Chairman  Bi>oom.  The  Chair  thinks  that  we  should  not  go  into  that. 

Mr.  Acheson.  I  am  sure  that  we  do  not  need  to  worry. 

Mrs.  Rogers.  I  think  if  there  were  any  way  to  have  an  agreement  it  would 
be  very  helpful.  I  thought  in  the  passage  of  lend-lease  we  should  have  some 
agreement  with  the  nations.  I  find  it  impossible,  and  many  other  members  find 
it  impossible,  to  find  out  just  exactly  what  is  going  on  in  lend-lease.  That  is 
all  I  have. 

Chairman  Bloom.  Mr.  Gordon. 

Mr.  Gordon.  I  have  no  questions  at  this  time. 

Chairman  Bloom.  Mr.  Vorys. 

Mr.  Vorys.  Mr.  Secretary,  sooner  or  later,  and  probably  sooner,  the  question 
mav  arise  as  to  whether  our  furnishing  arms  to  the  Republic  of  China  is  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  United  Nations  Charter,  and  I  note  in 
your  statement  you  mentioned  the  obligations  of  the  Charter  for  the  preservation 
of  peace,  at  various  times.  I  think  it  would  be  very  helpful  if  you  would  spell 
out  for  us  who  are  not  as  familiar  with  the  provisions  as  you  are  and  our 
chairman  and  our  ranking  Republican  member,  who  were  there  when  it  was 
drafted,  just  how  this  operates. 


3408  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  some  material  from  the 
Congressional  Record  here  that  I  should  like  to  read  into  this  record 
as  pertinent  to  my  own  thinking  in  the  year  1945. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  am  going  to  ask  you  about  what  Mr.  Acheson 
was  thinking  in  1946.  Do  you  know  what  change  there  was  between 
June  of  1945  and  June  of  1946,  other  than  the  peace,  other  than  the 
stopping  of  the  shooting?     I  do  not  mean  the  peace. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  know  about  the  change.  General  Marshall 
had  been  carrying  on  his  mission  in  China,  had  succeeded  in  halting 
the  civil  war  to  a  certain  extent,  and  was  trying  to  negotiate  a  form 
of  settlement  that  would  leave  the  dominant  control  of  power  in  the 
hands  of  Chiang  Kai-shek. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  recognize  at  the  time  what  Mrs.  Rogers 
apparently  recognized  in  1946;  that  is,  in  1945  when  you  were  asking 
for  this  unity,  particularly  the  aid  to  the  Communists,  and  the  unifica- 
tion by  virtue  of  a  joint  government?    Such  as  is  said  here  [reading]  : 

Mrs.  Rogers.  Is  there  any  way  we  could  have  an  agreement  with  China  whereby 
she  would  not  use  our  arms  against  us  ? 

Then  Mr.  Acheson  said : 

Mr.  Acheson.  Well,  I  suppose  we  have  that  in  the  United  Nations  Charter. 
There  all  the  nations  agree  that  they  will  not  employ  force  against  any  country 
in  accordance  with  the  principles  and  under  the  procedure  of  the  Charter.  Under 
the  principles  and  procedure  of  the  Charter,  if  anyone  wished  to  employ  force 
against  us,  I  am  sure  that  we  would  veto  that.  They  will  not  do  it.  That  is  the 
technical  and  legal  answer  to  your  question. 

Did  you  have  the  same  view  back  in  1945  ?  You  talked  about  the 
Charter  and  the  protection  under  the  Charter,  and  what  had  happened. 
Did  you  think  all  we  had  to  do  to  stop  a  war  was  to  veto  it  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir ;  I  don't  think  I  referred  to  the  Charter  at  all. 
My  view  was  that  the  postwar  situation  in  China  was  one  that  could 
be  kept  manageable  only  by  international  agreement. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mrs.  Rogers  then  said,  to  that  answer,  when  he 
ended  up  by  saying  "I  think  we  can  rest  assured  that  the  Chinese  will 
not  do  that,"  meaning  they  would  not  use  the  arms  we  gave  them 
against  us,  Mrs.  Rogers  said :  "L  suppose  a  fight  could  start  before 
that  was  decided ;  could  it  not?" 

Then  Mr.  Acheson  seems  to  be  quite  surprised  at  that,  because  he 
said :  "Do  you  mean  that  the  Chinese  would  attack  us  ?  I  do  not  think 
so." 

Had  you  the  same  idea  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir;  I  did  not  have  the  same  idea.  My  ideas 
went  no  further  in  June — July  1945  than  a  belief  that  the  situation  in 
China  could  only  be  controlled  by  agreement  between  the  major 
powers. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  then  Chairman  Bloom  said : 

The  Chair  thinks  that  we  should  not  go  into  that. 
Mr.  Acheson.  I  am  sure  that  we  do  not  need  to  worry. 

Was  that  your  thinking  at  the  time :  that  there  was  no  worry  about 
bringing  these  Communists  in  and  bringing  Russia  into  this  Chinese 
situation  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir.  You  are  making,  I  tliink,  an  unjustifiable 
link  between  Mr.  Acheson's  worries  in  1946  and  the  problem  that  I 
was  trying  to  consider  in  1945. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3409 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  only  thing  I  can  see  now  is  the  difference 
that  we  did  not  give  the  Communists  arms ;  but,  if  so,  there  may  have 
been  some  worry  back  in  those  days. 

Is  it  not  true  that  as  soon  as  they  did  get  arms  we  found  them 
moving  down  in  North  Korea,  down  across  the  imaginary  line  that  we 
used  to  divide  the  country;  and,  in  November  of  the  same  year,  we 
find  the  Communists  in  China  using  arms  against  the  United  States. 

]Mr.  Lattimore.  I  would  not  put  it  quite  the  same  way,  Senator. 

Senator  Ferouson.  How  would  you  put  it? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  would  put  it  that,  when  we  supplied  arms  in 
large  quantities  to  armies  that  proved  incompetent  to  use  them,  they 
passed  very  rapidly  into  the  hands  of  the  Chinese  Communists  and 
were  turned  against  our  policy. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  was  the  reason  for  your  going 
to  the  President  with  this  letter  and  this  memorandum  the  point  that 
you  felt  that  Ambassador  Grew,  Mr.  Dooman,  and  Mr.  Ballantine 
were  opposed  to  your  views  and  your  philosophy  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir.  My  feeling  was,  as  is  shown  in  my  letter 
and  memoranda  quite  clearly,  that  controversial  problems  of  Ameri- 
can policy  were  arising,  and  that  the  most  important  thing  to  do  was 
to  get  an  impartial  review. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you,  directly  or  indirectly,  contact  Dean 
Acheson  about  your  visit  to  the  Wliite  House  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Fer.^uson.  Were  you  surprised  when  you  saw  Ambassador 
Grew  coming  out  of  the  President's  office  the  morning  that  you  called 
on  him? 

By  the  way,  it  was  Tuesday  morning,  the  3d,  instead  of  Monday. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  it  struck  me  as  quite  natural  to  see — I  still 
forget  whether  he  was  Assistant  Secretary  or  Under  Secretary  of 
State — him  in  the  President's  anteroom. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  did  not  get  the  urge  to  say,  "xA.mbassador 
Grew,  I  am  going  to  talk  about  the  Far  East.  Will  you  not  come  into 
the  President's  office  and  we  will  talk  it  over  together?" 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir ;  I  didn't  think  it  was  a  privilege  of  a  citizen 
going  in  to  see  the  President  to  do  the  President's  inviting  for  him. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  think  that  you  were  just  acting  as  a 
private  citizen  when  you  took  this  message  to  the  President? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  did. 

Senator  Ferguson.  No  more? 

Mr.  Lattimore,  No  more. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  no  less  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  And  no  less. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  all  at  the  present  time. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  some  material  here  from  the 
Congressional  Eecord  pertinent  to  the  general  question  of  discussion 
of  the  subject  of  China  in  1945  that  I  should  like  to  read  into  the 
record. 

The  Chairman.  Let  me  see  it  first,  please. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  have  something  before  he  puts  that  in,  Mr. 
Chairman. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  One  is  from  Re])resentative  Walter  Judd,  and  the 
other  is  from  Representative  Mike  Mansfield. 


3410  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  said  that  I  would  produce  for 
the  minutes  a  matter  concerning  the  Secretary  of  State.  1  have,  from 
the  ticker,  this  announcement  as  of  11 :  3.3  this  morning,  3-5,  meaning 
today  [reading]  : 

Secretary  Adiesoii  said  todav  he  personally  had  cleared  Foreign  Service 
Officer  O.  Ednuind  CUibb  after  the  State  Department's  Loyalty  and  Security 
Board  had  decided  Clubb  was  a  security  risk. 

Last  evening  I  asked  Mr.  Michael  McDermott  to  furnish  to  me  a 
CODY  of  all  press  releases  by  the  State  Department,  or  any  officer 
thereof,  concerning  the  Clubb  case.  At  about  1 :  25  he  called  me  and 
said  that  they  had  not  assembled  them  all,  but  that  he  would  send 
them  up  to  me.  I  will  want  to  put  those  into  this  record  also,  becaiise 
I  think  it  is  very  material  to  the  issue  that  we  cannot  get  information 
from  the  officers  under  oath  but  when  they  desire  it  they  can  release 
statements  to  the  press.  ..i  • 

I  am  o-oing  to  ask  that  the  whole  matter  be  taken  up  m  this  com- 
mittee as  to  the  Clubb  case  so  that  we  may  get  it  under  sworn  testi- 
mony and  not  only  in  press  releases. 

You  will  note  that  this  says  "The  State  Department  Loyalty  and 
Security  Board  has  decided  Clubb  was  a  security  risk." 

That  is  under  the  McCarran  rider  to  the  appropriation  bill  and  not 
the  President's  Loyalty  Board,  the  question  of  security. 

I  believe  that,  uiider  the  law,  he  has  absolute  discretion  to  discharge 
a  person  for  security  risk ;  but,  if  they  try  the  person  under  the  loyalty 
and  then  he  sets  aside  an  order  of  the  Loyalty  Board,  the  Appeal 
Board  of  the  Loyalty  Board  would  have  the  right  to  post-audit. 

But,  if  they  do  it  under  the  security  risk,  there  is  no  right  for  the 
Appeal  Board  to  come  into  the  picture  at  all.  This  would  be  a  method 
of  cutting  off  the  Appeal  Board.  It  seems  significant  that  this  is 
done  in  this  way,  after  the  Service  case  was  reversed  by  the  Loyalty 
Appeal  Board.  "  I  think  the  record  ought  to  show  that. 

The  Chairman.  Let  me  say  to  you.  Senator,  that  this  matter  was 
taken  up  in  the  Appropriations  Committee,  incidentally,  and  the  sub- 
stance of  Mr.  Humelsine's  statement  was— and  I  quote  the  substance 
only—that  he  was  precluded  from  giving  the  information  to  the 
committee. 

As  far  as  1  am  concerned,  whether  it  be  m  this  committee  or  in 
the  Appropriations  Committee,  the  matter  should  and  must  be  gone 
into.  If  men,  after  having  been  considered  unfit  to  continue  in 
service  by  the  Loyalty  Board,  are  relieved  of  that  decision  so  that 
they  may  become  "inheritors  of  pensions  from  the  (Tovernment,  it  is 
time  forCongress  to  take  very  decisive  action. 

Do  you  have  something  else  that  you  want  to  say? 
Senator  Fercsuson.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  might  say  that  last  evening 
I  had  asked  the  State  Department  also,  by  letter,  to  furnish  to  the 
Ai)i)ropriations  Committee  the  number  of  employees  that  have  been 
allowed  to  resign,  or  have  resigned  after  a  loyalty  case  has  been 
started,  the  number  of  employees  that  have  resigned  or  have  been 
permitted  to  resign  after  an  investigation  of  their  loyalty  was  started, 
the  amount  of  salary  of  each  such  employee  and  the  amount  of  pension 
that  they  are  now  drawing. 

The  Chairman,  I  might  say  to  you  that  that  request  was  also  made 
by  Mr.  Humelsine  by  the  chairman  of  the  subcommittee  having  the 
appropriation  at  hand.    I  understancl  it  is  being  prepared. 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3411 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  did  not  have  the  privilege  of  being  here,  and 
I  did  not  have  the  privilege  of  being  in  the  Appropriations  Subcom- 
mittee, of  which  I  am  a  member,  and  I  asked  that  it  be  furnished  to 
you.  I  did  not  know  that  it  was  going  to  be  furnished  to  you,  or  I 
would  not  have  asked. 

The  Chairman.  The  two  excer])ts  here,  assertedly  from  the  Con- 
gressional Record,  I  think  counsel  will  check  with  the  Congressional 
Record ;  and,  if  they  are  to  go  in,  they  will  go  in  in  context,  and  I  will 
reserve  the  ruling  on  the  matter. 

As  regards  this  matter  that  was  submitted  to  the  Chair  this  morn- 
ing, asserted  to  be  a  quotation  from  General  Chennault,  I  have  sub- 
mitted this  to  the  committee. 

Is  there  any  objection  to  its  going  into  the  record? 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  have  read  it,  and  I  have  no  objection. 

The  Chairman.  If  there  is  no  objection,  it  will  go  in  the  record. 

On  the  other,  the  ruling  of  the  Chair  will  be  withheld  until  we  can 
check  the  context  of  the  Congressional  Record. 

Mr.  Arnold.  May  the  witness  read  it  at  this  point  ? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Mr.  LAT-riMORE.  The  quotation  is  from  Way  of  a  Fighter,  by  Claire 
Lee  Chennault,  published  in  New  York,  1949.  That  is  well  after  the 
end  of  the  war.    It  is  chapter  5,  page  61  [reading]  : 

Soon  after  .lapan  attacked  at  Shaniihai,  the  Chinese  sent  an  official  call  for 
help  to  all  the  major  powers.  Only  Russia  responded.  The  Russians  didn't 
pause  to  play  partisan  politics  or  trip  over  ideological  folderol  when  their 
national  interests  were  at  stake  in  China.  All  of  the  Soviets'  aid  went  to  the 
Central  Government  of  the  Generalissimo.  The  Russians  had  had  no  love  for 
the  Generalissimo  since  the  1927  split  when  he  drove  the  Russian-supported 
Chinese  Communists  from  the  Kuomintang  and  slaughtered  them  by  the  thou- 
sands. For  nearly  "20  years  he  fought  a  ruthless  war  of  extermination  against 
communism  in  China.  The  Russians  sent  their  aid  to  the  Generalissimo  solely 
because  he  represented  the  strongest  and  most  effective  force  opposing  Japan, 
and  they  supported  him  exclusively,  igncn-ing  the  Chinese  Communist  armies, 
which  badly  needed  external  support. 

Mr.  Morris.  As  of  what  time  was  General  Chennault  writing  there  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  He  is  describing  the  early  years  of  the  war  in 
China,  before  Pearl  Harbor. 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  not  apparent,  however,  from  that  article;  is  it? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes;  it  is  apparent  that  this  aid  began  when  Japan 
was  attacked  at  Shanghai,  which  would  be  the  summer  of  1937. 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  did  you  first  get  that  memorandum  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  This  one? 

Senator  Fergltson.  Yes;  that  information. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  think  about  2  weeks  ago.  I  had  a  moment  to 
spare  in  my  university  office,  and  1  noticed  there  was  this  book  by 
General  Chennault  which  was  in  the  book  case.  I  pulled  it  out  just 
to  look  through  it,  to  see  if  there  might  be  anything  pertinent,  and 
then  ran  on  to  this  passage. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  it  backs  up  what  part  of  your  thinking 
as  of  that  time  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  backs  up  my  thinking  that,  while  the  Russians 
supported  the  Chinese  Connnunists  politically  and  in  their  world 
propaganda,  they  disregarded  them  during  the  period  of  the  war  in 
China  in  favor  of  assistance  to  China  as  a  nation,  delivered  exclusively 
through  Chiang  Kai-shek. 


3412  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  not  think  that  could  have  been  for  the 
purpose  of  their  getting  the  Yalta  agreement,  and  also  getting  the 
agreement  or  the  treaty  with  the  Nationalist  Government,  not  being 
quite  sure  that  the  Communists  could  not  throw  out  the  Nationalists? 
Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  not  my  interpretation,  Senator,  My  inter- 
pretation is  that  the  Russians  were  afraid  of  Japan  and  would  sup- 
port anything  that  was  against  Japan. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  know  that  General  Chennault  has  testi- 
fied before  the  watchdog  committee  of  the  Appropriations  Committee 
and  before  the  Appropriations  Committee  itself  of  the  Senate  in 
reference  to  that  subject? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  You  did  not  know  that.  Are  there  any  further 
questions? 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Mr.  Chairman,  if  I  might  inquire,  I  have  a  few 
loose  ends  we  can  tie  up  here. 

The  Chairman.  All  right. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  First,  Mr.  Lattimore,  with  regard  to  the  letter  and 
memoranda  to  the  White  House,  wdiich  has  been  discussed  here  at 
some  length  today,  do  you  feel  that  the  letter  itself,  the  letter  of  June 
10,  adequately  conveyed  to  the  President,  and  did  you  intend  by  it 
to  convey  to  him,  your  belief  that  the  Chinese  Communists  were  then 
and  had  been  since  at  least  1940  supported  by  Russia,  along  with  what 
I  assume  was  your  belief  stated  here  that  "If  America  then  identified 
itself  with  one  party,  Russia  would  be  justified  in  following  that  lead 
in  committing  itself  to  the  other  major  party";  namely,  the  Com- 
munists ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Mr.  Sourwine,  my  letter  wns  intended  solely  to 
indicate  to  the  President  that  I  would  like  very  much  to  see  him  and 
lay  my  opinions  before  him. 

The  Chairman.  I  would  like  to  have  the  question  read.  It  is  an 
involved  question.    I  would  like  to  have  it  read. 

(The  record  was  read  by  the  reporter.) 

The  Chairman.  You  use  the  term  "letter"  there.  1  wonder  if  it 
would  be  clarified  to  say  "memoranda." 

Mr.  Sourwine.  No,  I  meant  letter,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  letter  w\as  intended  to  convey  only  what  was 
in  the  letter,  and  the  matter  that  was  in  the  memoranda  was  matter 
that  I  considered  only  when  I  sat  down  to  write  the  memoranda. 

The  Chairman.  All  right. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Do  you  care  to  assert  a  belief,  Mr.  Lattimore,  as  to 
whether  there  is  any  intellectual  dishonesty  of  this  letter  of  June  10 
to  the  President? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  should  say,  Mr.  Sourwine,  that  I  should  resent 
any  indication  of  intellectual  dishonesty. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Did  you  intend  to  mislead  the  President  in  that 
letter? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  did  not. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  In  your  letter  of  June  10,  addressed  to  the  Presi- 
dent  

The  Chairman.  By  that  last  question,  do  you  mean  to  intend  to 
this  committee  that  you  meant  to  lead  him  and  that  you  presented  an 
honest  view  in  leading  him? 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3413 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir,  I  meant  to  imply  solely  that  I  wanted  to 
have  a  chance  to  put  some  opinions  before  the  President. 

The  Chairman.  It  was  for  the  purpose  of  leading  the  President, 
was  it  not  ?  It  was  for  the  purpose  of  influencing  his  judgment,  was  it 
not?    It  was  net  just  for  the  purpose  of  laying  a  paper  before  him. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  certainly  hoped  that  the  President  would  con- 
sider my  opinions.  To  that  extent,  I  wanted  to  influence  him.  I  did 
not  want  to  influence  him  exclusively.  I  took  it  for  granted  that  the 
President  would  consider  the  opinions  of  many  people. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  If  you  will  look  at  your  letter  of  June  20  to  the 
President,  June  20,  1945,  the  middle  paragraph,  the  second  para- 
graph, quoting  from  the  letter :  "Your  forthcoming  meeting  with  the 
Prime  Minister  Churchill  and  Marshal  Stalin." 

I  ask  you,  sir,  did  you  have  any  private  information  with  regard 
to  that  forthcoming  meeting? 

Mr.  Latttmore.  No,  I  didn't.  My  best  recollection  is,  in  looking 
over  these  memoranda,  that  that  had  not  been — that  that  had  just  come 
out  in  the  press  and,  therefore,  made  me  feel  that  if  anything  I  had 
to  say  was  worth  consideration  at  all,  it  was  worth  consideration  at 
that  time. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  You  refer,  of  course,  by  that,  to  the  Potsdam 
meeting  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  I  think  that  must  be  the  Potsdam  meeting. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  Would  you  be  surprised  to  learn  that  the  public 
announcement  of  the  Potsdam  meeting  had  not  vet  been  made  on  the 
20th  of  June? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  should  be  very  mueh  surprised.  Had  it  not  been 
mentioned  in  the  press? 

Mr.  Sourwine.  I  do  not  know  what  the  fact  is,  sir.  I  am  just  mak- 
ing a  record  as  to  your  recollection  as  to  whether  you  had  any  private 
recollection. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  My  recollection  is  that  I  had  no  private  recol- 
lection. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Looking  up  to  the  memorandum  itself,  sir,  I  have 
just  three  questions  about  it. 

There  were  some  things  in  this  memorandum  that  were  intended 
as  recommendations,  were  there  not,  and  I  speak  of  that  portion  of 
the  memorandum  which  is  labeled  as  related  to  Japanese  policy  as 
related  to  China  policy. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  This  paragraph,  the  third  paragraph,  to  counter- 
act this  Japanese  policy,  the  American  policy  in  China  must  work 
steadily  for  peace,  unity,  and  modern  political  forms,  was  in  the 
nature  of  a  recommendation ;  was  it  not  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  should  agree  to  that ;  yes. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  It  called  for  an  American  policy  favoring  unity 
in  China  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes;  that  is  right. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  And  that  was  the  American  policy  for  some  time 
thereafter,  was  it  not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  was. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  The  next  paragraph  says,  at  the  same  time,  Japan 
hopes  that  fear  of  Russia  will  induce  Britain  and  America  to  be  soft 


3414  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

with  antirevolutionary  Japanese.big:  business     That  was  was  it  not, 
an  implicit  recommendation  against  a  soft  policy  with  Japanese  big 

business  ? 

Mr.  Laitimore.  Implicitly;  yes. 

Mr  SouRWiNE.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  American  policy  was  a  haid 
policy  with  Japanese  big  business  thereafter ;  was  it  not  '• 

Mr".  LA-rriMORE.  No,  not  particularly  hard;  not  hard,  not  soft.    In 

^Mi?SouRwiNE.  At  the  end  of  that  memorandum  you  find  this  sen- 
tence [reading]  : 

In  most  Govenuiient  agencies  at  the  present  time  the  tendency  is  to  find 
Japin'Slned  men  in  higher  policy-makir.g  posts  than  ^^-^-^J^^^^'  ^^"^- 
ply  because  Japan  used  to  be  a  more  important  i;reat  power  than  China. 

That  is  an  implicit  recommendation  for  more  China-trained  men  in 
hio-her  policy-making,  posts,  is  it  not  ? 

'^Ir.  Latiimore.  Yes ;  it  is.  p^      i     i  u 

Mr  SoTiRWiNE.  And  the  State  Department  thereafter  had  a  sub- 
stantial number  more  of  China-trained  men  m  high-policy  posts; 
did  it  not? 

Mr.  La'itimore.  It  did.  i    it    ^  i 

I  would  say  that  there  is  no  question  of  cause  and  effect  here. 

Mr  SouRWiNE.  Can  you  name  some  of  those  China-trained  men 
who  came  into  power  in  higher  policy-making  posts  at  a  period  subse- 
quent to  the  date  of  this  memorandum  ?  . 

Mr.  Latomore.  I  think  I  am  correct  m  saying  that  it  was  after  this 
memorandum  that  Mr.  Vincent  was  promoted.  ,  .     ,,  . 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  wanted  to  piit  in  the  record 
here  a  quotation  from  The  Present  Situation  and  the  ^ext  Tasks  It 
is  a  draft  resolution  of  the  national  board.  Communist  Political  Asso- 
ciation, as  amended  and  approved  by  the  national  committee  on  June 

^%he^source  is  Political  Affairs,  of  July  11)45,  pages  579  to  591,  Earl 

Browder,  Editor.  i  •.  •   .    ^i  a 

I  will  ask  that  our  director,  Mr.  Mandel,  read  it  into  the  recoid 
Mr   Mvnuel.  These  are  excerpts  from  the  draft  resolution  ot  the 
National  Board  of  the  Communist  Political  Association : 

Now  that  the  war  against  Hitler  Germany  has  been  won,  the  American  eco- 
non  <  rovalists,  like  their  British  Tory  counterparts  are  alarmed  at  tbe  strength- 
ened positions  of  world  labor,  at  the  den.ocrati.-  advan<-es  ui  Europe  and  at  the 
n,s  rge  of  the  national  liberation  movements  in  the  coh.nml  and  independent 
"  .unti-ies  ^  *  *  They  are  trying  to  organize  a  new  cordon  sanitaire  against- 
the  Soviet  Union  *  *  * 
That  is  from  page  580. 
Further,  from  page  581 : 

It  is  this  reactionary  position  of  American  big  business  which  explains  why 
Washington  along  with  London,  are  pursuing  the  dangerous  policy  of  preventing 
a  strong^  united  and  democratic  China  ;  why  they  bolster  up  the  reac-tionary,  in- 
competent Chiang  Kai-sheli  regime  and  why  they  harbor  the  idea  of  coming  to 
terms  with  the  Mikado  in  the  hope  of  maintaining  Japan  as  a  reac-tionary  bul- 
wark in  the  Far  East.  It  accounts,  too,  for  the  renewed  campaign  of  antl-So^  let 
slander  and  incitement  calculated  to  undermine  American-Soviet  friendship  and 
cooperation     *      *     * 

I'heii  on  page  584 :  ^'Remove  from  the^  State  Department  all  pro- 
fascist  and  reactionary  officials     * 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Sourwine  has  one  more  question. 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3415 

Senator  Fergusox.  Just  a  moment. 

Mr.  Mandel,  I  take,  from  your  experience  as  director  of  this  com- 
mittee, that  is  what  is  known  as  the  commie  Hne  as  of  that  time  'i 

Mr.  Maxdel.  That  was  a  resolution  presented  to  the  Plenary  meet- 
ing'. That  is  a  full  meeting  of  the  national  committee  of  the  Com- 
munist Political  Association,  which  was  held  June  18  to  20,  1945,  and 
sets  the  line  for  the  coming  period. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  "VVliere  ^ 

Mr.  Mandel.  In  the  United  States.  That  was  held  in  New  York 
City.     It  sets  the  line  for  the  United  States. 

The  Chairman.  Who  was  then  the  head  of  the  Comnnmist  Party? 

Mr.  Mandel.  In  this  same  issue  of  the  Political  Affairs,  the  state- 
ment of  Jacques  Duclos,  which  laid  the  basis  for  the  removal  of  Earl 
Browder,  is  included  in  this  issue  and  the  resolutions  included  here 
marked  the  change  of  line  of  the  Communist  Party  from  one  of 
cooperation  with  the  Ignited  States  and  Great  Britain  to  one  of  hostil- 
ity; which  was  symbolized  by  the  removal  of  Browder  and  the  selec- 
tion of  Eugene  Dennis  as  the  executive  secretaiy. 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Smith,  do  you  have  any  questions? 

Senator  Smith.  I  have  two  questions.     They  are  very  short. 

Mr.  Lattimore,  did  you  know  young  Lamont  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  In  1945  ? 

Senator  Smith.  Yes ;  at  the  time  this  letter  was  prepared,  when  you 
prepared  that  communication '( 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No;  I  don't  think  I  had  ever  met  him  at  that  time. 

Senator  Smith.  Had  he  been  active  at  that  time  in  the  Institute  of 
Pacific  Relations? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No:  I  don't  believe  so. 

Senator  Smith.  Do  you  know"  whether  or  not  Mr.  Carter  knew  him 
at  that  time  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  is  evident  that  Mr.  Carter  knew  him  to  the  extent 
of  seeing  him  at  that  time ;  but  how  well  he  knew  him,  I  don't  know. 

Senator  Smith.  You  do  not  know  of  any  relations  that  existed  be- 
tAveen  Mr.  Carter  and  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  and  young  Mr. 
Lamont  ? 

Mr.  Latt'imore.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Smith.  You  had  never  met  him  then  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  At  that  time,  I  don't  believe  I  had  met  him. 

Senator  Smith.  Did  you  get  acquainted  with  him  shortly  thereafter  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Not  shortly  thereafter,  I  don't  think. 

At  sometime  thereafter,  after  the  war,  he  spoke  at  a  meeting  of  the 
Foreign  Policy  Association  in  Baltimore,  and  I  met  him  then. 

Senator  Smith.  At  the  time  you  pi-epared  this  proposed  letter  for 
Mr.  Lamont,  Sr.,  to  sign,  did  you  know  then  Mr.  Lamont.  Jr.'s  politi- 
cal thinking  on  communism? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  knew  nothing  whatever  about  him,  sir. 

Senator  Smith.  Did  Mr.  Carter  at  that  time,  Avhen  he  proposed  this 
plan  for  you  to  prepare  the  text  for  a  letter  for  young  Mr.  Lamont  to 
get  old  Mr.  Lamont  to  sign ;  did  Mr.  Carter  tell  you  anything  at  all 
about  young  Mr.  Lamont's  signature? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  He  told  me  no  more  than  is  in  that  letter. 

Senator  Smith.  That  is  all. 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  Mr.  Sourwine. 


3416  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr  SoTJRWiNE.  I  have  one  more  question  on  the  memorandum. 
The  memorandum  on  China  policy  starts  out  with:  "There  are  two 

ahernatives  in  China."  .       ,    ^i    ,  . , 

Did  you  intend  in  that  memorandum  to  state  or  imply  that  there  were 

two,  and  only  two,  alternatives  in  China,  m  the  context  h 

Mr.  LA-rriMORE.  I  presume  so.  ,     .1  •    i   i    • 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  was  there  not  a  third  choice  very 

clearly  indicated  ? 

Mr.'LATTiMORE.  Whatis  that?  t^  •    i    1    4-^ 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  To  wit,  American  support  of  Chiang  Kai-shek  to 
drive  the  Communists  out  or  overcome  them? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  think,  if  you  call  that  an  alternative,  it  is  certainly 
taken  up  here  by  implication ;  isn't  it? 

Mr.  Sourwine.  You  think  it  is? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes.  -,  p     ^i    .       j  i.    „^,.^^ 

Mr.  Sourwine.  You  intended  to  have  regard  for  that  and  to  cover 
in  your  memorandum  for  the  President,  did  you  ? 

Mr  Lattimore.  That  is  the  way  I  read  this  memorandum. 

Mr"  Sourwine.  You  question  whether  it  was,  in  fact,  an  alternative. 

It  is,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  an  alternative  which  Dean  Acheson  recog- 
nized ;  is  it  not  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  After  the  end  of  the  war ;  yes. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Yes. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No.     Is  it?  ,,      .   ,  -^x. 

I  thought  the  third  alternative  that  Mr.  Acheson  gave  was  with- 
drawal from  China.  ■      ^^        ^.         4.-        f 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Did  not  Mr.  Acheson  recognize  the  alternative  ot 

all-out  American  aid  to  Chiang  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Maybe  he  did.  •       .-u 

Mr    Sourwine.  Let  us  go  back  to  you.     Did  you  recognize  the 

alternative  of  all-out  American  aid  to  Chiang  at  the  time  you  wrote 

this  memorandum ?  ^    •  iv  ^     ^         ^  ;„f^ 

Mr  Lattimore.  I  don't  think  the  term  "all-out  aid"  had  come  into 

use  then,  and  I  doubt  if  those  were  the  terms  in  which  I  was  thinking. 
Mr  Sourwine.  Did  you,  in  whatever  terms  you  thought  ot  it,  tlunk 

of  the  alternative  of  American  aid  to  Chiang  against  the  Chinese 

Communists  for  the  unification  of  his  nation  under  him  by  eliminating 

the  Communist  forces  as  a  revolutionary  force? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  think  this  is  implied  m  this  memorandum,  Mr. 

Sourwine.  ,  t  n  ^^i  •   i     ^  -j.    *.  ^.i  „ 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Is  your  answer,  then,  that  you  did  think  of  it  at  the 

time  you  wrote  this  memorandum  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  suppose  I  must  have.      ,.    ^    .        .  ,      ^  , 

Mr.  Sourwine.  You  could  not  have  implied  it  without  having 

thought  it,  could  you  ?  . 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  can  only  read  this  memorandum  now  with  the 

interpretation  I  put  on  it  in  1952. 

Mr  Sourwine.  Do  you  mean  you  have  now  no  memory  ot  whether 

you  thought  of  that  alternative  at  the  time  you  wrote  this  memo- 
Mr  Lattimore.  The  only  memory  I  have  is  that  I  placed  before  the 

President  what  I  thought  were  the  two  alternatives :  Division  of  the 

country,  or  unification  of  the  country. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3417 

And,  under  division  of  the  country,  I  envisaged  the  possibility 
of  American  support  for  one  side  and  Kussian  support  for  the  other. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Morris  has  a  question. 

INIr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  in  connection  with  the  memorandum 
you  prepared  for  ISIr.  Carter,  do  you  know  whether  that  memorandum 
was  shown  to  Mr.  Bisson  before  it  was  sent  to  Mr.  Lamont  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  no  clear  recollection  on  that  subject,  but  if 
you  have  a  document  to  refresh  my  memory,  I  should  be  glad  to  see  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  I  just  want  your  recollection  at  this  time,  Mr.  Latti- 
more. 

The  Chairman.  He  says  he  has  no  recollection. 

Is  that  right? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Xo,  I  don't  believe  I  have. 

Maybe  I  should  have. 

Wa's  it  mentioned  in  JNIr.  Carter's  testimony,  or  something  of  that 
sort? 

Mr.  ]\Iorris.  I  will  give  you  the  executive  session  minutes  of  your 
testimony,  Mr.  Lattimore. 

At  the  bottom  of  the  page  there,  does  that  refresh  your  recollection  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Oh,  yes  [reading:] 

Mr.  MoEKis.  Now,  I  would  like  to  introduce  into  the  record  in  conjunction 
with  this,  and  I  would  like  to  show,  first  of  all,  to  Mr.  Lattimore,  a  memorandum 
from  the  files  of  the  institute,  "TAB  from  ECC,"  "TAB"  generally  standing  for 
Mr.  Bisson  and  "ECC"  standing  for  Mr.  Carter,  dated  June  20,  1945,  and  ask 
you  if  that  means  anything  to  you? 

And  I  replied  that  I  had  never  seen  this  before,  it  has  my  initials 
on  it,  but  I  didn't  recall  seeing  it  before. 

Mr.  ISIoRRis.  Does  that  refresh  your  recollection  that  it  was  shown 
to  Mr.  Bisson  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

The  Chairman.  Is  your  answer  "that  is  right"? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  We  will  stand  in  recess  until  10  o'clock  tomorrow 
morning. 

(Thereupon,  at  3:25  p.  m.,  the  hearing  recessed,  to  reconvene  at 
10  a.  m.,  Thursday,  March  6, 1952.) 


88348— 52— pt.  10 10 


INSTITUTE  OF  PACIFIC  RELATIONS 


THURSDAY,   MARCH  6,    1952 

United  States  Senait:, 
Subcommittee  To  Ixvestigate  the  Administration 
OF  THE  Internal  Security  Act  and  Other  Internal 
Security  Laws,  of  the  Commiittee  on  the  Judiciary, 

Washing  tan.,  D.  C. 
The  subcommittee  met  at  10 :  15  a.  m.,  pursuant  to  recess,  in  room 
424,  Senate  Office  Building,  Hon.  Pat  McCarran,  chairman,  presiding. 
Present:  Senators  McCarran,  Smith,  O'Conor,  Ferguson,  Watkins, 
and  Jenner. 

Also  present :  J.  G.  Sourwine,  committee  counsel ;  Robert  Morris, 
subcommittee  counsel,  and  Benjamin  Mandel,  research  director,  and 
Senator  McCarthy. 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 
Mr.  Morris,  you  may  proceed. 

TESTIMONY  OF  OWEN  LATTIMORE,  ACCOMPANIED  BY 
ABE  rORTAS,  COUNSEL— Resumed 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  did  Mr.  Carter  ever  ask  you  for  the 
best  possible  Soviet  defense  of  the  Soviet  invasion  of  Finland? 

Mr.  Latitmore.  I  believe  I  remember  some  correspondence  on  that 
subject;  yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Would  you  tell  us  what  you  remember  about  that? 

The  Chairman.  The  question  was :   Did  Mr.  Carter  ever  ask  you  ? 

He  said  he  believes  he  remembers  some  correspondence  on  this. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes.  I  should  be  glad  to  have  my  memory  , re- 
freshed, if  you  have  correspondence. 

Senator  Ferguson,  Mr.  Chairman,  let  us  go  ahead  without  refresh- 
ing memories.    Let  us  find  out  what  the  witness  now  knows. 

The  Chairman.  But  he  does  not  tell  you  what  he  knows.  He  says 
lie  believes  that  he  received  some  communication,  in  answer  to  a  ques- 
tion, "Did  Mr.  Carter  ever  ask  you?" 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  does  not  take  a  memorandum  to  refresh 
your  memory. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  best  of  my  recollection  at  the  moment  is 
that  I  think  Mr.  Carter  wrote  to  me  on  the  subject  of  the  Russian  in- 
vasion of  Finland  and  asked  my  opinion  on  the  subject. 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  was  that,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Presumably  about  the  time  of  the  invasion  of 
Finland. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  when  that  was  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  was  the  winter  of  1940-41,  wasn't  it? 

3419 


3420  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Senator  Fp:rguson.  That  was  from  the  IPR.  I  mean  he  was  repre- 
senting the  IPR  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  believe  it  was  an  individual  inquiry  on  his 
part. 

Senator  Ferguson.  A  personal  matter  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  A  personal  matter. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  he  wrote  you  about  it  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  believe  so. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  did  you  answer  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yos. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  was  your  opinion  ?  What  did  he  want  to 
know  about  the  invasion  of  Finland  ? 

]\Ir.  Lattimore,  My  recollection  is — and,  as  I  say,  it  is  not  very 
precise — that  at  that  time  there  was  a  great  deal  of  discussion  about 
the  significance  of  the  Russian  invasion  of  Finland. 

My  feeling  was  that  the  invasion  of  Finh^nd  was  an  outrageous 
thing  on  the  part  of  the  Russians,  but  I  also  believed  that  the  politics 
of  Europe  at  that  time  had  sunk  to  a  pretty  low  level. 

The  previous  betrayal  of  Czechoslovakia  by  Britain  and  France  had 
created  a  situation  in  which  there  was  a  general  scramble  for  advan- 
tage among  the  great  powers,  and  the  ethics  of  international  relations 
were  not  very  conspicuous. 

Senator  Ferguson.  So  you  would  say,  then,  that  if  France  and 
Britain  did  something,  then  you  think  that  the  morals  were  lowered 
so  as  to  justify  Russia  in  doing  something  like  the  invasion  of  Finland  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  think  that  I  thought — I  am  sure  that  I 
didn't  think  that  the  Russian  invasion  of  Finland  was  justified,  be- 
cause I  supported  the  local  branch  in  Baltimore  that  was  of  some  sort 
of  organization  that  was  collecting  fluids  for  Finland, 

On  the  other  hand,  I  remember  that  at  that  time  there  were  some 
people  who  were  advocating  going  to  war  with  Russia  on  the  subject 
of  Finland,  and  that  seemed  to  me  to  be  a  rather  unrealistic  proposition. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  Carter  ever  ask  you  for  a  pro  or  a  con 
opinion  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  My  recollection  is  that  he  asked  me  for  my  opinions 
on  the  subject. 

I  would  have  to  see  the  correspondence  again. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  did  you  take  that  he  had  an  opinion  ? 

Mr.  LAi'riMORE.  I  don't  remember  whether  he  had  an  opinion  or  not, 
or  whether  he  was  trying  to  form  an  opinion  and  was  asking  me  what 
I  thought  of  it. 

Senator  Ferguson,  And  that  time  was  he  pro-Russian  ? 

Mr,  Lattimore.  I  wouldn't  be  able  to  say.  No ;  I  don't  think  he  was 
particularly  pro-Russian. 

Senator  Ferguson,  Now,  wait ;  you  "don't  think,"  You  put  in  the 
word  "particularly." 

Was  he  pro-Russian,  or  do  you  want  the  answer  to  be  that  he  was 
not  particularly  pro-Russian  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  think  that  he  was  pro-Russian, 

Senator  Ferguson.  Was  he  pro-Soviet  at  that  time? 

Mr.  Lattimore,  No;  I  don't  think  he  was  pro-Soviet. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  do  not  think  so  ? 

Mr,  Lattimore.  No;  I  don't  think  so. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3421 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  did  Britain  and  France  do  that  you 
thought  justified  Eussia,  or  the  Soviets,  invading  Finland? 

Mr,  Lattimore.  I  did  not  think  that  the  British  and  French  had 
done  anything  that  justified  Russia  in  invading  Finland.  At  least, 
that  is  my  recollection. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  mentioned  them  here  this  morning.  What 
did  they  do  to  mitigate  Finland's  aggression  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  thought  that  the  British  and  French  had  be- 
trayed Czechoslovakia  and  had  thereby  contributed  to  creating  a  very 
nasty  situation  in  Europe,  in  which  everybody  v^as  engaged  in  a 
bare-faced  scramble  for  power,  and  ethical  considerations  were  being 
trampled  underfoot. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  explain  what  the  "betrayal"  was — 
so  the  record  will  show  it — of  Britain  and  France,  of  Czechoslovakia ; 
what  you  thought  it  was  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  My  recollection,  without  looking  up  the  documents 
of  the  time,  is  that  the  French  had  a  treaty  of  mutual  defense  of 
some  kind  with  Czechoslovakia  and  the  British  had  some  kind  of 
treaty  or  understanding  for  the  support  of  France — and  let  me  see — 
I  believe  the  Russians  also  had  a  treaty  for  the  support  of  Czecho- 
slovakia; that  the  Czechoslovaks  appealed  to  the  French,  but  the 
French  and  British,  at  Munich,  decided  to  put  pressure  on  the  Czecho- 
slovak s  to  surrender  their  western  defense  system  to  Hitler,  and  that 
tliat  destroyed  the  security  system  for  the  containment  of  Gennan 
aggression  that  had  been  built  up  after  the  First  World  War. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  because  Britain  and  France  had  failed  to 
carry  out  their  treaty  obligation  to  Czechoslovakia,  you  felt  that  had 
something  to  do  with  a  justification  of  the  Soviets  invading  Finland, 
did  you  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir;  I  did  not  think  it  was  justification. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then  why  did  you  mention  it,  Mr.  Lattimore  ? 

Mr.  LATriMORE.  I  don't  think  I  called  it  a  justification.  Senator.  _ 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  mentioned  here  this  morning — what  is  it? 
Mitigation  ? 

Senator  Smith.  Are  we  not  getting  off  the  beam  a  little  bit,  Mr. 
Chairman? 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  think  this  is  important. 

Senator  Smith.  I  just  wonder  if  it  is  because  I  can  understand 
that  if  it  was  a  trail — and  I  am  inclined  to  think  a  little  bit  it  was — 
that  is  something  about  another  question  entirely,  about  the  Czecho- 
slovakian  situation. 

I  assume  that  what  Dr.  Lattimore  meant  was  that  that  so  lowered 
the  level  of  public  morals  in  Europe  that  that  was  one  of  the  reasons 
understanding  Russian  aggression  in  Finland. 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words,  the  morals  were  so  lowered  by  the 
Czechoslovakia!!  incident  that  anything  might  follow. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes ;  that  is  right. 

Senator  Smith.  Yes.  The  Russians  might  be  encouraged  to  do 
anything. 

i  happen  to  know  a  little  bit  about  that,  because  the  Russians  had 
agreed  to  go  to  the  aid  of  Czechoslovakia — Dr.  Benes  wrote  me  that, 
incidentally— if  England  and  France  bad  laid  down  on  Czecho- 
slovakia. 


3422  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

I  want  to  go  ahead,  except  I  am  thinking  of  the  time  we  are 
taking. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  am  trying  to  go  ahead. 

Now,  you  say  that  was  a  personal  matter  between  you  and  Mr. 

Carter. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  the  best  of  my  recollection. 

The  Chairman.  Wait  just  a  minute. 
•    Mr.  Carter  was  then  the  secretary-general  of  the  Institute  of  Pacihc 
Relations,  just  the  same  as  he  has  been  all  the  time;  is  that  right? 

Mr.  Lati'IMOre.  That  is  right.  •  ,     *    • 

But  Finland  was  not  connected  with  the  Pacific  or  with  Asia,  and 
any  correspondence  between  me  and  Mr.  Carter  on  the  subject  would 
not  have  been  institute  correspondence,  but  personal  correspondence. 

Senator  Ferguson.  If  it  was  personal  correspondence,  would  Mr. 
Field  have  anything  to  do  with  it? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don\  remember  whether  Mr.  Field  had  anything 
to  do  with  it,  or  not. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Would  he  be  consulted  if  it  was  personal  cor- 
respondence ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Might  be.  Anybody  in  Mr.  Carter  s  and  my  per- 
sonal acquaintainceship  might  have  been  consulted. 

As  I  remember,  at  that  time,  everybody  was  talking  to  everybody 
else,  and  a  good  many  people  were  writing  to  a  good  many  people 
about  this. 

Here  was  one  of  the  most  perplexing  situations  that  had  ever  arisen 
in  the  history  of  Europe. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes,  your  long  answers. 

Will  you  tell  us  now  whether  or  not  you  felt  at  the  time  that  Mr. 
Carter  asked  you  about  the  Soviet  invasion  of  Finland  that  he  was 
pro-Soviet?  ^     . 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No;  I  would  not  say  he  was  pro-Soviet. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Morris,  do  you  have  a  letter? 

The  Chairman.  Go  ahead,  Mr.  Morris. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  identify  this  document,  please  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  is  a  photostat  of  a  carbon  copy  of  a  document 
from  the  files  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  dated  April  26, 
1940,  addressed  to  Owen  Lattimore,  Esq.,  with  the  typed  signature  of 
Edward  C.  Carter. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  I  show  you  that  letter  and  ask  you  if 
you  can  recall  having  received  that? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  This  must  be  the  letter  that  I  recall. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  will  that  be  received  into  the  record? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

I  want  to  know  if  that  is  an  answer  that  you  recall  having  received. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes;  I  recall  having  received  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  will  you  read  that  letter,  please? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  This  is  dated  April  26,  1940  [reading]  : 

ExiiiRiT  No.  .531 

Dkab  Owen 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  was  your  address  at  that  time?  Will 
you  give  it? 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3423 

Mr.  Laitimore.  My  address  was  Johns  Hopkins,    [Reading :] 

Where  in  English  or  French  or  Russian  has  there  appeared  the  most  convinc- 
ing (I  mean  convincing  to  bourgeoisie  readers)  statement  as  to  the  U.  S.  S.  R.'s 
justification  for  the  Finnish  campaign?  The  Soviets  clearly  regard  the  action 
as  a  necessary  defense  measure.  Three-fourths  of  the  rest  of  the  world  still 
regards  it  as  unprovoked  aggression. 

Have  you  yourself  written  or  are  you  writing  anything  along  this  line? 
Sincerely  yours, 

This  is  dated  April  26,  1940. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  will  you  receive  it  into  the  record? 

The  Chairman.  Yes,  it  will  be  admitted  into  the  record. 

(Document  referred  to  was  marked  ''Exhibit  No.  531"  and  was  read 
in  full  beginning  on  p.  3422.) 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  would  that  indicate  as  to  whether 
or  not  Mr.  Carter  was  pro-Soviet? 

Mr,  Lattimore,  No,  sir, 

I  would  say  that  this  indicates  that  Mr.  Carter  was  trying  to  form 
an  opinion  on  the  subject  and  that,  as  a  necessary  part  of  forming 
an  opinion  on  the  subject,  he  was  trying  to  find  out  whether  there  had 
been  a  convincing  statement  from  the  Russian  point  of  view  or  of  the 
Russian  point  of  view  ? 

The  Chairman.  He  says,  "Where  in  English  or  French  or  Russian 
has  there  appeared  the  most  convincing" — and  then  in  parentheses : 
"I  mean  convincing  to  bourgeoisie  readers." 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

The  Chairman.  "Bourgeoisie  readers"  are  non-Soviet  readers;  are 
they  not  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Non-Soviet,  and,  I  should  say,  non-Communist. 

The  Chairman.  And  he  wanted  to  convince  the  non-Soviet  reader. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir ;  I  do  not  agree  that  he  wanted  to  convince 
a  non-Soviet  reader. 

The  Chairman.  He  said,  "I  mean  convincing  to  bourgeoisie  read- 
ers" ?    What  does  that  mean  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  He  is  obviously  considering  himself  as  a  non-Soviet 
and  non-Communist  person,  and,  as  such,  he  wants  to  know  where  the 
Russian  case  is  stated  for  people  like  himself. 

He  obviously  means  he  wants  to  compare  it  with  other  opinions. 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  moment.    Read  the  sentence  again. 

So  as  to  make  it  complete,  leaving  out  the  parentheses,  it  states : 

AVhere  in  English  or  French  or  Russian  has  there  appeared  the  most  con- 
vincing *  *  *  statement  as  to  the  U.  S.  S.  R.'s  justification  for  the  Finnish 
campaign? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  riarht. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  what  he  is  looking  for;  is  it  not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  would  say  that  is  a  reasonable  step  for  an  im- 
partial man  to  take  when  he  was  trying  to  assemble  evidence  and 
opinions  on  a  very  complicated  problem. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  was  this,  or  was  it  not,  an 
IPR  matter? 

Was  he  trying  to  do  this  personally? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  should  say  that  that  letter  is  clearly  a  personal 
letter  and  not  an  organizational,  institutional  letter. 


3424  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  when  we  get  to  a  case  like  this, 
do  you  not  see  anything  in  this  letter  at  all  to  indicate  that  Mr. 
Carter  was  pro-Soviet  in  this  letter  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir ;  I  see  nothing  of  the  kind.  I  see  he  states 
that:  "Three-fourths  of  the  rest  of  the  world  still  regards  it  as  un- 
provoked aggression." 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes.  But  is  he  not  asking  you  to  give  him  the 
best  possible  defense  for  the  Russians  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  He  is  trying,  it  is  obvious,  to  find  that  out 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  moment.    Let  us  hear  the  question. 

Please  read  the  question,  Mr,  Reporter. 

I  am  asking  you  to  address  yourself  to  the  question. 

(Thereupon,  the  pending  question,  as  above  transcribed,  was  read 
by  the  reporter.) 

The  Chairman.  That  can  be  answered  "Yes"  or  "No,"  then  you 
can  explain,  if  you  wish. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes. 

Obviously,  as  a  part  of  trying  to  inform  himself  on  all  points  of 
view  of  a  very  complicated  question,  which  was  the  subject  of  great 
political  discussion  at  the  time. 

The  Chairman.  You  have  to  read  that  into  the  letter,  do  you  not, 
that  last  statement  of  yours  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Where  do  you  get  the  idea  that  he  wanted  all 
points  of  view  when  he  was  trying  to  get  the  best  for  the  Russians 
and  said  nothing  about  any  other  point  of  view  at  all  ^ 

Mr.  LA-rriMORE.  He  is  saying:  "Three-fourths  of  the  rest  of  the 
world  still  regard  it  as  unprovoked  aggression." 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes.  And  does  he  not  also  in  the  letter  assume 
that  you  would  be  writing  on  the  Soviet  side  when  he  said,  "Have 
you  yourself  written,  or  are  you  writing  anything  along  this  line?"— 
meaning  along  the  line  of  the  Soviet  side  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  He  does  not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  consider  it  impossible  to  read  any  such  implica- 
tion into  the  letter. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  you  said  that  this  was  not  an  organ- 
izational letter. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Morris.  Was  Mr.  Field  sent  a  copy  of  that  letter  ? 

Mr.  Latoimore.  I  don't  know.    It  doesn't  say  here  that  he  was. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Field,  did  he  venture  an  answer  to  Mr.  Carter's 
questions  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  I  don't  recall. 

Mr.  Morris.  You  cannot  recall  anything  on  that  ? 

]\Ir.  Lattimore.  No. 

Senator  Smith.  May  I  ask  you  this  question : 

Was  129  East  Fifty-Second  Street  the  address  of  the  Institute  of 
Pacific  Relations? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  that  was. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  identify  that  document,  please? 

Mr  Mandel.  I  have  here  a  memorandum  from  the  files  of  the  In- 
stitute of  Pacific  Relations,  dated  April  30,  1940,  headed  "Memo- 
randum to:  E.  C.  C.  from  F.  V.  F.» 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3425 

The  Chairman.  Who  is  ECC  and  who  is  FVF  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  presumably  Mr.  Edward  C.  Carter  and  Fred- 
erick Vanderbilt  Field. 

Mv.  Chairman,  this  letter  bears  on  the  question  about  which  the  wit- 
ness is  now  testifying,  and  I  would  like  Mr.  Mandel  to  read  this  letter 
into  the  record. 

The  Chairman.  Let  me  see  it.  • 

Senator  Ferguson.  It  that  original  out  of  the  files  of  the  IPR? 

Mr.  Mandel.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  read  that  letter,  please  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  April  30,  1940:  "Memorandum  to:  E.  C.  C.  from 
F.  V.  F." 

Mr.  Morris.  This  is  4  days  after  the  previous  letter,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  Mandel  (reading)  : 

Exhibit  No.  .532 

I  noticed,  in  a  letter  from  you  to  Lattimore,  or  vice  versa,  which  passed  over 
my  desk  today,  a  question  about  good  sources  for  the  Soviet  point  of  view  on  the 
Finnish  campaign.  I  wonder  if  you  have  seen  a  booklet  of  130  pages  just  issued 
by  Soviet  Russia  Today,  entitled  "War  and  Peace  in  Finland — A  Documented 
Survey."  It  contains  most  of  the  pertinent  documents  and  if  you  are  looking  for 
an  analysis  which  is  admittedly  from  the  Soviet  point  of  view,  this  is,  I  think,  as 
good  as  anything  which  has  come  to  hand. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  that  be  admitted  into  the  record,  Mr.  Chairman? 

The  Chairman.  It  may  be  admitted  into  the  record. 

(Document  deferred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  532"  and  was  read 
in  full.) 

Mr.  Fortas.  Excuse  me. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  want  to  ask  your  counsel  something  ? 

Mr.  Fortas.  He  said  "no." 

Mr.  INIorris.  Mr,  Lattimore,  do  you  notice  there  in  the  first  line 
that  Mr.  Field  is  looking  upon  you  and  Mr.  Carter  as  interchangeable 
in  connection  with  that  particular  query  ?  He  could  not  recall  whether 
the  letter  was  from  Carter  to  Lattimore,  or  Lattimore  to  Carter. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  would  not  say,  Mr.  Morris,  that  he  regards  me 
and  Carter  as  interchangeable. 

The  Chairman.  He  is  speaking  of  the  language  now,  Mr.  Lattimore. 

The  first  line  of  the  note  reads :  "I  noticed,  in  a  letter  from  you  to 
Lattimore  or  vic€  versa  which  passed  over  my  desk  today    *    *    *." 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Mr.  Morris'  question  is :  Do  I  regard  that  as  indi- 
cating that  Field  says  that  Lattimore  and  Carter  were,  or  regarded 
Lattimore  and  Carter  as  interchangeable  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  With  respect  to  this  query. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  With  respect  to  this  query. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  not  the  question. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  My  answer  is  "No,"  and  I  would  like  to  explain. 

Mr.  Fortas.  We  want  the  question  read. 

The  Chairman.  Reframe  the  question.  You  can  get  at  it  in  an- 
other way. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  does  not  that  first  sentence  indicate 
to  you  that,  with  respect  to  this  particular  query,  namely,  where  to 
find  the  most  convincing,  to  bourgeoisie  readers,  defense  of  the  Soviet 
invasion  of  Finland,  did  he  not  consider  in  his  mind  that  you  and 
Carter  were  interchangeable  with  respect  to  being  the  originator  of 
that  particular  query  ? 


3426  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Mr.  Lattimore.  My  answer  is  "No." 
May  I  explain? 

Tlie  Chairman.  I  do  not  think  it  is  necessary  for  an  explanation. 
The  answer  is  "No."    That  is  all  there  is  to  it. 

It  is  a  question  of  the  construction  of  the  language. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  think  I  have  something  pertinent  to  say  on  the 

subject.  .  . 

The  Chairman.  I  do  not  think  there  is  anything  pertinent.  When 
you  say  "no,  it  is  not  interchangeable,"  then  it  is  not  interchangeable. 
That  is  your  decision.  .  „ 

Mr.  Lai'timore.  May  I  explain  why  I  think  the  answer  is    JNo    >. 

The  Chairman.  No.     The  language  speaks  for  itself. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  it  appears  that  Mr.  Field  had 
on  his  desk  that  particular  day,  which  would  seem  to  be  the  30th  of 
April,  the  Soviet  literature.  War  and  Peace  in  Finland;  would  it  not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  that  when  it  passed  over  the  desk,  he  was 
not  quite  sure  whether  it  was  a  letter  from  you  to  Carter,  or  Carter 

to  you  ?  -(.^11 

]\Ir.  Lattimore.  No,  sir ;  that  is  not  my  construction  of  the  language. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  not  your  construction  >. 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  moment,  Senator. 

If  there  is  any  more  evidence  of  expression  in  the  rear  of  the  room, 
any  more  disturbance  in  the  rear  of  the  room,  the  room  will  be 
cleared.     I  have  said  that  once  or  twice  before.     I  hope  it  will  not 

occur  lagain.  ,     •      t-»       •    r^    i 

Mr.  Morris.  JNIr.  Lattimore,  did  you  know  that  Soviet  Kussia  loday 

was  a  Soviet  publication?  .       „     -r   i     ,    i    v 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  answer  is  "No,  at  that  time.       I  don  t  believe 

at  that  time  I  knew  the  publication  Soviet  Kussia  Today  at  all. 
Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  know  at  that  time  that  Frederick  V.  P leld 

was  a  Communist?  n     ^■ 

Mr.  Lai-itmore.  No,  sir;  I  didn't.  To  the  best  of  my  recollection, 
I  did  not  believe  then  that  he  was  Communist— 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  moment. 

A  moment  ago,  in  listening  to  the  question,  1  think  the  Chair  ruled 
erroneously,  and  I  want  to  correct  my  ruling.  I  refused  to  permit 
the  witness  to  explain  his  view  on  the  first  two  lines,  or  three  lines 
of  the  letter.  I  think  I  ruled  hastily  and  I  want  to  correct  that  ruling. 
I  want  him  to  have  that  opportunity. 

You  may  have  it  now. 

Mr.  P'oRTAS.  We  want  the  question  and  the  answer  read  back. 

The  Chairman.  You  may  have  the  question  and  the  answer  read 
back,  if  you  want  to  clarify  your  position. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Y"es.     May  I? 

The  Reporter  (reading)  : 

Mr  Moiiius  Mr.  Lattimore,  does  not  that  first  sentence  indicate  to  you  that, 
with  respect  to  this  particular  query,  namely,  where  to  tind  tlie  most  convincing, 
lo  h(.uri;eoisie  readers,  defense  of  the  Soviet  invasion  of  Finland,  did  he  not 
considei-  in  his  mind  that  you  and  Carter  were  interchangeaitle  with  respect  to 
Iteing  the  ori^'inator  of  that  particular  (luery? 

The  Chairman.  The  reason  why  I  changed  my  ruling  is^that  I 
caught  the  expression  "in  your  mind"  as  to  what  was  in  Mr.  Carter  s 
mind.  .      , 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  not  what  was  in  Field  s  mmd  ? 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3427 

The  Chairman.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  FoRTAs.  In  Mr.  Lattimore's  mind. 

The  Chairman.  It  is  liis  analysis  of  wliat  might  liave  been  in  the 
writer's  mind. 

Mr.  FoRTAS.  He  said  Carter.     I  thonght  he  said  Lattimore. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  right^     In  his  analysis. 

If  he  wants  to  give  it  after  looking  at  the  language  and  listening 
to  the  question  again,  I  think  the  Chair  was  erroneous  in  its  ruling. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  simply  wanted  to  explain.  Mr.  Chairman,  that 
it  was  the  practice  in  the  institute  to  circulate  letters  and  copies  of 
letters  to  everybody  in  the  office  and  people  outside  the  office,  and  my 
construction  of  this  language  is  simply  that  Mr.  Field  remembered 
seeing  some  correspondence  some  days  before  and  hadn't  bothered  to 
look  up  who  wrote  the  correspondence  when  he  sent  this  little  note 
to  Mr.  Carter. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  a  fair  explanation  of  it,  if  you  can  guess 
what  was  in  the  writer's  mind. 

He  is  making  a  guess  at  it,  and  that  is  all  there  is  to  it. 

Let  us  proceed. 

Senator  Smith.  With  that  language,  ''vice  versa.''  I  do  not  quite 
agree  with  the  chairman. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Had  you  ever  seen  before  that  time  the  publica- 
tion Soviet  Russia  Today? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  believe  I  had. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  ever  furnish  a  document  to  Mr.  Carter 
in  reply  to  his  letter? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  recall  writing  to  Mr.  Carter  expressing  some 
opinions.    I  don't  recall  the  exact  language. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  did  you  furnish  a  documejit? 

Mr,  Latiimore.  Do  you  mean  a  document  other  than  writing  him 
a  letter? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Mr.  Laitimore.  No ;  I  don't  believe  I  did. 

Senator  P^erguson.  Did  he  ever  ask  3^ou  for  any  more  than  an  an- 
swer to  his  letter? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  can't  recall  that  he  did.     I  don't  believe  he  did. 

Senator  Ff:rguson.  Did  vou  ever  read  AVar  and  Peace  in  Fin- 
land? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Xo,  I  don't  think  I  ever  read  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  endeavor  to  answer  his  question  about  what 
is  nicest  convincing  to  bourgeoisie  readers  in  defense  of  the  Soviet  in- 
vasion of  Finland  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Xo;  I  don't  believe  I  did.  I  believe  that  what  I 
did  was  to  expi-ess  my  own  opinions  about  some  of  the  factors  in- 
volved. 

Mr.  Morris.  As  the  most  convincing  defense? 

Mr.  LA'rriMoRE.  Xo.  I  don't  recall.  I  don't  believe  that  I  responded 
to  any  such  point,  that  I  simply  wrote  down  some  general  observations 
that  were  in  my  mind  at  the  time  as  to  what  I  thought  about  the 
situation. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  it  your  testimony,  Mr.  Lattimore,  that  you  did  not 
reply  to  this  particular  query  of  Mr.  Carter? 

Mr.  LAT'riMoRE.  To  the  question  about  some  source  in  English, 
French,  or  Russian? 


3428  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Morris.  Yes. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  believe  I  replied  to  that  point. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  attempt  to  give  the  best  possible  defense  of  the 
Soviet  invasion  of  Finland  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir.  I  believe  that  I  expressed  my  own  opinion. 
My  own  opinion  may  have  included  some  expression  about  what  sort  of 
case  I  thought  the  Russians  could  make  for  themselves,  or  something 
of  that  sort. 

But  I  certainly  did  not  do  any  research  on  the  subject. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  do  you  think  that  the  memo- 
randum from  Field  to  Carter  indicated  that  Field  believed  Carter 
wanted  a  pro-Soviet  opinion? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes.  The  language  is :  "A  question  about  good 
sources  for  the  Soviet  point  of  view." 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Which,  it  seems  to  me,  would  be  a  reasonable  point — 
let  me  repeat  once  more — for  anybody  who  was  trying  to  find  out  what 
the  score  was  on  Finland. 

The  Chairman.  The  language  of  this  note  is,  again,  interesting. 
This  was  a  note  from  Frederick  V.  Field  to  the  secretary  general  of  the 
Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  Mr.  Carter. 

He  says  in  this  note :  "I  notice,  in  a  letter  from  you  to  Lattimore  or 
vice  versa,  which  passed  over  my  desk  today  *  *  *."  In  other 
words,  the  note  which  Carter  had  written  to  you  passed  over  Field's 
desk.  You  said  that  you  did  not  know  whether  or  not  that  note  was 
referred  to  Mr.  Field. 

It  is  evident,  from  this  letter,  that  it  had  been  referred  to  Mr.  Field. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

The  Chairman.  And  he  says :  "A  question  about  good  sources  for 
the  Soviet  point  of  view  on  the  Finnish  campaign." 

Then  he  refers  Carter  to  what  he  considers  a  good  source : 

I  wonder  if  you  have  seen  a  booklet  of  130  pages  just  issued  by  Soviet  Russia 
Today,  entitled  "War  and  Peace  in  Finland — A  Documented  Survey."  It  con- 
tains most  of  tlie  pertinent  documents — 

This  was  Field  giving  advice  to  Carter,  who  had  written  you. 

*  *  *  It  contains  most  of  tlie  pertinent  documents  and  if  you  are  looking 
for  an  analysis  which  is  admittedly  from  the  Soviet  point  of  view,  this  is,  I  think, 
as  good  as  anything  which  lias  come  to  hand. 

He  was  rather  praising  it ;  was  he  not  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  He  was  rather  what? 

The  Chairman.  Praising  it.  In  other  words,  he  was  recommending 
it. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  He  was  recommending  that  anybody  who  wanted  to 
find  out  what  the  Soviet  point  of  view  was  would  find  in  this  publica- 
tion the  documents  which  the  Russians  had  considered  it  pertinent  to 
publish. 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  Mr.  Morris,  go  ahead. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Would  you  say  that  Field's  statement  was  pro- 
Soviet  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  identify  that  document,  please? 

Mr.  Mandel.  I  have  here  a  photostat  of  a  carbon  copy  of  a  letter 
from  the  files  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  dated  April  29, 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3429 

1940,  addressed  to  Mr.  E.  C.  Carter,  with  the  typed  signature  of  Owen 
Lattimore.  In  the  upper  part  of  the  sheet  we  have  the  initials  F.  V.  F. 
and  K.  B.,  presumably  Frederick  Vanderbilt  Field  and  Kathleen 
Barnes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Does  K.  B.  stand  for  Kathleen  Barnes  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Presumably. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Would  you  explain  what  you  believe  those 
initials  mean  on  the  top  of  that  photostat  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Wliat  I  believe  they  mean? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  My  assumption  would  be  that  Mr.  Carter  had 
initialed  them  for  circulation  in  the  office  to  Kathleen  Barnes  and 
Frederick  V.  Field. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  your  name  being  on  the  top  would  indi- 
cate that  it  was  later  to  be  filed,  I  assume,  under  your  name? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Probably  woidd  be  put  in  the  file  of  Carter's  cor- 
respondence with  me;  yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  So,  certainly  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  con- 
sidered it  an  organizational  letter,  did  it  not,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  wouldn't  say  so. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  think  it  still  indicates  what  is  before 
you  now,  that  this  is  purely  a  personal  matter  between  you  and  Mr. 
Carter? 

]\Ir.  Lattimore.  As  far  as  I  was  concerned,  it  was  a  purely  personal 
matter  between  me  and  Mr.  Carter. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  was  not  the  question. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  I  would  still  say  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  From  the  evidence  before  you 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  what  has  been  produced  here  in  the  case? 

Mr.  Lai-timore.  Knowing,  as  I  do,  that  it  was  Mr.  Carter's  regular 
practice  to  circulate  a  great  deal  of  his  personal  correspondence  to 
other  people. 

The  Chairman.  "Wliat  was  the  address  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific 
Relations  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  At  that  time? 

The  Chairman.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  129  East  Fifty-second,  I  think. 

The  Chairman.  What  is  the  address  on  the  letter? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  129  East  Fifty-second. 

The  Chairman.  That  was  the  address  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific 
Relations. 

All  right. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  will  you  read  the  last  paragraph  in 
your  letter. 

]\Ir.  Chairman,  first,  will  it  be  admitted  into  the  record  ? 

The  Chairman.  It  has  been  identified  by  Mr.  Mandel,  has  it  not, 
as  having  come  from  the  files  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations? 

ISIr.  Morris.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  It  may  be  admitted  into  the  record. 


3430  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  533''  and  is 
as  follows:) 

Exhibit  No.  533 

300  Oilman  Hall,  Johns  Hopkins  University, 

Baltimore,  Md.,  April  29,  1940. 
Mr.  E.  C.  Carter, 

Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  129  East  Fifty-second  Street, 

New  York  City. 

Dear  Carter:  Thanks  very  iiiucli  for  putting  me  wise  to  the  correspondence 
and  editorial  comments  in  the  Herald-Tribune.  I  thought  your  letter  was  per- 
fectly justifiable,  and  the  tone  taken  by  the  editorial  writer  in  commenting  on  it 
rather  nasty.     I  enclose  a  copy  of  the  letter  I  have  just  written  them. 

With  regard  to  the  Gayer  book  on  "American  Economic  Foreign  Policy,"  am  I 
to  understand  that  Holland  has  received  a  review  copy,  or  that  he  is  merely  rec- 
ommending it  to  youV  Let  me  know  if  I  should  write  for  a  review  copy.  Off- 
hand, I  should  concur  with  the  selection  of  Pluniptre  as  reviewer. 

We  are  so  far  advanced  in  the  process  of  getting  the  June  issue  of  Pacitic  Af- 
fairs through  the  press  that  it  would  be  difficult  now  to  get  in  the  suggested 
notice  of  the  nonparticipation  committee  pamphlet  "Shall  America  Stop  Arm- 
ing Japan,"  for  reasons  of  both  time  and  space.  What  should  be  our  future 
policy  about  matters  of  this  kind?  Would  it  not  be  making  Pacific  Affairs  too 
"American"  for  subscribers  abroad? 

Your  (luestion  al)Out  where  to  find  the  most  convincing  statement  as  to  the 
Soviet  justification  for  tlie  Fiimish  campaign  is  one  that  I  have  been  asking  my- 
self. It  seems  to  me  that  everybody  takes  a  too  simple  approach  to  this  prob- 
lem, the  Russians  from  their  side  and  everybody  else  from  his  own  side.  It 
seems  to  me  that  even  If  the  Russians  had  more  detailed,  plausible  and  docu- 
mented evidence  of  "plots''  in  or  concerning  Finland  than  I  have  yet  seen,  and 
even  if  they  had  strong  justification  in  "realistic"  terms,  from  the  strategic 
point  of  view,  they  nevertheless  made  a  political  blunder  in  attacking  Finland. 
On  the  other  hand,  I  think  there  is  apt  to  be  a  certain  smugness  in  the  peojjle  who 
either  unconsciously  assume  or  explicity  state  that  what  Russia  did,  after  a  great 
war  had  already  broken  out,  was  much  worse  than  what  the  French  iind  British 
did  in  letting  down  first  Spain  and  then  Czeclioslovakia.  The  Russians  may  have 
been  feeling  and  hoping  for  years  for  a  chance  to  do  this  very  thing :  but  as  far  as 
the  evidence  goes,  the  Russians  stood  by  collective  securit.y  and  the  honoring  of 
treaties  until  these  principles  had  been  violated  by  some  of  the  great  powers 
with  which  Russia  was  dealing,  and  betrayed  by  others.  The  moral  guilt  of 
Russia  is  presumably  as  great  as  that  of  any  of  the  others,  since  if  you  assume 
that  there  is  an  absolute  morality,  then  by  definition  tliere  can  be  no  degree  of 
morality;  but  if  justification  be  jileaded.  the  Russians  can  point  out  that  they  did 
not  lead  off  in  the  scramble  of  aggression,  and  can  cla'ni  that  there  is  a  difference 
between  being  the  first  to  start  aggression  and  committing  what  might  be  called 
an  act  of  "self-protective  aggression"  after  the  general  sci'ainble  had  begun. 
Yours  very  sincerely, 

Owen  Lattimore. 

P.  S. — Who  is  in  charge  of  the  Pacific  Council  Library  now  that  Lilienthal  has 
left?  I  should  like  to  know  if  you  have,  and  if  I  may  borrow,  "League  of  Nations 
Mission  of  Educational  Experts:  The  Reoi-ganization  of  Educati(tn  in  China," 
Paris,  1032. 


Mr.  Lattimore.  The  paragraph  reads : 


Your  question  about  where  to  find  the  most  convincing  statement  as  to  the 
Soviet  justificati<m  for  the  Finnish  campaign  is  one  that  I  have  been  asking 
myself.  It  seems  to  me  that  everybody  takes  a  too  simple  approach  to  this  prob- 
lem, the  Russians  from  their  side  and  everybody  else  from  his  own  side.  It  seems 
to  me  that  even  if  the  Russians  had  more  detailed,  plausible  and  documented 
evidence  of  "jilots"  in  or  concerning  Finland  that  I  have  yet  seen,  and  even  if 
they  had  strong  justification  in  "realistic"  terms,  from  the  strategic  point  of 
view,  they  nevertheless  made  a  political  blunder  in  attacking  Finland. 

On  the  other  hand,  I  think  there  is  apt  to  be  a  certain  snuigness  in  the  ijeople 
4  ho  either  unconsciously  assume  or  explicitly  state  that  what  Russia  did,  after 
a  great  war  had  already  broken  out,  was  much  worse  than  what  the  French 
and  British  did  in  letting  down  first  Spain  and  then  Czechoslovakia.  The  Rus- 
sians may  have  been  feeling  and  hoping  for  years  for  a  chance  to  do  this  very 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3431 

tliiiij;.  but  as  far  as  the  evidence  goes,  the  Russians  stood  by  collective  security 
and  the  honoriuir  of  treaties  until  these  principles  had  been  violated  by  some 
(if  the  jrreat  powers  with  which  Russia  was  dealing,  and  betrayed  by  others. 
The  moral  guilt  of  Russia  is  presumably  as  great  as  that  of  any  of  the  others, 
since  there  can  be  no  de.gree  of  morality;  but  if  justification  be  pleaded,  the 
Russians  can  point  out  that  they  did  not  lead  off  in  the  scramble  of  aggression, 
and  can  claim  that  there  is  a  difference  between  being  the  first  to  start  aggres- 
sion and  committing  what  might  be  called  an  act  of  "self-protective  aggression," 
after  the  general  scramble  had  begun. 

The  expression  "self-protective  aggression"  is  in  quotes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  were  yon  thereby  answering  Mr.  Car- 
ter's query  as  to  what  was  the  most  convincing  statement  as  to  the 
Soviet  justification  for  the  Finnish  campaign? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir;  I  don't  think  I  was.  I  was  replying  to  Mr. 
Carter's  letter  as  a  whole  anci  not  to  a  particular  point  of  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  that  your  answer,  Mr.  Lattimore,  or  Mr.  Fortas" 
answer^ 

Mr.  Lattimore.  My  answer  has  been  introduced  by  the  phrase, 
"Your  question  about  where  to  find  the  most  convincing  statement 
as  to  the  Soviet  justification  for  the  Finnish  campaign  is  one  that  I 
have  been  asking  myself." 

But  the  language  shows  that  I  had  not  looked  up  the  matter. 

May  I  add  a  word  of  explanation? 

The  Chairman.  You  Mere  asking  yourself  for  a  justification  of 
the  Russian  invasion,  were  3'ou  not  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No;  I  was  not. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  what  you  say  here. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  was  asking  where  to  find  the  most  convincing- 
statement. 

The  Chairman.  You  said  it  was  a  question  that  you  had  been  asking 
yourself. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes.  In  other  words,  like  Mr.  Carter,  I  thought 
that  here  was  an  extremely  complex  and  confusing  question,  and  I 
would  like  to  know  more  evidence  on  all  sides. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  was  that  your  answer  to  my  question,  or 
was  that  Mr.  Fortas'  answer  to  my  question  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  was  my  answer  to  your  question. 

Mr.  Fortas.  Mr.  Morris,  I  object.     I  don't  think  that  is  called  for. 

The  Chairman.  I  have  not  caught  Mr.  Fortas  suggesting  an.swers 
as  yet. 

Mr.  Fortas.  No,  sir:  and  you  won't. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  believe  I  should  be  given  the  courtesy  of  making  a 
statement.  I  unconsciously  and  without  deliberation  commented  on 
Mr.  Morris'  question,  I  am  afraid,  audibly.  I  said  that  that  is  not 
what  Mr.  Carter  had  asked  JNIr.  Lattimore. 

And  the  record  speaks  for  itself. 

Mr.  Morris'  question  was  whether  this  was  the  most  convincing- 
statement  of  the  Soviet  position  that  Mr.  Carter  had  asked  for.  Now, 
that  is  not  what  the  record  shows  Mr.  Carter  asked  Mr.  Lattimore  for. 

The  Chairman.  I  do  not  think  you  intentionally  broke  in. 

Mr.  Fortas.  I  did  not. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  As  long  as  we  are  all  testifying,  Mr.  Chairman 

The  Chairman.  I  hope  that  that  will  not  occur  again. 

Senator,  you  were  asking. 


3432  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes.  I  was  going  to  ask  a  question  on  that,  in 
line  with  what  the  Chair  asked. 

Your  question  about  where  to  find  the  most  couvincting  statement  as  to  the 
Soviet  justification  for  the  Finnish  campaign  is  one  that  I  have  been  asking 
myself. 

Mr.  Lattimore,  does  not  that  clearly  indicate  that  you  stated  to 
Carter  that  you  had  been  asking  yourself  just  what  he  asked  you  ? 
Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

The  Chairman.  Something  to  justify  the  Finnish  campaign. 
Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir;  not  something  to  justify  the  Finnish  cam- 
paign ;  a  statement  of  the  Soviet  point  of  view  as  a  necessary  ingredient 
for  anybody  who  was  trying  to  find  out  what  the  score  was  on  Finland. 
Senator  Ferguson.  Wliat,  Mr.  Lattimore,  was  a  "self-protective 
aggression"  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  presume,  in  1952 

Senator  Ferguson.  No,  no.     In  1940. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  In  1952,  trying  to  reconstruct  what  I  was  thinking 

in  1940, 12  years  previously,  that  I  meant  here  that — what  is  it  now 

Senator  Ferguson.  "Self-protective  aggression." 
Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes;  that  if  justification  be  pleaded  I  presume  that 
the  Russians  might  put  up  a  case  of  saying  that  this  was  self -protective 
aggression  after  other  people  had  started  aggression. 

I  might  add  that  I  doubt  if  anywhere  in  the  record  have  the  Russians 
ever  admitted  to  such  a  thing  as  self-protective  aggression. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you  had  any  trouble  solving,  in  your  own 
mind,  the  problem  as  to  who  was  the  aggressor  in  Korea  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  aggressor  in  Korea  was  clearly  the  North 
Korean  Communists. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  you  would  not  say  that  Russia  now  calls 
that  "self -protective  aggression"  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  would  doubt  very  much  if  the  Russians  would 
admit  to  such  a  damaging  formula. 
The  Chairman.  All  right,  Mr.  Morris,  go  ahead. 
Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Might  I  ask  one  question,  Mr.  Chairman? 
The  Chairman.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Mr.  Lattimore,  when  you  wrote  that  letter,  did  you 
really  believe  that  Russia  had  only  become  a  treaty  breaker  because 
Britain  and  France  had  set  her  a  bad  example? 

The  Chairman.  Are  you  referring  now  to  Mr.  Lattimore's  letter 
of  April  29, 1940  ? 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  May  I  have  your  question  again,  Mr.  Sourwine? 
Mr.  Sourwine.  Did  you  really  believe  that  Russia  had  become  a 
treaty  breaker  only  because  she  had  been  set  a  bad  example  by  Britain 
and  France  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  remember  what  I  meant  at  the  moment, 
Mr.  Sourwine,  beyond  the  language  of  this  letter. 
Mr.  Sourwine.  Now,  I  am  using  plain  English. 
Mr.  Lattimore.  The  language  of  this  letter  does  not  support  the 
twist  that  you  are  trying  to  put  on  it,  sir. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  What  are  you  saying  in  that  letter?  Are  you  not 
saying  in  that  letter  that  Russia  really  stood  by  her  treaties  until 
Britain  and  France  set  her  a  bad  example,  and  then  she  became  way- 
ward? 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3433 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No.    I  am  saying : 

The  Russians  may  have  been  feeling  and  hoping  for  years  for  a  chance  to  do 
this  very  thing.  But  as  far  as  the  evidence  goes,  the  Russians  stood  by  collec- 
tive security  and  the  honoring  of  treaties  until  these  principles  had  been 
violated  by  some  of  the  great  powers  with  which  Russia  was  dealing  and 
betrayed  by  others. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  What  do  you  mean  by  that? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  meant  there  that  there  were  two  possibilities. 
One  was  tliat  the  Kussians  may  have  been  feeling  and  hoping  for 
years  for  a  chance  to  do  this  very  thing. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Yes.    You  underlined  the  "may,"  did  you  not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes ;  I  put  that  in  as  a  possibility,  and  I  doubt  if 
any  pro-Soviet  or  pro-Communist  person  would  have  allowed  for  that 
possibility. 

The  Chairman.  What  is  the  other  ? 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Now,  you  said,  "as  far  as  the  evidence  goes." 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Then  I  said,  "as  far  as  the  evidence  goes." 

Obviously,  as  far  as  the  evidence  known  to  me  went  at  that  time. 

jNIr.  Sourwine.  What  I  want  you  to  do,  ]\Ir.  Lattimore,  is  to  put 
into  different  language  what  you  meant  there.  You  are  a  man  very 
facile  with  language.    Express  your  thought  there  another  way. 

Mr.  FoRTAS.  He  wants  to  consult  with  me. 

The  Chairman.  All  right. 

(Consultation  between  witness  and  counsel.) 

The  Chairman.  Just  before  proceeding,  I  would  like  to  have  the 
record  read  back  just  a  little.  I  think  Mr.  Lattimore  said  there  were 
two — I  do  not  think  he  called  them  alternatives,  but  he  dwelt  on  one. 

One  was  that  Russia  may  have  for  a  long  time  been  hoping  for  this, 
or  that  is  the  substance  of  it. 

The  other  was  something  else.    He  did  not  dwell  on  the  other. 

Mr.  Morris.  The  other  alternative  was  that  the  Russians  had  stood 
by  collective  security  and  the  honoring  of  treaties  until  the  treaty 
structure  had  been  violated  by  others. 

The  Chairman.  And  that  they  had  taken  that  as  a  justification; 
is  that  right  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  not  that  they  had  taken  it  as  a  justification. 

But  I  suggested  that  if  justification  be  pleaded,  the  Russians  can 
point  out  that  they  did  not  lead  off  in  the  scramble  of  aggression. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  I  accept  that  as  an  answer,  Mr.  Chairman.  I  think 
the  witness  has  rephrased  what  he  said  in  the  letter. 

The  Chairman.  I  think  it  is  an  answer. 

Do  you  accept  that  as  an  answer  ? 

Mr.  SouR^viNE.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  proceed,  Mr.  Morris. 

Mr.  Morris.  INIr.  Lattimore,  do  you  recall  making  an  effort,  after  a 
Soviet  protest,  to  prevent  the  appearance  of  an  article  by  Mr.  L.  M. 
Hubbard,  in  1938,  from  appearing  in  Pacific  Affairs? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Do  I  recall  what  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Your  making  an  effort  to  prevent  an  article  by  Mr. 
L.  M.  Hubbard  from  appearing  in  Pacific  Affairs. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  don't  remember  that.  If  you  have  a  docu- 
ment to  refresh  my  memory,  I  should  be  glad  to  see  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  You  do  recall  some  controversy  about  Mr.  Hubbard's 
article,  do  you  not? 

88348— 52— pt.  10 11 


3434  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  La'fi'imore.  I  do  recall  that  Mr.  Hubbard  wrote  an  article.  I 
don't  recall  a  controversy. 

The  Chairman.  The  question  is,  Do  you  recall  a  controversy  about 
Mr.  Hubbard's  article?    It  calls  for  a  simple  answer,  "Yes"  or  "No." 

Mr.  Laitimork.  I  don't  recall  a  controversy  beyond  the  fact  that — 
now,  wait  a  niinue. 

Mr.  FoRTAs.  What  year  was  this,  Mr.  Morris  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  In  1938.    That  is  in  the  question. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  recall  a  controversy  about  Mr.  Hubbard's 
article? 

Just  answer  that,  if  your  memory  serves  you. 

Mr.  Latiimore.  I  remember  not  exactly  a  controversy,  but  a  ques- 
tion of  whether  another  point  of  view  should  also  be  expressed. 

The  Chairman.  All  right. 

Mr.  ]\IoRRis.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  identify  that  document? 

Mr.  Mandel.  1  have  here  a  photostat  of  carbon  copy  of  a  letter  from 
the  files  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  dated  February  8,  1938, 
addressed  to  Dr.  V.  E.  Motylev,  20  Razin  Street,  Moscow,  with  the 
typed  signature  of  Owen  Lattimore,  and  the  initials  ECC,  in  the  upper 
lefthand  corner. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  Mr.  Mandel,  what  you  mean,  is  it  not,  is  that  you 
have  there  a  photostat  of  a  document  from  the  files  of  the  IPR?  Is 
that  correct  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Morris.  The  document  itself  was  a  carbon  copy  of  a  letter. 

Mr.  Mandel.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  I  show  you  this  document  and  ask  you 
if  you  recall  having  sent  it? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No;  I  don't  recall  having  sent  it.  But  I  obviously 
did  send  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  will  it  be  received  into  the  record. 

The  Chairman.  That  document,  as  I  understand  it,  is  a  photostatic 
copy  of  a  document  in  the  nature  of  a  carbon  copy,  found  in  the  files 
of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations. 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  right,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  The  witness  says  he  obviously  had  sent  it. 

It  will  be  received  into  the  record. 

(The  document  i-eferred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  534"  and  is  as 
follows:) 

Exhibit  No.  .534 

1795  California  Street, 
t^iin  Franciffco,  Calif.,  February  8,  1938. 
Dr.  V.  E.  MoTYi.Ev, 

20  Razin  Street,  Moscoiv. 

Dkar  Dr.  Motyi.kv:  Inuiiediately  on  receipt  of  .V(inr  letter  of  in  .Taniiai'y  I 
ciihled  yon  reqne.stini^  an  article  on  possibilities  of  constrnctive  international  ac- 
tion, to  be  considered  as  part  of  a  general  defense  auainst  inipei-ialist  and  fasciKSt 
aggression;  this  article  to  be  nsed  as  the  leading  contribntion  in  onr  June 
nnmbei-. 

I  hope  very  much  that  you  will  be  able  to  provide  such  an  article.  Naturally, 
I  have  suggested  only  geiuM'al  terms  :  the  particular  terms  are  for  you  to  decide. 
I  may  adcl  that  in  the  December  number  I  tried  to  set  a  tone  that  would  enccmrage 
such  articles  from  all  sf)Urces.  The  response  up  to  date  has  not  been  too  encourag- 
ing; therefore  it  will  be  all  the  moi-e  helpful  to  me  if  you  can  now  supply  the 
suggested  article. 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3435 

In  regard  to  L.  M.  Hubliard's  article.  I  have  carefully  noted  your  criticisms. 
I  am  sorry  that  I  seem  to  have  expressed  myself  clumsily  in  regard  to  the  question 
of  anti-Soviet  articles  in  Pacific  Affairs.  The  real  difiiculty  is  this :  the  member- 
ship of  the  IPR  is  predominantly  of  the  "democratic  nations."  These  nations 
continue  to  set  great  store  by  the  principle  of  free  speech.  Many  individual 
members  of  the  IPR  appeal  to  this  principle  for  the  purpose  of  criticising  the 
USSR.  If  I,  as  editor  of  Pacific  Affairs,  prevent  them  from  doing  so,  they  will 
criticise  Pacific  Affairs  as  "an  organ  of  Soviet  propaganda"  and  largely  destroy 
its  usefulness. 

Realization  of  the  urgent  necessity  for  promoting  all  that  is  really  democratic 
in  the  public  life  of  the  "democratic  nations,"  and  resisting  the  forces  that  favor 
imperialist  aggression  and  fascism,  is  only  gradually  spreading.  In  the  cir- 
cumstances the  only  wise  and  constructive  thing  for  me  to  do  is  to  favor  publi- 
cation of  positive  and  constructive  articles,  while  not  prevent'mn  entirely  the 
expression  of  negative  and  defeatist  views.  This  means  that  whenever  we  find  it 
impossible  to  prevent  publication  of  such  an  article  as  this  one  by  Hubbard 
we  should  at  least  make  sure  that  in  the  same  number  there  shall  appear  an 
article  which  deals  with  the  true  values  of  the  same  questions,  and  deals  with 
them  constructively. 

Now  as  to  L.  M.  Hubbard  bimself.  Of  course  I  do  not  propose  to  print  his 
article  simply  because  he  is  a  brother  of  G.  E.  Hubbard  of  Chatham  House. 
The  reason  that  I  find  it  difficult  to  reject  his  article  is  that  he  is  an  "expert" 
of  the  P>ank  of  England,  he  has  written  a  book  on  Soviet  finance  that  is  con- 
sidered authoritative  in  Great  Britain  and  America,  and  to  reject  his  article 
would  cause  the  majority  group  represented  in  the  Royal  Institiite  of  Inter- 
national Affairs  to  accuse  Pacific  Affairs  of  being  partisan — thus  damaging  its  in- 
fiuence  in  Great  Britain.  The  accident  that  this  Hubbard  is  a  brother  of  the  Hub- 
bard who  is  appointed  by  Chatham  House  to  be  in  charge  of  communications  with 
Pacific  Affairs  merely  increases  the  difficulty  of  dealing  with  the  situation. 

In  the  circumstances,  I  am  taking  the  following  course  of  action: 

(1)  I  am  deleting  from  the  article  one  of  its  most  objectionable  paragraphs. 
A  copy  of  the  article,  thus  revised,  is  attached  to  this  letter. 

(2)'  I  am  writing  to  G.  E.  Hubbard,  of  Chatham  House,  asking  him  to  with- 
draw the  article  altogether,  on  behalf  of  Chatham  House.  It  however,  he 
officially  insists  on  publication  of  the  article,  I  shall  have  to  publish  it,  in  our 
June  number. 

(3)  Finally.  I  urge  yon  to  write,  immediately,  a  reply  to  the  article,  to  be 
published  in  the  same  number.  This  must  be  received  in  New  York  not  later 
than  the  last  week  of  March.  It  will  be  used  only  in  case  Chatham  House  insists 
on  publication  of  the  original  article. 

In  concluding  this  letter  I  wish  to  concur  with  you  in  the  sentiment  that  at 
this  time  of  extreme  crisis  in  the  Far  East,  Pacific  Affairs  ought  to  find  more 
suitable  subjects  for  publication  than  anti-Soviet  articles.  To  the  best  of  my 
ability,  within  the  limits  impo.sed  on  me  by  the  different  national  bodies  which 
have  a  voice  in  the  conduct  of  Pacific  Affairs,  I  shall  publish  only  material 
which  emphasizes  the  true  issues  which  the  world  is  facing.  In  this,  the  USSR 
Council  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  can  come  to  my  aid  with  indis- 
pensable assistance. 
Yer.v  sincerely, 

Owen  Lattimore. 

The  Ch AIRMAN.  In  ofoino:  along  here,  we  have  not  attempted  to  nnin- 
ber  or  designate  tliese  documents.  They  .should  be  numbered  in  the 
record  when  the  record  is  ]~>ut  up.  They  should  be  numbered  or 
desiginited  so  that  they  will  have  some  designation. 

The  Chair  has  not  attempted  to  do  it,  bu^  it  must  be  done. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  Mr.  Chairman,  under  a  previous  order  of  the  Chair, 
these  documents  were  ordered  numbered  consecutively  as  introduced. 
They  have  not  been  marked,  however.  Avhich  T  think  is  what  the  Chair 
is  referring  to. 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  will  you  read  that  letter  commencing 
with  paragraph  3,  which  is  where  the  pertinent  reference  commences? 


3436  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr,  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

In  regard  to  L.  M.  Hubbard's  article,  I  have  carefully  noted  your  criticisms. 
I  am  sorry  that  I  seem  to  have  expressed  myself  clumsily  in  regard  to  the  ques- 
tion of  anti-Soviet  articles  in  Pacific  Affairs.  The  real  diflSculty  is  this :  The 
membership  of  the  IPR  is  predominantly  of  the  "democratic  nations."     *     *     * 

Mr.  Morris.  That  "democratic"  is  in  quotes,  is  it  not  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes ;  "democratic  nations"  is  in  quotes  [reading]  : 

*  *  *  These  nations  continue  to  set  great  store  by  the  principle  of  free 
speech.  Many  individual  members  of  the  IPR  appeal  to  this  principle  for  the 
purpose  of  criticizing  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  If  I,  as  editor  of  Pacific  Affairs,  prevent 
them  from  doing  so,  they  will  criticize  Pacific  Affairs  as  "an  organ  of  Soviet 
propaganda"  and  largely  destroy  its  usefulness. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  organ  of  Soviet  propaganda  is  in  quotes. 
]\Ir.  Lattimore.  Is  in  quotes,  yes  [reading]  : 

Realization  of  the  urgent  necessity  for  promoting  all  that  is  really  democratic 
in  the  public  life  of  the  "democratic  nations,"  and  resisting  the  forces  that  favor 
imperialist  aggression  and  fascism,  is  only  gradually  spreading.  In  the  circum- 
stances the  only  wise  and  constructive  thing  for  me  to  do  is  to  favor  publication 
of  positive  and  constructive  articles,  while  not  preventing  entirely  the  expression 
of  negative  and  defeatest  views.  This  means  that  whenever  we  find  it  impossible 
to  prevent  publication  of  such  an  article,  as  this  one  by  Hubbard,  we  should  at 
least  make  sure  that  in  the  same  number  there  shall  appear  an  article  which 
deals  with  the  true  values  of  the  same  questions,  and  deals  with  them  con- 
structively. 

Now  as  to  L.  M.  Hubbard  himself.  Of  course,  I  do  not  propose  to  print  his 
article  simply  t)ecause  he  is  a  brother  of  G.  E.  Hubbard,  of  Chatham  House. 
The  reason  that  I  find  it  difficult  to  reject  his  article  is  that  he  is  an  "expert" 
of  the  Bank  of  England,  he  has  written  a  book  on  Soviet  finance  that  is  con- 
sidered authoritative  in  Great  Britain  and  America,  and  to  reject  his  article 
would  cause  the  majority  group  represented  in  the  Royal  Institute  of  Inter- 
national Affairs  to  accuse  Pacific  Affairs  of  being  partisan — thus  damaging  its 
infiuence  in  Great  Britain.  The  accident  that  this  Hubbard  is  a  brother  of  the 
Hubbard  who  is  appointed  by  Chatham  House  to  be  in  charge  of  communications 
with  Pacific  Affairs  merely  increases  the  difficulty  of  dealing  with  the  situation. 

In  the  circumstances,  I  am  taking  the  following  course  of  action : 

1.  I  am  deleting  from  the  article  one  of  its  most  objectionable  paragraphs. 
*     *     * 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  what  that  paragraph  was? 
Mr.  Lattimore.  No ;  I  don't  [reading]  : 

*  *     *     A  copy  of  the  article,  thus  revised,  is  attached  to  this  letter. 

2.  I  am  writing  to  G.  E.  Hubbard,  of  Chatham  House,  asking  him  to  withdraw 
the  article  altogether,  on  behalf  of  Chatham  House.  If,  however,  he  officially 
insists  on  publication  of  the  article,  I  shall  have  to  publish  it.  in  our  June 
number. 

3.  Finally,  I  urge  you  to  write,  immediately,  a  reply  to  the  article,  to  be 
published  in  the  same  number.  This  must  be  received  in  New  York  not  later 
than  the  last  week  of  March.  It  will  be  used  only  in  case  Chatham  House 
insists  on  publication  of  the  original  article. 

In  concluding  this  letter,  I  wish  to  concur  with  you  in  the  sentiment  that  at 
this  time  of  extreme  crisis  in  the  Far  East,  Pacific  Affairs  ought  to  find  more 
suitable  subjects  for  publication  than  anti-Soviet  articles.  To  the  best  of  my 
ability,  within  the  limits  imposed  on  me  by  the  different  national  bodies  which 
liave  a  voice  in  the  conduct  of  Pacific  Affairs.  I  shall  publish  only  material 
which  emphasizes  the  true  issues  which  the  world  is  facing.  In  this,  the 
U.  S.  S.  R.  Council  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  can  come  to  my  aid  with 
indispensable  assistance. 
Very  truly  yours, 

Owen  Lattimore, 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  ^  3437 

May  I  comment  ? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  This  letter  begins  with  a  paragraph  not  yet  read 
into  the  record,  showing  that  I  had  received  a  letter  from  Mr.  Motylev, 
evidently  a  letter  criticizing  the  article  I  was  about  to  publish. 

Senator  Fergusox.  Had  you  submitted  it  to  Motylev  in  order  that 
he  could  censor  it? 

Mr.  Latiimore.  No  ;  not  for  censorship. 

In  the  course  of  the  usual  practice  of  Pacific  Affairs,  I  liad  circu- 
lated the  article  in  advance. 

Senator  Ferguson.  To  whom  did  you  circulate  those  that  were  pro- 
Soviet?  Who  in  America  censored  them  or  looked  them  over  for 
the  pro-Soviet  article? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  All  articles  were  circulated  to  those  who  might  be 
considered  most  interested,  in  the  first  place.  Many  of  them  were 
sent  additionally  to  people  who  might  be  considered  to  have  no  posi- 
tion one  way  or  the  other. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  not  an  answer  to  the  question. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  does  not  answer  my  question. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  not  an  answer  to  that  question  at  all. 

Read  the  question,  Mr.  Reporter. 

The  question  was  propounded  twice. 

Mr.  LA'riTMORE.  I  recall  only  one  article. 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  moment. 

(The  pending  question,  as  heretofore  recorded,  was  read  by  the 
reporter. ) 

The  Chairman.  I  think  there  was  more.    He  doubled  back. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  say  you  circulated  this  because  it  was 
anti-Soviet.  It  is  clear  from  the  letter  that  you  did  that.  I  want  to 
know 

Mr.  Lattimore.  In  the  same  way- 


The  Chairman.  Let  the  Senator  ask  his  question,  and  answer  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  To  whom  did  you  submit  pro-Soviet  articles 
so  that  they  could  be  censored,  or,  as  least,  criticized  before  they  were 
published  ? 

Mr.  Laitimore.  That  would  depend  on  the  content  of  the  article. 
Any  article  would  be  circulated 

Senator  Ferguson.  Suppose  it  was  an  article  criticizing  Russia, 
written  by  a  United  States  writer. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  An  article  criticizing  Russia  by  a  United  States 
writer  would  be  circulated  to  the  Russians,  also  to  the  British,  Chi- 
nese, Japanese,  and  so  on. 

Senator  Fergusqn.  Suppose  it  was  an  article  by  Soviet  Russia,  pro- 
Soviet.    Who  criticized  it  for  the  United  States  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  New  York  office  would  look  after  that. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Field? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  know  whether  it  would  be  Mr.  Field,  or 
who  it  would  be.  It  would  also  be  circulated  to  the  Japanese,  Chinese, 
British,  et  cetera. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  think  that  ^Ir.  Field  was  a  competent 
critic  to  determine  whether  or  not  an  article  should  be  changed  that 
was  a  pro-Russion  article? 


3438  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Mr.  Lattimore.  In  1938  I  thoii^dit  that  Mr.  Field  was  one  of  the 
critics  to  whom  such  an  article  might  be  circulated. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  ask  a  question? 

]Mr.  LA-rriMORE.  You  will  remember  that  in  the  record  there  was 
an  article  by  a  Soviet  contributor,  which  I  personally  disliked  very 
much  and  which  was  finally  put  in  because  the  Chinese  Council  said, 
"Oh,  go  ahead  and  print  it^  it  is  the  Soviet  i^oint  of  view  and  every- 
body knows  it  is'';  although  the  Japanese  continued  to  object. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  May  I  mquire,  Mr.  Chairman? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Just  a  moment. 

I  cannot  quite  understand  why  you  would  take  an  article  by  this 
Britisher  and  send  it  to  the  Russians,  which  is  in  effect  sending  it  to  the 
Russian  Government,  for  their  connnent  on  that  article  as  to  whether 
or  not  you  should  or  should  not  print  it. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  was  part  of  regular  practice.  It  was  the  same 
for  all  other  councils. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  you  had  stricken  out  one  anti-Soviet  para- 
graph, at  least  ? 

Mr.  Laitimore.  Which  was  undoubtedly  also  covered  in  my  cor- 
res|)ondence  with  the  British. 

This  is  only  a  part  of  the  record,  and  the  full  record  would  show 
my  correspondence  with  the  British  as  well. 

"Senator  Ferguson.  I  would  like  to  see  it  all. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  So  should  I,  Senator. 

The  Chairman.  The  question  was  asked  now  about  having  stricken 
one  out ;  that  is,  the  Soviet  phase  of  it,  at  least. 

Did  you,  or  did  you  not  in  the  letter  so  state? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  letter  so  states. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  said  it  was  the  most  objectionable,  indi- 
cating there  were  other  objectionable  ones  that  were  anti-Soviet.  But 
that  was  the  most? 

Mr.  LAT-riMORE.  That  was  evidently  my  opinion  at  the  time. 

And  may  I  add  that  this  was  undoubtedly  covered  in  correspondence 
with  the  British,  too. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  would  like  to  see  the  article. 

Mr.  Latitmore.  This  was  a  period  when  all  of  us  were  leaning  over 
backward  trying  to  drag  the  Soviets  into  more  contributions  to  Pacific 
affairs,  and  more  participation  in  the  Institute,  and  I  remember  clear- 
ly that  the  attitude  taken  was,  "Let's  get  the  Russians  out  of  this 
business  of  just  criticizing  and  stalling;  let's  get  them  to  make  some 
contributions  and  then  make  them  realize  that  they  are  getting  only 
the  same  treatment  as  other  peoi^le." 

You  can  see  that  this  whole  letter  is  an  attempt  to  explain  to  a 
Russian,  who  is  unfamiliar  with  the  practice  of  free  speech  and  criti- 
cism in  democratic  countries,  how  things  worked  and  that  Russia 
was  not  being  particularly  singled  out  as  an  object  of  anti-Soviet 
propaganda;  that  we  frequently  published  articles  unacceptable  to 
other  councils. 

This  was  recognized  practice  at  the  time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  you  had  a  pro-Soviet  article,  to  whom 
did  you  submit  the  article  so  that  an  anti-Soviet  could  appear  in  the 
same  edition? 

You  were  indicating  liero  that  you  were  going  to  do  that  on  the 
reverse. 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3439 

Mr.  LA-rriMORE.  I  referred  already  to  the  case  of  an  article — I 
believe  it  was  by  Voitinsky— which  attacked  both  the  Japanese  and 
the  Chinese,  and  I  asked  both  the  Chinese  and  the  Japanese  to  reply, 
A\hich  they  didn't. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  send  them  copies  of  the  articled 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  sent  them  copies  of  the  article  in  advance. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Mr,  Chairman,  may  I  inquire  \ 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  Was  it  not  your  understanding,  Mr.  Lattimore, 
that  the  Soviets  would  not  permit  the  editing  or  changing  of  their 
articles^ 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  question  was  brought  up  in  one  of  the  con- 
ferences at  Moscow,  and  we  were  still  then  in  the  frame  of  mind  that 
many  people  had  in  those  years 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  moment.  I  want  to  get  the  question.  1 
want  to  get  the  question  and  see  whether  you  are  ansAvering  it. 

(The  record  Avas  read  by  the  reporter.) 

The  Chairman.  The  question  was  what  Avas  your  understanding. 

Mr.  Laitimore.  My  understanding  is  that  quite  recently  Mr.  Chair- 
man, in  those  memoranda 

The  Chairman.  The  question  is  Avas  it  not  your  understanding,  re- 
ferring to  that  particular  time. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  My  understanding  was  that  the  Russians  had  made 
that  demand.  My  recollection  Avas  that  Ave  Avere  still  hoping  to  Avean 
them  aAvay  from  this  Soviet  rigidity  Avhich  has  since  become  more 
familiar  to  all  of  us. 

Mr.  SouRAviNE.  You  had  had  that  made  clear  to  you  in  the  con- 
ferences in  Moscow  in  1936.  that  the  Russians  would  not  permit  their 
articles  to  be  changed  or  edited  l 

Mr.  LAT'riMORE.  That  had  been  made  clear,  that  that  Avas  the  Soviet 
attitude,  and  Ave  had  not  accepted,  from  our  point  of  vieAV,  the  idea 
that  that  attitude  could  not  be  changed. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  ever  strike  out  of  a  Soviet  article  a  part 
that  you  thought  Avas  objectionable? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  I  did. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  produce  that? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  can't  produce  it,  but  I  remember  that  that  very 
question  came  up  in  the  case  of  the  article  by  Voitinsky. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then  Avill  you  produce  it  so  that  Ave  Avill  have 
it  here  on  the  record. 

The  Chairman.  Was  the  article  jiublished? 

Mr.  Latfimore.  The  article  was  ])ublished. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  IPR  Avould  be  able  to  do  that  for  you. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir,  I  don't  think  they  can  do  it.  You  have 
all  of  the  IPR  documents. 

Senator  Ferguson.  They  can  come  doAvn  here  and  look  through  the 
papers. 

The  Chairman.  The  IPR  must  have  it  if  it  Avas  published.  It 
must  l)e  in  the  files  of  the  IPR. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  remember  Avriting  to  Mr.  Carter  my  strong  ob- 
jections to  the  Avhole  tone  of  that  Soviet  article. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  Avas  not  my  question.  Did  you  strike  any 
of  it  out? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  struck  some  of  it  out. 


3440  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  produce  or  have  the  institute  pi^^ace 
for  this  record  what  you  struck  out? 

The  Chairman.  The  question  is  to  produce  the  article,  and  I  think 
it  calls  for  the  printed  article. 

Mr.  FoRTAs.  Senator,  may  I  inquire  whether  we  may  have  access 
to  the  IPR  files  in  vour  possession  for  the  purpose  of  searching  for 
that? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes,  you  can  look  through  them.  I  ask  the 
Chair  that  you  be  permitted  to  do  that. 

Mr.  FoRTAS.  Not  for  the  article.  The  article  would  not  show  what 
was  cut  out.     It  would  require  access  to  the  files. 

The  Chairman.  The  article,  he  said,  was  printed. 

Mr.  FoRTAS.  Yes,  but  it  would  not  show  what  was  deleted. 

The  Chairman.  But  he  could  designate  where  the  deletion  was. 

Mr.  SouRW^iNE.  Mr.  Chairman,  if  I  might  submit,  I  do  not  believe 
the  files  of  the  IPR  would  contain  editorial  material  of  Pacific  Affairs. 
Would  they,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  I  couldn't  tell  you. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Were  not  the  Pacific  Affairs  files  kept  separately? 

Mr,  Lattimore.  The  Pacific  Affairs  files  were  kept  separately  by 
me,  but  I  think  in  large  part  in  duplicate  in  the  New  York  office. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  You  have  made  a  point,  sir,  that,  as  Pacific  Affairs 
editor,  you  were  employed  by  the  International  Council  of  IPR. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  The  files  which  this  committee  has  are  the  files  of 
the  American  Council  of  the  IPR. 

Can  you  tell  the  committee  whether  your  files  of  Pacific  Affairs 
were  duplicated  in  the  files  of  the  American  Council  of  the  IPR? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  know,  Mr.  Sourwine,  whether  they  were 
kept  in  the  files  of  the  American  IPR  or  in  a  separate  file  box  in  the 
New  York  office. 

But  Pacific  Affairs,  the  handling  of  the  printing  and  distribution 
of  Pacific  Affairs,  was  done  from  New  York,  and  I  sent  copies  of  all 
manuscripts  and  correspondence  in  the  normal  course  of  operation  to 
the  subeditor  in  New  York. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  To  the  American  IPR  did  j^ou  send  such  manu- 
scripts and  correspondence? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  To  the  person  who  was  acting  as  the  subeditor  of 
Pacific  Affairs  in  New  York. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Who  was  that? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  In  those  years  I  think  it  was  Miss  Catherine  Porter. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  This  committee  is  interested  in  thb  relationship  be- 
tween Pacific  Affairs  and  the  American  Council  of  IPR  and  has 
touched  on  that  subject  before  and  understood  you  to  say  that  you 
were  making  a  clear  distinction  that  you  were  not  employed  by  the 
American  Council  of  IPR,  that  you  were  working  for  the  Interna- 
tional IPR. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  quite  right. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  If,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  your  correspondence  and 
records  of  documents  and  manuscripts  were  filed  with  the  American 
Council  of  IPR,  that  is  a  germane  and  important  point,  and  we  would 
like  to  know  what  your  best  memory  is  on  it. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  IVIy  best  memory  is  that  duplicates  of  all  corre- 
spondence and  manuscripts  were  sent  to  Miss  Porter  in  New  York. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3441 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  What  happened  to  the  original  ? 

The  Chairman.  Miss  Porter  was  with  whom  or  with  what  organi- 
zation, rather? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  She  was  with  the  IPR,  and  she  may  have  been — I 
couldn't  recall ;  the  records  will  undoubtedly  show  it — she  was  prob- 
ably working  part  time  with  the  American  Council  and  part  time  for 
the  Pacific  Council. 

Senator  Watkins.  May  I  ask  a  question,  Mr.  Chairman? 

The  Chairman.  Yes, 

Senator  Watkins.  Was  this  Hubbard  article  actually  published  in 
Pacific  Affairs  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes ;  it  was. 

Senator  Watkins.  Did  the  Russians  send  in  a  reply  to  it? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No;  as  usual,  they  didn't.  This  was  one  more 
case  of  our  trying  to  get  something  out  of  them  so  that  there  could  be 
equal  treatment.  I  think  that  article — I  may  be  wrong  in  saying  it — 
was  by  Voitinsky ;  that  article  that  we  published  was  on  railway  ques- 
tions in  jManchuria  by  a  Soviet  correspondent.  I  believe  that  was  the 
only  one  we  ever  got  out  of  them. 

Senator  Watkins.  You  asked  them  to  reply  and  send  it  in  early  so 
you  could  publish  it  in  the  same  number  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right,  and  they  never  sent  it. 

Senator  Watkins.  Suppose  they  had  sent  in  a  reply,  what  would 
have  been  your  action  witli  respect  to  that  reply  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  would  have  gone  straight  to  Chatham  House, 
among  other  councils.  The  top  carbon  copy  would  have  gone  to 
Chatham  House. 

Senator  Watkins.  Would  you  have  published  that,  with  the  others 
having  a  chance  to  criticize  and  tell  what  they  thought  about  the  reply 
article  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  would  have  been  subject  to  the  same  sort  of  back- 
and-forth  correspondence  between  a  number  of  councils  and 
individuals. 

The  Chairman.  The  question  is,  Would  you  have  published  it? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  publication  would  have  followed  exactly  the 
same  course  as  in  the  case  of  the  Soviet  article. 

The  Chairman.  The  Senator  wants  to  know  if  you  would  have  pub- 
lished the  article. 

Mr.  Fortas.  Could  we  have  the  question  read  back  ? 

Senator  Watkins.  I  did  not  think  I  asked  that,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  It  may  be  read  back. 

(The  record  was  read  by  the  reporter.) 

Senator  Watkins.  Would  you  have  published  it,  the  reply  without 
first  submitting  it  to  these  others  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Definitely  not. 

Senator  Watkins.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  you  were  rushing  him  to  get 
it  in  so  you  would  have  had  it  there  in  time.  You  would  not  have  had 
time  to  do  that,  would  you  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  wanted  to  get  it  out  of  him  as  early  as  possible ; 
but,  if  there  had  been  a  cable  or  a  letter  from  the  British  saying  that 
they  objected  to  it,  then  it  would  have  been  held  over  to  a  later  num- 
ber.   That  kind  of  thing  frequently  happened. 


3442  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Senator  Watkins.  As  I  got  from  this  situation,  you  were  right  up 
against  a  deadline,  and  you  would  not  have  time  to  do  all  of  this,  send 
it  around  and  have  it  circulated  around. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  We  always,  Senator,  tried  to  get  articles  as  early  as 
])ossible,  es])ecially  from  these  non-English-si)eaking  councils,  because 
they  were  always  falling  behind  deadlines,  and  we  were  usually  giv- 
ing them  a  deadline  ahead  of  the  real  deadline  so  as  to  give  ourselves 
a  little  margin  of  time. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Did  you  have  a  real  deadline,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No;  not  as  a  newspaper  regards  it,  sir.  With  a 
quarterly  magazine  there  is  always 

Mr.  SouKwiNE.  I  did  not  mention  newspaper.  Did  you  have  a  real 
deadline,  Mr.  Lattimore  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  We  had  a  flexible  sort  of  a  deadline. 

Senator  Smith.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  think  jVIr.  Sourwine  asked  a  ques- 
tion just  now  that  had  been  answered,  and  1  think  maybe  we  ought  to 
clear  it  up  now.  That  is  to  say  where  the  files  of  Pacific  Affairs  were 
located,  if,  indeed,  they  were  located  anywhere  else  except  at  the  Insti- 
tute of  Pacific  Relations. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  That  was  not  cleared  up.  Senator. 

Senator  Smith.  I  can  see  how  the  editorial  files  might  have  been  in 
Mr.  Lattimore's  possession  or  in  one  of  the  other's  ])ossession.  Why 
not  ask  Mr.  Lattimore  specifically  whether  or  not  the  files  that  would 
have  contained  the  original  articles  which,  when  compared  witli  the 
article  which  was  printed,  would  have  shown  what  was  deleted, 
whether  he  has  that  file  or  whether  he  knows  where  it  is. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  had  that  file',  and  I  think  I  can  tell  you  exactly 
what  happened.  I  kept  original  files  in  the  same  office  in  which  I 
worked  at  Johns  Hopkins. 

At  that  time  I  was  considered  half  time  with  Johns  Hopkins  and 
half  time  with  the  institute.  Then  I  left,  went  out  to  China,  did 
various  war  jobs,  came  back  to  Johns  Ho))kins.  and  did  not  want  to 
resume  the  editorship  of  Pacific  Affairs. 

I  remember  at  that  time  writing  to  the  New  York  office  and  saying: 
'"Here  I  have  a  lot  of  back  files  of  Pacific  Affaiis.  Do  you  want  them 
shipped  to  New  York  or  shall  I  junk  them  ^''  The  answer  was:  "We 
think  the  duplicate  files  here  are  sufficient,  so  yoti  can  just  junk  that 
stuff  you  have  in  Baltimore.'' 

Mr.  Sourwine.  What  do  you  mean  by  the  Xew  Yoi'k  office,  Mr. 
Lattimore?     The  New  York  office  of  what  ^ 

Mr.  LAT-riMORK.  The  Xew  York  odlce  of  IPK. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  The  International  Council  or  the  American  Council  ? 

Mr.  LA'rriMORE.  The  two  offices  were  together.  I  don't  recall 
clearly,  but  on  this  case  I  would  probably  have  written  to  Mr.  Carter 
as  secretary-general,  therefore  representing  the  International  IPR. 

Senator  Smith.  Well,  now,  were  those  files  actually  junked,  or  do 
yo\i  still  have  them  somewhere  in  your  office  '. 

Mr.  Latitmore.  No,  sir;  they  were  junked. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Is  it  your  o]:»inion,  sir,  as  the  former  editor  of  Pacific 
Affairs,  that  the  best  place  to  look  foi-  old  files  of  Pacific  Affairs  is  in 
the  files  of  the  American  Comicil  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  best  place  to  look  would  be  in  the  storage  files 
of  Pacific  Affairs.  Whether  they  have  been  amalgamated  witli  the 
American  Council  files  or  not  is  something  I  just  don't  know  about. 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  ^         3443 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  might  I  inquire  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  ceased  to  have  any  concern. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Who  wrote  the  headings  for  the  articles  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Sometimes  the  author;  sometimes  I,  myself. 

Senator  P>.rguson.  In  the  Hubbard  article,  who  wrote  it? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  recall. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  what  it  was? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  AVhat  the  article  was? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  The  article  or  the  heading  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  heading. 

Mr.  Fortas.  The  question  is  the  heading. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  There  are  two  articles  by  L.  E.  Hubbard ;  that  is, 
the  one  that  is  being  given  here — it  is  a  misprint — ^by  L.  M. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  one  of  October  1937. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  One  of  June  1938,  called  A  Capitalist  Appraisal  of 
the  Soviet  LTnion,  and  one  of  September  1938,  The  Standard  of  Living 
in  the  Soviet  Union. 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  did  you  get  the  article  from  Plubbard, 
the  one  A  Capitalist  Appraisal  of  the  Soviet  Union  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Published  in  June  1938?  I  don't  know  when  I 
got  it.     Maybe  several  weeks  ahead,  maybe  several  months  ahead. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  letter  to  Motylev  is  February  8,  1938,  and 
he  had  apparently  had  the  article  before  that.  Did  you  not  get  it 
around  October,  when  the  man  wrote  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Did  he  write  it  in  October  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  There  is  another  footnote  on  it :  "This  article 
was  written  in  October  1937." 

I  notice  that  tlie  editor  edited  this  even  in  the  article.  Apparently 
you  put  the  heading  on,  "A  capitalist  appraisal  of  the  Soviet  Union," 
and  your  first  footnote  is:  "This  article  was  written  in  October  1937." 

Your  second  footnote  is:  "In  1937  production  rose  to  1,000 
pounds — Ed." 

You  were  seeing  that  the  people  were  advised  when  the  article 
was  written.  He  had  written,  in  his  article,  1925,  667  pounds  of 
grain.     I  will  read  what  it  says : 

Since  Russia  has  always  been  self-suflScient  in  food,  the  average  consump- 
tion per  head  of  population  must  be  determined  by  the  production  per  head 
of  population.  The  most  important  constituent  in  the  total  food  supply  is 
grain.  Official  Soviet  figures  show  that  the  total  quantity  of  wheat  and  rye 
produced  per  head  of  population  since  1925  has  varied  as  follows :  1925,  677 
pounds  ;  1926,  731  pounds  ;  1927,  666  pounds  ;  1928,  590  pounds  ;  1929,  550  pounds  ; 
1930,  696  pounds  ;  1931,  503  pounds ;  1932,  480  pounds  ;  1933,  681  pounds  ;  1934,  672 
pounds ;  1935,  697  pounds.    This  is  an  average  of  about  632  pounds — 

Now  you  put  the  "2"  in  and  refer  down  to  your  own  footnote,  and 
you  make  this  memorandum :  "In  1937  production  rose  to  over  1,000 
pounds." 

Why  did  you  do  that  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Presumably  because  that  was  a  recent  statistic 
that  had  come  to  hand  since  the  author  wrote  his  article. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Where  did  you  get  it? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Presumably  from  the  New  York  office.  We  had 
several  people  there  doing  research  on  Soviet  economics,  and  so  forth. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  think  you  may  have  got  that  from 


3444  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Field  to  make  it  appear  that  these  figures  were  all  wrong  because 
it  was  a  capitalist  appraisal  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  doubt  it.  I  think  it  would  be  much  more  likely 
that  we  got  it  from  somebody  who  was  able  to  read  economic 
materials. 

Senator  Ferguson.  On  page  174  you  have  a  footnote  3  giving  differ- 
ent figures  than  he  gave. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  More  recent  figures ;  is  that  right  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  No.     You  give : 

Professor  Prokopovich,  in  his  Bulletin  No.  104,  published  by  the  Slavonic 
Institute  in  Prague,  gives  the  following  comparison  of  the  purchasing  power 
of  the  price  of  a  quintal  of  wheat  and  rye  in  1913  and  1932. 

The  item  that  you  corrected  was : 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  purchasing  power  of  the  peasants'  money  income 
now  is  less  than  prewar. 

Now,  to  contradict  that,  you  publish,  as  an  editor's  note,  something 
different. 

Mr.  FoRTAS.  Senator,  may  the  witness  see  that  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes;  I  am  going  to  show  it  to  him  later. 

Then  you  make  a  correction  on  page  177 :  "Figures  for  1936  include 
all  footwear,  for  previous  years  only  leather  footwear." 

Then  on  page  184  there  is  a  criticism,  or  this  sentence  is  used : 

The  greater  part  of  the  collective  farm  peasant's  income  consists  of  a  dividend 
in  kind  from  the  farm  produce  after  all  State  requirements  have  been  filled,  and, 
as  an  individual,  he  has  no  choice  in  the  policy  of  the  farm  nor  in  the  work  he 
must  do. 

You  have  carried  it  in  "6"  and  you  call  it  an  editor's  footnote.  You 
put  this  in : 

This  does  not  agree  with  the  account  in  Soviet  Communism,  a  New  Civiliza- 
tion, by  Sidney  and  Beatrice  Webb,  second  edition,  London,  1937 — Ed. 

How  do  you  account  for  that  correction  ? 

Mr.  LAT'riMORE.  I  suppose  somebody  had  found  this  other  statistic 
and  put  it  in. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Who  was  working  on  this  article  besides  you? 

Mr.  LAT'ruviORE.  I  have  no  idea  who  may  have  worked  on  it  in  the 
New  York  office. 

Senator  Ferguson.  This  article  annoyed  you  to  have  published  it, 
did  it  not;  it  was  quite  a  corn  to  you  to  have  to  publish  this  article? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir;  I  was  trying  to  avoid  a  break  with  the 
Soviet  Union.  I  was  trying  to  get  them  into  the  works  and  get  them 
to  participate  in  the  give  and  take  of  the  other  councils. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  not  do  the  best  by  these  footnotes  to 
appease  the  Soviets? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  would  not  say  so. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  would  not  say  so? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  do  not  think  that  last  quote  that  I  gave 
you,  No.  6,  was  an  appeasement  to  the  Soviets? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No;  I  don't  think  so.  I  think  it  was  an  attempt 
to  balance  tlie  article,  and  may  I  say  that  the  whole  such  editorial 
changes  were  referred 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3445 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  minute.  Strike  that  last  from  the  record, 
Mr.  Reporter.  When  you  are  asked  to  pause,  please,  Mr.  Lattimore, 
pause. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you  found  anything  in  this  record  so  far, 
and  I  am  excluding  yours  now,  on  the  part  of  Carter  or  Field  that 
has  been  pro-Soviet.  I  do  not  think  I  have  found  an  answer  from  you 
that  anything  was  ever  pro-Soviet. 

I  am  asking  you,  can  you  point  out  anything  that  you  have  heard 
in  the  record  by  Field  or  Carter  that  was  pro-Soviet? 

The  Chairman.  In  the  record  of  this  hearing? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes;  in  the  record  of  this  hearing. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No;  not  in  any  objectionable  sense. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Are  you  qualifying  it?  Objectionable  to  you? 
That  is  the  difficulty  in  this  hearing.  You  want  to  be  the  sole  judge, 
judge. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Senator,  I  merely  wish  to  be 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  am  not  asking  whether  it  is  objectionable.  I 
am  asking  whether  it  was  pro-Soviet. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir;  not  in  the  sense  of  furthering 

The  Chairman.  The  answer  is  "No"  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  answer  is  "No." 

Senator  Ferguson.  Even  the  letter  this  morning  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Even  the  letter  this  morning. 

Senator  Ferguson.  From  Carter  to  you,  about  the  invasion  of 
Finland  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  was  an  attempt  to  get  all  sides  of  a  ques- 
tion by  a  man  who  had  not  yet  made  up  his  mind.  I  don't  think 
that  can  be  called  pro- Soviet. 

Senator  Watkins.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Mr.  Lattimore,  you  were 
against  publishing  any  anti-Soviet  articles,  were  you  not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir;  I  was  trying  to  get  the  Soviet  people  to 
participate  in  the  working  of  the  institute. 

Senator  Watkins.  Let  me  read  you  this  sentence  from  your  letter. 

In  concluding  this  letter,  I  wish  to  concur  with  you  in  the  sentiment  that 
at  this  time  of  extreme  crisis  in  the  Far  East,  Pacific  Affairs  ought  to  find 
more  suitable  subjects  for  publication  than  anti-Soviet  articles. 

That  is  a  part  of  your  letter.     That  expressed  your  views. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  expressed  part  of  what  I  thought  was  a 
diplomatic  approach  to  these  rigid  and  unbending 

The  Chairman.  The  question  is,  did  that  express  your  views? 
Answer  that  question. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  expressed  my  attempt  to  be  diplomatic. 

Senator  Watkins.  At  that  time,  were  you  anti-Soviet  or  pro-Soviet 
in  your  own  views  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  As  best  I  can  recall,  Senator,  at  that  time  I  was 
not  pro-Soviet,  and  in  the  workings  of  the  institute  I  was  trying  to 
get  the  Soviet  people  to  participate. 

The  Chairman.  All  right ;  let  us  proceed. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  was  certainly  anti-Communist. 

Senator  Watkins.  I  had  a  question  there  with  respect  to  that. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  was  not  anti-Soviet  participation  in  the  institute, 
certainly. 


3446  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Senator  Watkins.  Did  you  realize  there  was  any  danger  from  a 
Communist  philoso]^]iy  and  the  Communist  progi'am  at  that  time? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  As  for  1938  I  did  not  consider  that  they  were  dan- 
gerous ;  no. 

Senator  Watkins.  And  when  you  said  that  you  agreed  with  this 
sentiment,  they  ought  not  to  publisli  anti-Soviet  articles,  you  would 
be  against  any  kind  of  an  anti-Soviet  article  that  might  reveal  even  a 
dangerous  situation  that  was  coming  up? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir;  I  was  trying  to  get  the  Soviet  people  into 
l^articipation  in  the  IPR,  and  for  that  purpose  I  was  willing  to  limit 
the  number  of  articles  that  were  direct  attacks  on  the  Soviet  until  we 
could  get  them  in  and  make  them  realize  that  they  were  not  being 
given  any  treatment  different  from  any  other  council. 

Senator  Watkins.  You  said  that  you  should  not  publish  these  anti- 
Soviet  articles. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Obviously  trying  to  placate  Mr.  Motylev  and  try- 
ing to  get  him  to  be  a  little  more  cooperative  than  he  had  been  in 
the  past,  or  ever  was  in  the  future. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  if  I  might  inquire  so  the  record 
will  be  very  clear  on  this.  If  you  changed  the  article  in  any  way  from 
the  author,  did  you  always  say  "Ed.,"  indicating  it  was  editor,  if  there 
was  a  footnote  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  sir.  I  not  only  did  that,  but  I  also  referred 
it  back  to  the  author  himself. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  try  and  show  us,  then,  the  corre- 
spondence showing  whether  or  not  these  footnotes  all  have  been  sub- 
mitted to  the  author  or  not  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  As  far  as  the  record  of  these  documents  may  show 
them,  I  will  certainly  try  to. 

The  Chairman.  As  I  understand,  the  record  of  these  documents 
and  the  record  that  he  kept,  let  us  see  if  I  have  this  clear,  the  files 
that  he  kept  have  been  destroyed.  Am  I  correct  in  that  assumption 
from  his  answers? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  files  that  I  kept  I  had  been  told  to  junk  because 
it  was  considered  that  the  duplicate  files  in  NeAv  York  were  sufficient. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Did  you  in  fact  junk  them? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes;  I  did. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  might  say  that  on  page  174  appears  " — Ed."  ', 
meaning  editor.  On  the  other  pages  there  are  uo  "Ed."  's  on  them  or 
" — Ed.,"  except  on  the  last  one  that  I  read,  where  I  read  the  "Ed.,"  on 
page  184. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  other  notes  would  be  the  author's  own  notes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then  wnll  you  get  us  the  correspondence  or  try 
to  find  the  correspondence  between  you  and  the  author  approving  the 
editor's  notes  ? 

Mr.  Latitmore.  If  they  can  be  found  in  the  files  yoti  possess,  I  will 
be  glad  to  try. 

Mr.  FoRTAS.  Senator,  so  the  record  may  be  clear,  do  I  understand 
that  it  was  the  first  footnote  and  the  last  footnote  to  which  you  re- 
ferred that  have  ''Ed."  and  the  other  ones  to  which  you  referred  do  not 
have  "Ed."? 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  did  not  read  "Ed."  on  those,  either, 
Mr.  SouRAviNE.  Mr.  Chairman,  if  I  may  intrude  here,  I  am  inter- 
ested in  the  witness'  suggestion  that  the  first  place  to  start  looking  for 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3447 

these  is  the  files  that  the  committee  has.  I  asked  the  witness  earlier 
if  he  felt  that  the  best  place  to  look  was  in  these  files,  and  I  understood 
his  answer  to  imply  that  he  did  not  think  so. 

I  would  like  to  ask  again,  sir,  do  you  think  that  the  most  likely 
place  to  find  remainino;  files  of  Pacific  Affairs  is  in  the  files  of  the 
American  Council  of  IPR,  which  this  committee  now  possesses? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  assume  that  you  had  all  of  the  files,  all  of  the 
back  files,  and  that  they  might  include  international  files  as  well  as 
xVmerican  council  files. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  If  we  do  not  have  international  files,  do  you  still 
feel  that  the  best  place  to  look  would  be  in  the  files  of  the  American 
council,  which  this  committee  has? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  As  I  said,  Mr.  Sourwine,  I  don't  know  anywhere 
else  to  look. 

Mr.  SouRwixE.  Do  you  have  any  resources  for  attempting  to  deter- 
mine what  became  of  those  carbons  which  you  were  told  were  adequate 
records  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  None  whatever. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  There  is  no  one  you  could  ask  what  became  of  them  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  could  ask  the  IPR  people  if  they  had  amalga- 
mated the  international  files  with  the  American  council  files.  May  I 
explain  why  I  think  so? 

My  understanding  is  that  those  back  files  had  been  moved  up  to 
]\Ir.  Carter's  barn,  partly  because  of  lack  of  space  in  the  Xew  York 
office 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Mr.  Lattimore,  pardon  the  interruption. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  not  an  explanation. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Did  you  not  testify  here,  sir,  that  you  had  no  knowl- 
edge about  those  files  being  in  the  barn,  or  where  they  were,  until  you 
read  in  the  newspaper  that  this  committee  had  seized  the  files? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right.  But  I  don't  think  that  alters  the 
explanation  I  was  just  giving. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  not  an  explanation  of  anything,  because 
you  do  not  know. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  think  there  is  a 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  moment.  I  am  not  going  to  argue  with  the 
witness,  and  I  do  not  want  the  witness  arguing  with  the  Chair. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  thought  the  record  showed  that  I  had  a  pertinent 
point,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Senator  Smith.  I  thought  Mr.  Lattimore  answered  a  question  I 
asked  him  if  he  had  been  in  the  barn,  and  I  thought  he  said  ''Yes.'' 

Was  that  before  or  after  the  documents  were  in  there  ? 

Mr.  Lait^'imore.  I  couldn't  even  tell  you  that.  I  don't  know  which 
year  they  were  moved  up  there. 

Senator  Smith.  Do  you  know  how  many  times  you  were  in  the 
barn  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Maybe  four  or  five  times. 

Senator  Smith.  Did  you  ever  have  any  conferences  or  meetings 
there  with  Mr.  Carter  or  anybody  else  in  the  barn  ? 

Mr.  La'i^itmork.  Yes.  Part  of  the  barn  was  fitted  up  as  a  sort  of 
conference  room. 

Senator  Smith.  That  was  with  respect  to  IPR  nuitters? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  was  with  respect  to  IPR  mattei-s,  and  I  be- 
lieve that  the  only  occasions  that  I  was  there  were  on  matters  of  the 


3448  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

International  IPR,  the  Pacific  council,  rather  than  the  American 
council. 

Senator  Smith.  You  never  saw  any  of  the  IPR  records  in  that  barn, 
the  question  Mr.  Sourwine  just  referred  to  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Well,  I  remember  there  were  file  cases  there,  but  I 
don't  know  what  was  in  which  ones.  I  know  that  Mr.  Carter  was 
planning  to  write  a  history  of  the  IPR,  and,  therefore,  he  would  have 
legitimate  reason  to  have  Pacific  council  files  there  as  well  as  Amer- 
ican council  files. 

Senator  Smith.  He  sort  of  took  over  that  job? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  After  he  retired  he  was  going  to  spend  some  time 
on  writing  a  history  of  tlie  IPR. 

The  Chairman.  Who  has  a  question  ? 

Mr.  Sourwine.  I  have  one,  Mr.  Chairman,  if  I  might  ask  it. 

The  Chairman.  All  right. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  You  destroyed  the  files  of  Pacific  Affairs,  is  that 
right,  Mr.  Lattimore  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  junked  them. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  What  do  you  mean  by  junked  them? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  told  my  secretary  that  we  didn't  want  these  files 
any  more,  and  would  she  have  the  janitor  take  them  out. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Where  was  this  at  the  time,  over  at  Johns  Hop- 
kins? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  At  Johns  Hopkins. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  When  did  you  do  this? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  think  in  1945  or  1946,  after  I  had  returned  to  the 
Hopkins  from  my  war  jobs. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Is  it  your  testimony  that  you  had  none  of  the  files 
of  Pacific  Affairs  in  your  possession  or  under  your  control  after  1946? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  When  these  files  were  junked,  as  you  say,  were  they 
taken  out  by  the  janitor  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  next  time  I  came  into  my  office  they  weren't 
there. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Do  you  know  what  was  done  with  them  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  haven't  the  faintest  idea. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  You  know  we  had  a  case  over  in  an  investigation 
before  the  other  body  where  a  witness  initially  testified  that  he  put 
certain  papers  in  the  wastebasket  and  later  on  he  said,  "They  didn't 
ask  me  what  I  did  with  the  wastebasket." 

Mr.  Fortas.  Mr.  Chairman,  could  we  have  a  few  minutes'  recess? 

The  Chairman.  We  will  recess  at  12.    Is  that  all  right? 

Mr.  FoRTAs.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  did  you  consider  this  article  by  L.  E. 
Hubbard  an  anti-Soviet  article? 

If  you  have  difficulty  answering  that  question,  I  call  your  attention 
to  the  last  paragraph  of  the  letter  we  have  been  discussing. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  think.  Mr.  Morris,  at  that  time  1  was  com- 
petent to  judge  an  economic  article  on  the  economics  of  Soviet  Russia. 
I  considered  it  an  article  that  the  Russians  considered  anti-Soviet. 

Mr.  Morris.  I  am  just  using  your  expression  of  anti-Soviet  there 
in  the  last  paragraph. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3449 

The  Chairman.  Eeacl  the  last  paragraph.  Read  the  first  sentence 
of  the  last  paragraph. 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

In  concluding  this  letter,  I  wish  to  concur  with  you  in  the  sentiment  that  at 
this  time  of  extreme  crisis  in  the  Far  East,  Pacific  Affairs  ought  to  find  more 
suitable  subjects  for  publication  than  anti-Soviet  articles. 

Mr.  IMoRRis.  Did  you  consider  this  article  an  anti-Soviet  article? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  considered  it  an  article  that  the  Russians  consid- 
ered anti-Soviet. 

The  Chairman.  The  question  is  did  you  consider  it  an  anti-Soviet 
article.    It  is  asking  for  your  own  consideration. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  consider  that  I  was  incompetent  to  judge  on  the 
subject.    Maybe  if  I  looked  over  the  correspondence 

The  Chairman.  That  is  the  answer. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  what  did  you  mean  in  paragraph  3  of 
that  letter,  that  criticism  of  Pacific  Affairs  as  an  organ  of  Soviet 
propaganda  would  largely  destroy  its  usefulness  ? 

Mr.  FoRTAS.  That  is  not  quite  the  quote. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  did  you  mean  by  that  ? 

Mr.  FoRTAs.  That  is  not  quite  the  quote. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  said  : 

If  I,  as  editor  of  Pacific  Affairs,  prevent  them  from  doing  so — 

that  is,  prevent  people  from  criticizing  the  U.  S.  S.  R. — 

they  will  criticize  Pacific  Affairs  as  "an  organ  of  Soviet  propaganda"  and  largely 
destroy  its  usefulness. 

You  Avanted  to  know  what  I  meant  by  that  ? 

Mr,  Morris.  What  did  you  mean  by  "that,  yes? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  1  meant  to  try  to  educate  the  Russians  to  an  under- 
standing of  the  practice  in  democratic  countries  that  if  you  publish 
pro  and  con  articles  you  are  not  necessarily  engaged  in  a  campaign 
against  some  one  particular  country,  something  that  we  never  got  them 
to  understand. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  identify  that  next  letter  ? 

Mr.  ]Mandel.  This  is  a  photostat  of  a  letter  from  the  files  of  the 
Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  evidentlv  a  photostat  of  a  carbon  from 
the  files  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  dated  February  10,  1938, 
addressed  to  a  Miss  Harriet  INIoore,  American-Russian  Institute,  56 
West  Forty-fifth  Street,  Xew  York,  N.  Y.     It  is  unsigned. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  is  the  address  of  the  letter,  the  mailing  address? 

Mr.  Mandel.  It  comes  from  129  East  Fifty-second  Street,  New 
York. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  this  the  address  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations 
at  that  time  ? 

Mr.  ]SL4lndel.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  moment  now.    I  want  Mr.  Mandel  to  testify. 

Is  this  a  photostatic  copy  of  a  paper  found  in  the  files  of  the  Pacific 
Relations,  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations? 

Mr.  Mandel.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  The  reason  I  raise  that  question  is  that  you  say 
"evidently."  I  want  to  clear  it  as  to  whether  it  is  or  is  not.  It  is; 
is  that  right? 

Mr.  Mandel.  It  is. 

88348— 52— pt.  10 12 


3450  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  will  you  receive  that  into  the  record 
inasmuch  as  the  first  parao;raph  in  this  letter  relates  to  the  controversy 
that  we  have  now  been  taking  testimony  on? 

The  Chairman.  Let  me  look  at  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  "Mr.  Chairman,  it  is  an  unsigned  letter,  but  it  did 
emanate  from  the  office  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations. 

The  Chairman.  It  is  addressed  to  Miss  Harriet  Moore,  American- 
Russian  Institute,  5(i  West  Forty-fifth  Street,  Xew  York.  Very  well, 
it  will  be  received  in  the  record. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  535"  and  is 
as  follows:) 

p]xiiiniT  No.  53.") 

129  East  Fifty-second  Street. 
Neic  York  City,  February  10,  1<J38. 
Miss  Harriet  Moore, 

Anicrican-Riissinri  Institute, 

56  West  Forty-fifth  Street,  Neiv  York,  N.  Y. 

Dkar  Harriet:  Has  Owen  Lattimore  written  you  about  Motylev's  protest  over 
the  Hubbard  article?  In  any  event,  here  is  a  copy.  Lattimore  feels  that  our 
relations  with  London  necessitate  our  publishing  Hubbard's  article,  but  we  are 
asking  Motylev  to  write  for  the  same  issue  a  re.ioinder.  Now.  Motylev  will 
probably  refuse  to  do  this,  so  Lattimore  and  I  are  considei'ing  getting  both  you 
and  Gradjansev  to  collaborate  in  the  most  penetrating  and  masterly  rejoinder 
that  can  possibly  be  produced. 

Before  starting  in  on  it,  however,  I  should  like  to  talk  with  you  so  as  to  get 
your  reaction  to  the  proposal. 

Tuesday  afternoon,  your  father  and  mother  put  on  a  swell  cocktail  party  for 
me  (or  rather  for  the  IPR)  at  the  Casino.  It  was  delightful  to  see  them  both 
and  to  see  your  brother.  You  will  probably  hear  from  the  family  as  to  who 
attended.  The  only  academic  people  were  Sam  Harper  and  Hazard.  Howard 
Vincent  O'Brien  of  the  Daily  News  was  there,  and  Mrs.  T.  Kenneth  Boyd.  As 
for  the  rest,  I'll  have  to  get  the  list  from  your  family  as  I  just  couldn't  rt>member 
the  names  of  everyone  that  I  met.  After  the  meeting  was  over.  Harper  and 
Hazard  endorsed  an  aside  that  I  made  with  reference  to  your  competency. 

At  luncheon  yesterday  with  Sewell  Avery.  I  took  the  same  line. 

I  wonder  wiiether  you  can  spare  a  little  time  to  see  me  on,  say,  Monday 
afternoon,  the  14th? 

Sincerely  yours, 


Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  will  you  read  the  first  paragraph, 
please? 

Mr.  Laitimore  (reading)  : 

Dear  Harriet:  Has  Owen  Lattimore  written  to  you  about  Motylev's  protest 
over  the  Hubbard  article?  In  any  event,  here  is  a  coi)y.  Lattimore  feels  that 
our  relations  with  London  necessitate  our  publishing  Hubbard's  article,  but  we 
are  asking  Motylev  to  write  for  the  same  issue  a  rejoinder.  Now,  Motylev  will 
pi-obably  refuse  to  do  this,  so  Lattimore  and  I  are  considering  getting  both  you 
and  Oradjansev  to  collaborate  in  the  most  penetrating  and  masterly  rejoinder 
that  can  possibly  be  produced. 

Before  starting  in  on  it,  1  should  like  to  talk  with  you  so  as  to  get  your  reaction 
to  the  proposal. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  at  that  time,  did  you  know  that  Harriet 
Moore  was  a  Communist^ 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No;  I  did  nol.  and  I  did  nol  consider  her  a  Com- 
numist. 

Seiuitor  Feu(!Uson.  Who  woidd  yoii  say  wrote  tliis  letter,  Mr.  Lat- 
timore, from  its  text? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  no  way  of  knowing. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3451 

The  Chairmax.  It  is  associated  with  your  correspondence  with  Mr. 
Carter,  is  it  not? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  strike  out  enouji:h  of  it  to  have  it  a])i)eas- 
iiio;  to  the  Russians,  with  your  editor's  notes? 

Mr.  Laitimore.  I  don't  think  the  editor's  notes  were  appeasin<«- 
the  Russians,  hut  apart  from  that ■ 

Mr.  Fortas.  What  is  tlie  question? 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  question  is,  did  they  ever  write  this  masterly^ 
))enetratiiio-,  penetrating-  and  masterly,  rejoinder  and  take  the  sting 
out  of  this  capitalist  article? 

The  Chairman.  That  can  be  answered  yes  or  no. 

Mr.  FoRTAs.  Senator,  I  do  not  think  so. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  ever  write,  yes  or  no?  # 

Mr.  FoRTAs.  Did  you  ever  write,  yes  or  no,  but  not  with  that 
addendum. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  am  going-  to  frame  the  ciuestions,  Mr.  Fortas, 
not  you. 

Tlie  Chairman.  You  are  not  going  to  i)ass  on  these  questions,  Mr. 
Fortas, 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  is  the  answer  to  my  c^uestion,  Mr.  Latti- 
more  ? 

The  Chairman.  Read  the  question  to  the  witness. 

(The  record  w^as  read  by  the  reporter.) 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  believe  any  masterly  rejoinder  was  ever 
written,  but  we  did  publish,  in  June  19o8,  an  article  called  The  Rate 
of  (xrowth  in  the  Soviet  Union,  which  might  be  considered  as  an  article 
balancing  the  Hubbard  article.  That  article  is  listed  by  A.  W.  Canniff, 
and  recently,  when  I  was  looking  through  copies  of  Pacific  Affairs,  1 
noticed  that  A.  W.  Canniff  was  described  as  a  pseudonym. 

That  may  have  been  the  result  of  this — this  pseudonym  may  repre- 
sent the  article  wdiich  is  suggested  in  this  letter.  But  my  recollection 
is  not  at  all  clear  on  the  subject. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Who  wrote  the  article  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Who  wrote  the  Canniff  article? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  was  trying  to  recall  that,  and  I  haven't  been  able 
to  recall  it.  When  I  saw  that  it  was  a  pseudonym,  I  searched  my 
memory  to  see  if  I  could  remember  who  it  was. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Why  would  it  be  written  by  an  alias? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  what  I  couldn't  imagine  at  the  time  I  saw 
it.    Now,  from  this  letter  here 

The  Chairman.  Which  letter  do  you  refer  to  now,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  am  referring  to  this  unsigned  letter  to  Miss 
Harriet  Moore  of  February  10,  that  it  may  have  been  a  joint  research 
article  done  by  Miss  Harriet  Moore  and  Mr.  Gradjansev,  and  that 
for  purposes  of  simplification  they  wrote  it  under  a  pseudonym  in- 
stead of  a  joint  name.    This  is  pure  speculation  on  my  part. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  it  appears  that  at  least  Miss  Moore  has 
refused  to  ansAver  whether  or  not,  when  she  was  working  on  this  job, 
she  was  a  Communist,  and  her  ground  assigned  was  that  it  would  tend 
to  incriminate  her. 

I  think  you  have  indicated  that  that  was  sufficient  proof  to  you  to 
jjrove  that  she  was  a  Communist, 


3452  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  would  certainly  raise  that  presumption  in 
my  mind.  But  as  I  have  also  said  quite  recently,  in  1938  I  had  no 
reason  whatever  to  consider  Miss  Moore  a  Communist. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Who  was  the  gentleman  there,  Gradjansev? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  other  was  Mr.  Gradjansev,  who  was  a  White 
Russian. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  know  whether  that  is  the  same  Mr.  Gradjansev 
who  was  dismissed  from  General  MacArthur's  headquarters  for  left- 
wing  activity  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  did  not  know  that  he  was  dismissed  for  left- 
wing  activity.    I  know  he  worked  for  a  while  under  SCAP. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  know  he  was  dismissed  ? 

Mr.  Latiimgre.  Xes ;  I  knew  he  was  dismissed. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  reason  did  you  believe  was  the  cause  of  his  dis- 
missal ? 

Mr.  Lathmore.  The  reason  I  heard  was  that  he  had  given  some 
cigarettes  to  some  Japanese.  He  was  a  man  who  didn't  smoke,  and 
he  used  his  cigarette  ration  to  give  to  some  Japanese  who  were  doing 
some  economic  work  for  him,  and  this  was  considered,  I  believe,  to  be 
black-marketeering. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  did  you  know  that  the  American- 
Russian  Institute  was  affiliated  with  the  Soviet  organization  Voks? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  been  asked  that  question  before,  and  I  did 
not  know  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  know  it  was  cited  by  the  Attorney  General  as 
a  subversive  organization,  the  American-Russian  Institute? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  had  heard  that,  and  then  I  heard  that  that  deci- 
sion had  been  revoked  . 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  identify  this  next  document, 
please  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  is  a  photostat  of  a  document  from  the  files  of 
the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  dated  February  24,  1938,  addressed 
to  Owen  Lattimore,  with  a  typed  signature  of  G.  E.  Hubbard.  It  is 
a  photostat  of  a  carbon  from  the  files  of  the  institute. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  I  offer  you  this  document,  and  ask  if 
you  can  recall  having  received  that  letter. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  recall  having  received  it,  but  obviously  I 
did. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  will  you  read  that  letter,  please? 

Mr.  Fortas.  May  we  have  a  copy  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  I  am  sorry,  we  do  not  have  copies  of  that. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  You  want  me  to  read  the  full  letter? 

Mr.  Morris.  Yes. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  This  is  dated  February  24,  1938  [reading]  : 

Exhibit  No.  536 

Deae  Lattimore  :  I  have  received  your  letter  of  February  8  about  the  articles 
by  my  brother  (whose  initials  by  the  way  are  L.  E.  not  L.  M.). 

It  is  my  first  sight  of  the  article  as  I  sent  the  only  copy  I  had  to  your  New 
York  office  as  I  explained  at  the  time.  As  it  now  stands  after  your  pruning, 
I  confess  I  can't  quite  understand  why  the  trouble  has  arisen.  Barring  the  last 
two  paragraphs,  which  verge  on  politics,  it  seems  to  me  a  thoroughly  unemotional, 
well-documented  and  slightly  overstatistical,  statement  of  economic  conditions 
in  Russia.  Whether  the  picture  it  gives  is  one-sided  only  a  very  well  informed 
person  can  tell ;  knowing  my  brother  I  am  perfectly  certain  that  there  is 
absolutely  no  intentional  distortion.    Any  criticistm  of  the  Soviet  system  by  a 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3453 

writer  brought  up  in  the  capitalist  school,  and  vice  vei'sa,  is,  I  should  imagine, 
likely  to  be  regarded  as  prejudiced  by  the  other  side,  but  I  find  it  hard  to  under- 
stand why  the  present  piece  of  work  should  be  classed  as  "anti-Soviet." 

I  should  have  thought  that  this  was  a  clear  case  for  a  "correcting"  article 
from  the  IPR  Soviet  Council  if  they  disagiee  with  the  writer's  factual  state- 
ments, his  interpretation  of  the  figures,  or  his  description  of  the  working  of  the 
collectivist  system.  If  Mr.  Motylev  had  contended  that  the  article  contained 
definite  misrepresentations,  and  was  in  a  position  to  show  that  this  is  so,  the 
same  question  of  principle  would  arise  which  we  considered  in  connection  with 
the  Asiaticus  article  in  the  June  1936  issue  of  Pacific  Affairs;  but  it  would 
almost  seem  from  the  quotations  you  give  from  his  letter  that  his  objection  is 
much  more  general  and  such  as  would  extend  to  any  critical  review  of  economic 
conditions  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  if  we  were  not  favorable  to  the  system.  If  so,  the 
question  of  excluding  such  contributions  from  Pacific  Affairs  is,  as  you  say,  one 
of  policy.  But  surely  one  of  policy  for  the  IPR  as  a  whole,  rather  than  for 
Chatham  House.  As  regards  Chatham  House  responsibility  our  view  would  be 
that  the  contribution  was  an  individual  one,  the  fact  that  it  went  through  me 
being  merely  the  result  of  my  attempt  to  fulfill  your  request  for  grist  for  Pacific 
Affairs  and  in  such  circumstances  I  am  sure  that  Chatham  House  would  not 
wish  to  accept  responsibility.  Macadam  and  I  feel  that  the  question  of  risk 
which  publication  would  imply  for  relations  with  the  Soviet  Council  can  only 
be  estimated  by  Carter  and  yourself  and  that  a  decision  on  this  point  could  not 
very  well  be  asked  of  our  committee. 

I  really  think  that  it  comes  back  after  all  to  the  question  of  editorial  prin- 
ciple, and  of  editorial  decision.  Obviously  no  one  would  want  to  see  the  rela- 
tions of  the  Soviet  with  the  IPR  torn  by  the  publication  of  anything  appearing 
in  Pacific  Affairs,  and  if  Mr.  Motylev  is  not  prepared  to  accept  the  article  as  an 
honest  attempt  at  analysis  by  an  informed  foreign  observer,  written  without 
political  arriere-pensee  although  from  an  admittedly  capitalist  viewpoint,  and 
to  counter  it  by  a  rejoinder  written  from  the  Bolshevik  standpoint,  it  may  be 
wiser,  as  a  matter  of  principle,  to  close  Pacific  Affairs  to  the  discussion  of 
Russian  internal  affairs  and  so  to  exclude  the  present  article.  I  should  hope, 
however,  that  Mr.  Motylev  would  consent  to  see  the  matter  in  that  light  and  to 
meet  criticism  of  things  in  his  own  country  just  as  we  had  to  meet  what  was,  I 
submit,  much  less  objective  criticism  of  ourselves  in  the  Asiaticus  article. 

I  am  not  referring  to  my  brother  as  he  is  really  not  concerned  with  IPR 
internal  politics,  so  will  you  deal  with  him  direct  as  and  when  necessary?  I  am 
afraid  that  he  was  not  warned  that  his  manuscript  would  have  to  pass  the  fire 
of  Moscow  criticism.  I  ought  no  doubt  to  have  remembered  your  practice  and 
told  him. 

Yours  sincerely, 

(Signed)  G.  E.  Hubbabd. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  that  be  received  for  the  record? 

The  Chairman.  It  will  be  inserted. 

(The  document  previously  read  by  the  witness  was  marked  "Ex- 
hibit No.  536"  and  was  read  in  full.) 

Senator  Ferguson.  May  I  ask  one  question  ? 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

Senator  Ferguson.  IVliat  was  the  name  of  the  man  or  the  writer 
that  wrote  tlie  counter-article  for  June  ? 

JNIr.  Lattimore.  Canniff. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  put  a  note  on  that.  You  seemed  to  know 
who  Andrew  W.  Canniff  was,  because  you  said  this,  and  you  have 
the  article  follow  the  Hubbarcl  article : 

Readers  of  Pacific  Affairs  are  accustomed  to  our  policy  of  printing  articles 
that  express  different  and  sometimes  opposite  points  of  view.  We  do  this  for 
something  more  than  the  interest  of  good  debate,  a  more  important  aim  of  our 
editorial  policy  is  to  let  our  readers  know  as  far  as  we  possibly  can  what  is 
really  happening  in  all  the  subjects  that  are  of  interest  to  the  Institute  of 
Pacific  Relations.  "We,  accordingly,  print  the  following  article  by  an  author 
who  uses  almost  exactly  the  same  figures  as  Mr.  Hubbard,  but  comes  to  an 
entirely  different  conclusion.  Mr.  Canniff  has  recently  been  studying  the  agri- 
cultural economics  of  both  the  Soviet  Union  and  Manchuria — Ed. 


3454  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  * 

You  said  that  yoii  knew  this  man.  He  had  been  studying  it.  You 
did  not  say  lie  was  writing  under  an  alias. 

Mr.  LA'rriMORE.  Yes,  I  did,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  In  this? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  is  in  the  list  of  authors  at  the  beginning  of 
the 

Senator  Ferguson.  In  this  note  you  did  not. 

Mr.  LA-rriMORE.  Not  in  the  note,  no.  It  was  in  the  description  of 
authors  at  the  beginning. 

The  Chairman.  My  recollection  is  that  you  said  this  morning  you 
did  not  know  who  this  w^as. 

Mr.  Laitimore.  I  said  that  I  didn't  recall. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Who  was  it? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  should  say  from  that  description  of  somebody 
who  had  been  studying  agricultural  economics  in  both  Kussia  and 
Manchuria,  that  it  was  probably  Mr.  Gradjansev. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  he  was  the  man  who  was  mentioned  in  the 
article  with  Harriet  Moore  to  write  the  masterly  piece? 

The  Chairman.  Is  that  right? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  somebody  else's  language. 

Senator  Ferguson.  To  prepare  the  masterly  rejoinder? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  somebody  else's  language,  not  my  lan- 
guage. 

The  Chairman.  We  will  recess  until  2  o'clock. 

(Whereupon,  at  12  noon,  the  hearing  was  recessed  to  reconvene  at 
2  p.  m.,  the  same  day.) 

AFTERNOON  SESSION 

The  subcommittee  reconvened  at  2  p.  m.,  upon  the  expiration  of 
the  recess. 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 

You  may  proceed,  Mr.  MoitIs. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  did  you  in  1945  recommend  Fred- 
erick V.  Field  as  a  person  to  work  with  the  Defense  Advisory  Com- 
mission of  the  United  States? 

Ml'.  Lattimore.  No,  I  don't  lielieve  I  did,  Mr.  Morris.  I  have 
seen  some  reference  to  that  possibility  in  the  transcript,  but  I  don't 
recollect  doing  so. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  identify  that  document,  please? 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  is  a  jihotostat  of  a  document  from  the  files  of 
the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  on  the  letterhead  of  Pacific  Alfairs, 
Telei)hone:  University  0100,  extension  48,  appearing  in  upper  right 
hand  corner,  and  Please  Address  Reply  to:  300  Gilman  Hall,  Johns 
Hopkins  University,  Baltimore,  Md.,  api)earing  under  letterhead  of 
Pacific  Affairs,  dated  SeptemV)er  10,  11)40,  addressed  to  Mr.  Fred- 
erick V.  Field,  signed  Owen  Lattimore. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  I  offer  you  that  letter  and  ask  if  you 
recall  having  written  it? 

Mr.  Latitmore.  No,  I  doirt  recall  having  written  this. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  that  your  signature? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  my  signature.     I  must  have  written  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  will  you  read  that  letter,  please? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  This  is  to  Frederick  V.  Field. 

The  Chairman.  What  is  the  date  of  it  ? 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3455 

Mr.  Lattimoke.  Dated  September  10,  1940.     [Reading:] 

ExHiRiT  No.  .")3T 

Dear  Fred  :  This  morning  a  Mr.  S.  Taylor  Ostrander,  of  room  303,  1424  K 
Street.  Washington,  D.  C,  rang  me  up  to  asli  where  to  get  hold  of  an  economist 
competent  to  deal  with  .Japanese  wartime  fiscal  policies.  I  at  once  gave  him  your 
name  and  told  him  that  on  account  of  getting  the  new  edition  of  the  Economic 
Handbook  ready  for  publication,  you  would  be  in  touch  with  the  right  people. 

He  said  that  he  already  had  you  on  his  list  to  ring  up,  and  went  on  to  ask 
about  other  people.  I  think  I  forgot  to  say  at  the  beginning  of  this  letter  that 
he  is  connected  with  one  or  another  branch  or  su!)division  of  the  Defense  Ad- 
visory Commission.  I  then  gave  him  Grajdanzev's  name,  as  l)eing  both  a  trained 
economist  and  currently  working  in  original  .Japanese  material.  I  pointed  out 
that  for  his  purposes  the  fact  that  Gra.jdanzev  does  not  yet  have  his  citizenship 
might  be  a  barrier,  but  he  told  me  that  in  some  cases  they  proceed  by  appointing 
someone  to  a  general  job,  with  salary  allowances  for  taking  on  assistants  for 
such  purposes  at  this. 

Yours  very  sincerely, 

[s]  Owen  Lattimore. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Cliairniaii.  may  it  be  received  into  the  record? 

The  Chairman.  It  may  be  received  into  the  record. 

(Tlie  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  537"  and 
was  read  in  fulL) 

The  Chairman.  What  is  that  other  name  there? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Grajchinzev. 

The  Chairman.  Who  was  he  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  He  was  the  man  referred  to  this  morning,  a  White 
Russian,  who  was  at  that  time  in  New  York.  And  I  tliink  he  was 
doing  some  work,  maybe  part  time  or  for  the  IPR. 

Mr.  Morris.  Was  what  you  wrote  to  Mr.  Fiekl  tliere  the  truth, 
Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Why,  yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Manclel,  will  you  identify  that  document  for  the 
record  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  is  a  photostat  of  a  document  from  the  files  of  the 
Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  on  the  letterhead  of  tlie  Institute  of 
Pacific  Relations,  headed  "E.  C.  C.  from  A.  G. — copies  to  O.  L.  and 
M.  F."    It  is  undated. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  be  this  be  read  into  the  record? 

The  Chairman.  I  would  like  to  have  the  initials  identified. 

Is  anyone  competent  to. identfy  them? 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  on  the  basis  of  your  experience  with 
the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  could  you  tell  us  who  used  the 
initials  E.C.C J 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Mr.  E.  C.  Carter. 

Mr.  Morris.  A.  G.? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  A.  G.  would  be  Andrew  Grajdanzev,  I  think. 

Mr.  Morris.  O.  L.  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Myself. 

Mr.  Morris.  M.  F.  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Miriam  Farley,  I  think. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  could  I  ask  on  this  recommen- 
dation of  Field,  of  September  10,  1940? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  We  have  had  some  difficulty  in  getting  an 
answer,  Mr.  Lattimore,  as  to  just  when  you  came  to  the  conclusion 


3456  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

that  Field  was  a  Communist.  You  said  in  your  statement  that  it  was 
in  the  forties. 

Did  you  withdraw  any  of  these  recommendations  after  you  came 
to  the  conclusion  that  he  was  a  Communist,  or  did  you  let  them  stand  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Excuse  me,  Senator,  this  is  not  a  recommendation 
of  Mr.  Field  for  an  intelligence  job. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  are  writing  to  Field : 

I  at  once  gave  him  your  name  and  told  him  that  on  account  of  getting  the 
new  edition  of  the  Economic  Handbooli  for  publication,  j-ou  would  be  in  touch 
with  the  right  people. 

You  mean  for  somebody  else  to 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  thought  that  Field  would  know  I'etter  than  I 
would  who  was  competent  to  work  with  Japanese  wartime  fiscal  policy. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  then  did  you  think  that  Field  at  that  time, 
as  a  Communist,  would  be  a  proper  person  to  get  them  in  touch  with 
the  Communists  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  believe  that  on  September  10,  1940,  I 
thought  Mr.  Field  was  a  Communist. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Can  you  give  us  the  date  when  you  did  come  to 
that  conclusion  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir.  I  can  only  come  to  the  conclusion  on  the 
basis  of  my  present  knowledge  and  recollections  that  Mr.  Field  prob- 
ably became  a  Communist  in  the  1940's  sometime. 

The  Chairman.  That  is,  you  came  to  the  conclusion  in  the  forties. 
I  think  you  stated  in  your  statement — see  if  I  quote  you  correctly 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  don't  think  so.  Senator. 

The  Chairman.  When  did  you  come  to  the  conclusion? 

I  think  this  question  has  been  asked  and  answered  two  or  three  times. 

When  did  you  come  to  the  conclusion  that  Mr.  Field  was  a  Com- 
munist ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  am  now  of  the  conclusion  that  he  became  a  Com- 
munist probably  sometime  in  the  1940's,  but  I  don't  know  when  I 
first  came  to  that  conclusion. 

The  Chairman.  Have  you  no  way  of  telling  this  committee  when 
you  came  to  that  conclusion  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  All  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Let  me  see  the  Harriet  Moore  letter  of  this 
morning. 

Mr.  Lattimore,  this  was  the  same  man  that  you  had  recommended, 
you  had  recommended  Grajdanzev's  name,  and  he  was  the  one  who 
was  being  recommended  to  "prepare  the  most  penetrating  and  mas- 
terly rejoinder  that  can  possible  be  produced  to  the  anti-Communist 
article  by  Hubbard."  And  it  was  put  in  your  magazine  in  June  of 
1938;  is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  recommendation  and  the  wording  are  not  mine, 
Senator. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  not  the  question  now.  Listen  to  the 
question. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  he  is  the  same  man  who  was  recommended 
for  that  job  and  did  write  the  pro-Soviet  article. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  cannot  accept  your  characterization  of  that  article 
as  pro-Soviet,  Senator. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3457 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  realize  that  you  have  said  that  you  see  nothing, 
you  have  not  seen  anything  pro-Soviet. 

But  is  not  that  what  you  were  telling  Molotov,  that  if  that  article 
went  in,  in  effect  you  would  try  and  get,  allow  him  to  write  an  article? 

And  then  the  facts  come  out  here  that  someone  is  writing  Harriet 
Moore,  who  turns  out  to  be  a  Communist,  and  to  get  Harriet  Moore 
to  get  this  gentleman  to  write  "the  most  penetrating  and  masterly 
rejoinder  that  can  possibly  be  produced." 

And  you  put  the  headline  on  this  article  by  Hubbard  that  was  a 
capitalist  article,  and  you  followed  it  with  this  article  that  was  sup- 
posed to  carry  out  what  you  had  in  mind  with  the  Soviets,  of  having 
a  counterarticle. 

Would  not  that  make  it  pro-Soviet  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

The  Chair3iax.  The  answer  is  no. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  ISIay  I  explain  ? 

I  asked  the  Soviet  Council  to  put  in  an  article  of  their  own,  which 
would  obviously  have  been  pro-Soviet.  Failing  that,  I  w^anted  to  get 
an  article  that  would  present  another  treatment  of  the  same  material 
used  by  Mr.  Hubbard,  and,  as  far  as  my  intentions  were  concerned, 
they  were  not  to  produce  an  article  that  would  be  Soviet  propaganda, 
or  anything  of  the  kind. 

I  had  at  that  time  no  reason  whatever  to  suppose  that  Harriet 
Moore  was  Communist,  and  I  had  no  reason  whatever  to  suppose  that 
Grajdanzev  was  Communist,  or  pro-Communist. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  revert  back — I  do  not  like  to  do 
this — to  previous  testimony? 

The  Chairman.  All  right. 

;Mr.  Morris.  But  on  Friday,  a  letter  written  by  Mr.  Field  to  Mr. 
Lattimore,  dated  October  3,  1939,  was  presented  to  Mr.  Lattimore  on 
the  general  bearing  of  whether  he  knew  at  that  particular  time  that 
Field  was  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party,  or  connected  with  the 
Communist  movement  ideologically. 

Mr.  Lattimore  read  Mr.  Field's  letter,  which  contained  the  following 
paragraphs : 

If  I  were  to  try  and  work  out  my  own  thoughts  on  Soviet  policy  I  think  I 
should  start  by  attempting  to  compare  the  conditions  of  the  present  war,  the 
second  imperialist  war,  with  those  of  the  first  imperialist  war.  I  should  first 
say  that  both  wars  were  similar  in  that  they  were  imperialist  wars,  in  the 
Marxist  sense  of  the  word.  I  should  immediately  add,  however,  that  they  con- 
tained an  essential  difference,  the  difference  being  the  concrete  existence  of  the 
Soviet  Union  with  21  or  22  years  of  revoluntionary  experience  now  as  con- 
trasted with  its  nonexistence  during  the  first  war. 

The  next  stop  would  be,  I  believe,  to  recall  the  slogans  of  revolutionary  groups 
during  the  first  war ;  namely,  to  transfer  the  imperialist  war  into  a  civil  war 
or  into  a  series  of  civil  wars.  This  object  came  off  only  in  Czarist  Russia  dur- 
ing the  last  war,  though  pretty  substantial  attempts  were  made  in  a  number  of 
other  countries.  I  judge  that  the  slogan  of  the  present  war  is  exactly  the  same, 
but  that  again  the  concrete  existence  of  the  Soviet  Union  makes  its  application 
in  the  present  war  something  quite  different  than  in  1914-18.  The  problem  to- 
day from  a  revoluutionax-y  point  of  view  is  the  same  as  it  was  in  1914 ;  the  Brit- 
ish must  get  rid  of  their  Chamberlains,  the  Germans  of  their  Hitlers,  the  French 
of  their  Daladiers.  But  this  time  the  Soviet  Union  operates  as  a  powerful  and 
concrete  force  to  aid  in  these  civil  war  efforts. 

The  Chairman.  ^Vliose  letter  is  that? 

Mr.  INIoRRis.  Mr.  Field  to  Mr.  Lattimore,  Mr.  Chairman. 

At  the  time,  as  I  recall,  we  presented  this  letter  to  Mr.  Lattimore. 


3458  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

He  conceded  that  his  memory  was  wrong  by  several  years  in  his  esti- 
mate that  Field  was  a  Communist. 

Mr,  FoRTAs.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  we  see  that  transcript? 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  moment,  Mr.  Fortas. 

Mr.  Fortas,  the  Chair  and  you  got  along  pretty  well  for  about  7  or 
8  days.    We  hope  we  will  get  along  for  the  rest  of  this  time. 

Mr.  Fortas.  I  join  you  in  that  hope,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Just  a  moment,  Mr.  Lattimore.  I  think  Mr.  Morris  sent  for  the 
transcript. 

Mr.  Morris.  I  think  we  can  get  on  while  we  are  waiting  for  that, 
Mr.  Chairman,  to  save  time. 

The  Chairman.  The  transscript  should  be  here  and  his  answer 
should  be  read  back  to  him. 

Mr.  Morris.  The  question  is  on  page  5149  of  the  transcript. 

Mr.  Lattimore,  perhaps  you  will  read  it,  commencing  with  the 
question  put  to  you  by  Mr.  Morris. 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

Mr.  Lattimore,  when  you  received  that  letter 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  the  letter  that  I  had  just  read,  is  it  not,  Mr. 
Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore,  That  is  right  [reading] — 

did  you  consider  that  that  was  evidence  that  Mr.  Field  had  vigorous  Com- 
ninist  sympathies? 

Mr.  Lattimoke.  I  don't  remember  receiving  the  letter,  and  my  recollection  has 
been  that  I  began  to  think  that  Mr.  Field  was  a  close  fellow  travelei-  of  the 
Russians  at  the  time  of  the  American  Peace  Mobilization,  which  I  think  was 
1941.  Wasn't  it?  But  judging  from  this  letter,  my  memory  was  in  error  by 
about  2  years. 

Mr,  Morris,  In  other  words,  you  knew  he  had  these  vigorous  pro- 
Communist  sympathies  in  1939? 

Mr,  Lattimore,  That  is  what  I  said  at  that  time,  Mr,  Morris,  I 
thought  the  matter  over  subsequently,  and  it  seems  to  me  that  1  ought 
not  to  go  too  far  in  characterizing  my  very  vague  recollections  of  that 
time  years  ago. 

It  seems  to  me  that,  reading  again  this  letter  of  Mr,  Field's  to  me, 
that  an  equally  possible  explanation  is  that  I  might  have  thought  at 
the  time  that  tliis  was  just  another  example  of  an  American  intellectual 
interested  in  Russian  problems  indulging  in  the  kind  of  amateur  in- 
terpretation of  ideology  that  has  since  become  such  a  prevalent  habit. 

Mr.  Morris.  In  other  words,  Mr.  Lattimore,  you  want  to  change 
your  testimony  of  last  Friday;  is  that  right? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  should  like  to  amend  my  testimony  to  that  extent, 
to  say  that  my  recollection  of  Avhat  I  thought  at  the  time  is  not  at  all 
clear. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Lattimore,  we  have  been  in  these  hearings  now 
some  7  or  8  days.  You  realize  that  during  all  of  that  time  and  now  you 
are  under  oath? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  Senator,  I  do. 

1  also  realize  that  many  pieces  of  evidence  have  been  presented  to 
me  in  many  ways  with  other  people's  phrasings  and  wordings,  and 
that  under  the  i)ressure  of  cross-examining,  I  may  at  times  have  ad- 
mitted to  using  other  people's  words  and  saying  things  that  I  didn't 
quite  mean  myself,  or  that  I  would  have  said  if  I  had  had  time  for 
mature  consideration,  or  if  I  had  been  less  fatigued. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3459 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  that  brings  us  to  the  question 
that  you  expect  this  body  to  pass  upon  the  question  and,  with  tliis 
statement,  how  are  we  going  to  tell  whether  you  are  telling  the  truth, 
or  not,  either  from  fatigue  or  a  willful  intent  not  to  tell  it? 

What  are  we  going  to  do?  Are  we  going  to  sit  here  for  8  days  and 
now  have  you  tell  us  that  you  are  not  responsible  for  what  you  have 
told  us?    Is  that  what  you  want  to  tell  us  now? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  Senator.  I  am  merely  saying  that  after  many 
days  of  interrogation  about  matters  that  happened  many  years  ago, 
I  am  not  at  all  surprised  that  I  should  have  become  somewhat  con- 
fused in  my  recollections,  and  I  don't  wish  to  nuake  too  strong  a  claim 
that  my  recollection  of  periods  so  long  ago  is  accurate. 

The  Chairman.  You  have  no  doubt  that  Field  is  a  Connnunist 
now,  have  you  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  believe  he  probably  is,  Senator. 

The  Chairman.  Allien  did  you  come  to  that  conclusion?  Now  let 
us  go  backward. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  As  I  said,  I  don't  remember  exactly  when  I  came 
to  that  conclusion. 

The  Chairman.  Then  the  date  that  you  gave  us  in  your  first 
answer  may  be  just  as  correct  as  that  which  you  are  giving  us  now; 
is  not  that  right? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  think  I  would  like  to  stand  on  my  statement  in 
the  record.  Senator,  in  my  prepared  statement. 

The  Chairman.  Which  statement  do  you  wish  to  stand  on? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  In  my  prepared  statement,  page  14,  that  I  have 
no  doubt  he  became  one  during  the  1940's. 

The  Chairman.  Which  statement  do  you  wish  to  stand  on?  The 
one  that  you  gave  last  Friday,  which  you  read  back,  or  the  one  that 
you  gave  today  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  one  that  I  read  back  was  an  admission  that  my 
memory  might  have  been  in  error  by  a  couple  of  years.  It  may  have 
been  in  error  by  a  couple  of  years,  or  it  may  have  been  in  error  by 
more  than  that. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  is  it  that  you  want  to  change 
your  testimony  because  you  are  confronted  with  this  letter  of  recom- 
mending  

Mr.  L-vnTMORE.  No,  sir;  this  letter  is  not  a  letter  recommending 
Mr.  Field.    This  is  a  letter  stating  that  Mr.  Field 

Senator  Ferguson.  Wait  a  minute.  Recommending  that  they  get 
in  touch  with  Mr.  Field  to  get  someone  to  work  on  the  Defense  Ad- 
visory Connnission? 

You  would  not  say,  would  you,  that  a  Communist  was  a  proper 
person  to  recommend  someone  in  1940  to  work  on  the  Defense  Ad- 
visory Commission  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Senator,  I  would  think — I  don't  know  what  I 
thought  at  that  time. 

The  Chairman.  What  do  you  say  now? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  think  it  now  ? 

The  Chairman.  What  do  you  say  now?    That  is  the  question. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  May  I  state  rather  carefully  what  I  think  now  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  hope  everything  you  say  is  stated  carefully. 

INIr.  Lattimore.  What  I  think  now  is  that  the  intelligence  services 
of  the  United  States  are  entitled  to  make  use  of  any  individual,  any 


3460  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

source  of  information  that  they  may  think  valuable  to  themselves 
under  such  conditions  of  security  as  the  intelligence  services  may  de- 
vise, which  an  outsider  like  myself  cannot  lay  down. 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  Mr.  Morris. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  continue  to  read  the  document? 

Mr.  Mandel.  I  am  reading  from  the  document  marked  "E.  C.  C. 
from  A.  G.,  copies  to  O.  L.  and  M.  F." 

(Exhibit  No.  538) 

{ International  Secretariat) 

Institute  of  Pacific  Relations, 
1  East  5-',th  Street,  New  York  22,  N.  Y. 
Tile  following  telegram  appeared  in  the  Soviet  newspaper  Trud,  but  prob- 
ably appeared  also  in  Pravda  and  Izvestia   (we  do  not  have  the  numbers  of 
these  two  from  August  29)  : 

[Trud,  August  29,  p.  4] 
Lattimore  on  the  National  Policy  of  the  Soviet  Union 

New  York,  August  27  (TASS) — In  the  magazine  Far  Eastern  Survey  there 
appeared  an  article  by  Lattimore,  the  Director  of  the  School  of  International 
Relations,  who  accompanied  Wallace  during  his  recent  trip  to  the  Soviet  Union 
and  China,  on  the  basis  of  his  personal  observations  Lattimore  regards  highly 
the  Soviet  national  policy  (policy  in  respect  to  the  nationalities),  observing  that 
from  the  moment  of  the  establishment  of  the  Soviet  regime  all  nationalities 
of  the  Middle  Asia  and  other  regions,  formerly  oppressed,  received  an  oppor- 
tunity to  develop  widely  their  economy,  national  culture,  language,  and  so  on. 
Lattimore  describes  the  present  prosperity  of  the  so-called  backward  peoples 
prosecuted  pitilessly  under  Czarism. 

Lattimore  points  out  that  his  knowledge  of  the  Russian  and  Mongolian 
languages  permitted  him  to  talk  with  Many  Kazakhs,  Buriato-Mongols,  Turko- 
mans, and  representatives  of  other  nationalities,  and  from  these  conversations 
he  obtained  valuable  information  that  shows  welfare  and  prosperity  of  these 
peoples  freed  by  the  Soviet  Constitution. 

Lattimore  compares  the  position  of  the  national  minorities  in  the  Middle  Asia 
in  the  Czarist  time  and  under  the  present  regime.  As  an  example,  Lattimore 
gives  the  fact  that  Kazakhstan,  a  country  populated  formerly  by  the  nomads, 
now  became  an  industrialized  country  which  has  its  own  industry,  own  engi- 
neers, and  a  large  percentage  of  the  Stakanovites  among  the  workers. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  what  role  did  Mr.  Grajdanzev  play  in 
this  kind  of  transaction?  Did  he  read  the  Soviet  press  and  find 
favorable  references  to  you  and  passed  them  on  to  you  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  would  like  to  see  this,  but  there  is  no  hurry 
about  it. 

I  have  very  little  knowledge  of  what  Mr.  Grajdanvez's  work  was  at 
that  time.  My  general  recollection  is  that  he  was  working  on  such 
Russian  language  materials  as  the  IPR  had  available. 

Mr.  Morris.  Was  it  a  practice  of  his  to  notify  you  of  any  such 
favorable  references  in  the  Soviet  press  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Certainly  not  a  practice.  I  presume  that,  as  a 
friend  of  mine,  if  he  ran  across  something  that  would  interest  me  he 
would  send  it  to  me. 

I  should  like  very  much  to  ask  for  the  text  of  my  original  article  in 
Far  Eastern  Survey,  because,  from  my  hearing — and  I  have  not  yet 
read  it — of  that  Soviet  extract  there,  I  should  say  that  it  is  obviously 
not  a  straight  quotation  from  what  I  wrote,  but  partial  quotations  in- 
terwoven with  phrases  put  in  by  the  Soviet  writer. 

Mr.  Morris.  And,  Mr.  Lattimore,  you  would  like  your  article  to 
go  into  the  record  with  this  Soviet  interpretation  ? 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3461 

Mr.  Lattimore,  I  certainly  should. 

This  Soviet  interpretation  or  misinterpretation. 

The  Chairmax.  Where  is  the  article? 

Mr.  JNIoRRis.  We  can  obtain  it  and  put  into  the  record. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well.  I  think  it  should  go  in  with  an  ex- 
hibit, if  you  are  goinor  to  introduce  the  exhibit. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  is  the  date  of  this  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  It  is  probably  1944,  Senator,  in  connection  with  the 
mention  of  the  "recent  trip."  He  accompanied  Mr.  Wallace  on  a 
'"recent"  trip. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Maybe  you  can  help  us  with  the  date,  Mr.  Latti- 
more.   You  look  at  that. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  a  document  here,  Senator,  which  my  wife  is 
looking  for  now,  which  I  should  like  to  enter  into  the  record  as  per- 
tinent to  this  question  of  Soviet  nationality. 

The  Chairman.  I  would  like  the  article  to  which  this  document 
refei-s  and  to  which  you  have  testified.    We  want  that  first. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  This  one  here  ? 

The  Chairman.  You  have  referred  to  a  document  that  you  wrote. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes ;  in  the  Far  Eastern  Survey. 

The  Chairman.  We  want  that  first,  if  you  please. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  have  that  with  me. 

Mr.  FoRTAs.  Is  your  staff  sending  for  that,  Senator? 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  They  are  looking  for  it,  Mr.  Fortas. 

Mr.  FoRTAs.  Do  you  want  Mr.  Lattimore  to  wait  until  you  find  it? 

The  Chairman.  If  you  want  to  go  into  some  question*,  as  an  inser- 
tion in  the  record 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Here  is  a  copy  of  the  Far  Eastern  Survey,  1944,  sir, 
the  bound  volume.    Perhaps  you  can  find  that  article. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  does  this  amount  about  to  what 
would  be  classed  as  someone  sending  you  a  newspaper  clipping? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes;  roughly. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  did  you  save  it? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  don't  think  I  did. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  3'ou  protest  it  was  wrong? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  write  back  and  say,  ''This  is  wrong"? 
Did  you  get  in  touch  with  the  papers  that  printed  it  and  say,  "I  deny 
this"?    Did  you  do  that? 

]Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  Senator. 

The  Chairman.  I  might  interpret  this  as  being  either  a  digest  of  a 
newspaper  quotation  or  a  newspaper  article  or  it  might  be  a  newspaper 
article  [reading]  : 

The  following  telegram  appeared  in  the  Soviet  newspaper  Trud,  but  probably 
it  appeared  also  in  Pravda  and  Izvestia  (we  do  not  haye  the  numbers  of  these 
two  from  August  29). 

Then  in  what  appeared  to  be  headlines,  caps,  appears : 

Lattimore  on  the  National  Policy  of  the  Soviet  Union — 

which  might  be  construed  as  being  a 

Senator  Ferguson.  Copy  of  a  clipping. 

The  Chairman.  Yes.    Otherwise,  I  do  not  know  what  it  is. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  This  appears  to  be  the  article:  "Minorities  in  the 
Soviet  Far  East,"  by  Owen  Lattimore,  in  the  Far  Eastern  Survey  of 
August  23,  1944. 


3462  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

It  is  not  very  lon<i:.    May  I  read  it  into  the  record? 

Mr.  Morris.  Put  it  into  the  record,  Mr.  Lattimore. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  It  is  two  printed  pages  or  more,  is  it  not,  Mr.  Latti- 
more ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Almost  exactly  two  printed  pages. 

The  Chairman.  I  want  something  to  be  done  with  this  photostatic 
copy  that  we  are  passing  around  here. 

Do  you  offer  this  for  the  record?  If  so,  what  is  its  authenticity? 
Where  does  it  come  from? 

Mr.  ]\IoRRis.  Mr.  Mandel  identified  it,  sir,  as  a  letter  having  been 
taken  from  the  files  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations. 

The  Chairman.  It  is  not  a  letter.  It  shows  on  its  face  that  it  is  not 
a  letter. 

Mr.  Morris.  It  is  a  memorandum. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  swear  now  that  you  never  saw  this  docu- 
ment, Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  no  recollection  of  seeing  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  It  appears  to  have  been  sent  to  you  with  your 
initials  on  it.    Is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  May  I  have  a  look? 

It  is  headed  E.  C.  C.'  from  A.  G.,  copies  to  O.  L.  and  M.  F. 

The  Chairman.  From  that,  Mr.  Lattimore,  would  you  say  it  was 
evidently  a  communication  of  some  sort  from  E.  C.  C.  to  the  other 
parties? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Xo,  sir;  from  Mr.  Grajdanzev,  to  Mr.  Carter,  with 
copies  to  myself  and  Miss  Farley. 

The  Chairman.  A  communication  from. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  A  communication  from,  yes. 

I  have  no  recollection  of  ever  seeing  it  before.  The  point  is  im- 
material, how^ever.    It  w^as  obviously  intended  for  me  to  see. 

The  Chairman.  It  will  be  inserted  in  the  record. 

With  it  should  go  the  article. 

Mr.  Morris.  May  it  be  i)laced  in  the  record,  Mr.  Chairman? 

The  Chairman.  The  article  will  be  placed  in  the  record. 

(The  documents  referred  to  were  marked  "Exhibits  Nos.  538,"  which 
was  read  in  full  by  Mr.  Mandel,  and  "539,"  as  follows  :) 

Exhibit  No.  539 
[Source  :  Far  Eastern  Survey,  August  23,  1944,  pp.  156,  157,  and  158] 

MiNOKITlES    IN    THE   SOVIET   FAR    EaST  ^ 

(By  Owen  Lattimore) 

On  many  occasions  durinji-  a  brief  recent  journey  through  the  Soviet  Far  East 
and  Centrjil  Asia  I  was  struck  by  the  obvious  success  of  the  Soviet  policy  toward 
its  minority  peoples,  and  by  the  international  importance  of  this  policy.  The 
essentials  of  the  Soviet  method  are  simple.  The  Russians  work  by  removing 
legal,  social,  and  e<'onomic  obstacles  to  the  progress  of  minority  peoples  and 
"backward"  i>eoi)les.  These  peoples  are  then  free  to  work  out  their  own  progress 
according  to  their  own  capacities.  The  method  is  anything  but  paternalistic. 
Because  the  people  work  out  their  own  progress,  they  feel  that  everything  which 
they  accomplish  is  their  own,  not  something  charitably  bestowed  on  them. 


^  Mr.  Lattimore,  Director  of  the  Page  School  of  International  Relations  and  coauthor  of 
The  Making  of  Modern  China,  accompanied  Vice  President  Henry  Wallace  on  his  recent 
trip  to  the  Far  Bast. 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3463 

The  chief  obstacle  removed  by  Soviet  action  was,  of  course,  the  "old  order"  of 
Tsarism,  with  its  legal  discriminations  and  its  policy  of  favoring  privileged 
uronps  among  non-Kiissiaii  minoi'ities.  in  order  to  use  them  as  instruments  for 
ruling  the  iui[)rivileged.  For  this  reason  the  minority  peoples,  who  feel  that  their 
local  self-government  is  their  own,  also  feel  that  the  Soviet  State  as  a  whole  is 
their  own.  This  accounts  for  an  outstanding  difference  in  the  psychology  of 
minorities  in  the  Soviet  Union  and  in  America.  With  us,  minority  rights  are 
largely  identified  with  the  right  to  nonccmformity.  Consequently  Americans 
sometimes  ask,  "What  would  happen  if  one  of  these  Soviet  minorities  were  to 
try  to  use  its  minority  rights  to  attempt  to  set  up  laws,  institutions,  and  prac- 
tices conflicting  with  Marxist  doctrines  and  Soviet  orthodoxy?"  The  answer 
api>ears  to  l>e  that  this  would  be  the  last  thing  that  would  occur  to  their  minds, 
not  the  first.  All  of  them  have  a  long  history  of  oppression.  Since,  in  all  their 
long  history,  only  the  S(jviet  Government  ever  freed  them  from  discrimination 
and  gave  them  the  opportunity  of  progress,  they  identify  their  own  interest  with 
the  Soviet  interest,  and  in  everytliing  which  they  do  to  advance  their  own  par- 
ticular interest  their  instinct  is  also  to  advance  the  general  Soviet  interest,  not 
to  encroach  upon  it,  because  the  general  Soviet  interest  is  the  primary  safeguard 
of  their  own  particular  interest. 

Within  the  framework  of  the  Soviet  economic  order  and  state  structure,  Soviet 
policy  has  been  to  encourage  the  national  pride  and  sense  of  cultural  or  com- 
munity identity  of  minority  groups.  In  Soviet  Asia,  this  includes  peoples  like 
the  Buryat  Mongols,  Kirghiz,  Kazakhs,  Uzbeks,  and  the  Tungusic  tribes,  whose 
languages,  traditions,  and  way  of  life  ai'e  very  different  from  those  of  the 
Russians.  Tliey  encourage  these  peoples  to  go  aliead  and  assert. their  independ- 
ence in  all  cultural  forms — costume,  theater,  art,  and  so  forth — and  to  work 
out  their  own  adaptation  to  tlie  general  structure  of  tlie  Soviet  Union. 

Although  many  of  the  places  visited  were  new  to  me,  some  of  the  peoples  were 
not  new,  as  I  had  known  Mongol.  Kazakh,  and  Kirghiz  nomads,  Turkish-si)eak- 
ing  oasis  dwellers,  and  Tungusic  forest  tribes  on  the  southern  side  of  tlie 
Russo-Chinese  border  in  Sinkiang,  Mongolia,  and  Manchuria.  Familiarity  with 
several  of  the  cultures  which  are  spread  on  both  sides  of  tlie  border,  and  an 
ability  to  speak  Mongol  and  a  certain  amount  of  Russian,  made  it  possible  for 
me  to  get  some  valuable  indications,  even  in  a  very  short  time,  as  to  how  con- 
tented and  prosperous  these  people  are  as  members  of  the  complicated  Soviet 
system  of  peoples,  republics,  and  autonomous  communities — uniform  in  some 
respects  and  vaiiegated  in  others. 

SOVIET  POLICY   IS   FLEXIBLE 

The  actual  way  in  which  Soviet  policy  works  is  naturally  not  uniform  in  all 
places  and  among  all  groups.  The  Yakuts,  for  instance,  seemed  to  me  to  have 
integi-ated  themselves  with  the  Soviet  order  less  than  such  peoples  as  the 
Buryats.  This  is  not  surprising  because  the  Yakuts  are  a  tough-fibered  people 
who  have  long  been  noted  more  for  their  ability  to  extend  their  own  culture 
to  other  sub-Arctic  peoples  than  for  their  absorption  of  Russian  culture.  More- 
over, they  live  in  small,  widely  scattered  and  isolated  communities  in  which 
the  spread  of  education  in  schools,  by  radio,  and  so  forth,  is  less  uniform  than 
it  is  in  more  closely  settled  regions. 

Among  people  who  are  few  in  niunbers,  also,  it  is  difficult  to  preserve  a 
separate  culture.  The  Khakass  near  Minusinsk,  for  instance,  are  so  minor  a 
minoVity  that  they  tend  to  merge  with  the  Russians  rather  than  to  preserve 
their  own  way  of  life. 

In  Buryat  Mongolia,  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  no  doubt  whatever  that  the 
Buryats  are  running  their  own  show.  This  is  also  true  in  Uzbekistan  and  in 
Kazakhstan. 

In  the  great  Kazakh  Republic,  which  extends  from  the  Chinese  frontier  to 
the  Caspian  Sea,  the  national  autonomy  policy  is  most  succes.sful.  Among  the 
Kazakhs  before  the  revolution  there  had  been  a  long  tradition  of  hostility  to  the 
Russians  and  the  Tsarist  Russians  had  never  attempted  to  recruit  Kazakhs  as 
troops.  An  attempt  to  conscript  them  into  labor  battalions  led  to  rebellions  in 
1916,  even  before  the  Russian  Revolution  of  1917.  In  the  present  war,  however, 
Kazakhs  have  supplied  whole  divisions  of  cavalry  to  the  Soviet  army.  Since  few 
of  them  speak  Riissian  they  are  brigaded  in  their  own  units  under  their  own 
officers.    The  Russians  speak  admiringly  of  the  battle  record  of  these  Kazakhs. 

While  Kazakh  nomadic  herding  is  flourishing,  the  Kazakhs — like  most  no- 


3464  msTiTUTE  of  pacific  relations 

mads — also  show  a  marked  aptitude  for  machines  and  industry.  At  Kara- 
ganda, in  the  Kazakh  Republic,  there  are  some  of  the  largest  open-cut  coal  mines 
in  the  world.  About  a  third  of  the  miners  are  Kazakhs.  Kazakh  engineers  and 
technicians  are  being  trained  there,  and  there  is  a  high  percentage  of  Stakhano- 
vites  whose  output  is  liigher  than  the  norms  on  wliicli  wage  rates  are  based.  The 
head  of  tlie  mines  is  a  third-generation  miner  from  tlie  Don.  When  I  asked  him 
if  he  planned  to  stay  on  after  the  war,  he  replied,  "No,  I  shall  go  back  to  the 
Don.    The  Kazakhs  will  want  to  run  their  own  mines." 

One  detail  of  policy  interested  me  as  being  particularly  significant.  Primary 
education  is  in  the  language  of  the  people  and  in  general  Russian  is  not  taught  in 
their  primary  schools.  In  high  schools  Russian  is  taught  as  a  second  language 
for  a  few  hours  each  week.  In  the  universities,  where  they  are  advanced  enough 
to  have  their  own  universities,  Russian  is  compulsory.  Conversely,  when  Rus- 
sians are  living  as  a  minority  group  in  an  area  that  is  overwhelming  Kazakh  or 
Mongol,  the  Russians  have  the  same  privilege  of  having  their  own  primary 
schools ;  but  for  Russian  children  the  Kazakh  or  Mongol  language  is  compulsory. 
Thus  the  cultural  autonomy  of  these  various  minorities  within  the  bounds  of 
Soviet  Asia  is  maintained,  and  the  minority  languages  are  given  a  prestige  value. 

All  of  this  is  important  because  it  will  have  repercussions  far  beyond  the 
Russian  frontier.  There  has  been  a  steady  movement  of  attraction  toward  Russia 
set  up  among  a  number  of  Cenetral  Asian  peoples.  The  Russians  do  not  need  to 
propagandize  among  them.  These  peoples  are  attracted  toward  Russia  because 
of  the  success  and  prosperity  of  their  cousins  on  the  Russian  side  of  the  frontier 
and  there  are  bound  to  be  some  important  international  consequences  of  this 
tendency. 

MOBILITY  IN  BORDER  REGIONS 

Along  most  of  the  Soviet  border  the  political  frontiers  are  artificial,  and 
identical  or  closely  similar  peoples  live  on  both  sides  of  the  line.  Tliis  is  true 
not  only  along  the  Chinese  but  along  the  Iran  and  Afghanistan  frontiers  as 
well.  In  the  19th  century  political  development  in  that  part  of  the  world  was  in 
abeyance.  Central  Asia  was  in  suspended  animation  except  for  the  superficial 
conquests  by  Tsarist  Russia.  If  there  was  oppression  on  one  side  of  the  line 
there  was  a  tendency  for  some  of  the  people  to  skip  over  to  the  other  side ;  but 
such  movements  did  not  express  a  choice  between  the  two  different  systems  of 
government. 

The  general  impression  today  among  their  neighbors  is  that  the  people  on 
the  Soviet  side  of  the  border  are  well  off.  They  are  envied  for  the  law,  order, 
and  security  which  they  enjoy  and  for  their  individual  and  community  prosperity. 
If  there  is  turmoil  in  Chinese  Turkistan  or  Iran  or  Afghanistan,  many  people  will 
want  to  move  to  get  away  from  the  trouble  and  Soviet  territory  is  the  nearest 
area  which  looks  safe  and  untroubled.  This  is  a  comparativel.v  recent  develop- 
ment. During  the  Soviet  revolution  there  was  a  bad  time  of  turmoil,  and  ele- 
ments which  were  opposed  to  the  revolution  moved  to  the  Chinese  side  and  into 
Iranian  and  Afghan  territory ;  but  that  period  is  now  over. 

The  situation  is  one  which  requires  adjustment  of  American  thinking.  We 
still  tend  to  assume,  whenever  Soviet  influence  is  noticeable  in  an  Asiatic  com- 
munity, that  ignorant  people  have  been  "misled  by  Communist  propaganda." 
To  think  in  this  way  is  to  mislead  ourselves.  The  Soviet  prestige  in  Asia 
today  has  little  to  do  with  propaganda.  It  is  noteworthy  that  Soviet  prestige 
is  highest  among  those  who  are  nearest  to  the  Soviet  frontier  and  influenced 
primarily  by  what  they  know,  and  by  the  practical  comparisons  which  they  are 
able  to  make.  Among  such  people  the  Soviets  are  rated  highly  not  because 
of  promises  of  what  they  might  do  for  others,  but  because  of  the  impressive 
evidence  of  what  they  have  actually  done  in  raising  their  own  standards. 

Everywhere  in  the  Soviet  Far  East  there  is  a  noteworthy  age  uniformity  among 
those  who  are  running  local  affairs.  Whether  Russian,  Buryat  Mongol,  or 
Kazakh,  the  average  age  of  people  in  high  positions  seems  to  be  between  30  and 
35.  They  ai'e  a  postrevolutionary  generation,  old  enough  to  have  had  the  new 
education  and  young  enough  to  be  free  of  the  old  social  cleavages.  To  them  the 
present  order  is  right,  inevitable,  and,  above  all-  their  own. 

The  implications  of  the  Russian  policy  are  evident.  China  and  the  Soviet 
Union  have  a  common  frontier  in  Mongolia,  Chinese  Turkistan  (Sinkiang),  and 
Manchuria,  and  along  this  frontiier  minority  populations  occupy  large  and  strat- 
egically ini'  ^rtant  areas.  Anywhere  along  the  frontier,  except  in  Manchuria, 
you  could  move  the  line  800  miles  south,  and  still  affect  the  personal  destinies 
of  no  Russians  and  very  few  Chinese.  This  situation  gives  these  minorities 
a  great  deal  of  bargaining  power.     Therefore,   their  political   importance  is 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC  JIELATIONS  3465 

great.  They  have  more  option  than  weak  minority  populations  usually  have. 
They  can  get  what  they  want  by  taking  sides.  This  is  true  to  some  extent  even 
as  far  as  Iran  and  Afghanistan. 

The  war  in  Far  East  is  being  won  largely  by  air  and  naval  power  in  the 
Pacific.  Yet  in  spite  of  these  victories  at  sea  and  in  the  air,  the  political 
situation  which  will  develop  inland  on  the  continent  is  likely  to  be  largely 
out  of  reach  of  naval  power  and  carrier-based  aircraft.  The  possibility  of  a 
political  outcome  of  this  kind  has  not  entered  into  the  political  thinking  of 
America  to  the  degree  that  it  should  have. 

Mr.  Lattimore,  And  I  should  like  in  the  record  also  my  competent 
statement,  before  reading  my  own  article,  that  this  citation  from  the 
Soviet  press  is  a  typical  piece  of  Soviet  propaganda ;  namely,  taking 
isolated  phrases  from  my  article  and  adding  phrases  of  their  own. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  did  you  make  an  effort  to  get  a  yearly 
review  of  Pacific  Affairs  into  the  New  Masses? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No ;  I  don't  believe  I  did.  But  if  you  have  a  docu- 
ment to  refresh  my  memory,  I  should  be  glad  to  see  it. 

The  Chairman.  That  answer  does  not  seem  to  carry  cogency,  "I 
don't  believe  I  did,  but  if  you  have  a  document."  You  certainly  know 
whether  you  did,  or  not.    That  was  a  publication. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir;  I  don't.  I  have  no  recollection  of  it  at 
all. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  want  to  say  that  you  do  not  know  that  you 
tried  to  get  these  documents  in? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  want  to  say  "No"  to  the  question  as  pro- 
pounded to  you? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  question  is  "No;  I  do  not  remember  doing 
any  such  thing." 

The  Chairman.  The  answer  is  "No,"  you  mean  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  answer  is  "No." 

The  Chairman,  All  right. 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  is  a  memorandum  from  the  files  of  the  Institute 
of  Pacific  Relations,  dated  July  10,  1937,  headed  "Memo :  F.  V.  F. 
from  C.  P." 

F.  V.  F.  presumably  is  Frederick  V.  Field,  and  C.  P.  is  presumably 
Caflierine  Porter. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  that  be  received  into  the  record? 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  minute,  now. 

Frederick  V.  Field  is  an  established  character  here  in  this  hearing. 
How  about  the  other  one  ?    Who  is  the  other  one  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  do  you  know  whose  initials  C.  P.  are  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  C.  P.,  I  think,  is  Catherine  Porter,  who  was  the 
New  York  subeditor  of  Pacific  Affairs. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  the  content  of  this  memorandum  bears 
on  the  questions  put  to  the  witness. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  read  that,  please  ? 

Mr.  Mandel  (reading)  : 

Owen  has  raised  the  question  of  our  getting  yearly  reviews  of  Pacific  Affairs 
into  the  New  Masses,  the  Nation,  the  New  Republic,  and  so  on.  He  wanted  me 
to  ask  you  about  this.  His  suggestion  was  that  we  might  have  such  reviews 
start  in  August  when  the  conference  is  on.  Do  you  think  there  is  any  possibility 
of  wangling  a  thing  like  this  in  so  short  a  time?  ; , 

88348— 52— pt.  10 13 


3466  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  that  be  inserted  in  the  record? 

The  Chairman.  It  will  be  inserted  in  the  record  for  the  purpose 
stated  by  Mr.  Morris. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  540"  and  was 
read  in  full.) 

Mr.  Morris.  JNIr.  Lattimore,  did  Mary  van  Kleeck  write  for  Pacific 
Affairs  an  article  on  the  Moscow  trials? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  know  whether  Mary  van  Kleeck  was  at  that 
time  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  Mr.  William  Henry  Chamberlin  subsequently 
write  an  article  in  Pacific  Affairs  on  the  Moscow  trials? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  he  did. 

Mr.  MoKRTs.  AVhat  was  your  reaction  to  ha  vino;  received  that? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  At  that  time,  I  can't  recall,  Mr.  Morris. 

]Mr.  Morris.  Was  Chamberlin's  article  published  in  Pacific  Affairs  ? 

Mr.  Latitjuore.  Yes,  it  was. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  at  the  same  time  write  an  answering  article  to 
Mr.  Chamberlin's  letter? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir.  I  wrote  an  article  which  was  my  own  com- 
ment on  the  whole  question  of  the  trials. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  identify  that  letter  please? 

Mr.  Mandfx.  This  is  a  document  taken  from  the  files  of  the  Institute 
of  Pacific  Kelations,  dated  July  5,  1938,  headed  "ECC  from  CP." 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  (^hairman,  the  contents  of  the  memorandum  iden- 
tified by  Mr.  Mandel  bear  on  the  last  question  addressed  to  the  wit- 
ness. 

Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  read  it,  please? 

Mr.  Mandel  (reading)  : 

Exhibit  No.  541 

July  5,  193S. 
ECC  from  CP :  Here  is  a  copy  of  a  letter  from  Chamberlin  (June  13)  intended! 
for  publication  in  Pacific  Affairs.     I  have  air  mailed  a  copy  to  Owen  and  have 
sent  a  copy  to  Harriet  Moore  requesting  her  to  write  Owen  by  air. 

Have  you  any  comments  to  be  passed  on  to  Owen?  Do  you  think  at  this 
point  Miss  van  Kleeck  should  see  Chamberlin's  letter,  or  shall  we  wait? 

Mr.  INIoRRis.  May  it  be  received  into  the  record,  Mr.  Chairman? 
The  Chairman.  It  may  be  received  into  the  record. 
(Documents  referred  to  were  marked  "Exhibit  No.  541"  which  was 
in  full  above  and  "Exhibit  No.  541A*'  which  appears  as  follows :) 


Exhibit  No.  541-A 

Comment  and  Cokrb:sponi)ence 
[Piiciflc  Affairs,  vol.  IX,  No.  3,  September  1938,  pp.  370-372] 

Mr.  Chamberlin's  successor  as  Moscow  correspondent  of  the  Christian  Science* 
Monitor,  Demaree  Bess,  has  published  in  the  Saturday  Evening?  Post,  which  is 
hardly  a  pro-Soviet  organ,  the  story  of  an  American  engineer  working  for  the 
Soviet  Government.  This  foreigner,  though  not  "called  as  an  independent  ex- 
pert witness,"  describes  how  his  work  was  hampered  by  men  who  were  later 
convicted  of  sabotage. 

Why  should  Mr.  Chamberlin  be  surprised  that  no  letters,  memoranda,  or 
minutes  of  meetings  of  the  conspirators  were  adduced  in  evidence?    The  testi- 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3467 

niouy  makes  it  clear  by  inference  that  the  work  of  all  the  conspirators  interlocked 
so  closely  with  that  of  loyal  citizens  that,  if  they  had  risked  much  in  writing, 
they  would  have  been  caught  much  sooner.'  As  for  the  suggestion  that  the  new 
head  of  the  secret  service  is  likely  to  abuse  his  power  just  as  Yagoda  did,  it  is 
obvious  that  the  publicity  given  in  the  Soviet  Union  itself  to  Yagoda's  turpitude 
is  a  safeguard  against  any  such  thing. 

Mr.  Chamberlin's  remarks  about  the  "striking  contrast  between  the  magnitude 
of  the  confessions  and  the  meagerness  of  the  results"  are  too  rhetorical.  The 
verbatim  records  of  the  trials  are  entirely  credible  in  the  way  they  describe  the 
descent  from  grandiose  ideas  to  futile  deeds.  The  ideas  were  so  grandiose  that 
they  could  not  have  been  carried  out  except  with  enthusiastic  popular  backing. 
It  requires  no  adroit  casuistry  to  conclude  that,  apart  altogether  from  disputes 
over  theory,  the  majority  of  the  people  in  the  Soviet  Union  are  unwilling  to  risk 
the  improved  life  which  they  are  beginning  to  enjoy,  after  the  sufferings  first  of 
the  revolution  and  then  of  the  "undeclared  civil  war"  of  the  Five-Year  Plan. 
The  authorities  are  beginning  to  make  good  on  the  promises  of  reward  held  out 
for  the  sacrifices  necessary  to  establish  Socialism  in  a  country  with  unoi-ganized 
resources.  Those  rewards,  though  not  yet  dazzlingly  great,  are  so  widely  dis- 
tributed that  no  general  revolt  in  the  face  of  visibly  growing  success  could 
possibly  be  expected  except  by  emotionally  biased  antagonists  like  Trotsky. 

The  "gross  discrepancies"  in  evidence  to  which  Mr.  Chamberlin  refers  appear 
to  be  subjective.  AVhere  conspirators  within  a  country  are  in  only  intermittent 
and  furtive  contact  with  exiles  abroad,  it  is  hardly  a  "gross  discrepancy"  to  coiuit 
on  the  future  aid  of  exile  accomplices  whom  you  do  not  yet  know  to  be  dead.  Nor 
am  I  emotionally  disturbed  by  the  fact  that  the  Norwegian  authorities  denied 
the  inconvienient  airplane  that  came  to  Oslo.  This  seems  to  me  a  not  vex'y  hair- 
raising  example  of  diplomatic  usage.  In  much  more  actutely  uncomfortable 
circumstances,  it  may  be  recalled,  the  British  Government  was  unable  even  to 
imagine  what  submarines  could  be  torpedoing  British  ships  off  the  ports  of  Spain. 


[Pacific  Affairs,  September  1938,  pp.  370-372] 

Then  we  come  to  the  well-known  phenomena  of  "sinister  pressure"  and  "grovel- 
ling repentance."  In  reading  the  verbatim  reports  of  the  trials,  I  naturally 
went  over  most  closely  the  testimony  and  confessions  of  the  only  two  of  the 
accused  whom  I  had  ever  met  personally,  because  these  were  men  whom  I  could  to 
some  extent  visualize.  They  were  Radek  and  Ilakovsky.  I  think  that  the  dis- 
tinguished personage  of  the  IPR  in  whose  company  I  called  on  Radek,  and  the 
British  diplomat  in  whose  house  I  met  Rakovsky,  would  both  agree  that  there  was 
nothing  out  of  character  in  the  testimony  of  either  man.  Both  of  them  not  only 
gave  perfectly  coherent  evidence,  but  psychologically  convincing  accounts  of  the 
way  in  which  they  were  enmeshed. 

The  real  point,  of  course,  for  tho.se  who  live  in  democratic  countries,  is  whether 
the  discovery  of  the  conspiracies  was  a  triumph  for  democracy  or  not.  I  think 
that  this  can  easily  be  determined.  The  accounts  of  the  most  widely  read 
Moscow  correspondents  all  emphasize  that  since  the  close  scrutiny  of  every  per- 
son in  a  responsible  position,  following  the  trials,  a  great  many  abuses  have 
been  discovered  and  rectified.  A  lot  depends  on  whether  you  emphasize  the 
discovery  of  the  abuse  or  the  rectification  of  it;  but  habitual  rectification  can 
hardly  do  anything  but  give  the  ordinary  citizen  more  courage  to  protest,  loudly, 
whenever  in  future  he  finds  himself  being  victimized  by  "someone  in  the  Party" 
or  "someone  in  the  Government."      That  sounds  to  me  like  democracv. 

O.  L. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  offer  for  the  record  the 
article  referred  to  in  this  testimon}^,  signed  "O.  L."  in  the  Pacific 
Affairs  of  September  1938,  which  commences  on  page  370,  together 
with  the  preceding  article,  which  is  signed  William  Henry  Chamber- 
lain, Tokyo,  June  1938,  which  ends  on  page  370. 

The  Chairman.  Have  you  properly  connected  the  article  with  the 
excerpt  that  has  just  been  inserted  in  the  record  ? 

1  See  review  (p.  401 )  b,v  J.  N.  Hazarrl  of  proceedings  of  the  Bukharin  trial. 


3468  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  will  you  testify  that  is  the  same  article 
referred  to  in  the  memorandum  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  believe  it  is. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  read  the  last  paragraph  in  Mr. 
Lattimore 's  article  ? 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

Mr.  Morris.  This  is  an  article  signed  "O.  L." — presumably,  Mr. 
Lattimore,  and  I  think  the  witness  has  identified  it  as  such. 

Have  you  not,  Mr.  Lattimore  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris  (reading)  : 

The  real  point,  of  course,  for  those  who  live  in  democratic  countries,  is  whether 
the  discovery  of  the  conspiracies  was  a  triumph  for  democracy  or  not.     *     *     * 

And  the  reference  is  to  the  Moscow  trials,  Mr.  Chairman. 

*  *  *  I  think  that  this  can  easily  be  determined.  The  accounts  of  the  most 
widely  read  Moscow  correspondents  all  emphasize  that  since  the  close  scrutiny 
of  every  person  in  a  responsible  position,  following  the  trials,  a  great  many  abuses 
have  been  discovered  and  rectified.     *     *     * 

The  words  "and  rectified'"  are  italicized. 

*  *  *  A  lot  depends  on  whether  you  emphasize  the  discovery  of  the  abuse 
or  the  rectitication  of  it ;  but  habitual  rectification  can  hardly  do  anything  but 
give  the  ordinary  citizen  more  courage  to  protest,  loudly,  whenever  in  future  he 
finds  himself  being  victimized  by  "someone  in  the  party"  or  "someone  in  the 
government."   That  sounds  to  me  like  democracy. 

The  Chairman.  By  whom  is  that  article  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  ]\Ir.  Lattimore,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Would  that  indicate,  Mr.  Lattimore,  that  you 
thought  these  trials  were  democracy  in  action  i 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  It  sounded  like  democracy. 

Senator  Ferguson.  It  sounded  like  democracy  in  action? 

Senator  Smith.  Would  you  like  to  see  it  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  should  like  to  see  it. 

It  sounds  to  me  like  exactly  what  it  says,  that  the  consequence  of 
people  in  Russia 

The  Chairman.  I  understood  it  is  the  last  paragraph. 

What  is  the  question,  Mr.  Morris,  please  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  The  questioning  on  tliis  subject  has  been  finished, 
Mr.  Chairman.    Mr.  Lattimore  has  requested  that  he  see  the  article. 

The  Chairman.  There  is  no  question  pending,  then  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  No  question  pending. 

The  Chairman.  All  right. 

Mr.  Morris.  May  I  continue  with  the  next  question  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  point  here — replying  to  Senator  Ferguson's 
question — I  tliink  it  is  that  I  said  that  conditions  which — and  here  I 
quote : 

Give  the  ordinary  citizen  more  courage  to  protest,  loudly,  whenever  in  future 
he  finds  himself  being  victimized  by  "someone  in  the  party"  or  "someone  in  the 
government."    That  sounds  to  me  like  democracy. 

That  is,  that  I  think  it  is  democratic  when  citizens  can  protest 
against  things  done  by  party  members  or  Government  members. 

Senator  Ferguson.  To  what  are  you  referring? 

Mr,  Lattimore.  I  may  say  that  this  was  a  disappointed  hope.  It 
didn't  develop  that  way. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC  RELATIONS  3469 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  think  that  the  trials  were  such  an  ex- 
pression ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir.  I  was  clearly  distinguishing  tliere  between 
the  trials  and  the  results  of  the  trials. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  result  of  the  trials  was  death  to  many  of 
the  people,  is  not  that  true  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  true. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  think  that  that  designated  democracy  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir.  I  thought  that  an  atmosphere  in  which 
citizens  could  protest  against  abuses  would  be  democracy. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  think  that  that  was  a  protest  of  the 
citizens,  or  a  protest  of  the  Government  departments  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  was  referring  to  articles  in  the  press  which  I  had 
seen  at  that  time,  saying  that  after  the  trials  of  these  people  in  Russia, 
a  lot  of  whom  were  officials,  these  press  articles  said  that  people  in 
Russia  were  beginning  to  act  a  little  more  independently  toward  their 
official  bureaucracy,  and  I  thought  that  was  an  encouraging  sign. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  did  E.  Herbert  Norman  w^rite  for  Pa- 
cific Atfairs? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  sir ;  I  believe  he  did. 

Mr.  Morris.  LTnder  what  name  did  he  write  for  Pacific  Affairs? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Under  the  name  of  E.  Herbert  Norman,  as  far  as 
1  remember. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  he  ever  use  a  nom  de  plume  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  don't  think  he  did. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  identify  that  document,  please  ? 

Mr.  ]\La.ndel.  This  is  a  photostat  of  a  document  from  the  files  of  the 
Institute  of  Pacific  Relations.  The  original  document  was  a  carbon 
copy.  It  is  dated  May  30,  1940.  It  is  from  129  East  Fifty-second 
Street,  New  York,  N.  Y.,  addressed  to  Owen  Lattimore,  with  the 
typed  signature  of  Edward  C.  Carter.  And  it  says  in  the  corner: 
■■•Penciled  note  copy  to  WLH." 

Mr.  Morris.  Mv.  Lattimore,  I  offer  you  that  letter  and  ask  you  if 
you  can  recall  having  seen  it? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  I  think  I  recall  having  seen  this. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  mind  reading  that  letter,  Mr.  Lattimore  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  'The  letter  is  dated  May  30,  1940.. 

(Exhibit  No.  542) 

Dear  Owen  :  Herbert  Norman  was  in  the  office  about  a  fortnight  ago  on  the 
eve  of  his  sailing  for  Tokyo  as  language  officer  in  the  Canadian  Legation.  He 
is  very  eager  to  continue  active  contact  with  the  institute  and  in  the  fi?ld  of 
Japanese  political  history.  He  would  like  to  do  some  writing  on  the  key  figures 
of  the  Meiji  period. 

I  am  sending  a  copy  of  this  letter  to  Holland  as  it  may  be  that  he  will  see  ways 
of  using  Norman  on  writing  that  might  not  be  quite  within  the  scope  of  Pacific 
Affairs. 

I  think  that  Norman  may  be  able  to  do  some  writing  for  Pacific  Affairs  on 
contemporary  matters,  providing  he  writes  under  a  nom  de  plume. 

I  imagine  that  by  novt^  you  have  read  his  Inquiry  book,  ".Japan's  Emergence  as 
a  Modern  State."  This  is  probably  the  most  fundamental  study  that  has  yet 
appeared  in  the  Inquiry  Series.  I  am  hoping  that  all  of  us  may  find  some  way  of 
continuing  Norman  as  a  contributor  to  the  IPR  publication  program  in  one  form 
or  another. 

Sincerely  yours. 

The  Chairman.  You  stated  to  counsel  just  a  few  minutes  ago  that 
you  did  not  believe  that  that  writer  wrote  under  a  nom  de  plume. 


3470  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Lattimore,  No. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  wish  to  change  your  answer  now  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No;  I  do  not  wish  to  change  my  answer.  I  don't 
believe  he  did. 

May  I  say  that  this  is  quite  obviously  a  reference  to  the  fact  that  it  is 
usual  practice  for  diplomatic  personnel  of  our  own  country  and  other 
countries  to  sign  a  non  de  plume  rather  than  their  own  names.  An 
outstanding  example,  of  course,  is  the  Mr.  X  article  by  George  Kennedy 
in  Foreign  Affairs. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  know,  Mr.  Lattimore,  that  Mr.  Norman  has  been 
identified  before  the  conunittee  as  having  been  a  member  of  the 
Communist  Party  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  seen  that  reference  in  the  transcript.  I  have 
also  seen  some  of  the  Canadian  press  protests  on  the  subject. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  introduce  into  the  record  at  this 
time  an  excerpt  from  the  publication  China  Today,  which  Mr.  Mandel 
AAill  identify? 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  is  a  photostat  of  the  magazine  China  Today,  for 
March  19o6,  which  is  the  official  organ  of  the  American  Friends  of  the 
Chinese  People. 

On  page  121  of  this  magazine  we  find  the  following : 

Canadian  Friends  of  the  Chinese  People 

It  is  with  great  pleasure  and  much  applause  that  we  greet  our  friends  in 
Canada  and  congratulate  those  who  played  an  active  part  in  organizing  a  Canadian 
r'riends  of  the  Chinese  People.  Taking  advantage  of  the  presence  in  Toronto  of 
Gen.  Fang  Chen-wu,  Mr.  A.  A.  MacLeod,  chairman  of  the  Canadian  League  Against 
War  and  Fascism,  organized  several  outstanding  meetings  which  resulted  in  the 
formation  of  the  new  organization.  Beginning  with  a  banquet  on  Saturday, 
February  8,  with  80  present,  Gen.  Fang  Chen-wu,  with  whom  China  Today 
readers  are  well  acquainted,  began  a  series  of  important  meetings  which  included 
a  special  luncheon  at  the  House  of  Commons  in  Ottawa  and  interviews  with  the 
Prime  Minister  and  other  political  figures.  Following  a  Fang  Chen-wu  mass 
meeting  in  Toronto  held  in  ('entral  Technical  School  on  February  9  and  attended 
by  1,500,  a  group  of  'AO  met  at  Wymilwood,  Queen's  Park,  and  organized  a  Cana- 
dian Friends  of  the  Chinese  People.  A  provisional  committee  was  elected  and 
is  composed  of  E.  H.  Norman  (secretary),  a  teacher  born  in  Japan     *     *     *. 

Mr.  Morris.  I  think  that  is  enough,  Mr.  Chairman. 

May  that  article  go  into  the  record  ? 

The  Chairman.  What  is  the  object  ?     What  is  its  significance  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  AA^e  are  questioning  the  witness  about  his  association 
and  the  publication  of  articles  by  Mr.  E.  H.  Norman.  According  to 
that  article,  E.  H.  Norman  was  tlie  secretary  of  a  Canadian  subdi- 
vision of  the  American  Friends  of  tlie  Chinese  People.  We  would  like 
to  have  something  in  the  record  to  show  that  the  American  Friends 
of  tlie  Chinese  People  is  a  Communist-front  organization. 

The  Chairman.  I  think  that  should  come  along  now  if  this  is  in- 
serted in  the  record. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  at  this  point,  then,  to 
introduce  the  testimony  of  Mr.  Morris  L.  Appelman,  who  was  mem- 
ber of  the  Communist  Party  and  a  member  of  the  Communist  cell 
that  ran  the  American  Friends  of  the  Chinese  People.  I  would  like 
his  testimony  covering  that  to  be  ])ut  into  the  record  in  its  entirety. 

The  Chairman.  Was  that  taken  in  executive  session  or  open 
session  ? 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3471 

Mr.  Morris.  In  executive  session,  Mr.  Chairman,  on  January  11, 
1952. 

The  Chair:man.  You  can  read  sufficient  of  it  now  to  tie  this  in, 
if  it  can  be  tied  in. 

Mr.  Morris.  ^Nlr.  Mandel  is  exaniinino;  Mr.  Appehnan  [reading]  : 

Exhibit  No.  542A 

Mr.  Mandel.  Then  in  May  1035,  you  were  contributing  editor  of  China  Today? 

Mr.  Appelmax.  I  don't  remember  that  title,  but  apparently  I  was  if  I  was  listed 
as  such. 

Mr.  aiANDEL.  What  was  China  Today? 

Mr.  Appelman.  It  was  a  publication  of  the  American  Friends  of  the  Chine.se 
People. 

Senator  Eastland.  What   is   the  American   Friends  of  the  Chinese  People? 

Mr.  Appelman.  A  front  organization  of  the  Communist  Party. 

And  then  on  page  6,  Mr.  Morris  questioning : 

In  connection  with  the  American  Friends  of  the  Chinese  People,  did  you  as 
a  matter  of  fact  belong  to  it? 

Mr.  Appelman.  Yes,  sir.  I  don't  remember  whether  it  was  a  dues-paying 
organization,  but  I  was  identified  with  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  Were  you  sent  there  by  the  Communist  Party? 

Mr.  Appelman.  Yes. 

Mr.  IMoRRLs.  Who  in  the  party  sent  you? 

Mr.  Appelman.  It  was  either  Crace  Maul  or  Esther  Carroll  or  both,  because 
they  were  my  two  contacts. 

Mr.  Mor.Ris.  Is  Grace  Maul  Grace  Granich? 

Mr.  Appelman.  The  same  party. 

Mr.  MoRRLS.  You  have  been  identitied  with  both  these  people? 

Mr.  Appelman.  They  were  lioth  definitely  party  members;  and,  so  to  speak, 
my  party  liaison  was  with  them.  At  that  time  I  was.  At  the  time  they  first 
contacted  me  I  had  been  exi:)elled ;  I  was  not  a  party  member  in  good  standing; 
and  they  were  my  supervisors  so  to  speak,  in  that  organization. 

Mr.  Fortas,  would  you  like  to  see  that  testimony  ? 

Mr.  Fortas.  No. 

The  Chairman.  What  is  the  relevancy  of  that  testimony  with  this 
witness  ? 

Mr.  FoRTAs.  That  is  my  point.. 

Mr.  Morris.  The  American  Friends  of  the  Chinese  People  ^vas  an 
organization  with  which  Mr.  Xorman  was  connected,  and  we  are  now 
asking  Mr.  Lattimore  if  he  published  articles  by  Mr.  Norman. 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  moment,  until  the  Chair  rules  on  this. 

The  testimony  of  Mr.  Appleman  may  be  inserted  in  the  record.  Do 
you  want  it  in  full  ? 

iMr.  Morris.  Just  those  portions  that  I  read,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  in  the  record  now. 

The  exhibit  China  Today  may  be  inserted  in  the  record  for  what 
it  is  worth  at  the  present  time. 

(The  documents  referred  to  were  marked  "Exhibits  Nos.  542  and 
5-42A",  which  was  read  in  fidl.     No.  543  is  as  follows :) 

ExHiBLP  No.  .543 

[Source:   China  Today,  March  19.36,  p.  121.     Published  monthly  at  168  West  23d  Street, 
New  York.  N.  Y..  by  the  American  Friends  of  the  Chinese  People  1 

Canadian  Friends  of  the  Chinese  People 

It  is  with  gi-eat  pleasure  and  much  applause  that  we  greet  our  friends  in  Canada 
and  congratulate  those  who  played  an  active  part  in  organizing  a  Canadian 
Friends  of  the  Chinese  People.  Taking  advantage  of  the  presence  in  Toronto 
of  General  Fang  Chen-wu,  Mr.  A.  A.  MacLeod,  Chairman  of  the  Canadian  League 
Against  War  and  Fascism,  organized  several  outstanding  meetings  which  resulted 


3472  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

in  the  formation  of  tlie  new  organization.  Beginning  with  a  banquet  on  Saturday 
February  Sth  with  eighty  present,  General  Fang  Clien-wu,  witli  whom  China 
Today  readers  are  well  acquainted,  began  a  series  of  important  meetings  which 
included  a  special  luncheon  at  the  House  of  Commons  in  Ottawa  and  interviews 
with  the  Prime  INIinister  and  other  political  figures.  Following  a  Fang  Chen-wu 
mass  meeting  in  Toronto  held  in  Central  Technical  School  on  February  9th  and 
attended  by  1,500,  a  group  of  thirty  met  at  Wymilwood,  Queen's  Parlv,  and  organ- 
ized a  Canadian  Friends  of  the  Chinese  People.  A  provisional  committee  was 
elected  and  is  composed  of  E.  H.  Norman  (secretary),  a  teacher  born  in  Japan, 
Professor  John  F.  Davidson  of  Upper  Canada  College,  and  A.  R.  Menzies,  a 
"Victoria  College  student  who  was  born  in  China.  One  of  the  important  members 
of  this  group  is  William  Arthur  Deacon,  Literary  Editor  of  the  Mail  and  Empire 
of  Toronto,  who  wrote  a  splendid  interview  with  General  Fang  for  his  paper. 

We  in  the  United  States  extend  our  heartiest  greetings  to  our  friends  in  Canada 
and  we  urge  them  to  keep  in  close  contact  with  us  and  we  in  turn  pledge  our- 
selves to  work  in  close  cooperation  with  them. 

The  importance  of  the  Far  East  in  the  whole  problem  of  war  and  peace  is 
rapidly  becoming  a  matter  of  common  knowledge.  It  is  therefore  very  signifi'cant 
and  hopeful  that  groups  of  "Friends  of  the  Chinese  People"  have  been  organized 
in  several  countries.  America,  France,  England,  Holland,  and  now  Canada  have 
joined  the  international  front  of  those  whose  chief  aim  is  to  help  the  Chinese 
people  in  their  struggle  for  national  liberation,  the  realization  of  which  will  play 
a  most  powerful  role  for  peace  throughout  the  Far  East  and  the  whole  world. 
We  urge  other  countries  to  follow  and  join  this  rapidly  forming  "International 
Friends  of  the  Chinese  People." 

Mr.  FoRTAS.  Mr.  Morris,  before  refusing  your  kind  offer  to  show 
me  that  transcript,  I  assume  there  is  no  reference  to  Mr.  Lattimore 
by  name. 

Mr.  Morris.  There  is  no  reference  to  Mr.  Lattimore. 

Mr.  FoRTAS.  Then  I  don't  care  to  see  it. 

The  Chairman.  It  has  to  do  with  the  writer.  That  is  the  tie-in,  I 
understand. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  what  article  did  Mr.  Norman  write 
in  Pacific  Affairs? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  been  lookinjr  for  it,  Mr.  Morris,  and  I  don't 
find  an  article  listed  for  the  period  when  I  was  editor. 

Mr.  Morris.  Was  there  one  subsequent  to  that  ? 

iNIr.  Lattimore.  I  believe  there  was  one  at  some  time ;  yes, 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  were  you  acquainted  with  Mr,  Evans 
F.  Carlson? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes;  I  was. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  was  your  association  with  Mr.  Carlson? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  knew  Mr.  Carlson  first  when  he  was  in  the  Amer- 
ican Marine  Guard  in  the  Embassy  in  Peking,  and  I  saw  him  maybe 
tAvo  or  three  times  here  in  America. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  a'ou  ever  give  him  advice? 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  moment.  I  want  to  go  back  to  this  offer 
of  the  exhibit  that  the  Chair  has  admitted  in  evidence  as  part  of  the 
record. 

The  question  was  propounded  to  the  witness  as  to  whether  or  not  this 
writer  had  been  a  contributor  to  the  publication  while  he  was  editor. 
He  says  "No,"  in  substance.  You  cannot  hold  him  responsible  for 
something  that  was  done  in  the  publication  before  he  was  in  charge  of  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  could  it  not  be  admitted  as  some 
evidence  as  far  as  the  institute  is  concerned  ? 

The  Chairman.  It  may  go  in  to  that  extent,  but  I  do  not  want  it  to 
go  to  the  extent  of  tying  in  this  witness  to  any  collaboration  with  the 
Avriter  through  the  introduction  of  these  exhibits- 
Senator  Ferguson.  I  appreciate  that. 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3473 

The  Chairman.  The  whole  matter  goes  to  the  weight  of  the  thing 
rather  than  to  its  admissibility. 

Senator  Smith.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  think  the  observation  you  are  mak- 
ing is  worth  while  to  make  at  this  time.  I  think  we  must  bear  in 
mind  that  our  prime  investigation  is  of  the  IPR  and  that  we  are  not 
trying  Mr.  Lattimore. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  correct. 

Senator  Smith.  I  notice  that  some  of  the  newsmen  and  some  of  the 
columnists  continue  to  refer  to  the  fact  that  we  are  trying  Mr.  Latti- 
more. I  have  not  felt  I  have  been  trying  Mr.  Lattimore,  and  I  do  not 
believe  any  of  the  rest  of  the  committee  have  felt  that  way. 

The  Chairman.  Mv.  Lattimore  came  here  at  his  own  request  as  a 
witness  to  testify,  to  clear  his  record,  apparently,  of  statements  that 
have  been  made  by  witnesses  who  testified  with  reference  to  him.  He 
is  not  on  trial. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr,  Chairman,  the  letter  read  into  the  record  previous 
to  the  introduction  of  these  exhibits  contained  an  offer  from  Mr.  Carter 
to  have  Mr.  Norman  write  for  Pacific  Affairs  under  a  nom  de  plume ; 
and,  in  view  of  the  testimony  this  morning  about  the  appearance  of 
the  nom  de  plume,  we  had  no  way  J3ut  to  ask  Mr.  Lattimore  whether  or 
not,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  Mr.  Norman  did  write  it. 

The  Chairman.  I  am  admitting  the  exhibits,  but  I  want  to  limit  their 
significance — that  is  all — because  they  address  themselves  to  the  Insti- 
tute of  Pacific  Relations  rather  than  to  Mr.  Lattimore. 

Mr,  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  you  knew  Mr.  Norman,  did  you  not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  knew  Mr.  Norman  at  that  time  very  slightly.  1 
think  I  had  met  him  once  or  twice  when  I  was  at  the  office  of  the 
Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  in  New  York.  I  knew  him  later  in 
Japan  when  I  was  in  Japan  with  the  Pauley  reparations  mission. 

Mr.  Morris.  How  frequently  did  you  see  Mr.  Norman  at  that  time  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  saw  him  quite  frequentl}^  at  that  time. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  did  you  give  advice  to  Evans  Carlson 
as  to  whether  or  not  he  should  stay  in  the  Navy  or  leave  the  Navy? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes.  I  remember  very  distinctly  that  Carlson  told 
me  that  he  was  thinking  of  resigning  from  the  Marine  Corps,  and  I 
urged  him  not  to. 

Mr.  Morris.  Why  did  you  urge  him  not  to,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Because  I  thought  that  a  man  of  his  expert  knowl- 
edge in  China  would  be  useful  to  the  Nation  in  his  service  in  the 
Marine  Corps. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  know  that  Mr.  Carlson  was  chairman  of  the 
Committee  for  Democratic  Far  Eastern  Policy^ 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No ;  I  didn't  know  that. 

Mr.  Morris.  Have  you  not  testified  in  executive  committee  that 
you  thought  that  organization  was  a  Communist  organization? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  May  I  see  my  testimony  on  that  ?  My  present  rec- 
ollection of  it  is  rather  blank,  I  am  afraid. 

Mr.  Morris,  That  is  page  91,  Mr.  Lattimore.  You  may  read  any 
part  of  it  into  the  public  record. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  My  testimony  in  executive  session  was  as  follows : 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  know  the  organization  Committee  for  Democratic  Far 
Eastern  Policy? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes ;  I  do. 

Mr.  Morris.  Have  you  ever  been  associated  with  that  in  any  way? 


3474  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No.  I  was  asked  to  subscribe  to  it,  and  I  replied  that  since  1 
was  at  that  time  writing  syndicated  newspaper  articles  as  an  independent 
commentator  I  did  not  want  to  subscribe  to  any  partisan  organizations  of  that 
kind.  However,  right  at  the  end  of  the  war,  they  were  bringing  out  some  fairly 
interesting  information  that  was  not  readily  available  elsewhere,  and  I  sent  in  a 
subscription  and  asked  them  to  send  me  their  material. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  believe  that  is  a  Communist  organization? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  should  say  that  it  certainly  has  become  a  fellow-traveling 
organization.  I  don't  know  whether  it  is  Communist,  or  not.  I  am  not  an  expert 
on  the  shades  of  difference  between  fellow-travelers  and  Communists. 

The  Chairman.  All  right. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  identify  that  last  letter,  please? 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  is  a  photostat  of  a  document  from  the  files  of 
the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  dated  March  27,  1939,  addressed 
to  Mr.  E.  C.  Carter,  with  the  typed  signature  of  Ow^en  Lattimore.  It 
is  a  photostat  of  a  carbon  copy  of  a  document,  and  it  was  previously 
used  as  exhibit  No.  154. 

Mr,  Lattimore.  Mr.  Lattimore,  will  you  identify  that  letter  as 
having  been  written  by  you  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Is  that  in  our  record  now^,  Mr.  Morris  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  exhibit  154. 

Mr.  Lattimore,  will  you  read  that  letter,  please  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  date  is  March  27,  1939.     [Reading :] 

Dear  Cartke:  Thanks  for  sending  me  the  copy  of  the  letter  from  Carlson. 
If  I  had  known  about  this  before,  I  should  have  risked  impertinence  by  writing 
to  urge  him  not  to  resign.  As  an  officer  in  the  Marine  Corps,  known  to  have  a 
favorable  view  of  China's  prospects  in  the  war,  and  known  to  be  I'estrained  from 
giving  full  expression  to  his  views  by  Navy  Department  policy,  Carlson  had 
quite  a  potent  effect.  As  an  officer  who  has  resigiied  his  commission  in  order 
to  speak  out  he  will  have  a  momentary  sensational  effect,  but  is  in  danger  of 
soon  l)eing  disparaged  as  more  sentimental  than  realistic.  I  hope  very  much 
that  he  has  the  ability  to  earn  his  way  by  writing  and  speaking,  but  there  is 
no  evidence  to  go  on.  As  I  did  not  see  him  on  his  brief  trip  east  I  have  no  recent 
impi'essions  by  which  to  gauge  his  possible  usefulness  as  a  "Friend  of  China." 

I  expect  I  shall  be  hearing  from  him  direct  before  long  and  if  so  I  shall  write 
you  again. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  identify  this  letter,  please? 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  is  a  document  from  the  files  of  the  Institute  of 
Pacific  Relations,  dated  February  8,  1940,  addressed  to  Maj.  Evans 
F.  Carlson,  American  Committee  for  Nonparticipation  in  Japanese 
Aggression.  The  typed  signature  is  "Owen  Lattimore."  It  is  a  car- 
bon copy  of  a  letter. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  do  you  recall  having  written  that  let- 
ter? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  recall  it  now. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  read  it,  please,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore,  It  is  dated  February  8, 1940.     [Reading :] 

Dear  Evans:  What  a  dope  I  am !  I  forgot  to  give  you  the  enclosed  glamorous 
candid  portrait  of  yourself. 

Don't  give  anybody  else  too  much  the  idea  that  it  is  a  Herculean  job  to  make 
the  fur  fly  in  Baltimore.    If  anybody  should  come  along  all  ai'dor  and  enthusiasm, 
why  break  his  spirit  in  advance?     Besides,  after  the  swell  work  you  did,  it 
should  be  easier  in  the  future. 
Yours. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Let  me  see  that  letter. 

Mr.  Morris,  Mr.  Chairman,  will  it  be  received  in  the  record? 

The  Chairman,  It  will  be  received  in  the  record. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3475 

(The  document  previously  read  by  the  witness  was  marked  "Ex- 
hibit No.  544''  and  was  read  in  full.) 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  Avill  you  identify  those  two  documents? 

Mr.  jNIandel.  I  have  here  a  photostat  of  an  article  from  the  Daily 
Worker,  of  March  16,  1944,  the  editorial  page,  which  is  an  article 
with  the  following  heading:  "Lieutenant  Colonel  Carlson's  tribute 
to  Sun  Yat-sen,  Chinese  Communists." 

Then  it  continues : 

Following  are  excerpts  from  the  address  delivered  by  Lt.  Col.  Evans  F.  Carl- 
son, at  Sun  Yat-sen  Day  Tribute  Meeting,  Sunday,  March  12,  Metropolitan 
Opera  House. 

Mr.  Morris.  Does  that  appear  in  the  Daily  Worker? 

Mr.  Maxdel.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  What  do  you  want  to  do  with  this  one? 

]VIr.  jNIorris.  Will  that  be  received  in  the  record,  Mr.  Chairman? 

This  is  an  article  about  Lieutenant  Colonel  Carlson,  which  appeared 
in  the  Daily  Worker. 

The  Chairman,  "Lieutenant  Colonel  Carlson's  tribute  to  Sun  Yat- 
sen,  Chinese  Communists." 

This  is  a  photostat  clipping  from  the  Daily  Worker,  is  that  correct, 
Mr.  Mandel? 

Mr,  JNIandel.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  that  be  received  into  the  record,  Mr,  Chairman? 

The  Chairman,  It  will  be  admitted  into  the  record. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No,  545"  and  is 
as  follows:) 

Exhibit  No.  545 

Lt.  Col.  Carlson's  Tribute  to  Su.\  Yat-Sen,  Chinese  Communists 

Following  are  excerpts  from  the  address  delivered  ty  Lt.  Col.  Evans. F. 
Carlson,  at  Sun  Yat-sen  Day  tribute  meeting,  Sunday,  March  21,  Metro- 
politan Opera  House. 

Fifteen  years  ago  this  coming  June  it  was  my  rare  privilege  to  participate  in 
the  ceremonies  at  Nanking,  China,  attending  the  State  Burial  of  the  Father  of 
the  Chinese  Republic,  Doctor  Sun  Yat-sen.  I  was  there  as  a  member  of  the 
personal  staff  of  Admiral  Mark  Bristol,  then  commanding  our  Asiatic  Fleet. 

This  man  of  humble  birth,  by  his  unshakable  confidence  in  the  dignity  of  the 
human  being,  regardless  of  his  race,  creed,  or  color,  and  by  his  unselfish  devotion 
to  the  cause  of  bringing  to  the  four  hundred  millions  of  his  native  China  the  hope 
and  freedoms  of  the  democratic  way  of  life,  overthrew  the  Imperial  Ching  dynasty 
and  set  the  pattern  which  gave  birth  to  the  Republic  and  which  has  enabled  his 
coumtrymen  to  resist  for  nearly  seven  years  every  effort  of  Japan  to  enslave 
them. 

We  of  the  United  States  of  America  cannot  escape  our  debt  to  Sun  Yat-sen. 
The  debt  is  rendered  more  poignant  by  the  knowledge  that  we  failed  Doctor  Sun 
back  in  1923.  in  his  hour  of  need.  Failing  to  secure  our  support  he  turned  to 
another  great  democratic  people,  tlie  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics,  who 
provided  the  financial  and  moral  aid  which  enal>le  Chiang  Kai-shek  to  accomplish 
the  task  of  uniting  China  under  one  government  in  1938.  Today  we  enjoy  the 
benefits  of  this  luiity  through  the  magnificent  efforts  of  China,  under  Generalis- 
simo Chiang's  leadership,  to  contain  Japan's  armies  in  Eastern  Asia  as  we  advance 
against  the  common  enemy  across  the  Pacific. 

HAILS   sun's  principles 

Doctor  Sun  is  best  known  for  the  political  philosophy  which  he  evolved,  called 
the  San  Min  Chu  I,  or  Three  Principles  of  the  People.  This  philosophy,  sub- 
scribed to  by  all  political  groups  in  China  today  regardless  of  their  complexion, 
combines  the  best  of  the  political  doctrines  of  ancient  China  vdth  those  principles 


3476  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

of  democratic  doctrines  of  Britain,  the  U.  S.  S.  R.,  and  tlie  United  States  which 
Doctor  Sun  felt  were  most  suitable  to  the  needs  and  temi^erament  of  the  Chinese 
people.  Some  of  his  ideas  regarding  the  application  of  these  principles  indicates 
the  universal  scope  of  his  iwlitical  thinking. 

His  principle  of  Nationalism  relates  to  the  fundamental  need  for  people  to  be 
organized  Into  a  sovereign  state.  In  ('hina  the  principles  had  a  two-fold  applica- 
tion :  (1)  to  induce  a  feeling  of  nationalism  throughout  all  the  people  of  this 
vast  country;  and  (2)  to  regain  for  China  the  sovereign  rights  which  had  been 
impaired  through  the  instrumentality  of  the  Unequal  Treaties  Imposed  by  foreign 
powers. 

The  Principle  of  Democracy  Doctor  Sun  interpreted  as  the  "People's  sover- 
eignty," or  control  of  government  by  the  people.  He  contemplated  that  the 
people's  will  would  be  exercised  through  suffrage,  the  recall,  the  initiative,  and 
the  referendum.  For  the  administration  of  government  he  added  to  ttie  executive, 
legislative,  and  judicial  branches  we  know,  the  old  Chinese  institution  of  exam- 
ination (comparable  to  our  civil  service)  and  censorship  (most  nearly  akin  to  our 
supreme  court).  The  application  of  these  principles  indicate  the  universal  scope 
of  his  political  thinking. 

China  is  administered  today  under  this  quintuple  form  of  government,  but  the 
people  have  not  yet  attained  the  right  of  suffrage.  Instead  the  nation  is  governed 
by  the  Kuomintang  party. 

TELT.S   OF  THREE-FOIJ>  PKOGRAM 

Doctor  Sun  contemplated  that  suffrage  would  be  attained  through  a  three-fold 
program.  Fii-st  there  was  to  be  the  Period  of  Military  Conquest,  during  which 
China  would  become  united  under  the  Kuomintang  Party.  Then  would  follow 
the  Period  of  Political  Tutelage,  during  which  the  party  would  govern  while  the 
people  were  being  politically  educated.  Finally,  suft'rage  would  be  conferred  on 
the  people  and  the  nation  would  enter  the  final  i>eriod  of  Representative  Govern- 
ment.    The  Period  of  Political  Tutelage  has  prevailed  since  1928. 

The  most  discussed  and  least  understood  of  the  Three  Principles  is  that  of  the 
People's  Livelihood.  In  effect.  Doctor  Sun's  conception  of  this  principle  boils 
down  to  state  socialism.  He  aimed  to  improve  the  livelihood  of  all  the  people, 
and  he  proposed  to  do  this  through  social  and  economic  reform,  nationalization  of 
transportation  and  communication,  direct  taxation  and  socialized  distribution 
through  cooperative  societies. 

While,  as  I  said  a  few  moments  ago,  all  political  groups  within  China  subscribe 
to  his  Three  Principles  of  the  People,  all  groups  do  not  interpret  the  principles 
in  the  .same  way,  and  emphasis  in  the  application  of  the  various  principles  differs 
with  the  groups.  Tlie  Kuomintang,  under  the  aegis  of  Chiang  Kai-shek,  has 
brought  Nationalism  to  a  high  peak.  The  Chinese  Communist  Party,  which,  from 
the  nature  of  its  works,  I  would  term  the  Social-Democratic  Party,  goes  in  more 
for  improving  the  people's  livelihood  and  preparing  them  for  the  exercise  of 
representative  government. 

You  hear  much  about  the  activities  of  the  Kuomintang  Party,  which  constitutes 
the  national  government  at  Chungking.  Let  me  say  a  word  about  the  less  pub- 
licized Social-Democratic  group  which  operates  mostly  in  the  northern  provinces 
and  largely  behind  the  lines  of  the  Japanese  army.  In  the  early  years  of  the 
Sino-Japanese  war  I  spent  a  number  of  months  with  this  group,  i  found  that 
its  military  successes  were  due  in  large  measure  to  the  democratic  political  action 
of  the  people  and  to  the  solid  integrity  of  its  leaders. 

HONORS    COMMUNIST    FIGHTERS 

Recently  I  had  a  report  from  Professor  Michael  Lindsay,  formerly  of  the 
faculty  of  Yenching  University,  and  now  pre.sent  with  this  group,  on  the  activities 
of  the  group  up  to  the  end  of  last  year.  Profe.ssor  Lindsay  tells  me  that  the 
military  agencies  of  this  group,  the  8th  Route  and  New  Fourth  Armies,  are  con- 
taining about  350,000  Japanese  troops.  These  Chinese  armies  operate  for  the 
most  part  In  small  mobile  columns  which  engage  the  enemy  daily.  Activities 
have  been  extended  northeast  of  Peiplng  and  Into  southern  Manchuria,  where 
they  constitute  a  constant  threat  to  the  Japanese  lines  of  communication  with 
China.  These  armies,  with  their  militia  units,  now  number  about  one  million 
men. 

One  feature  of  the  administration  in  the  northern  provinces  that  is  significant 
is  the  extent  of  the  public  school  system  as  well  as  of  the  adult  education  pro- 
gram.   There  are  7,500  schools  operating  in  the  Shansi-Hopei  area,  west  of  the 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3477 

Peiping-Hankow  railroad,  and  in  tliis  same  area  300,000  adults  had  learned  to 
read  and  write  by  the  middle  of  1943.  People  in  this  area,  out  off  from  Free 
China  by  Japanese  military  units,  not  only  participate  in  the  war  effort,  but 
govern  themselves  through  their  elected  representatives.  Thus  are  the  principles 
of  Doctor  Sun  being  brought  into  full  realization. 

One  exponent  of  Doctor  Sun's  principles  who  merits  special  mention,  is  his 
widow,  the  former  Sing  Ling  Soong.  Madame  Sun  has  consistenly  and  per- 
sistently, since  her  husband's  death  in  1925,  endeavored  to  bring  about  the  com- 
plete realization  of  his  aspirations.  Quiet  and  self-effacing,  she  is  less  well- 
known  abroad  than  her  sister,  Madame  Chiang  Kai-shek,  but  in  China  she  has  a 
large  and  loyal  following. 

Madame  Sun  places  only  one  interpretation  on  the  teachings  of  her  distinguished 
husband:  the  literal  application  of  the  principles  of  Nationalism,  Democracy, 
and  the  People's  Livelihood.  She  understands  the  self-discipline  and  self-sacri- 
fice which  their  application  requires,  and  she  begins  with  herself.  None  who 
has  visited  her  can  have  failed  to  be  impressed  by  the  simplicity  of  her  life,  her 
love  for  humanity  and  her  unremitting  effort  to  improve  the  livelihood  of  her 
fellow  citizens.  I  have  known  Madame  Sun  for  many  years,  and  her  friendship 
has  been  an  unfailing  source  of  inspiration. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  is  the  other  one,  Mr.  Mandel  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  I  have  here  the  original  of  an  article  from  a  magazine 
entitled  "Youth,"  the  official  organ  of  the  American  Youth  for  Democ- 
racy, which  had  been  cited  as  subversive  by  the  Attorney  General. 

This  issue  is  evidently  undated,  and  on  page  5  of  this  issue  we  have 
the  following  article  headed  "We  Fought  For  Peace;  by  National 
Committee  to  Win  the  Peace,  Brig.  Gen.  Evans  F.  Carlson,  USMCR 
(Retired),  Paul  Robeson,  cochairmen." 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  Mr.  Carlson  has  been  identified  before 
this  connnittee  as  having  been  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Are  you  offering  just  this  article  for  the  record, 
Mr.  Morris  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  right,  Mr.  Sour^vine. 

Mr.  FoRTAS.  Mr.  Morris,  we  have  not  seen  these  two  articles  offered 
for  the  record.  Is  there  any  reference  in  them  to  Mr.  Lattimore  by 
name,  in  either  of  them  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  No. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  wonder  if  the  significance  or  the  meaning  of 
this  letter  of  February  8,  1940,  from  Owen  Lattimore  to  Carlson  is 
clear,  where  Mr.  Lattimore  starts  out  with :  "What  a  dope  I  am !  I 
forgot  to  give  you  the  enclosed  glamorous  candid  portrait  of  yourself." 

Was  there  a  memorandum  in  the  paper,  or  in  this  envelope,  or  do 
you  mean  what  followed  as  being  the  "glamorous  candid  portrait?" 

Mr.  Lattimore  .  I  should  say,  Senator,  that  it  probably  is  a  refer- 
ence to  a  snapshot  that  was  enclosed,  a  snapshot  of  himself,  a  camera 
snapshot. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  did  not  mean  to  convey  that  the  language 
was  the  portrait? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then  you  say:  "Don't  give  anybody  else  too 
much  the  idea,"  and  so  forth.     What  did  you  mean  by  that? 

Read  it  and  tell  us  what  you  meant  by  that. 

Mr.  Lattimore  [reading]  : 

Dear  Evans  :  What  a  dope  I  am  ! 

The  Chairman.  How  did  you  spell  the  word  "dope?" 

Mr.  Lattimore.  D-o-p-e. 

The  Chairman.  You  did  not  use  "u,"  did  you? 


3478  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No.     I  said : 

What  a  dope  I  am !  I  forgot  to  give  you  the  enclosed  ghimorons  candid  por- 
trait of  yourself. 

Don't  give  anybody  else  too  much  the  idea  that  Lt  is  a  Herculean  job  to  make 
the  fur  fly  in  Baltimore. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Could  you  stop  right  there  now  ?  What  did  you 
mean  by  that  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  think  my  recollection  is  probably  correct,  Senator, 
that  I  was  referring  to  Colonel  Carlson  coming  to  Baltimore  to  speak 
for  the  American  Committee  for  Nonparticipation  in  Japanese  Ag- 
gression. Among  other  speakers  we  had  for  it  were  Dr.  Walter  Judd, 
now  Congressman  Judd,  also  Admiral  Harry  Yarnell. 

*  *  *  If  anybody  should  come  along  all  ardor  and  enthusiasm,  why  break 
his  spirit  in  advance?  Besides,  after  the  swell  work  you  did,  it  should  be  easier 
in  the  future. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Wliat  "swell  work"  were  you  talking  about  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Swell  work  in  raising  funds  for  the  American  Com- 
mittee for  Nonparticipation  in  Japanese  Aggression. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Morris,  you  have  an  exhibit  here  that  you  have 
offered  for  the  record.  Up  to  this  point,  I  have  not  been  able  to  catch 
your  connection  to  tie  it  in  here  w4th  either  the  Institute  of  Pacific 
Relations  or  the  witness  on  the  stand. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore  gave  testimony  today,  Mr.  Chairman, 
about  his  having  given  advice  to  the  author  of  that  article,  that  he 
should  stay  in  the  Navy  and  not  resign.  We  had  some  questioning  on 
that  point. 

Reference  was  also  made  to  Colonel  Carlson's  membership  in  the 
Communist  Party.  That  article  is  an  article  that  Carlson  wrote  for 
the  American  Youth  for  Democracy  publication,  and  that  bears  on 
Colonel  Carlson's  political  persuasions  in  connection  with  the  advice 
offered  to  him  by  Mr.  Lattimore,  who  told  him  he  should  have  stayed 
in  the  Navy,  where  he  would  be  more  potent. 

Mr.  FoRTAs.  Do  you  mean  the  article  refers  to  it? 

Mr.  Morris.  It  bears  on  his  political  identity.  He  is  writing  for 
a  Communist  publication. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  On  his  political  identity  at  the  time  I  gave  him 
that  advice  ? 

The  Chairman.  Wait  a  minute. 

Did  I  understand  that  this  organization,  of  which  Carlson  was  a 
member,  was  listed  as  a  subversive  organization  b}-  the  Attorney  Gen- 
eral? 

Mr.  Morris.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  It  may  be  inserted  in  the  record. 

Again  I  say  it  goes  to  the  weight  of  its  worthwliileness. 

(Tlie  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  546''  and  is  as 
follows:) 

Exhibit  No.  546 

We  Fought  For  Peace 

(By  National  Committee  to  Win  the  Peace,  Brig.  Gen.  Evans  F.  Carlson,  USMCB. 
(retired)  Paul  Robeson,  cochairmen) 

[Source:    Youth,    Published   by   American    Youth   for   Democracy,    February    1947,    p.    5] 

During  the  war,  American  youth  carried  their  ideals  for  a  postwar  world  into 
battle.    Their  gims  spoke  the  hope  of  an  era  of  permanent,  democratic  peace, 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3479 

The  rhythm  of  marching  feet  sounded  their  aspirations  for  an  economic  future 
quite  in  contrast  to  the  homeless,  blaclv-market  ridden  land  to  which  they 
returned. 

They  fought  hard  and  they  fought  well  in  their  battle  against  the  enemy. 
But  their  enemies  were  not  only  Hans  or  Tayaka.  Their  enemies  were  the 
philosophies  that  held  one  man  is  better  than  another  because  of  the  color  of  his 
skin  or  the  religion  that  he  practiced ;  that  democracy  is  an  archaic  system 
that  must  be  replaced  by  fascism ;  and  that  the  armed  might  of  imperialism 
can  rule  the  world.  Side  by  side  the  democratic  peoples  of  the  world,  American 
youth  defeated  the  advocates  of  these  philosophies. 

The  youth  of  America  had  good  cause  to  fight  as  they  did  under  the  leadership 
of  Franklin  Roosevelt.  They  remembered  well  how  his  courageous  leadership 
had  saved  the  post-World  War  I  generation  from  the  chaos  of  the  Hoover  de- 
pression. They  knew  from  experience  how  his  fight  for  a  better  America  had 
enabled  many  of  them  to  finish  school,  to  improve  their  living  standards  and  to 
enjoy  the  full  benefits  of  American  democracy. 

With  Franklin  Roosevelt,  the  youth  of  America  envisaged  a  world  free  from 
the  scourge  of  war.  They  knew  that  his  policy  of  friendship  and  unity  of  all 
United  Nations  held  the  key  to  peace  as  well  as  victory.  Translated  into  prac- 
tical terms,  it  meant  an  incessant  battle  for  economic  democracy,  for  colonial 
independence,  for  minority  rights  and  for  the  spirit  of  friendly  cooperation 
among  the  Big  Three  powers. 

F.  b.  R.  did  not  live  to  see  the  peace  he  worked  so  hard  to  win.  He  did  not 
live  to  see  that  peace  threatened  by  dangerous  voices  in  our  midst  who  are  al- 
ready crying  for  a  new  war — a  new  and  terrible  conflagration  that  will  wipe 
out  democracy  as  it  lashes  the  earth  with  the  weapons  of  an  atomic  age. 

But  today,  others,  particularly  the  youth  of  America,  are  fighting  along  the 
battle  lines  set  by  F.  D.  R.  Through  the  AYD,  through  the  National  Com- 
mittee to  Win  the  Peace  and  through  every  other  democratic  channel  of  people's 
expression,  American  youth  are  working  to  return  our  Nation  to  the  program 
of  F.  D.  R. 

The  future  of  the  youth  of  America  is  inextricably  woven  into  the  pattern 
this  country  sets  for  itself  in  the  immediate  period  to  come.  The  voice  of  youth 
will  play  a  major  role  in  determining  that  pattern. 

Together  witli  the  youth  of  America,  the  National  Committee  to  Win  the 
Peace  will  work  to  crystalize  public  opinion  on  a  course  which  will  enable  us 
to  live  in  peace  with  all  nations  of  the  world — on  a  course  which  will  enable  us 
to  steer  clear  of  a  war  whicli  might  be  precipitated  by  forces  which  are  inimical 
to  the  best  interests  of  the  youth  and  people  of  America. 

Only  if  our  country  follows  such  a  course  will  the  ideals  of  F.  D.  R.  and  the 
youth  of  America  for  a  better  postwar  world  be  fulfilled. 

Mv.  ^Morris.  IVIr.  Lattimore,  did  you  ever  serve  as  a  member  of  the 
board  of  directors  of  the  American-Russian  Institute? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  believe  I  may  have,  for  a  year. 

If  you  have  a  document  to  refresh  my  recollection,  I  should  be  glad 
to  see  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  identify  that  document,  please? 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  is  a  photostat  of  a  document  from  the  files  of  the 
Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  dated  October  21, 1940,  addressed  to  Miss 
Harriet  L.  jMoore,  the  American-Russian  Institute,  56  West  Forty- 
fifth  Street,  New  York  City,  with  the  typed  signature  of  Owen  Latti- 
more.    The  document  is  a  photostat  of  a  carbon  copy. 

Mr.  iSIoRRis.  Mr.  Lattimore,  can  you  recall  having  written  that 
letter  ? 

j\Ir.  Lattimore.  Yes;  I  recall  it.  And  it  shows  that  my  recolTection« 
was  wrong. 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  he  recalls  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  ]\Ir.  Lattimore,  will  you  read  the  letter,  please  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  date  is  October  24,  1940,  to  Miss  Harriet  L. 
Moore,  the  American-Russian  Institute,  56  West  Forty-fifth  Street, 
New  York  City. 


3480  INSTITUTE    or    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

(Exhibit  No.  547) 

Dear  Hakbiet:  I  am  afraid  that  I  cannot  serve  on  the  board  of  directors  of  the 
institute,  but  I  thinlv  you  will  appreciate  my  reasons. 

My  primary  interest,  and  the  only  field  in  which  I  speali  with  any  authority, 
is  the  Far  East.  At  the  present  time,  of  all  times,  I  do  not  want  to  run  the 
risk  of  having  anything  I  may  say  about  the  Far  East  discredited  by  people  who 
say  "You  can't  trust  a  word  he  says  about  China,  because  he  is  interested  in 
cultural  relations  with  the  Soviet  Union." 
Yours  very  sincerely. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  will  it  be  received  into  the  record? 

The  Chairman.  It  will  be  received  into  the  record. 

(The  document  previously  read  in  full  by  the  w^itness  was  marked 
"Exhibit  No.  547".) 

The  Chairman.  Wliat  is  the  next  one  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr,  Mandel,  will  you  identify  this  document,  please? 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  is  a  photostat  of  a  document  from  the  files  of  the 
Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  headed  "On  board  M.  V.  Georgic^  en 
route  to  New  York."  It  is  dated  October  19,  1937,  addressed  to 
W.  L.  Holland,  with  the  typed  signature  of  Edward  C.  Carter.  It  is 
a  phototsat  of  a  carbon  copy. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  read  the  handwritten  notations 
on  the  top  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  At  the  top  are  the  following  handwritten  notes 
[reading]  : 

Copies  to  OL— to  share  with  RP  &  ED. 
CHS— to  share  with  HM,  CP,  EFC,  KB,  CT. 

The  Chairman.  Can  somebody  interpret  those  initials,  please,  who 
they  were,  for  the  record  ?     Who  were  the  parties  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr,  Lattimore,  will  you  identify  the  parties? 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

OL— to  share  with  RP  &  ED. 

The  Chairman.  Is  that  your  signature  to  the  letter,  "OL"  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No;  this  is  a  circulation  notation,  to  be  sent  to 
"OL"  and  for  "OL"  to  share  with  "RP"  and  "ED." 

The  Chairman.  Who  are  they.     Who  is  "RP"  ? 

Mr,  Lattimore.  "RP"  I  think  was  an  Englishman  named — I  for- 
get his  name — Page  or  something  like  that,  who  was  working  for 
the  IPR  in  Shanghai. 

"ED,"  I  think,  is  Elizabeth  Downing. 

Then  the  other  initials  are  "CHS— to  share  with  HM,  CP,  EEC, 
KB,  CT."  Presumably,  that  means  Chen  Han-seng,  to  share  with 
Harriet  Moore,  Catherine  Porter,  Elsie  Fairfax  Cholmeley,  Kathleen 
Barnes,  Charlotte  Tyler. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  the  relevancy  of  this  document  is  that  a 
copy  of  it  had  been  sent  to  Mr.  Lattimore,  and  the  questioning  will  bear 
on  his  knowledge  of  the  contents  of  this  memorandum. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Are  you  offering  that  for  the  record,  Mr.  Morris? 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  offer  this  for  the  record. 

"The  Chairman.  It  will  be  inserted  in  the  record. 

(The  document ire.ferr^d  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  548"  and  is 
as  follows:) 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3481 

Exhibit  No.  548 

Copies  to  01. — to  share  with  RP  &  ED 

CHS— to  share  with  HM,  CP,  EFC,  KB,  CT 

On  Board  "M.  V.  Georoic,"  en  Route  to  New  York, 

19th  October,  1937. 

W.  L.  Holland,  Esq., 

%  Kokusai  Kyokai,  12  2-cJiomc  Marnnoiichi,  Kojimaclii-ku, 

Tokyo,  Japan. 

De.\b  Bill:  The  pace  in  and  following  Moscow  has  been  such  that  I  can  only 
now  begin  a  piecemeal  report  to  you  on  visit  and  discussions.  Today  I  will 
group  mv  answers  around  the  agenda  which  I  prepared  for  a  meeting  of  the 
praesidium  on  August  13  and  August  17.  To  give  you  the  trend,  I  will  italicize 
the  agenda  which  formed  the  basis  of  these  two  formal  meetings,  but  there  were 
many  other  conversations  so  that  the  information  contained  in  this  letter  was 
not  entirely  conveyed  at  those  two  stated  meetings. 

1.    THANKS    TO   SOVIET   COUNCIL    FOR    ARRANGING    SECRETARY-GENERAL'S    FAR    EASTERN 

VISIT 

Here  I  gave  a  rather  full  account  of  what  I  regarded  as  the  deeper  significances 
of  the  visit.  V.  B.  M.  explained  the  difficulties  in  makincr  the  arrangements  but 
his  great  satisfaction  that  the  object  of  the  visit  had  been  achieved,  namely, 
better  equipment  of  the  Secretary-General  for  his  work. 

This  led  to  a  very  extended  discussion  of  possible  developments  in  the  war 
in  China.  The  sketch  made  by  V.  E.  M.  and  Y.  P.  B.  in  August  has  thus  far 
been  proved  both  fundamental  and  accurately  prophetic.  To  describe  it  here 
would  make  this  letter,  which  must  be  long  anyhow,  too  bulky.  It  would  also 
make  the  letter  interesting. 

n.    RESEARCH 

.4.  Letter  from  Holland  to  Bremman  dated  June  28, 1937. 

(1)  Enf/lish  or  American  editions  of  Standards  of  Living  Repot'ts. 

(2)  Report  on  North  Pacific  fisheries. 

B.  Letter  from  Holland  to  Carter  dated  June  28, 1937. 

"The  other  place  of  research  which  ice  should  like  to  have  started  in  the 
Soviet  Union  is  a  report  on  Soviet  foreign  policy  mith  special  reference  to  the 
Far  East  and  the  countries  having  membership  in  the  IPR.  Each  national  coun- 
cil is  being  asked  to  prepare  a  similar  report,  necessarily  presenting  its  oun 
national  point  of  view. 

"In  connection  with  the  studies  on  the  economic  development  of  dependent 
territories  in  the  Pacific  it  might  be  interesting  for  them  to  prepare  a  report  on 
the  administration  and  economic  development  of  its  Far  Eastern  territories  in- 
habited by  minor  nationalities,  contrasting  this  loith  the  customary  methods  of 
V,^ester7i  Colonial  administration. 

"There  is  one  further  point.  Motileff  in  discussing  the  Land  Utilization 
studies  at  Yosemite  spoke  with  some  enthusiasm  about  securing  an  extensive 
and  very  illuminating  report  on  land  utilization  and  agricultm-al  development 
in  the  Soviet  Far  East.  There  would  be  widespread  interest  in  such  a  report 
and  I  hope  you  will  take  the  matter  up  again  with  him  and  assure  him  of  our 
desire  to  have  the  study  done  and  to  do  ichaterer  we  can  to  facilitate  its  publi- 
cation in  English.  Besides  this  Motileff  spoke  of  supplying  material  for  the 
new  edition  of  the  Economic  Handbook.  On  this  point  hotcevcr  I  assume  that 
Miss  Mitchell  will  be  tvell  armed  with  specific  requests  and  suggestions  since  the 
preparation  of  the  new  edition  has  already  been  star-ted  under  Mr.  Field's 
direction." 

With  reference  to  English  or  American  editions  of  the  Standard  of  Living 
Reports,  the  praesidium  is  hospitable  to  the  idea  in  principle,  but  is  very  reluctant 
to  have  these  handled  on  any  but  a  commercial  basis.  They  do  not  wish  to  have 
publications  subsidized  for  this  makes  their  work  liable  to  attack  as  propaganda. 
If  some  English  or  American  publisher  will  not  take  the  studies  on  a  commercial 
basis  it  is  probable  that  it  could  be  published  through  the  English  Workers  Press 
or  tlirough  International  Publishers. 
88348-^52— pt.  10 ^^14 


3482  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

With  reference  to  a  report  on  the  North-Pacific  fisheries,  the  praesidium  wants 
to  know  precisely  what  tlie  objective  of  tlie  Institute  is  for  this  study.  There  are 
so  many  approaclies  that  the  praesidium  does  not  wish  to  set  a  lot  of  people  to 
work  on  every  aspect  of  Soviet  Far  Eastern  fislieries  without  knowing  with  very 
great  precision,  what  you  and  Alsherg  want.  In  this  connection,  please  see  my 
letter  to  Alsberg  of  V.  E.  M.  thought  that  the  fisheries  question  had  been 

better  treated  in  the  Pacific  Fisherman  than  it  had  in  Pacific  Affairs.  He  had 
sent  Miller  Freeman  the  latest  data  in  Jiily.  Some  time  when  you  are  in  Tokyo 
you  may  wish  to  look  up  Juikoff,  an  expert  on  fish,  who  is  attached  from  time 
to  time  to  the  staff  of  the  Soviet  Embassy  in  Tokyo. 

If  the  Japanese  I.  P.  R.  or  the  American  I.  P.  R.  set  the  pace  in  the  studies  of 
the  fishery  question  or  if  you  and  Alsberg  give  a  precise  outline  of  just  what  the 
purpose  of  the  study  is,  it  will  be  very  easy  for  the  Soviet  I.  P.  R.  to  make  the 
necessary  start  on  the  study. 

With  reference  to  a  report  on  Soviet  foreign  policy  in  the  Far  East,  V.  E.  M. 
wonders  whether  you  wish  it  treated  primarily  from  the  historical  point  of  view 
or  with  the  emphasis  on  contemporary  manifestations  of  Soviet  foreign  policy. 
If  the  latter  is  what  you  want,  the  situation  is  a  little  difficult  because  of  the  lack 
of  connection  between  the  Soviet  I.  P.  K.  and  the  Foreign  Ofiice,  as  prescribed  by 
I.  P.  R.  custom.  It  may  be  helpful  if  you  would  suggest  an  organizing  principal 
for  all  of  the  Councils  for  their  monographs  in  this  field. 

With  reference  to  your  suggestions  that  the  praesidium  prepare  a  report  on 
the  development  of  the  Far  Eastern  Territories  inlial)ited  by  Minor  Nationalities, 
for  contrast  with  the  customary  methods  of  Western  Colonial  administration,  I 
have  already  written  you  (see  my  letter  of  September  29)  that  it  is  quite  im- 
possible for  the  Soviet  I.  P.  R.  to  prepare  a  report  for  such  a  purpose.  The  INIinor 
Nationalities  are  in  no  sense  "colonial"'  areas.  If  you  want  a  monograph  on  this 
subject  it  is  a  legitimate  request  to  make  of  the  Soviet  I.  P.  K.,  but  only  if  it  is 
completely  disassociated  from  preparation  for  the  Round  Table  on  Colonial 
Problems. 

With  reference  to  Land  L^tilization  there  is  a  voluminous  report  on  this  sftbject 
for  '34,  '35,  '36,  on  which  someone  is  working.  But  it  probably  cannot  be  brought 
up  to  date  until  the  second  half  of  next  year.  Then  someone  should  go  to  the 
Far  East  for  the  purpose  of  correcting  and  supplementing  the  statement. 

With  reference  to  the  new  edition  of  the  Economic  Handljook.  I  had  nothing 
to  say  as  Field  had  not  supi)lied  me  with  an  outline  of  his  proposed  procedure  in 
this  matter.  When  a  specific  request  is  made  to  Motylev  I  think  he  will  respond. 
But  I  didn't  get  the  idea  that  he  regarded  this  project  as  one  to  which  everything 
else  should  be  subordinated. 

III.    PACFFIC    ATFAIRS 

Lattimore's  urgent  desire  for  Soviet  articles  for  Pacific  Affairs,  for  example, 
Voitiriskifs  article  in  TikMi  Olcean,  ivhich  tvas  translated  and  used  in  Amerasia, 
ironld  have  been  ideal  as  a  contribution  to  Pacific  Affairs. 

This  has  been  covered  in  my  letter  to  Lattlmore  of  September  12,  a  copy 
of  which  I  have  already  sent  you. 

IV.    AGENDA    FOR    1039    CONFERENCE 

A.  Comment  of  Soviet  Council. 

B.  Replies  fro)n  other  Councils. 

The  Soviet  Council  prefers  the  methodology  of  our  April  proposal  to  that 
followed  at  Yosemite.  At  the  same  time  the  praesidium  does  not  feel  so  strongly 
in  this  matter  as  to  desire  to  have  their  vote  weigh  too  decisively.  They  feel 
that  as  one  of  the  newest  Councils  they  would  prefer  to  throw  in  their  lot  with 
the  wishes  of  the  majority  of  the  older  Councils.  The  Council  favors  the  inclu- 
sion of  the  current  crisis  in  the  Far  East  in  the  agenda  of  the  next  Conference. 
The  Soviet  Council  had  not  yet  received  the  Kingston  proposals  when  I  was  in 
Moscow.  They  had  seen  the  Chatham  House  memorandum  of  August  3rd  and 
Miss  Harriet  Moore's  important  contribution  on  methods  and  objectives. 

v.  INTERIM  MEETINGS  OF  PACIFIC  COUNCIL  AND  INTERNATIONAL  RESEARCH  COMMITTEE, 
HANKING,   APRIL   21-28,    1938 

A.  Af/enda. 

B.  Soviet  participation. 

If  the  meetings  are  held  in  Naidving  the  Soviet  Council  will  aim  to  be  repre- 
sented.    The  Soviet  Council  would  have  preferred  a  meeting  in  October  1937^ 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3483 

in  England  to  a  meeting  in  China  in  April  1938,  partially  because  of  distance, 
but  principally  because  of  the  advantage  of  getting  Great  Britain  to  assume 
greater  interest  and  responsibility  in  the  I.  P.  R.  through  acting  as  host. 

VI.    PACIFIC   COUNCIL  FINANCE 

I  referred  to  Dafoe's  letter  of  March  30th  in  which  he  referred  to  Lord  Astor's 
letter  stating  that  the  Chatham  House  increase  of  its  gift  was  defended  on  the 
ground  that  it  would  enable  the  Institute  to  get  more  money  from  the  other 
Councils. 

The  praesidium  was  glad  that  Chatham  House  had  increased  its  contriljution 
to  $750,  but  sorry  that  it  had  not  raised  it  to  .$1,000.  The  U.  S.  S.  R.  will  con- 
sider increasing  its  contribution  to  .$3,000.00  next  year.  If  all  the  other  Councils 
would  increase,  they  would  do  likewise,  but  they  do  not  feel  that  it  is  sound  for 
them  to  give  more  than  Great  Britain  which  in  reality  they  are  already  doing 
if  you  take  everything  into  consideration.  The  Soviet  Council  is  the  only 
Council  which  has  never  taken  a  penny  from  the  International  liesearch  Fund. 
Nearly  every  Council,  except  the  American  and  Canadian  have  got  more  from 
the  Research  Fund  than  they  have  contributed  to  the  General  Purposes  budget. 
Furthermore,  the  Soviet  Council  this  year  took  care  of  all  my  expenses  from 
the  time  I  arrived  in  Vladivostok  until  I  reached  Moscow,  and  thus  in  fact  added 
'several  hundred  dollars  to  the  Pacific  Council's  income,  though  this  item  will 
not  show  in  our  books.  The  Soviet  I.  P.  R.  is  prepared  to  supplement  its  contri- 
bution to  the  Pacific  Council  by  helping  to  meet  the  Ruble  needs  of  staff  mem- 
bers like  Miss  Moore  and  Lattimore  when  they  travel  on  study  tours  in  the 
U.  S.  S.  R. 

VII.  IXF0R:\[AL  report  ox  I.  p.   R.  developments  in   japan,   PHILIPPINES,   AND  CHINA 

Here  I  gave  a  survey  of  the  difficulties  and  promise  of  the  three  Far  Eastern 
Councils.  I  described  the  favorable  financial  outlook  in  Japan  and  China  and 
indicated  that  I  feared  that  few  if  any  of  the  hoped  for  contributions  would  now 
actually  be  paid  to  either  Council.  I  referred  to  the  promises  of  increased  finan- 
cial support  of  the  Philippine  Council  and  the  bearing  this  might  have  in  ulti- 
mately creating  .something  more  substantial  than  that  which  has  existed  in  the 
past.  The  praesidium  asked  very  penetrating  questions  regarding  the  Institute 
in  the  three  countries. 

VIII.  CRITICISMS  AND  COMMENTS  OF  THE  U.  S.  S.  R.      I.  P.  R.  EEGAKDING  THE  WORK  OF 

THE    INTERNATIONAL    SECRETARIAT    SINCE    YOSEMITE 

The  praesidium  was  so  conscious  of  its  failure  to  cooperate  in  supplying 
articles  for  Pacific  Affairs  that  little  was  said  under  this  heading.  Fears  with 
reference  to  Problems  of  the  Pacific  will  not  it  appears  be  realized.  I  saw  an 
advance  copy  of  the  volume  in  London  and  was  able  to  write  Motylev  a  letter 
which  will  I  think  end  his  anxiety.  The  only  real  criticism  was  with  reference  to 
Cressy  whom  the  praesidium  recognized  was  not  a  representative  of  the  I.  P.  R. 
and  had  only  been  recommended  by  the  I.  P.  R.  as  in  Class  B.  Motylev  felt  that 
Cressy  was  exceedingly  conservative  and  in  many  important  fields  uninformed. 
For  example,  he  criticized  the  Atlas  because  Manchuria  and  the  Outer  Mongolian 
People's  Republic  were  not  .shown  in  the  same  colors  as  indicating  an  identic 
political  status. 

Motylev  nevertheless,  was  very  glad  that  the  Atlas  had  been  able  to  pay  Cressy 
between  3,800  and  4,000  Rubles  for  eight  days  work  on  the  Atlas,  thus  providing 
for  all  of  his  Ruble  needs  throughout  the  extensive  journeys  which  Motylev  ar- 
ranged for  him  to  different  parts  of  the  Union. 

IX.  WORK  PLANS  OF   MEMBERS  OF  THE  INTERNATIONAL   SECRETARIAT   FOR  THE   COMING 
YEARS  CARTER,  MITCHELL,  HOLLAND,  CHEN  HAN-SENG,  LATTIMORE,  MOORE,  PYKE,  ETC. 

Here  I  gave  the  best  foreca.st  I  could  of  staff  plans.  Motylev  was  sorry  that 
Mitchell  had  been  unable  to  come  to  Moscow  and  that  I  had  not  applied  earlier 
for  permission  for  Holland  to  accompany  me  to  the  Far  East.  The  pdsition  with 
reference  to  Lattimore's  going  to  Outer  :\longolia  is  set  forth  in  my  letter  to 
Lattimore  of  September  12,  a  copy  of  which  I  sent  you.  The  position  with  refer- 
ence to  Miss  Moore's  going  to  Buryat,  Mongolia  is  set  forth  in  my  letter  to  her 
of  September  12,  a  copy  of  which  I  have  also  sent  you. 


3484  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

X.  COMMENTS  BY   OFFICERS   OF  THE  V.    S.    S.    R.      I.   P.    R.    ON   PRESENT   CRISIS    IN   THE 

FAR   EAST 

This,  as  indicated  above,  calls  for  a  separate  memorandum. 

XI.  MOTYLEV'S     SUGGESTIONS    FOR    CARTER'S    VISIT    TO     MOSCOW     (AUGUST     10,     1923) 

When  I  reached  Vladivostok,  Bremman  told  me  that  Dr.  Motylev  hoped  that 
it  would  be  possible  for  me  to  take  my  family  for  a  fortnight  to  the  Crimea  at 
the  end  of  tlie  Moscow  visit.  Motylev  renewed  this  invitation  on  our  arrival, 
but  because  of  previous  engagements  in  Western  Europe,  and  the  growing  serious- 
ness of  the  crisis  in  the  Far  East,  we  had  to  decline  with  thanks  this  very  kind 
invitation. 

Arrangements  were  made,  however,  for  us  to  take  a  fascinating  three-day  trip 
in  the  Moscow-Volga  Canal,  going  as  far  as  Kalinin.  We  made  interesting 
visits  to  the  parks,  to  the  Red  Army  Club,  to  one  of  the  big  stadiums  for  a  soccer 
game  between  Dynamo  and  the  Red  Army,  and  spent  all  of  August  18  at  the 
great  aviation  field  outside  of  Moscow  watching  some  hundreds  of  airplanes 
celebrating  the  annual  Civil  Aviation  Day. 

We  saw  a  good  many  of  the  staff  of  the  American  Embassy,  although  Mr. 
Davies  was  away  on  his  yacht  in  the  Baltic.  We  saw  the  British  Ambassador, 
and  several  of  his  staff,  had  long  talks  with  both  the  Chinese  and  Japanese 
Ambasi^adors,  with  Litvinova,  and,  of  course,  with  several  of  the  foreign  journal- 
ists. Mr.  and  IVIrs.  Barnes  extended  many  courtesies  including  a  cocktail  party 
for  many  of  the  foreign  journalists  the  day  we  left.  On  August  21st  Motylev 
gave  a  dinner,  attended,  among  others,  by  Smirnov,  the  new  head  of  Vox, 
Vinogradoff,  Foreign  Office  referent  for  England  and  the  United  States,  Wine- 
berg,  of  the  Anglo-American  section  of  the  Foreign  Office,  Miss ,  one  of  the 

editorial  staff  of  Isvestia.  Voitinsky  we  did  not  see  as  he  had  not  returned 
from  his  holiday.  It  so  happened  that  our  visit  to  Moscow  came  at  a  time  when 
several  members  of  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  I.  P.  R.  Council  were  away  on  vacation. 
Hai'ondar  had  been  borrowed  for  six  months  to  assist  in  the  Soviet  Building  at 
the  Paris  Exposition.     We  had  two  good  talks  with  him  in  Paris. 

One  evening  Motylev  took  us  to  the  movie  "Na  Vostoke."  This  is  a  film 
version  of  Pavlenko's  novel  which  has  gone  through  edition  after  edition  since 
its  publication  a  few  months  ago.  I  am  told  though  it  is  a  novel,  it  contains 
a  surprising  amount  of  military  information  regarding  the  position  of  the  Red 
Army  in  the  Far  East.  You  will  remember  Harriet  Moore's  review  of  this  book 
in  the  September  Pacific  Affairs. 

We  had  a  long  session  at  Vox  at  the  invitation  of  the  new  president,  Smirnov. 
Motylev,  Mrs.  Carter,  Miss  Kislova,  and  myself  were  present.  Smirnov  wanted 
to  know  how  cooperation  between  Vox  and  the  American-Russian  Institute 
could  be  made  more  effective.  He  wished  to  get  a  very  much  fuller  understanding 
•of  the  work  and  program  of  the  A.  R.  I.  and  hoped  tliat  more  substantial  coopera- 
tion could  be  built  up  in  the  future.  I  read  betv/een  the  lines  that  Vox  felt  that 
the  A.  R.  I.  gave  letters  of  introduction  to  Vox  to  any  American  tourist  who 
requested  one  and  thus  they  had  no  basis  for  discrimination  as  to  who  was  en- 
titled to  a  lot  of  time  and  who  could  best  be  liandled  by  Intourist.  If  Vox  knew 
in  advance  of  the  specific  social  opinions  and  interests  of  important  Americans, 
they  could  make  very  much  better  use  of  their  limited  staff.  Smirnov  wanted 
a  long  explanation  as  to  why  the  A.  R.  I.  still  retained  a  certain  internationally 
known  enemy  of  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  on  its  board  of  directors.. 

Just  before  I  left,  Smirnov  luckily  bad  a  long  letter  from  Osgoode  Field,  the 
President  of  the  A.  R.  I.,  which  I  gather  set  his  mind  at  rest  at  several  points. 
The  A.  R.  I.  bad  recently  sent  a  representative  to  Moscow  who  didn't  seem  to 
know  very  much  either  about  the  A.  R.  I.  or  about  the  social  views  of  its  members. 

I  used  the  occasion  to  explain  what  I  thought  was  the  membership  basis  of  the 
A.  R.  I.,  namely,  an  interest  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  I  said  that  I  thought  the  member- 
ship was  open  both  to  friends  and  critics  of  the  Soviet  Union.  I  added  that 
perhaps  in  the  long  run  its  greatest  strength  might  lie  in  its  being  a  cross  section 
of  American  public  opinion. 

XII.    OTUEB   BUSINESS 

A.  Memorandum  from  Chatham  Hoiise  dated  August  3rd,  1937 

This  memorandum  arrived  after  our  first  conversation  on  preparation  for 
the  next  conference.  On  one  of  these  occasions  Motylev  emphasized  how  eager 
the  Soviet  I.  P.  R.  is  to  have  the  Institute  deal  with  current  controversial  issues. 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3485 

Unless  the  Institute  courageously  continues  to  face  the  most  pressing  and  funda- 
mental controversies,  it  cannot  render  its  largest  service. 

B.  What  steps  will  be  taken  to  insure  intelligent  and  significant  revieics  of  Great 

Soviet  World  Atlas  in  principal  countries.  How  secure  a  feiv  advance 
copies  with  memorandum  on  principal  points  of  significance 
Motylev  indicated  that  the  first  edition  of  the  Atlas  would  be  10,000  copies. 
These  would  be  used  up  almost  immediately.  He  really  hoped  that  the  first 
edition  would  not  be  widely  reviewed  because  then  the  overseas  demand  for 
copies  might  exceed  the  number  available.  He  would,  of  course,  see  that  one 
copy  was  sent  to  the  International  Secretariat  and  to  each  National  Council. 

C.  Recommendation  as  to  duration  Miss  Harriet  Moore's  visit  to  Buryat  Mongolia 
ECC  was  asked  to  write  a  formal  letter  to  Dr,  Motylev  a  few  months  in  advance 

of  Miss  Moore's  proposed  visit  to  Buryat  Mongolia,  describing  the  purpose  of  the 
visit  and  its  duratioh.  It  was  suggested  that  an  application  for  .say  two  months' 
residehce  in  Buryat  Mongolia  be  thade.  A  major  diffl;illty  was,  of  cour.se,  the 
matter  of  military  secrets.  A  minor  difBclilty  might  be  the  question  of  .suitable 
living  quarters  as  the  Btiryat  Mongols  draw  no  lines  between  the  sexes. 

D.  Could  Bremman  spend  at  least  3  months  as  a  member  of  the  Internntional 

Secretariat  in  1938  or  1939 
Motylev  indicated  that  the  Soviet  Council  mii.'^t  provide  a  Soviet  staff  member 
for  the  International  Secretariat  for  a  few  months  prior  to  the  next  Conference ; 
but  whether  Bremman  himself  could  be  spared  was  another  question,  Bremman 
as  you  know  is  one  of  the  Japanese  experts  in  the  Academy  of  Science  (Insti- 
tute of  World  Politics  and  Economics).  He  is  only  able  to  give  part  time  to  the 
work  of  the  I.  P.  R.  He  is  exceedingly  al)le  and  would  be  quickly  annexed  by 
the  American  Council  if  we  ever  station  him  in  New  'Sfork. 

E.  Procedure  with  reference  to  members  of  the  Internatimial  Secretariat  and 

the  Secretariats  of  the  National  Councils  visiting  the  Soviet  Union  in  the 
future 
This  question  was  raised  as  a  result  of  Shiman's  long  delay  in  getting  a  visa. 
The  full  details  of  this  are  covered  in  my  letter  to  Field  of  August  20th,  a  copy 
of  which  I  enclose. 

In  general  the  Soviet  I.  P.  R.  will  always  find  it  ea.sier  to  get  visas  for  senior 
staff  members,  who  come  for  longish  visits  rather  than  for  junior  members  who 
contemplate  visits  of  only  a  few  days.  Very  great  regret  was  expressed  by 
Motylov  that  Field  had  not  notified  him,  in  advance,  of  Shiman's  plans. 

F.  The  internal  situation  in  the  Soviet  Union 

The  discussion  of  this  topic  by  Motylov  and  Bremman  was  one  of  the  most 
interesting  and  enlightening  experiences  in  the  whole  cour.se  of  my  visit.  But 
thi.s  better  be  covered  in  a  separate  memorandum  which  I  hope  some  day  to  be 
able  to  prepare. 

G.  Suggestions  from  Soviet  Council  to  the  Secretary-Generpl  regarding  making 

the  loork  of  the  International  Secretariat  more  efficient 

The  praesidium  had  no  suggestions  to  make. 

H.  How  secure  promptly  several  copies  of  the  folloiolng  publications  of  the  In- 
stitute of  World  Politics  and  Economics.     Provisional  titles  only 

(a)  Symposium  on  Fifth  Anniversary  of  Japanese  Invasion  of  Manchuria 

(&)  Guerrilla  Warfare  in  Manchuria 

(c)  Symposium  07i  China 

id)  Position  of  and  Struggle  by  the  Peasantry  for  Improved  Conditions  in 
Japan 

{e)  Financial  situation  in  Japan 

if)  Position  of  the  Working  Class  iti  Japan 

(g)  Dissertation  on  the  Decay  of  American  Imperialism  by  Gourivitch 

(h)  Dissertation  by  Levina  (?)  developing  Lenin's  idea  that  Capitalism  is 
acceptable  to  the  United  States  peasant  because  of  the  absence  of  feudal  factors. 

Motylev  and  Bremman  said  that  some  of  the  foregoing  titles  were  not  phrased 
accurately,  some  are  completed,  and  some  may  never  be  published. 

Notice  of  publication  of  any  of  the.se  studies  will  presumably  appear  in  Tikhii 
Okean.  Miss  Moore  should  be  asked  to  notify  the  Secretary-General  when  any 
of  them  are  forthcoming,  with  a  view  to  deciding  whether  translation  is  desirable. 


3486  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

I.  Other  business  lOS  proposed  by  the  officers  of  the  U.  8.  S.  R.  I.  P.  R. 

There  were  several  general  conversations  with  reference  to  the  attitude  of 
other  Councils  to  the  present  a.csression  in  the  Far  East.  Surprise  was  ex- 
pressed that  the  American  intelligensia  is  so  silent ;  even  the  interesting  discus- 
sions at  the  annual  meeting  of  the  American  Council  revealed  a  lack  of  funda- 
mental information  as  to  the  actual  forces  that  are  operating  in  Japan.  Both 
Reichshauer  and  Warnshuis  took  the  optimistic  and  inaccurate  view  of  trends 
in  Japan  which  were  not  refuted  in  a  clear-cut  way  in  the  ensuing  discussion. 
Similarly  there  is  little  evidence  in  the  discussions  of  the  Royal  Institute  in 
Loudon,  of  a  fundamental  understanding  of  the  Far  Eastern  situation.  Is  it  not 
possible  for  the  American  and  British  Councils  to  make  such  a  clear-cut  analysis 
of  the  forces  at  work  in  the  Far  East  as  will  reveal  to  their  publics  the  nature 
and  danger  of  the  present  aggression?  Should  not  the  Institute  in  all  countries 
be  the  foremost  organization  in  making  highly  fundamental  analyses?  Could 
not  the  American  and  British  Councils  hold  special  meetings  and  express  opin- 
ions on  contemporary  questions  while  they  are  acute? 

A  special  conference  convened  by  the  American  Council,  if  adequately  reported 
and  publicized,  could  give  a  fundamental  analysis  of  the  whole  Far  Eastern  sit- 
uation which  might  be  of  the  greatest  importance  to  public  opinion  throughout 
the  world.  The  imperialistic  fallacy  of  men  like  Orchard  should  be  dealt  with 
in  a  clear-cut  way  by  the  American  Council  of  which  he  is  a  member. 

Reverting  to  the  program  for  the  next  Conference,  the  Soviet  I.  P.  R.  is  not 
deeply  concerned  with  shipping  and  trade  competition  in  the  Pacific  because  of 
the  Soviet's  foreign-trade  policy. 

With  reference  to  the  two  reports  on  Standards  of  Living ;  the  first  part 
should  be  completed  by  the  end  of  December  and  the  second  half  by  the  end  of 
January.  I  think,  however,  that  the  first  report,  namely  that  by  Krivetsky,  is 
more  certain  of  completion  than  that  by  Professor  Kravel.  I  seem  to  remember 
Motylev  saying  that  Kravel's  work  had  been  interrupted  either  by  serious  ill- 
ness or  by  his  transfer  to  another  and  more  urgent  job. 

With  reference  to  the  symposium  on  the  Far  East ;  Krasavtsev  stayed  on  in 
the  Soviet  Far  East  after  Bremman  and  I  left  in  order  to  see  all  of  the  authors 
personally  and  make  arrangements  for  checking  all  of  the  manuscripts. 

Both  Motylev  and  Bremman  were  eager  to  know  of  developments  in  the  I.  P.  R. 
in  all  of  the  member  countries.  They  discussed  many  of  the  ideas  put  forward 
at  Yosemite  by  members  from  the  various  countries.  They  had  enjoyed  the 
visits  after  Yosemite  of  Liu  Yu-wan,  of  Van  Walrec  of  the  Pacific  Institute  in 
Amsterdam.  They  were  much  impressed  by  Lattimore's  statement  that  if  the 
Soviet  I.  P.  R.  would  only  furnish  a  regular  series  of  articles  for  Pacific  Affairs 
it  would  be  much  easier  for  him  to  bring  the  editorial  policy  into  a  real  focus 
than  it  is  at  present. 

Doubtless  this  letter  will  raise  many  questions  on  which  you  will  want  further 
clarification.    Plea.se,  therefore,  write  me  fully  after  you  have  read  it. 
Sincerely  yours, 

Edward  C.  Carter. 

]\Ir.  MoRRi.s.  I  ask  you  now  to  turn  to  page  5  of  the  stencil  copy,  Mr. 
Lattiniore.  Will  you  read  the  paragraph  commencing  at  the  top  of 
the  page  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  ISIay  I  look  at  the  document  of  the  whole  to  see  the 
relevance  of  the  particular  paragraph  to  the  whole? 

Mr.  Morris.  Yes,  you  may,  Mr.  Lattimore. 

(The  witness  examined  the  exhibit.) 

Mr.  Lattimork.  I  found  here  the  name  Pyke.    That  must  be  "'R.  P." 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  tlie  questioning,  you  see,  is  about  the 
American-Russian  Institute,  and  you  find  the  reference  to  that  com- 
mences, I  believe,  on  page  5.    The  whole  thing  will  be  in  the  record. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  What  is  the  paragraph  you  wanted  me  to  read? 

Mr.  Morris.  The  top  of  page  5. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Before  he  reads  that,  might  I  inquire? 

The  Chairman.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you  found  the  reports  on  your  visit  to 
Moscow,  that  you  were  going  to  look  up  for  me,  referred  to  in  your 
Ordeal  bv  Slander? 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3487 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  haven't  found  it  yet.  I  haven't  had  an  oppor- 
tunity to  go  and  look  for  it.  I  can  tell  you  in  general  what  its  nature 
is. 

Senator  Ferguson.  No,  we  want  to  see  the  report. 

Mr.  Chairman,  even  though  we  recess  Mr.  Lattimore's  testimony, 
might  we  hold  it  open  until  we  get  those  reports,  until  we  see  whether 
they  ought  to  go  into  the  record  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  There  was  no  report  solely  on  the  Moscow  meetings. 
It  was  my  report  to  the  committee  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations 
on  my  work  as  editor  of  Pacific  Affairs,  which  included  a  reference  to 
the  Moscow  visit.    There  was  no  separate  report  on  the  Moscow  visit. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  report  that  was  referred  to  in  the  record. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  In  the  testimonv,  sure. 

Shall  I  read? 

Mr.  Morris.  Yes,  Mr.  Lattimore. 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

We  had  a  long  session  at  Vox  at  the  invitation  of  the  new  president,  Smirnov. 
Motylev,  Mrs.  Carter,  Miss  Kislova  and  myself  were  present.  Smirnov  wanted 
to  know  how  cooperation  between  Vox  and  the  American-Russian  Institute 
could  be  made  more  effective.  He  wished  to  get  a  very  much  fuller  understanding 
of  the  work  and  program  of  the  ART  and  lioped  that  more  substantial  coopera- 
tion could  be  built  up  in  the  future.    I  read  between  the  lines ■ 

"I"  meaning  Carter. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  "ARI"  meaning  what  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  American-Russian  Institute. 

"I"  and  ''myself"  all  the  way  through  here  is  Carter. 

I  read  between  the  lines  that  Vox  felt  that  the  ARI  gave  letters  of  introduction 
to  Vox  to  any  American  tourist  who  requested  one  and  thus  they  had  no  basis 
for  discrimination  as  to  who  was  entitled  to  a  lot  of  time  and  who  could  best 
be  handled  by  Intourist.  If  Vox  knew  in  advance  of  the  specific  social  opinions 
and  interests  of  important  Americans,  they  could  make  very  much  better  use  of 
their  limited  staff.  Smiruov  wanted  a  long  explanation  as  to  why  the  ARI  still 
retained  a  certain  internationally  known  enemy  of  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  on  its  board 
of  directors. 

Do  you  want  me  to  go  on  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Yes,  please. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  This  is  still  Carter : 

.Just  before  I  left  Smirnov  luckily  had  a  long  letter  from  Osgood  Field,  thQ 
president  of  the  ARI,  which  I  gather  set  his  mind  at  rest  at  several  points.  The 
ARI  had  recently  sent  a  representative  to  Moscow  who  didn't  seem  to  know 
very  much  either  about  the  ARI  or  about  the  social  views  of  its  members. 

I'used  the  occasion  to  explain  what  I  thought  was  the  membership  basis  of 
the  ARI,  namely,  an  interest  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  I  said  that  I  thought  the  member- 
ship was  open  both  to  friends  and  critics  of  the  Soviet  Union.  I  added  that 
perhaps  in  the  long  run  its  greatest  strength  might  lie  in  its  being  a  cross  section 
of  American  opinion. 

The  Chairman.  The  "ARI*'  stands,  again,  please,  for  what? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  American-Russian  Institute. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  correct  our  record  in  connection 
with  whether  or  not  the  American-Russian  Institute  is  now  listed  as  a 
subversive  organization  by  the  Attorney  General  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  A  member  of  the  stall  called  the  Justice  Department 
after  this  morning's  session,  in  that  regard,  and  was  told  that  the 
present  status  of  the  American-Russian  Institute  of  New  York,  which 
has  been  cited  as  subversive  by  the  Attorney  General  on  April  24, 1951, 


3488  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

renuiins  the  same.  This  was  told  the  member  of  the  staff  by  Mrs. 
Keene,  of  Mr.  Foley's  office.  .  ^     ,     t^     i      -d 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  did  you  serve  with  the  Pauley  Kepara- 

tions  Mission  in  Japan? 
Mr.  Lati'imore.  Yes,  I  did. 

Mr   Morris.  For  what  period  of  time  did  you  so  serve  i 
Mr    Lattimore.  I  think  from  about  maybe  late  October  or  No- 
vember 1945  to  late  January  or  possibly  the  beginning  of  February 

Mr.  Morris.  During  that  time,  were  you  on  the  State  Department 

^^Mr  Lattimore.  Yes.  My  recollection  is  that  the  staff  were  paid 
through  the  State  Department,  although  they  were  regarded—- 

The  Chairman.  How  the  staff  were  paid  makes  no  difference.  Were 
you  on  the  State  Department  payroll ;  yes  or  no  ? 

Mr.  Latiimore.  I  would  say  yes  and  no,  Senator. 

May  I  explain  ? 

The  Chairman.  Speaking  of  yourself,  not  of  the  staff. 

Mr  Lattimore.  Speaking  of  myself,  my  understanding  was  that 
the  Pauley  Mission  was  a  White  House  mission,  not  a  State  Depart- 
ment mission,  but  for  some  reason  of  Government  arrangements  that 
I  don't  know,  my  pay  checks  came  through  the  State  Department. 

Tlie  Chairman.  The  declaring  of  that  whole  statement  is  your 
answer  that  you  were  on  the  State  Department  payroll.  So  what  is 
the  use  of  wasting  time? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir ;  I  should  say— well,  I  won  t  quibble  about 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  were  you  the  third  ranking  member  of 
that  mission . 

Mr  Lattimore.  Oh,  about  third  or  fourth,  I  should  say. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Were  you  going  to  read  this  document? 

Mr.  Morris.  I  am  sorry.  Senator.    Did  you  want  to  go  into  that  i 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes.    I  wanted  to  ask  a  question. 

Who  was  the  director  who  was  anti-Soviet  on  this  board,  do  you 
know  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  no  idea.  r,   .  i.r 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  in  this  that  you  read,  what  they 
mean  by  "social  opinion"  and  "social  views"? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  have  not  any  idea? 

Mr.  Lattimore,  No.    It  would  be  a  matter  of  speculation. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  would  you  speculate? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  If  you  want  me  to  speculate.  Senator 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes.  .    , 

Mr  Lattimore.  The  first  recollection  that  would  come  to  my  mind 
is  that  they  wanted  to  know  those  views  because  they  gave  capitalists 
and  anti-Communists  better  treatment  than  they  did  Communists. 
At  least,  so  I  was  told  when  I  was  in  I^Ioscow,  by  Mr.  Demaree  Bess, 
who  was  then  correspondent  to  the  Christian  Science  Monitor,  and  i 
expressed  amazement  that  after  the  hostile  way  they  criticized  my 
writing,  they  had  allowed  me  to  make  a  trip  to  Moscow  to  look  at 
their  Siongolian  research  work.  And  he  said,  "Oh,  that  is  quite 
simple."  He  said,  "If  they  consider  a  person  anti-Soviet  they  always 
treat  him  much  better." 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3489 

The  Chairman.  I  do  not  think  the  question  calls  for  you  to  quote 
anybody  else. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  was,  of  course,  as  of  1936. 

The  Chairman.  Are  there  any  further  questions.  Senator? 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  do  not  think  that  the  words  "social  views" 
meant  Communist  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  doubt  it.  But  is  pure  speculation  on  my  part. 
I  don't  think  my  speculation  is  very  authoritative. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  received  this  at  the  time.  It  indicates  that 
it  was  passed  to  you. 

]\Ir.  Laitimore.  It  indicates  it  was  passed  to  me,  yes.  I  don't  recall 
readino;  it,  and  I  presume  I  put  it  on  one  side  as  something  that  didn't 
have  any  particular  concern  to  me. 

The  Chairman.  That  was  by  Mr.  Carter,  was  it  not? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  were  you  listed  as  a  special  consultant 
Avith  the  Pauley  Mission  staff? 

Mr.  Laitimore.  I  believe  that  was  my  rank,  or  title,  or  whatever 
you  call  it,  listino;. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  when  you  testified  in  executive  session 
before  this  committee,  we  asked  you  if  you  helped  draft  the  Pauley 
reparations  report,  and  you  testified  "quite  largely." 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Mr.  Morris,  in  his  opening  pre- 
pared statement,  it  is  my  memory  that  Mr.  Lattimore  referred  to  the 
Pauley  report  as  a  report  which  "I  wrote."  Is  that  not  correct,  Mr. 
Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  am  not  sure  whether  I  wrote  or  drafted,  or  some- 
thing. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  It  is  on  page  26,  the  fifth  line  from  the  bottom. 

Mr.  Latitmore.  I  have  it  on  27. 

Mr,  Fortas.  You  must  have  different  pages. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Is  this  the  reference  you  mean,  Mr.  Sourwine : 

When  I  was  in  Japan  with  the  Pauley  mission  at  the  end  of  1945,  I  did  play 
a  major  part  in  drafting;  a  reparations  report  in  close  conference  with  Mr. 
Pauley. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  No,  I  am  referring  to  this  statement  which  is  at 
the  bottom  of  page  26,  which  is  the  copy  I  have  here,  and  which  is 
one  of  the  copies  you  distributed  on  the  opening  day : 

Mr.  Dooman  claimed  that  the  Pauley  report  which  I  had  written  provided  for 
turning  Japan  into  a  pasture. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  think,  Mr.  Sourwine,  that  must  be  a  reference  to 
a  statement  by  IVIr.  Dooman. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Did  you,  in  fact,  write  the  Pauley  report? 

Mr,  Lattimore.  No,  I  played  a  large  part  in  drafting  it. 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  let  us  go  on, 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  by  bringing  together  a  lot  of  loose 
ends  here,  I  believe  we  can  finish  in  about  an  hour  and  a  half  tomorrow. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Why  do  we  not  recess  until  then  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr,  Sourwine  has  a  question  today. 

The  Chairman.  There  was  submitted  to  the  chairman  yesterday  a 
matter  of  the  insertion  into  the  record  of  excerpts  from  the  Con- 


3490  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

gressional  Record.  I  had  Mr.  Sourwine  and  other  members  of  the 
staff  look  up  the  question  of  context. 

Mr.  Sourwine,  wliat  did  you  find  as  regards  those  excerpts? 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Mr.  Chairman,  the  excerpts  were  two  in  number. 
They  are  referred  to  on  page,  or  beginning  on  page  5635  of  the 
record  of  this  committee  of  yesterday.     Mr.  Lattimore  said : 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  some  material  here  from  the  Congressional  Record 
pertinent  to  the  general  question  of  discussion  of  the  subject  of  China  in  1945 
that  I  should  like  to  read  into  the  record. 

The  Chairman.  Let  me  see  it  first,  please. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  have  something  before  he  puts  that  in,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  One  is  from  Representative  Walter  Judd  and  the  other  is 
from  Representative  Mike  Mansfield. 

Senator  Ferguson  then  went  forward  with  the  matter  he  had,  after 

which  the  chairman  said : 

The  two  excerpts  here,  assertedly  from  the  Congressional  Record,  I  think 
counsel  will  check  with  the  Congressional  Record  and,  if  they  are  to  go  in, 
they  will  go  in  in  context,  and  I  will  reserve  the  rviling  on  the  matier. 

With  regard  to  these  two  excerpts,  I  have  here  the  original  sheet 
as  furnished  by  Mr.  Lattimore,  and  also  a  longer  excerpt  from  the 
Congressional  Record,  showing  the  point  at  which  each  of  these  ap- 
peared in  context.  If  the  Chair  deems  it  not  improper,  I  would  like  to 
ask  the  witness  a  question  or  so  about  these  and  then  lay  the  whole 
thing  in  the  record,  or  offer  it  for  the  record. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well.  I  do  not  want  to  go  too  far  in  ques- 
tioning the  witness. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Mr.  Lattimore,  did  you  prepare  these  excerpts? 

Mr.  LAT-riMORE.  May  I  see  the  typing?  I  think  that  would  show 
whether  I  did  or  not. 

(Documents  handed  to  the  witness.) 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  don't  think  I  did  this  actually  myself. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  You  offered  them  for  the  record.  Do  you  know 
who  did  prepare  them  ? 

Mr,  Lat^itmore.  No,  I  couldn't  tell  you  exactly,  Mr.  Sourwine. 
Several  people  at  the  Hopkins  have  very  kindly  volunteered  to  help 
me  by  looking  up  references,  and  so  on,  and  I  think  this  must  be  from 
one  of  them.    But  1  don't  know  which  one. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Did  you  take  any  steps  before  you  offered  these  for 
the  record  to  satisfy  yourself  that  they  were  not  out  of  context? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  made  no  check.  I  accepted  them  as  excerpts  from 
the  Congressional  Record. 

The  Chairman.  I  think  the  Chair  will  hold  its  ruling  further  in 
the  matter  at  this  time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Until  the  witness  at  least  can  vouch  for  these? 

The  Chairman.  Yes.  We  will  stand  in  recess  until  10 :  30  to- 
morrow morning. 

(Whereupon,  at  3:  37  p.  m.,  the  hearing  was  recessed,  to  reconvene 
at  10  :  30  a.  in.,  Friday,  March  7,  1952.) 


INSTITUTE  OF  PACIFIC  RELATIONS 


FRIDAY,   MARCH   7,    1952 

United  States  Senate, 

Si:bcommi  ri'EE  To  Investigate  the  Adminisi^ration 
OF  the  Internal  Security  Act  and  Other  Internal 
Security  Laws,  or  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary, 

W ashing on^  D.  C. 

The  subcommittee  met  at  10 :  oa  a.  m.,  pursuant  to  recess,  in  room 
424,  Senate  Office  Building,  Hon.  Pat  McCarran  (chairman)  pre- 
siding. 

Present :  Senator  McCarran, 

Also  Present:  J.  G.  Sourwine,  committee  counsel;  Robert  Morris, 
subcommittee  counsel,  and  Benjamin  Mandel,  research  director. 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 

Of  the  Senators  belonging  to  the  Internal  Security  Subcommittee 
of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary,  Senator  Smith  has  been  called 
hastily  to  his  home  in  North  Carolina  on  official  matters.  Senator 
O'Conor  is  away  on  official  matters,  and  Senator  Eastland  has  been 
called  away. 

The  belief  of  the  committee  is  that  as  many  as  can  listen  to  this 
testimony  should  listen  to  it.  For  that  reason,  it  is  the  conclusion 
of  the  committee  that  this  matter  goes  over  and  is  recessed  now  until 
10 :  30  Monday  morning. 

(Whereupon,  at  10:37  a.  m.,  the  hearing  was  recessed,  to  recon- 
vene at  10 :  30  a.  m.,  Monday,  March  10, 1952.) 

3491 


INSTITUTE  OF  PACIFIC  RELATIONS 


MONDAY,   MARCH   10,    1952 

Unite!)  States  Senate, 
Subcommittee  to  Investigate  the  Administration 
OF  THE  Internal  Security  Act  and  Other  Internal. 

Securitt  Laws,  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary, 

Washington^  D.  C. 
The  subcommittee  met  at  10:30  a.  m.,  pursuant  to  recess,  in  room 
424,  Senate  Office  Building,  Hon.  Pat  McCarran  (chairman)  presid- 
ing. 

Present :  Senators  McCarran,  Smith,  O'Conor,  Ferguson,  Watkins. 
Also  present:  Senator  McCarthy  and  Senator  Mundt. 
Present  also:  J.  G.  Sourwine,  committee  counsel;  Robert  Morris, 
subcommittee  counsel,  and  Benjamin  Mandel,  research  director. 
The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 
Mr.  Morris,  you  may  proceed. 

Senator  Ferguson.  'Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  a  question  I  would  like  to 
ask. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

TESTIMONY  OF  OWEN  LATTIMORE,  ACCOMPANIED  BY  ABE  FORTAS, 

COUNSEL— Resumed 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  did  you  put  into  the  record  in 
the  Tydings  committee  the  memorandum  that  you  left  at  the  White 
House  on  July  3,  1945  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  put  into  the  record  the  letter  that  you 
wrote  to  the  President  as  of  that  time? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is,  June  10, 1945. 

Did  you  at  all  discuss  the  visit  to  the  White  House,  before  the  Tyd- 
ings committee  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  believe  I  was  asked  whether  I  had  made  such  a 
visit,  and  I  replied  that  I  had. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  you  did  not  give  the  letter  or  the  memo- 
randum ? 

]Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir ;  I  was  not  asked  for  them. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  were  not  questioned,  then,  about  those  let- 
ters at  all,  were  you? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  think  you  did  state  that  you  had  been 
to  the  White  House  in  1945  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  believe  that  was  stated  in  the  record;  yes. 

3493 


3494  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  iiotlniio;  more  than  just  you  had  visited 
there  ? 

Mr.  Latttmore.  That  is  riglit. 

Senator  Ferguson,  Mr.  Lattimore,  did  you  consider  the  Soviet 
Government  a  normal  government,  or  did  you  consider  it  an  inter- 
national conspiracy? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  When? 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  will  ask  you  tlie  question  when  if  you  will 
tell  me  whether  you  ever  did. 

In  your  opinion,  what  was  it?  A  normal  government,  or  was  it 
an  international  conspiracy? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  In  my  opinion,  the  Government  of  Russia  was  the 
revolutionary  of  Russia  and  different  from  any  other  government. 

Senator  Ferguson.  So  you  did  recognize,  in  the  early  thirties,  that 
the  Soviet  Government  was  different  tlian  the  normal  government  of 
nations  ? 

Mr.  Latiimore.  Well,  it  was  the  only  government  of  its  kind. 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  did  3'ou  come  to  the  conclusion,  if  you 
ever  did,  that  it  is  a  conspiracy  and  has  in  mind  installing  its  form 
of  government  world  wide? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Senator,  I  believe  that  involves  questions  of  re- 
lations between  the  Russian  Government,  the  Comintern,  and  the  Com- 
munist Parties  of  various  countries  on  which  I  am  not  versed. 

The  Chairman.  The  question  is,  "V^^ien  did  you  come  to  the  con- 
clusion ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes.  You  said  it  was  different  than  other 
governments ;  it  was  the  only  government  of  its  kind. 

The  Chairman.  When  did  you  come  to  that  conclusion?  That  is 
the  question. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  answer  is  that  I  have  not  come  to  that  con- 
clusion. 
/May  I  explain  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes,  sir. 

IVIr.  Lattimore.  I  have  not  come  to  that  conclusion  because  I  don't 
know  how  the  structure  of  international  relations  is  set  up  as  between 
the  Russian  Government  and  the  various  Communist  Parties. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  did  you  ever  study  the  Russian 
language? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes ;  I  have  studied  the  Russian  language. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  speak  it  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  don't  speak  it.     I  read  it  quite  freely. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  show  tlie  exhibits  that  we  have  now 
on  the  record,  of  your  visit  to  the  White  House,  that  is,  the  memo- 
randum and  the  letter,  to  any  member  of  the  Ty dings  committee  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No. 

Mr.  Ferguson.  Or  the  staff  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  do  you  account,  Mr.  Lattimore,  for  not 
making  that  part  of  the  record?  Did  you  not  think  that  was  mate- 
rial on  the  question  as  to  whether  or  not  you  ever  had  anything  to  do 
with  the  foreign  Policy  of  the  Far  East,  as  far  as  the  President  or 
the  State  Department  was  concerned  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  did  not  think  it  was  material.  The  question  of 
whether  the  committee  wanted  to  see  it  was  up  to  them. 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3495 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  would  tliey  know  that  it  existed?  You 
did  not  disclose  it  to  any  of  them. 

JNIr.  Lattimore.  They  knew  that  I  had  visited  the  White  House. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  your  only  explanation,  is  it,  for  not 
disclosing  at  that  time  your  memorandum,  your  stand  on  the  Far 
East,  and  your  letter  ? 

]\Ir.  Lattimore.  No.  I  would  add  to  that,  that  as  a  citizen  I  would 
not  take  the  initiative  in  revealing  the  details  of  a  citizen  asking  to  see 
the  President  of  his  country. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  disclosed  at  least  the  letter  to  this  com- 
mittee in  your  voluntary  statement ;  did  you  not  ? 

]Mr.  Lattimore.  No;  I  don't  think  so.     I  disclosed  the  fact  that • 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  you  a  copy  of  your  statement?  "Will  you 
read  it  ? 

The  Chairman.  The  answer,  as  I  understand  it,  then,  is  no. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes.  Now  I  am  asking  him  to  look  on  the  bot- 
tom of  page  24. 

Mr.  FoRTAS.  It  is  No.  6. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Thirty-three  I  have  here,  No.  6 : 

In  194.5,  on  my  own  initiative,  I  wrote  to  President  Truman  expressing  my 
views  on  China  policy.  Tlie  President,  in  response,  aslied  me  to  come  to  see 
liim,  and  I  did. 

Senator  Ferguson.  So  you  disclosed  it  to  the  President  and  to  the 
public  prior  to  coming  into  this  hearing.  What  was  the  difference 
betAveen  this  hearing  and  the  Tydings  committee  hearing  so  that  you 
did  not  want  to  disclose  the  fact  that  you  had  written  to  the  President  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  did  not  sa}'  that  1  did  not  want  to  disclose  the 
fact  that  I  had  written  to  the  President,  I  said  here  that — I  told  the 
Tydings  committee  that  I  had  seen  the  President,  and  in  this  state- 
ment I  said  that  I  had  written  to  the  President  and  asked  if  I  could  see 
him.    I  see  no  discrepancy. 

Mr.  Fortas.  No;  that  is  not  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Your  counsel  corrects  3'Ou. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  wrote  to  President  Truman  expressing  my  views 
on  China  policy. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes.  You  did  not  say  that  you  just  wrote  a 
letter.  You  say  in  this  statement  that  you  had  written  a  letter  ex- 
pressing your  views  on  China  policy.  You  knew  that  the  Tydings 
committee  was  investigating  a  question,  and  one  of  the  questions  w^as 
whether  or  not  you  had  been  an  influence  on  our  foreign  policy,  or 
what  you  had  to  do  with  it. 

Why  did  you  not  disclose  what  you  did  in  this  memorandum  to  us  ? 
Why  did  you  not  disclose  it  to  the  Tydings  committee  so  that  they 
could  have  gone  into  it? 

You  cite  the  case,  do  you  not,  that  the  Tydings  committee  has  found 
you  absolutely  innocent  of  everything?  Why  did  you  not  disclose 
that  fact  to  them  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  1  told  the  Tydings  committee  that  I  saw  the 
President. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Why  did  you  not  tell  them  that  you  had  written 
a  memorandum  of  your  views  on  the  Far  East  or  on  China  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  told  the  Tydings  committee  that  I  had  seen  the 
President.  If  they  wanted  to  know  more  about  it,  I  was  perfectly 
prepared  to  answer. 


3496  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  tell  them  that  ? 

Mr,  Lattimore.  I  don't  remember  the  transcript  of  the  Tydings 
committee  at  that  point.  I  certainly  didn't  refuse  to  answer  any 
questions. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  are  aware  of  the  fact  that  you  were  sworn 
at  that  time  to  give  them  all  the  facts,  were  you  not  ?  The  truth,  the 
whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth? 

Did  you  not  think  that,  as  part  of  your  visit,  if  you  left  a  memoran- 
dum, that  that  was  material  to  the  issue  as  well  as  giving  your  views 
in  a  letter  which  you  expressed  here  ?  You  did  not  even  disclose  to  this 
committee  that  you  had  left  a  memorandum  with  the  President,  in 
your  voluntary  statement. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Senator,  I  understand  that  when  I  am  sworn  to 
tell  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  that  is  an 
undertaking  to  tell  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the 
truth  in  response  to  questions. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  came  in  and  were  sworn,  and  you  read 
this  statement  to  this  committee.     Will  you  let  me  see  it,  please? 

You  read  this  statement.  No.  6,  at  the  bottom  of  page  33 : 

In  1945,  on  my  own  initiative,  I  wrote  to  President  Truman  expressing  my 
views  on  China  policy.  The  President,  in  response,  aslied  me  to  come  to  see 
him,  and  I  did.     Our  conference  lasted  about  3  minutes. 

Now,  Mr.  Lattimore,  you  produce  here  a  letter  giving  your  views 
on  the  matter.  You  swore,  when  you  read  this,  that  it  was  the 
truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth. 

Now  I  ask  you,  why  did  you  not  then,  instead  of  leaving  the  idea 
that  you  had  left  nothing  with  the  President,  but  talked  with  him  for 
just  3  minutes,  why  did  you  not  produce,  as  part  of  this  memor- 
andum  

Mr.  Lattimore.  Senator,  may  I  see  the  relevant  part  of  the  Tydings 
transcript  ? 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  minute.  Let  the  Senator  conclude  his 
question. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Why  did  you  not  then  give  to  the  committee 
the  fact  that  you  had  written  the  memorandum  and  left  it  with 
the  President?     How  can  you  say  that  that  is  an  accurate  statement? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Senator,  may  I  see  the  relevant  part  of  the  Tydings 
transcript  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes.  But  I  am  still  asking  you  the  question 
not  on  the  Tydings  transcript  at  all,  but  wdiat  you  told  this  com- 
mittee. You  did  not  mention  in  this  statement  to  the  committee 
when  you  were  telling  them  that  was  the  truth,  the  whole  truth, 
and  nothing  but  the  truth,  that  you  had  left  the  memorandum ;  you 
said  merely  that  you  had  written  a  letter  to  him.  How  do  you  ac- 
count for  that  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Senator,  I  have  already  said  that  I,  as  a  citizen, 
do  not  believe  in  taking  the  initiative  in  revealing  what  a  citizen 
talks  about  to  his  President  when  he  sees  him. 

If  the  committee  wants  to  ask  for  it— and  this  committee  did — 
it  is  not  in  my  power  to  refuse.  But  the  responsibility  lies  with  the 
committee.     I  see  no  obligation  to  volunteer  anything  of  that  kind. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  was  the  difference  between  your  state- 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3497 

ment  on  your  views  of  the  China  policy  in  your  letter  than  those  in 
the  memorandum  that  yon  left  with  the  President?  What  is  the 
difference  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  am  sorry.     I  don't  understand  the  question. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  said  that  you  did  not  want  to  disclose  what 
you  said  to  the  President. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  do  you  think  that  that  is  the  reason  for 
stating  it  this  way,  that  you  only  wrote  a  letter  and  saw-  him  for  3 
minutes  and  did  not  tell  us  that  you  left  the  memorandum? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir.    I  see  nothing  wrong  in  that  whatever. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  did  not  ask  you  whether  you  saw  anything 
wrong.    Is  that  a  statement  of  the  whole  truth? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Senator,  I  repeat  that  the  question  of  the  truth  is 
a  question  of  what  the  committee  asks  me. 

The  Chairman.  You  were  asked.  Is  that  a  statement  of  the  whole 
truth  ?    Do  you  want  to  answer  that  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  you  said  to  the  committee  in  your  mem- 
orandum. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Senator,  it  is  impossible,  in  one  memorandum,  to 
state  the  whole  truth  of  the  whole  range  of  things  that  the  committee 
may  be  interested  in,  or  of  what  has  already  been  in  the  transcript. 

I  provided  here  a  basis  on  which  the  committee  could  question  me, 
and  on  which  it  has  questioned  me. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  is  that  your  explanation  ? 

Mr,  Lattimore.  That  is  my  explanation. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  would  like  to  have  the  witness  see  the  record 
now  in  the  Tydings  committee,  if  he  wants  to. 

The  Chairman.  Is  the  Tydings  committee  record  available? 
record  l\lfi5^ifyi  on  which  the  witness  asked  for  the  Tydings  committee 
ever,  but  if  he  wants  to'see'tlie  ^i'ya'S'i^^iG^s^.^P^^^it^^ee  record  what- 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes.   He  had  nsked  to  see  ir      '^""'"'^ 

Mr.  Fortas.  Senator  you  don^t  have  the  reference  to  this  portion 
ot  the  Tydings  record,  do  you  ?  ^ 

Senator  Ferguson.  No. 

Mr.  Fortas.  This  will  take  some  time. 

TwYJ'o^P^^®^^^-  Then  we  can  get  it  later. 
1  hat  is  all  X  L,^e  ^^  ^j^^    ^^^^^^^  ^.^^ 

over  ihe  w^k  en d  dfscl™^  understand  a  review  of  the  record 

'^Kl  Max  Eastina  for  thl  Readei's'l^-!;'^fl  ''^''''t\^y  ^-  ?•  P<^-ell 
the  record.  May  it  be  done  at  this  tim 3"'  ^"'^  "''  ^'"^  ''''''''^  "^^« 
not  s^rve'^nr"'^-  ^'"  ^'''  '^''''  ^''''  ^^^^^^^^^d?    My  memory  does 

helou&il^:  ";!i"rr''  '''''^^r^  '"f -^J^  '^'^  ^^^t  -^^k  that 
Mr,  Thomas  Lai  on  to  sin  "^^™°f  "^^"^"  ^^j^h  Mr.  Carter  wante<l 
the  article  in  Ser's  Dfo;stT^^V"'"n''"t^S'  addressed  itself  to 

-liie  i^iiAffiMAN.  It  may  be  inserted  in  the  record 

88348— 52— pt.  10 15 


3498  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  549"  and  is  as 
folloAYS :) 

Exhibit  No.  549 

[Source:   Reader's  Digest,  June  1945,  article  entitled  "The  Fate  of  the  World  Is  at  Stake 
in  China,"  by  Max  Eastman  and  J.  B.  Powell  (pp.  13-22,  inclusive)  ] 

The  Fate  of  the  World  Is  At  St.a.ke  in  China 

Periodicals  in  Allied  countries  do  not  hesitate  to  publish  blunt  opinions 
^Yhen  their  national  interest  is  at  stake.  Criticism  of  American  policy 
and  of  individual  Americans  by  official  Russian  journals,  for  instance, 
has  been  extreme.  We  can  hardly  expect  to  keep  the  respect  of  the  otlier 
United  Nations  if  our  press — supposed  to  be  the  freest  in  the  world — 
does  not  speak  up  just  as  boldly.  Especially  in  relation  to  our  friendly 
neighbor  China,  a  plain-spoken  report  of  the  facts  and  a  frank  discussion 
of  American  policy  are  imperative. — The  Authors. 

China  is  a  giant  among  nations.  Larger  than  all  Europe,  its  population  is  one- 
fourth  of  the  human  race.  And  this  giant  is  waking  up.  Following  the  example 
of  Japan  and  Russia,  it  is  entering  the  industrial  age. 

Therefore,  the  question  wliether  China  goes  democratic  or  totalitarian  is  tlie 
biggest  political  question  of  today.  In  war  or  peace  the  weight  of  this  giant 
of  manpower  may  well  be  decisive  in  settling  the  fate  of  the  world. 

China  at  present  is  split  into  three  parts.  IManchuria  and  the  eastern  half, 
including  most  of  the  seaboard,  are  occupied  by  Japan.  A  northwestern  region 
not  fai^from  the  Soviet  border  is  held  by  the  Chinese  Communist  Party.  The 
rest  of  China  is  still  under  the  Chiang  Kai-shek  government,  which  commands 
the  loyalty  of  an  immense  majority  of  Chinese  everywhere. 

Chiang  Kai-shek  is  the  successor  of  Sun  Yat-sen.' father  of  the  Chinese  revolu- 
tion and  founder  of  the  Kuomintang  (People's  Party),  which  is  dedicated  to 
these  three  aims :  National  independence,  political  democracy,  and  the  people's 
welfare.  From  1927  to  1937  Chiang  defeated  the  war  lords;  crushed  the  at- 
tempt of  the  Communists,  Moscow-led,  to  seize  power;  and  united  under  the 
Kuomintang  practically  all  China  except  the  smali  northwest  region  into  which 
his  armies  drove  the  Communists.  Through  popular  and  powerful  enough  to 
make  himself  permanent  dictator,  Chiang  set  a  date,  November  12,  1937,  for  a 
constitutional  convention.  Japan  attacked  in  July  of  that  year,  and  the  con- 
vention had  to  be  postponed.  With  victory  now  in  sight,  he  ho^  --'-  " 
again— November  12, 1945--Sun  Yat:f.eTi'.^J];"-<fii'^  Communists  formed  a  united 
fronfwoVf  uTe  lluomintang  and'  promised  to  fight  under  Chiang  Kai-shek.  But 
they  cooled  off  after  the  Stalin-Hitler  pact  and  finally  renounced  their  promise. 
Explaining  that  theye  were  "revolutionaries,  not  reformers,"  they  declared  them- 
selves and'^their  Red  Army  independent.  They  now  have  their  own  government, 
coin  their  own  monev,  run  their  own  party-controlled  newspapers  and  suppress 
all  others.  Thev  recently  declared  a  boycott  against  Chiang's  effort  to  pro''-^-^_ 
a  democratic  republic,  denouncing  his  constitutional  convention,  6  ^^'"^ 
fore  its  delegates  are  elected,  as  a  slaves' congress  ^j^i. 

J.  B.  Powell,  born   not  far  from  minmbal    Mo.,   gj^--':^^^^ 
versity  of  Missouri  and  taught  4  years  m  tl|e^^\o^\;.;.^^'';,;rL  editor  of  the 
in  China  throughout  the  penod  between  tjp  ^X   he  woricr  He  was  at  the 
China  Weekly  Review,  a  liberal  louriial  kno|^  n  ^";'T^.\ „\f  ,^^,/    n^er  papers  and 
same  time  correspondent  for  the  Ma^-J'e'^tei    Guaidian  an(i     uiei   i    i 
edit^ed  for  several  months  the  d«Uy  China  Press  in  Shanghai.      (He  says  he 


-U^^Sr^;^?take.f  ^Iciier  by  ^e  ^r'^at^^S^'J'^  t^^^eS 
of  the  inhuman  treatment  he  received,  ^^'V^^^S^^n  ember  194''     Mr  - 

i;-S;^^t:;sSsl'a^i^^wi;i^"-^ 

thP  titlo  "Mv  2,")  Years  in  China."  ,,      .,  ,....„: —   , 


Powell 
cMillan  under 


the  development  of  the  Soviet  regime  and  the  Comintern. 

Suc7i  is  the  present  state  of  China's  hope  for  democracy   Japan    we  aie  jw 
sure   will  be  driven  out;  but  whether  ^lanchuna  and  north  China,  which   oiQ 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3499 

the  principal  makinixs  of  srreat  industry,  will  fall  to  the  Communists  and  thus 
ultimati^ly  s\Yin,a:  the  whole  gigantic  nation  down  the  totalitarian  road  is  un- 
determined. We  Americans  cannot  evade  our  responsibility  in  this,  for  the  ques- 
tion which  social  system  prevails  in  China  is  identical  with  the  question  whose 
leadership  prevails — that  of  democratic  America  or  of  totalitarian  Russia. 

American  modes  of  influence  are  cultural  persuasion ;  the  example  of  pros- 
perity ;  skilled  technical  assistance ;  capital  investment ;  and,  above  all,  military 
and  economic  supplies.  Russia's  weapons  are  conspiratorial  organization  and 
party-controlled  propaganda,  leading  to  seizure  of  power  and  a  liquidaticm  of  all 
democrats  and,  if  necessity  arises,  military  invasion  in  the  name  of  liberation. 
Russia  cannot  furnish  capital,  an  example  of  prosperity,  technical  assistance, 
or  supplies  on  a  scale  comparable  to  ours.  This  gives  us  the  trump  cards  if  we 
play   our   hand   with   clear   understanding  of   the  forces   involved. 

The  Communists  know  this  and  are  doing  their  best  to  cloud  our  understand- 
ing of  these  forces.  A  flood  of  books,  articles,  reviews,  news  dispatches,  lectures, 
and  radio  broadcasts  is  pouring  across  our  country,  dedicated  to  the  sole  purpose 
of  confusing  American  public  opinion  about  the  situation  in  China.  There  are 
four  main  points  in  this  deception  now  being  practiced  upon  us,  all  equally  false 
and  all  aimed  at  persuading  us  to  abandon  another  450  million  people  to  the 
totalitarian  infection  spreading  from  Russia. 

DECEPTION     1.    THAT    RUSSIA    IS    A    "DEMOCRACY"    AND    THAT    CHINA    CAN    THEREFORE 
SAFELY  BE  LEFT  TO  RUSSIAN    "INFLUENCE" 

Owen  Lattimore  is  perhaps  the  most  subtle  evangelist  of  this  erroneous  con- 
ception. Mr.  Lattimore  appraised  the  net  result  of  the  Moscow  trials  and  the 
blood  purge  by  which  Stalin  secured  his  dictatorship  in  193G-39  as  "a  triumph 
for  democracy."  He  now  urges  our  Government,  in  a  Ijook  called  Solution  in  Asia, 
to  accept  cheerfully  the  spread  of  '"the  Soviet  form  of  democracy"  in  central  Asia. 
His  publishers  thus  indicate  the  drift  of  his  book  on  its  jacket : 

He  [Mr.  Lattimore]  shows  that  all  the  Asiatic  peoples  are  more  interested 
in  actual  democratic  practices,  such  as  the  ones  they  can  see  in  action  across 
the  Russian  border,  than  they  are  in  the  fine  theories  of  Anglo-Saxon  de- 
mocracies which  come  coupled  with  ruthless  imperialism. 
This  deception  was  set  going  in  Moscow  in  1936,  when  a  new  constitution  was 
filled  with  .iazzed-up  phrases  from  our  Bill  of  Rights  so  that  it  could  be  adver- 
tised as  more  democratic  than  ours.    Instead  of  establishing  popular  government, 
however,  it  legitimized  the  dictatorship  of  the  Russian  Communist  Party  (art. 
126).     Stalin  himself,  addressing  the  congress  which  ratified  the  draft  of  the 
constitution,  frankly  stated  this  fact : 

"I  must  admit  that  the  draft  of  the  new  constitution  actually  leaves  in 
force  the  regime  of  the  dictatorship  of. the  working  class  and  preserves 
unchanged  the  present  leading  position  of  the  Communist  Party.     In  the 
Soviet  Union  only  one  party  can  exist,  the  party  of  Communists   (Pravda, 
November  26,  1936)." 
In  the  "elections"  held  under  this  constitution  in  1937  and  193S,  only  one  can- 
didate's name  appeared  on  each  ballot.     He  had  been  endorsed  by  the  party, 
and  the  "voting"  consisted  of  assenting  to  the  party's  choice.     The  ceremony 
has  not  been  repeated,  and  would  make  no  difl'erence  if  it  had.    The  constitution 
is  merely  a  facade  for  dictatorship,  and  anyone  who  protests  the  fact  is  shot  or 
sent  to  a  concentration  camp.     In  Siberia  whole  regions  are  given  up  to  these 
concentration  camps  where  from  15  to  20  millions  *  of  Russian  citizens  are  dying 
a  slow  death  at  hard  lal)or.     That  is  the  kind  of  "democratic  practices"  the 
Chinese  would  see  "across  the  Russian  border"  if  they  could  look.     But  looking 
is  not  permitted  by  totalitarian  states. 

First  of  all,  then  if  our  policy  in  China  is  to  be  wise,  we  must  hold  in  steady 
view  the  fact,  frankly  admitted  by  Stalin  and  once  vigorously  stated  by 
President  Roosevelt  as  follows :  "The  Soviet  Union  is  a  dictatorship  as  absolute 
as  any  other  dictatorship  in  the  world." 

If  this  dictatorship  spreads  its  tentacles  across  China,  the  cause  of  democracy 
in  Asia  is  lost.     As  is  well  known,  these  tentacles  need  not  include  invading 


♦Alexander  Barmine,  former  brigadier  general  in  the  Red  arm.v,  estimates  that  the 
number  is  about  12,000,000.  Boris  Sonvarine,  French  historian  of  bolshevisni.  estimates 
15,000,000.  Victor  Kravchenko.  recently  resljrned  from  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission 
in  Washington,  who  has  visited  man.v  camps  and  had  official  relations  with  their  manage- 
ments, says  these  estimate.s  are  low  and  puts  the  figure  at  20,000,000. 


3500  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Sovi<4  troops,  but  only  the  native  Communist  parties  now  giving  allegiance  to 
the  Soviet  Union  and  taking  their  directives  from  Moscow.  When  these  Com- 
munist parties  get  control  of  a  neighboring  state,  the  Moscow  dictatorship  and 
its  fellow  travelers  call  that  a  friendly  government.  It  is  by  means  of  these 
Communist-controlled  "friendly  governments" — not  by  overt  military  conquest — 
that  Russian  power  and  totalitarian  tyranny  is  spreading  frem  the  Soviet  Union, 
in  Asia  as  in  Europe. 

Hence,  for  those  who  cannot  swallow  deception  No.  1,  there  is  another.  We 
shall  quote  from  a  recent  book,  Report  from  Red  China,  by  Harrison  Forman : 

DECEPTION  NO.  2.  "THE  CHINESE  COMMUNISTS  AIIE  NOT  COMMUNISTS NOT  ACCORD- 
ING TO  THE  RUSSIAN  DEFINITION  OF  THE  TERM.  I  SAW  NOT  THE  SLIGHTEST  TANGIBLE 
CONNECTION   WITH  RUSSIA." 

Forman  is  backed  up  by  Edgar  Snow,  the  best-known  popularizer  of  the  pro- 
Communist  view,  with  the  remark  that  the  Chinese  Communists  and  their  leader 
Mao  Tse-tung,  "happen  to  have  renounced,  years  ago  now,  any  intention  of  estab- 
lishing communism  in  China  in  the  near  future." 

To  unmask  this  deception,  you  need  only  go  to  the  Daily  Worker's  book  shop 
on  Thirteenth  Street,  New  York  City,  pay  25  cents  for  Mao  Tse-tung's  book, 
China's  New  Democracy  (1941),  published  with  an  introduction  by  Earl  Browder 
(1945),  and  read  the  book.  You  will  find  that  the  "Lenin  of  China"  is  a  devout, 
orthodox,  and  obedient  disciple  of  Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism  and  gives  un- 
qualified allegiance  both  to  Soviet  Russia  and  the  Communist  world  revolution. 

Here  are  a  few  quotations  from  Mao's  book  : 

"The  world  now  depends  of  communism  for  its  salvation,  and  so  does 
China." 

"We  cannot  separate  ourselves  from  the  assistance  of  the  Soviet  Union 
or  from  the  victory  of  the  anticapitalist  struggles  of  the  proletariat  of  Japan, 
Great  Britain,  the  United  States,  France,  and  Germany." 

"No  matter  whom  you  follow,  so  long  as  you  are  anti-Communist  you  are 
traitors." 

Mao  explains  learnedly  that  communism  in  China  has  two  stages :  First,  the 
present  stage  of  "New  Democracy,"  which  is  but  a  preparation  for  the  second 
stage :  i.  e.,  "proletarian  revolution"  and  the  establishment  of  collectivism  on 
the  Soviet  model.  Mao  excoriates  those  who  do  not  understand  this,  and  insists 
that  "the  second  stage  must  follow  the  first  closely,  not  permitting  a  capitalist 
dictatorship  to  be  inserted  between  them."  ("Capitalist  dictatorship"  is  Mao's 
term  for  democracy  as  we  understand  it.) 

How  different  this  is  from  Edgar  Snow's  dulcet  assurance  that  the  Chinese 
Communists  "happen  to  have  renounced,  years  ago  now,  any  intention  of  estab- 
lishing Communism  in  China  in  the  near  future." 

Mr.  Snow  also  says,  "Long  before  it  became  defunct,  the  Comintern  ceased  to 
have  much  direct  contact  with  the  Chinese  Communist  Party."  The  fact  is  that 
JNIao  Tse-Tung  was  one  of  three  Chinese  members  of  the  Executive  Committee 
of  the  Comintern  from  1935  to  its  dissolution  in  1943.  At  the  last  congress  of 
the  Russian  Communist  Party  the  growth  of  the  Chinese  Party  was  enthusias- 
tically reported  and  the  Party  congratulated  on  becoming  "tempered  in  the  fires 
of  civil  war  and  national  war,"  and  on  "building  a  Soviet  regime."  Mao  sent 
the  congress  a  "flaming  Bolshevik  greeting"  lauding  the  Russian  Soviet  system 
and  concluding  with  "Long  live  Comrade  Stalin  !" 

The  Chinese  Communist  Party  is  the  darling  of  Moscow  and  of  Communists  all 
over  the  world.  Its  national  congress  has  actually  met  in  Moscow.  All  its 
maneuvers,  even  the  most  "reformist,"  have  been  executed  under  orders  from 
the  Kremlin.  A  glance  in  the  Moscow  Party  press  is  enough  to  prove  that  there 
has  been  no  let-up  of  this  intense  concern  with  the  Chinese  Communist  Party. 
Obviously,  the  success  of  the  Chinese  Communists  in  building  a  Red  Army  and 
establishing  an  independent  nation  just  over  their  border — a  nation  whose 
leader  declares,  "We  cannot  be  separated  from  the  Soviet  Union" — would  only 
intensify  the  interest  of  the  heads  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

To  complete  the  record  of  this  deception  :  In  the  translation  of  Mao's  book, 
Earl  Browder  omitted  words  and  passages  which  would,  if  printed  in  America, 
expose  his  own  game  of  playing  democratic  patriot  in  order  to  get  his  henchmen 
into  positions  of  power.  In  the  Chinese  edition  Mao  is  outspoken  in  advocating 
the  "dictatorship  of  the  proletariat,"  and  explaining  that  democracies  like 
England  and  the  United  States  are  "capitalist  dictatorships,"  which  "have  be- 
come, or  are  about  to  become,  blood-stinking  military  dictatorships  of  the 
capitalist  class."    "On  the  point  of  death,"  they  have  become  "imi)erialist"  and 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3501 

will  soon  be  replaced  by  "the  newest  Soviet-style  socialist  republic,  a  dictatorsliip 
of  the  proletariat." 

He  explains  that  in  this  respect  there  is  no  difference  between  the  "Eastern 
(i.  e.,  Japanese)  imperialist"  and  "the  s.  o.  b.  Imperialists  of  the  West."  (The 
Chinese  epithet  is  fouler,  but  s.  o.  b.  will  do.)  All  this,  which  is  of  the  essence  of 
Mao's  orthodox  Communist  position,  is  omitted  from  the  American  edition. 

The  Chinese  Communist  Party  is  more  honest.  Late  in  1944  it  passed  a  reso- 
lution "accepting  American  demands  to  establish  military  bases  in  the  North- 
west," but  adding- :  "We  are  heir  to  the  orthodoxy  of  Marx  and  Engels  which 
calls  for  a  class  revolution  of  the  workers  and  pea.sants.  *  *  *  The  coopera- 
tion of  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  with  the  United  States  is  a  temporary 
strategy.     *     *     *" 

That  disposes  of  the  propaganda  myth  that  the  Chinese  Communists  are  not 
Communists. 

DECEPTION  NO.  3.    THAT  THE  CHINESE  COMMUNISTS  ARE  FIGHTING  THE  JAPS,  AND  THAT 
THE  CHINESE  NATIONAL  ARMY  IS   NOT 

The  truth  is  that  the  Chinese  Communists  are  lighting  the  Japs  enough  to  hold 
their  border,  but  not  enough  to  make  it  worth  while  for  the  Japs  to  move  in  and 
clean  them  out.  This  can  be  seen  by  a  glance  at  the  map.  The  front  east  of 
Yenan,  where  the  Communists  claim  they  have  an  army  of  450,000  soldiers  heroi- 
cally fighting  the  Japs  is  stationary.  It  hasn't  moved  since  Japan  came  up  to  the 
Yellow  River  in  1938.  Although  the  Japanese  have  attacked  in  some  areas, 
there  have  been  no  real  battles.  American  military  observers  agree  that  a  virtual 
truce  has  existed  in  several  front  sectors,  especially  along  the  railways  supplying 
Japanese  forces  fighting  American  and  Chungking  troops  in  the  south. 

Where  Chiang  Kai-shek's  National  Army  fights,  the  record  of  bloody  and  heroic 
battles  has  been  spread  on  the  pages  of  the  world  press  for  years.  We  all  know 
of  the  great  struggles  in  1937  and  1938  in  which  the  flower  of  Chiang  Kai-shek's 
armies  was  lost  together  with  such  modern  armaments  as  China  possessed. 
China  has  received  only  a  trickle  of  aid  as  against  the  flood  of  lend-lease  sent  to 
Russia,  but  Chiang's  armies  have  fought  on.  There  were  at  least  100,000  casual- 
ties in  the  battles  they  fought  last  year  on  Chinese  soil,  and  certainly  85,000  in  the 
furious  Burma  campaign  which  has  broken  the  blockade  by  reopening  the  Stilwell 
road. 

Casualties  among  Chiang's  troops  run  to  over  four  times  the  total  number  of 
soldiers  the  Communists  claim  to  have. 

The  tragic  fact  is  that  while  fighting  the  Japs  a  little,  but  never  enough  to 
menace  Japanese  communication  lines  to  the  war  against  Chiang  in  the  south, 
the  Communists  are  also  waging  "revolutionary  war"  against  the  Chinese  Na- 
tional Army.  When  the  war  began,  the  Chinese  Communists  Central  Committee 
declared :  "In  Chinese  politics  the  decisive  factor  is  military  power.  We  must 
in  the  course  of  the  war  of  resistance,  expand  as  far  as  possible  the  military 
power  of  the  Party  as  the  basis  for  capturing  the  revolutionary  leadership  in 
the  future."  Since  Pearl  Harbor  Mao  naturally  has  been  willing  to  let  the 
"s.  0.  b.  Western  imperialists"  finish  the  Japs  while  he  concentrates  on  "capturing 
the  revolutionary  leadership." 

This  makes  less  astounding  the  statement  of  Lin  Yutang :  "For  every  Japanese 
the  Communists  claim  to  have  killed  they  have  killed  at  least  five  Chinese,  for 
every  town  they  have  captured  from  the  Japanese  they  have  captured  50  towns 
from  other  Chinese."  It  explains  Congressman  Walter  Judd's  statement  that 
when,  last  summer,  the  Japanese  armies  raided  down  fi'om  the  north  through 
four  to  six  hundred  miles  of  country  the  Communist  claim  to  control,  they  got 
free  passage.  Not  a  single  one  of  the  hundreds  of  trains  carrying  Japanese 
soldiers  and  supplies  was  derailed.  (Congressman  Judd,  of  Minnesota,  served 
10  years  as  a  medical  missionary  in  China,  and  saw  communism  first  hand.  He 
revisited  the  country  last  September  and  October.) 

While  this  process  of  Commuui-st  revolution  is  going  forward  accoi'ding  to  a 
published  schedule,  such  fables  as  the  following  are  related  by  Harrison  Forman 
and  solemnly  quoted  in  a  review  of  his  book  by  Edgar  Snow : 

"In  the  7  years  of  war  the  Communists  have  fought  over  92,000  battles.  They 
have  killed  and  wounded  1,100,000  *  *  *  and  captured  150,000  of  the  enemy. 
*     *     *     For  the  same  period  the  Communists  suffered  over  4(K),000  casualties." 

Ninety-two  thousand  battles  in  7  years  is  36  battles  a  day,  or  one  battle  every 
40  minutes.  In  these  battles  the  Communists,  although  a  good  number  of  them 
were  armed  only  with  "old  blunderbusses,  mines,  or  any  weapon  at  hand,"  are 


3502  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

alleged  to  have  knocked  off  enemy  troops  at  the  rate  of  20  per  hour,  or  one  every 
3  minutes — this  without  allowing  for  mealtime  or  rest  hours,  night  or  day,  for 
7  years  running.  Hesides  these  astronomical  achievements,  the  deeds  of  our 
Marines  at  Tarawa  or  (luadalcanal  are,  of  course,  mere  child's  play. 

It  is  doubtful  if  a  more  fantastic  tale  was  ever  told  with  a  straight  face  to 
the  American  people.  And  we  repeat :  To  expose  it,  you  have  only  to  look  up 
the  documents  and  use  your  brains. 

DECEPTION  NO.  4.  THAT  CHIANG  KAI-SHEK  IS  A  FASCIST,  AND  THAT  HIS  TOTALITARIAN 
REGIME   IS    PREVENTING    THE    COMMUNISTS    FROM    ESTABLISHING    DEMOCRACY 

What  kind  of  "democracy"  the  Communists  aim  to  establish  we  have  heard 
from  their  leader :  a  "Soviet-style  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat."  Not  only 
Chiang  Kai-shek  but  everyone  in  the  world  who  intelligently  opposed  this 
kind  of  dictatorship  is  denounced  as  a  fascist.  This  has  been  the  Communist 
smear  techni(iue  ever  since  Hitler  broke  his  pact  with  Stalin. 

Chiang's  regime  is  not  democratic.  When  he  assumed  power  in  1926,  it  was 
the  opinion  of  the  leaders  of  the  Kuomintang  that  only  a  military  dictatorship 
could  achieve  the  unity  and  independence  of  China.  Until  that  should  be  achieved 
China,  thanks  as  much  to  the  Communists  as  to  foreign  intruders  and  war 
lords,  could  not  create  a  democratic  republic.  V.'hether  they  were  right  or  wrong, 
it  is  certain  that,  except  for  the  Connnunists  and  their  subservience  to  INIoscow, 
Chiang  has  achieved  both  the  unity  and  independence  of  China ;  and  he  is 
moving  toward  a  democratic  republic. 

He  once  remarked  to  Ambassador  Hurley :  "If  I  become  a  dictator  I  will 
be  forgotten,  like  all  dictators  in  our  history,  within  48  hours  of  my  death. 
But  if  I  sincerely  work  to  return  power  to  the  people,  I  will  be  remembered 
as  the  George  Washington  of  China.     Can  there  be  any  doubt  of  my  choice?" 

Chiang's  speech  of  last  INIarch,  in  which  he  set  the  date  for  constitutional 
convention,  is  sensible  and  convincing.    It  concluded : 

"Upon  the  inauguration  of  constitutional  government,  all  political  parties 
will  have  legal  status  and  enjoy  equality.  The  Government  has  offered  to 
give  legal  recognition  to  the  Conmiunist  Party  as  soon  as  the  latter  agrees 
to  incorporate  its  army  and  local  administration  in  the  National  Army  and 
Government.    The  offer  still  stands.     *     *     * 

"I  am  optimistic  of  national  unification  and  the  future  of  democratic 
government  in  our  country." 

No  one,  comparing  Chiang's  speech  with  the  schedule  of  steps  toward  prole- 
tarian dictatorship  drawn  up  by  Mao  T.se-Tung,  could  fail  to  see  which  of  the 
two  is  on  the  road  to  democracy.  Chiang  has  permitted  the  publication  of  a 
Communist  daily  in  his  capital  throughout  the  war,  while  Mao  will  not  even  ad- 
mit a  correspondent  of  any  Kuomintang,  or  non-Party,  newspaper  in  his  capital. 
There  is  a  maddening  press  censorship  under  Chiang,  but  under  Mao  there  is  no 
free  press  to  censor.     That  is  a  rough  indication  of  how  things  stand. 

The  Chinese  Communist  regime  is  a  ruthless  party  dictatorship,  camouflaged 
like  Russia's  with  ceremonial  elections,  but  ruled  with  executions,  purges,  con- 
centration camps.  The  Chinese  National  Government  has  tabulated,  with  name, 
place,  date,  and  circumstance,  the  persons  known  to  have  been  oflicially  nuirdered 
by  the  Communists  as  "traitors  and  Trotskyites"  from  April  1989  to  October 
1944.  They  total  34.758,  of  whom  26,834  were  military  personnel,  3,009  govern- 
ment officials,  1,387  Kuomintang  Party  workers,  and  the  rest  civilians.  This 
does  not  include  the  unnumbered  Chinese  soldiers  killed  by  the  Communists  in 
combat  action  against  Chiang's  troops. 

The  fact  that  China  under  Chiang  is  not  yet  democratic  is  the  very  thing  that 
makes  the  Conuuunist  danger  so  great.  If  the  Chinese  knew  freed<mi  and  pos- 
sessed it,  they  would  be  less  ready  victims  of  the  totalitarian  infection.  Hav- 
ing known  little  but  the  arbitrary  rule  of  rival  war  lords,  and  then  tlie  equally 
arbitrary  enforcement  of  national  unity  by  the  Kuomintang,  they  are  as  open  to 
this  infection  as  the  Russian  peasants  were  who  had  known  only  the  regime  of 
the  Czar.  They  are  poised  at  a  cross  road,  ready  to  go  either  way — the  way  of  the 
Russian  totalitarian  state  toward  which  Mao  and  the  Chinese  Connnunist  Party 
are  pointing,  or  the  way  of  American  democracy  toward  which  Chiang  and  the 
Kuomintang  are  pointing.  This  is  why  the  Chinese  liberals,  as  even  pro-Soviet 
reporters  admit,  while  fighting  for  more  freedom  under  Chiang,  are  not  for  the 
Communists. 

What  Chiang  needs  is  our  political  understanding,  technical  assistance,  loans, 
investments,  munitions,  and  supplies  in  support  of  his  plan  to  introduce  con- 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3503 

stitutional  goverumeut  and  make  China  democratic.  The  two  most  important 
items  on  this  list  at  the  moment  are  supplies  and  understanding.  Supplies  our 
State  Department  has  recently,  to  the  relief  of  all  wise  men.  decided  to  give  to 
Chiang,  and  not  to  the  Communists.     But  we  must  give  understanding  too. 

It  shows  no  understanding  to  demand  of  an  anti-Communist  government  that 
it  "unite"  with  Communists.  An  American  foreign  policy  based  on  this  mis- 
take may  very  soon  prove  fatal,  not  only  from  the  standpoint  of  democracy  hut 
of  every  American  interest  in  Asia.  Put  yourself  in  the  place  of  Chiang  Kai- 
shek  and  you  will  see  why.  Chiang  has  fought  the  Communists  in  bloody  war 
and  desperate  intrigue  for  20  years.  He  gained  his  power  by  saving  China  from 
a  Communist  revolution  in  1927.  He  knows  the  Communists.  He  knows  that 
one  word  from  Stalin — and  no  word  from  anywhere  else  in  the  world — could 
in-odur-e  the  "unity"  some  critics  are  so  irritatingly  urging  him  to  pull  out 
of  a  hat. 

Chinese  courtesy  will  survive  a  lot  of  irritation.  But  Chinese  patriotism 
has  a  limit  beyond  which  it  will  not  go.  And  there  lies  behind  our  pressure  upon 
Chiang  for  a  "unity"  he  cannot  acliieve,  an  implication  that  can  only  infuriate 
Chinese  patriots.  The  implication  is  that  the  Roosevelt-Churchill  pledge  at 
Cairo  to  return  Manchuria  to  China  at  the  end  of  the  war  may,  if  unity  fails, 
be  interpreted  to  mean  turn  over  Manchuria  to  the  Stalin-dominated  Communist 
govei-nment  of  Yenan. 

Washington  rumor,  reported  in  the  New  York  Times,  even  says  that  Stalin 
was  promised  a  free  liand  in  Manchuria  for  his  help  in  the  war  against  Japan. 
But  Stalin  may  never  have  asked  for  Manchuria.  That  is  not  his  method  of 
expansion.  All  Stalin  needs  in  order  to  establish  his  power  in  Manchuria  is  a 
"friendly  government"  :  a  quick  march  in  there  by  Mao's  Red  Arrhy,  followed  by 
the  usual  made-to-ordei-  puppet  state.  Our  acquiescence  in  that  operation  will 
be  sufficient  to  sell  out  Chiang — sell  out  the  hope  of  democracy  in  China,  and 
the  hope  of  a  strong  independent  American  ally  in  Asia. 

Chiang's  loyalt.v  to  the  Western  democracies,  and  to  America  in  particular, 
throughoiit  the  long  war  for  Manchuria  has  been  inflexible.  It  survived  our 
unlimited  export  of  war  materials  to  .Japan ;  it  survived  our  "defeat  Hitler 
first"  policy  and  the  loss  of  Burma  and  ^lalaya.  which  enabled  the  Japanese  to 
Itlockadi^  China,  and  prolonged  her  sufferings  interminably:  it  survived  the  Stil- 
well  incident;  it  has  survived  the  recent,  Communist-kindled  flare  of  anti- 
Chinese  slander  in  the  American  press:  it  has  even  survived,  so  far.  our  inane 
demand  for  "unity"  (with  armed  x'evolutionists  who  are  waging  war  against 
him).  But  it  will  not  survive  the  knowledge  that  we  propose  to  turn  over 
to  Stalin,  through  the  agency  of  these  revolutionists,  the  richest  lands  of  China 
about  which,  essentially,  the  whole  war  with  Japan  has  been  fought. 

Chiang,  because  of  his  belief  in  Western  institutions,  has  stood  like  a  rock 
against  those  in  his  party  who  advocate  a  rapprochement  with  Russia  as  against 
his  close  friendship  with  the  United  States.  But  should  it  become  apparent 
that  we  intend  to  bargain  away  all  North  China  for  the  sake  of  Russia's 
help  in  the  war,  will  Chiang  be  able  to  resist  this  pressure?  With  what  argu- 
ments can  he  answer  those  Chinese  patriots  who  will  su'-igest  that  China  do 
her  own  bargaining  witli  Russia,  and  renounce  the  policy  of  special  trust  in 
the  United  States?  Only  the  smoke-screen  of  deception  laid  down  by  the  Com- 
munists and  their  fellow  travelers  blinds  us  to  this  momentous  question,  and 
all  it  entails — for  us  and  for  world  democracy. 

These  pro-Communists  are  playing  the  same  game  in  Asia  that  succeeded  so 
brilliantly  in  Eastern  Europe.  In  Yugoslavia,  for  instance,  on  his  principle 
of  "arming  anyliody  who  will  kill  a  Hun,''  Churchill  sent  munitions  and  sup- 
plies to  the  rebel  Tito,  veteran  Comintern  organizer  and  agent  of  Moscow, 
enabling  him  besides  Idlling  Huns  to  wage  a  civil  war  against  our  ally,  the 
legitimate  government,  whose  troops  were  commanded  by  General  Mikhailovitch. 
Mikhailovitch  was  also  killing  Huns,  but  he  had  not  the  backing  of  Mo.scow, 
and  he  had  no  propaganda  machine  with  which  to  counter  this  same  four- 
sided  lie:  Russia  is  a  democracy,  Tito  is  not  a  Communist.  Tito  is  fighting  the 
enemy  and  Mikhailovitch  is  not,  and  Mikhailovitch  is  a  "fascist." 

Except  for  Chiang's  loftier  position  as  head  of  his  government  for  IS  years, 
the  situation  in  China  is  ominously  similar.  And  the  choice  for  us  is  inescap- 
alile :  Either  we  face  the  facts  and  side  with  the  growth  of  democracy,  or  we 
swallow  the  lies  and  endorse  the  totalitarian  strangulation.  There  was  never  a 
plainer  or  more  simple  issue  before  a  United  States  Government. 

But  there  is  one  big  difference — tliat  is  the  size  of  China.  To  sell  out  Chiang 
Kai-shek  to  the  Chinese  "Tito''  will  not  add  a  paltry  13  million  to  the  totali- 


3504  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

tarian  Colossus.  It  will  bring  under  totalitarian  regimentation  450  million 
people.  This  vast  population,  united  in  their  policy  with  the  Soviet  totalitarian 
empire  of  some  200  million,  would  certainly  threaten  the  hope  for  a  democratic 
world.  When  Iran  and  India  followed  China,  as  they  almost  certainly  would, 
that  would  mean  a  solid  block  of  1  billion  people  under  a  totalitarian  regime. 

Facing  such  a  prospect,  it  seems  obvious  that  as  intelligent  democrats  we 
nuist  abandon  the  whole  policy  of  meek  appeasement  toward  Communist  prop- 
aganda and  power  in  China.  Even  Russia  will  have  greater  resi>ect  for  us  if 
we  make  unmistakably  clear  our  loyalty  to  those  free  institutions  which  have 
enabled  our  American  nation  to  arm,  equip,  feed,  and  rescue  from  destruction 
a  half  of  the  planet.  If  we  really  believe  in  democracy,  let  us  implement  that 
belief  with  a  peaceable  but  clear-headed,  informed  and  resolute  campaign  to  pro- 
mote the  democratic  way  of  life  throughout  the  earth. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  I  am  presenting  you  a  list  of  names. 
I  am  going  to  ask  you,  in  connection  with  that  list  of  names,  the  fol- 
lowing two  questions.  Perhaps  we  can  save  some  time  on  it,  if  you 
will  advert  to  this  for  just  a  minute. 

The  question  wall  read  in  every  case :  In  your  dealings  with  the 
following  people,  did  you  know  or  did  you  have  any  reason  to  believe 
that  they  were  Communists?     That  will  be  the  question. 

If  you  had  no  dealings  with  them,  of  course,  you  will  have  the 
opportunity  to  say  so  at  the  outset.  So  the  question  in  connection 
with  each  one  of  these  individuals  will  be: 

Did  you  know,  or  did  you  have  any  reason  to  believe  that  they  were 
Communists  ? 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  That  this  person  was  Communist? 

Mr.  Morris.  Tliat  this  particular  person  was  a  Communist,  in  your 
dealings  wnth  that  particular  person. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  not  include  otherwise?  Whether  it  was 
in  his  dealings  with  them  that  he  knew  they  were  Communist,  or  other- 
wise knew  they  were  Communist  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  right,  or  otherwise  knew. 

Mr.  FoRTAS.  Mr.  Morris,  if  you  are  going  to  ask  that  question  about 
all  these  people,  may  I  ask  you  to  reframe  it  now? 

Mr.  Morris.  All  right,  let  us  take  one. 

In  your  dealings  with  Solomon  Adler,  did  you  know,  or  did  you 
have  any  reason  to  know,  that  Solomon  Adler  was  a  Communist? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No. 

Senator  Smith.  Wait  a  minute,  Mr.  Morris.  Is  that  presupposing 
that  he  had  dealings  with  Solomon  Adler? 

Mr.  Morris.  Senator  Smith,  I  indicated  that  if  he  had  no  dealings 
with  the  man  he  would,  of  course,  have  the  opportunity  to  so  state  at 
the  time. 

Senator  Smith.  All  right. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  understand  the  question,  now,  Mr.  Latti- 
more ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  think  so. 

Mr.  I'ORTAS.  Two  questions. 

Mr.  Morris.  There  were  two  questions;  that  is  right. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  May  I  rephrase  the  question,  just  in  case  there  is 
any  doubt  about  it?  It  might  not  do  any  harm  to  say  it  once  more. 
Mr.  Morris  wall  read  a  name.  The  reading  of  the  name  presumes  that 
Mr.  Lattimore  had  dealings  with  the  person.  If  he  has  had  no  deal- 
ings with  the  person,  he  is  to  say  so.  Otherwise,  INIr.  Lattimore  is  to 
indicate  his  answer  to  the  question  as  to  whether,  in  his  dealings  with 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3505 

this  person,  or  otherwise,  he  ever  knew  or  had  any  reason  to  believe 
that  the  named  person  was  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party. 

Tlie  Chairman.  Was  a  Communist. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Was  a  Communist,  all  right. 

Mr.  Morris.  The  second  name  is  Hilda  Austern. 

]VIr.  Lattimore.  No. 

Mr.  Morris.  H.  W.  Baerensprung. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No. 

Mr.  Morris.  How  well  did  you  know  H.  W.  Baerensprung? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  think  I  saw  him  once  when  he  came  to  this  coun- 
try, and  I  knew  him  as  a  person  who  had  been  reorganizing  Chiang 
Kai-shek's  police  force. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  he  prepare  an  article  for  Pacific  Affairs? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  think  so. 

Mr.  Morris.  Joseph  F.  Barnes. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No. 

Mr.  Fortas.  Just  a  moment. 

Mr.  Chairman  and  Mr.  Morris,  may  we  have  it  understood,  if  you 
are  going  to  conduct  the  examination  this  way,  that  by  the  witness 
answering  these  questions,  he  does  not  personally  name  any  statement, 
or  no  inference  is  permissible  as  to  whether  he  thinks  or  does  not  think 
that  they  were  Communists  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  right.  The  question  is  addressed  to  his  knowl- 
edge as  to  whether  or  not  he  knew  them  to  be  Communists. 

The  Chairman.  Or  had  reason  to  believe. 

Mr.  Morris.  Or  had  reason  to  believe ;  that  is  right.  Senator. 

Kathleen  Barnes. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  until  the  question  came  up  to  her  refusing  to 
testify. 

Mr.  Morris.  Joseph  M.  Bernstein. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  know  who  he  is  and  I  don't  believe  I  ever 
met  him. 

Mr.  Morris.  Charles  Bidien. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  know  who  he  is  and  I  don't  believe  I  ever 
met  him. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  he  prepare  an  article  for  Pacific  Affairs  while  you 
were  the  editor  of  Pacific  Affairs  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  doubt  it  very  much.  I  don't  believe  I  have  ever 
seen  that  name  before. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  T.  A.  Bisson. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Albert  Blumberg. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  believe  I  ever  met  him,  and  I  am  not  sure 
M'ho  is  meant. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Michael  Borodin. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Mr.  Michael  Borodin  I  never  met.  I  have  seen  him 
once  and  I  assume  he  is  a  Communist. 

Mr.  Morris.  Louise  Bransten. 

Mr.  Fortas.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  ask  a  question  of  clarification? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Mr.  Fortas.  Again  I  understand  the  question  is :  Did  j^ou  have  any 
reason  to  know  that  they  were  Communists,  or  to  believe  that  they 
were  Communist  at  the  time  that  you  were  dealing  with  them  ? 


3506  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  No.  The  question  is:  Did  you,  in  your  dealings 
with  them,  or  in  any  other  way,  know  or  have  reason  to  believe  that 
this  person  Avas  a  Communist  ? 

Mr.  FoRTAS.  At  any  time? 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Yes,  sir. 

]Mr.  Lattlimore.  I  certainly  never  had  any  dealings  with  Mike 
Borodin. 

Mr.  Morris.  You  did  not  encounter  Borodin,  did  you  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  didn't  encounter  him.  He  was  at  a  meeting 
in  Moscow  when  I  was  there  in  1936  with  Mr.  Carter  and  somebody 
afterward  told  me  that  tliat  was  Borodin. 

Mr.  Morris.  Louise  Bransten. 

The  Chairman.  My  understanding  is  that — see  if  my  recollection 
is  correct — that  you  said,  in  answer  to  the  former  question,  that  you 
believed  he  was  a  Communist.    Am  I  in  error  on  that? 

Mr.  Latimore.  I  believe  that  he  is  a  Communist  simply  from  my 
reading  of  Chinese  history  in  the  1920's. 

Tlie  Chairman.  All  right. 

Mr.  Morris.  Louise  Bransten. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  recognize  that  name  and  I  don't  believe 
I  ever  met  any  such  person. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  prepare  an  article  for  the  committee  of  the 
American-Russian  Institute,  the  chairman  of  which  was  Louise  K. 
Bransten  ? 

Senator  Watkins.  Is  that  Louise  R.  or  Louise  A.  Bransten  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Louise  R.  Branstein  is  the  name. 

Mr.  FoRTAS.  It  is  wi-ong  on  the  list. 

Mr.  Morris.  It  is  wrong  on  the  list ;  that  is  right.  Louise  R.  Bran- 
sten. Do  you  remember  preparing  an  article  for  the  American-Rus- 
sian Institute,  of  which  she  was  acting  as  chairman? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  am  not  sure  this  is  the  same  thing,  Mr.  Morris, 
but  I  remember  publishing  an  article  in  the  American  Quarterly  on 
the  Soviet  Union,  or  something. 

Mr.  Morris.  Does  that  refresh  your  recollection  ? 

Mr.  Lati'imore.  No,  it  doesn't.  Tlie  article  here  appears  to  be  an 
article  that  I  published  in  Far  Eastern  Survey,  and  it  may  have  been 
reprinted  by  this  publication.  But  I  don't  recall  ever  seeing  it  be- 
fore. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  give  permission  to  have  it  republished? 

Mr.  Latitmore.  Not  that  I  recall.    It  is  quite  possible. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  prepare  the  article  ? 

jNIr.  Lattimore.  I  prepared  an  article  for  the  Far  Eastern  Survey. 
The  Far  Eastern  Survey  may  have  considted  me  on  permission  to 
have  it  rej)ublished  elsewhere,  but  I  don't  recall  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  the  article,  as  it  appears  in  this 
particular  document,  be  introduced  into  the  record? 

Senator  Smith.  Does  Mr.  Lattimore  identify  this  article? 

The  Chairman.  He  has  not  identified  the  article. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  identified  the  article  by  title.  Let  me  look 
and  see  if  it  is  the  same  article. 

Yes;  this  is  the  same  article.  It  is  marked  "By  permission  of  Far 
Eastern  Survey,  American  Council  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Re- 
lations." 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3507 

Witliout  comparing  the  two  articles,  I  would  not  know  whether 
this  is  a  complete  reprint,  or  not. 

Senator  Smith.  I  think  we  might  have  it  understood  there  that 
Mr.  Lattimore  will  have  a  chance  to  review  that,  sentence  by  sentence, 
if  he  wishes  to. 

The  Chairman.  I  tliink  he  should  be  given  that  chance  before  it 
goes  in. 

Senator  Smith.  It  can  be  put  in  with  his  right  to  apply  to  it  any 
changes  he  finds  necessary  in  order  to  make  it  conform. 

The  Chairman.  You  may  return  to  this  article  at  a  later  time,  after 
Mr.  Lattimore  has  had  a  chance  to  look  at  it. 

All  right,  Mr.  Morris. 

Mr.  Morris.  Earl  Browder. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes ;  I  considered  him  a  Communist. 

Mv.  ]\IoRRis.  When  did  you  meet  Mr.  Browder,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  recall  what  year  it  was,  but  I  went  down 
once  when  I  was  about  to  leave  for  China.  I  went  down  to  the  offices 
of  the  American  Communist  Party  and  called  on  him  to  see  if  I  could 
get  some  leads  to  find  out  about  the  Communists  in  China,  and  I  got 
a  complete  brush-off. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  anyone  arrange  that  meeting  for  you,  Mr.  Latti- 
more ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  My  recollection  is  that  I  just  walked  down  there. 

Mr.  Morris.  You  walked  in  cold  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Walked  in  cold. 

Senator  Smith.  Let  me  ask  a  minute. 
,     That  was  before  you  started  for  China  on  one  occasion,  was  it  not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Smith.  Up  to  that  time,  had  you  ever  met  Browder  before  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No. 

Senator  Smith.  Had  you  ever  had  any  dealings  with  him  since 
that  time  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No.  He  came  down  and  testified  before  the  Tydings 
committee,  but  I  didn't  see  him. 

Senator  Smitpi.  Did  you  ever  attend  a  conference  or  meeting  when 
he  was  present? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  FoRTAS.  Will  you  try  to  place  that,  approximately? 

Senator  Smith.  I  recall  reading  somewhere  about  Mr.  Lattimore's 
conference  with  jNIr.  Browder  before  he  left  for  a  trip  to  China.  I  do 
]iot  know  what  the  date  was. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  was  before  the  Tydings  committee  I  testified  to 
that. 

Senator  Smith.  I  do  not  remember  where  I  had  seen  it.  I  believe 
3^ou  do  refer  to  that  in  your  book. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  That  he  had  a  conference  with  Browder? 

Senator  Smith.  Yes. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Well,  I  wouldn't  call  it  a  conference. 

Mr.  ]\IoRRis.  Did  you  testify  that  took  place  in  1936,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  may  have  been  in  1936. 

Mr.  Morris.  Herman  Budzeslawski. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  believe  that  I  identified  that  name  from  an  article 
by  a  woman  columnist,  Dorothy  Thompson.    She  wrote  an  article  in 


3508  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

tlie  Saturday  Evening  Post  about  him.  I  met  him  once  at  the  office 
of  Overseas  News  Agency  at  the  time  when  I  was  writing  syndicated 
articles  for  them,  and  so  w\as  he,  under  a  different  name,  wdiich  I 
forget. 

Mr.  Morris.  CoukI  you  try  to  recall  what  that  other  name  is,  Mr. 
Lattimore  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  could  try,  but  I  am  very  vague  on  the  subject.  I 
believe  it  is  probably  in  that  article  by  Dorothy  Thompson. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  it  your  testimony  that  you  did  not  know,  or  had  no 
reason  to  believe,  that  he  was  a  Communist? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Morris.  Dr.  Norman  Bethune. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  know  his  name  only  by  reading.  I  don't  believe 
I  ever  met  him. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  have  any  reason  to  believe  that  he  was  Coni' 
munist? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No;  I  don't  think  I  have  seen  that  stated. 

Mr.  Morris.  Angus  Cameron? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Angus  Cameron,  I  have  no  reason  to  believe  was  a 
Communist. 

Mr.  Morris.  Have  your  dealings  with  Angus  Cameron  been  exten- 
sive, Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  not  at  all.  I  met  him  once.  I  have  never  had 
any  dealings  with  him. 

Mr.  Morris.  How  many  books  of  yours  has  he  published,  Mr.  Lat- 
timore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  He  was  a  member  of  a  firm  that  has  published 
several  books  of  mine,  but  the  handling  of  my  books  for  publication 
by  that  firm  was  never  through  him. 

Mr.  Morris.  Through  whom  was  it? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  was  through  Mr.^ — oh,  I  would  have  to  go  a 
long  way  back — wait  a  minute.  My  first  two  books  were  published 
by  tliat  firm  at  the. end  of  the  1920's  and  I  dealt  with — I  think  he  was 
the  then  head  of  the  firm,  wdiose  name  was  Max  something.  He  has 
since  died.  And  my  more  recent  books  through  that  firm  have  all  been 
handled  through  Mr.  Stanley  Salmen. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  spell  that,  please  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  S-a-1-m-e-n. 

Mr.  ]\Iorris.  Evans  Carlson.    Evans  F.  Carlson. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  had  no  reason  to  believe  he  was  a  Communist. 

Mr.  Morris.  Were  your  dealings  with  him  extensive  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  wouldn't  say  they  were  extensive. 

Mr.  Morris.  How  frequently  have  you  met  General  Carlson  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Well,  I  used  to  see  him  socially  quite  a  bit  in  the 
19?>0's,  when  he  was  at  the  American  Marine  Guard  at  the  Embassy  in 
Peking,  and  I  have  seen  him  maybe  three  times  in  this  country,  three 
or  four  times. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  advise  him  at  the  time  of  his  considered 
resignation  from  the  Marine  Corps  in  1939  that  he  would  be  more 
effective  in  serving  the  cause  of  China  by  "staying  in  the  Marine  Corps" 
rather  than  resigning. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  don't  think  that  wording  is  exact. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  is  your  recollection  of  it,  Mr.  Lattimore,  of  what 
is  in  the  record.    I  would  like  to  have  your  testimony  on  it. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3509 

Mr.  Lattijniore.  My  recollection  is  that  I  thought  it  would  be  a  pity 
for  him  to  resign  from  the  Marine  Corps.  I  thought  that  his  knowl- 
edge and  experience  would  be  of  better  service  to  this  country  in  the 
Marine  Corps. 

Mr.  Morris.  Abraham  Chapman. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  don't  believe  I  have  ever  met  him. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  know  he  was  a  writer  for  the  Institute  of  Pacific 
Eelations  publications  ? 

JVIr.  Lattimore.  I  remember  some  correspondence  on  the  subject  at 
a  time  when  I  was  on  the  research  committee  of  the  IPR,  but  I  never 
met  him. 

Mr.  Morris.  Chen  Han-seng. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Chen  Han-seng,  at  the  time  I  knew  him,  I  had  no 
reason  to  believe  was  a  Communist. 

Mr.  INIoRRis.  "Where  is  he  now  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  heard  that  he  is  in  China. 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  Eed  China? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Your  dealings  with  Chen  Ilan-seng  were  quite  exten- 
sive, were  they  not,  Mr.  Lattimore  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Well,  I  knew  him  when  he  was  doing  research  for 
the  IPE,  and  then  he  worked  two  academic  years  at  Johns  Hopkins. 

Mr.  Morris.  Under  your  sponsorship  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Under  iny  direction. 

Mr.  Morris.  Chew  Shi  Hong. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  am  not  quite  sure  who  is  meant  there  by  Chew 
Shi  Hong. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  we  come  back  to  that  ? 

The  Chairman.  All  right. 

Mr.  IMoRRis.  Harriet  Chi. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Harriet  Chi,  yes,  I  knew  slightly ;  had  no  reason  to 
believe  was  a  Communist. 

Mr.  ]\Iorris.  She  was  your  secretary  at  one  time,  was  she  not  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  She  worked  as  my  secretary  for,  oh,  10  days  or  2 
weeks,  in  1936,  I  believe. 

Mr.  Morris.  She  is  the  wife  of  Chao-Ting  Chi,  who  is  now  an  official 
of  the  Chinese  Communist  Government,  is  she? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  She  is ;  or  was. 

Mr.  Morris.  The  next  name ;  will  you  pronounce  that  next  name,  Mr. 
Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  pronounce  it  "Chow  Moo"  (ChTao  Mu). 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  that  a  feminine  or  a  masculine  name? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  1  couldn't  tell. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  it  your  testimony  you  have  had  no  dealings  with  that 
person  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  know.  It  may  be  somebody  I  had  met  in 
China.    I  can't  place  the  name. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  it  your  testimony  you  had  no  dealings  with  that  per- 
son while  you  were  acting  as  an  adviser  to  the  Generalissimo? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  'No;  I  can't  testify  exactly  to  that.  I  met  so  many 
people  once  or  twice  while  I  was  working  for  the  Generalissimo. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  know  where  that  particular  person  is  now? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  don't. 


3510  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Morris.  Cliu  Tong. 

Mr.  Latiimore.  Chu  Tong  1  met  maybe  twice  while  he  was  working 
for  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Eelations. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  have  any  reason  to  believe,  or  did  you  know  at 
that  time  that  he  was  a  Communist? 

Mr.  LAi^riMORE.  No ;  I  did  not  consider  him  a  Communist. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  Mr.  Chairman,  if  I  might  interpose : 

Mr.  Morris  occasionally  rephrases  the  question,  and  I  think  it  should 
be  made  clear  to  the  witness  that  even  so,  that  does  not  change  it  for 
subsequent  names.  The  question  remains  for  each  name,  first,  the 
assumption  that  the  witness  has  had  dealings  with  this  person.  If 
not,  he  is  to  so  state. 

Then  the  question  is :  Did  you,  in  your  dealings  with  this  person,  or 
in  any  other  way,  know  or  have  any  reason  to  believe  that  this  person 
was  a  Communist  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  In  the  case  of  Chu  Tong,  there  was  some  question  of 
his  loyalty  record  being  reviewed  by — I  forget  whether  it  was  the 
Security  Board  of  OWI  or  the  Civil  Service,  or  both  of  them,  and  the 
question  came  up  whether  he  should  be  considered  as  a  person  who 
should  be  discharged  for  loyalty. 

And  I  believe  the  record  shows  that  the  grounds  were  considered 
insufficient. 

The  Chairman.  Back  there  a  few  names  there  w^as  one  to  whom 
the  witness  referred  as  having  been  under  him  at  Johns  Hopkins. 
What  name  was  that? 

Mv.  Morris.  Chen  Han-seng. 

Mr.  Laitimore.  Chen  Han-seng. 

The  Chairman.  I  understand  he  testified  he  is  now  in  Red  China. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  So  I  believe.    I  heard  that  recently. 

The  Chairman.  I  do  not  think  the  question  embraced  whether  or 
not  he  knew  or  had  reason  to  believe  that  he  was  a  Communist. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  I  think  it  did,  Mr.  Chairman.  I  certainly  did 
not  believe  him  to  be  a  Comnumist  at  that  time. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  I  offer  you  this  copy  of  a  civil  service 
paper,  the  first  line  of  which  makes  reference  to  Chew  Sih  Hong.  In 
connection  with  the  difficulty  we  had  in  identifying  who  that  was,  I 
ask  you  if  that  would  refresh  your  recollection. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  would  mean  that  Chew  Sih  Hong  and  Chu 
Tong  are  probably  the  same  person.  Many  Chinese  have  two  })er- 
sonal  names,  and  sometimes  one  is  used  and  sometimes  the  other.  Chu 
would  be  the  family  name. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Mr.  Lattimore,  was  that  a  matter  of  your  recollec- 
tion, or  was  that  only  a  statement  as  to  what  the  paper  that  Mr.  Morris 
handed  you  indicates  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  paper  that  Mr.  Morris  handed  to  me  indicates 
that  it  was  the  same  person. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Do  you  have  any  recollection  as  to  whether  that  is 
true,  whether  they  were  the  same  person  ? 

Mr.  Lattiiniore.  No,  not  without  reading  the  document  through 
again.     But  I  am  willing  to  assume  they  were  the  same  person. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  Do  you  think  if  you  read  the  document  through  it 
would  refresh  your  recollection? 

Mv.  Lattimore.  Does  the  document  also  refer  to  1dm  as  Chu  Tong? 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3511 

Mr.  FoRTAS.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  let- 
ter refers  to  Chew  Sih  Hong,  the  middle  name  appearing  here  as  S-i-h. 
On  this  list  it  is  S-h-i ;  that  is,  on  the  list  that  Mr.  Morris  supplied. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  a  matter  that  will  have  to  be  straightened 
out  by  the  witness. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  The  American  spelling  of  Chinese  names  and  sylla- 
bles is  a  fearful  and  wonderful  thing,  is  it  not  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Oh,  I  remember  now.  I  was  thinking  of  this  as  a 
Mr.  Chew,  which  would  be  a  common  Chinese  name,  but  I  see  that  he 
is  referred  to  here  as  IVIr.  Hong.  And  I  remember  now  old  Dr.  Chi 
telling  me  something  that  I  didn't  know  before,  that  the  family  name 
there  is  Tong,  or  Hong,  which  is  pronounced  one  way  in  Fukien  Prov- 
ince and  the  other  way  in  other  provinces  of  China. 

The  Chairman.  Let  us  clear  it  up  now. 

Did  you  know  him  ?    Did  you  have  dealings  with  him  ? 

Mr.  LATa^iMORE.  I  knew  him.  I  saw  him  a  couple  of  times  at  the 
New  York  office  of  the  IPR. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  know  him  to  be,  or  have  reason  to  believe 
that  he  was  a  Communist? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No.  There  was  this  question  raised  by  the  Civil 
Service  Commission  and,  as  I  say,  my  recollection  is  that  it  was  de- 
cided that  the  evidence  was  insufficient. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Do  you  now  recollect,  sir,  that  the  two  names  on  this 
list,  Chew  Sih  Hong  and  Chew  Tong  are  the  same  person? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  They  must  be  the  same  person ;  yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  will  this  document  that  reflected  the 
witness'  recollection  on  that  point  be  introduced  into  the  record,  for 
that  purpose  ? 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Simply  as  the  document  that  was  shown  to  the 
witness,  and  which  he  read  ? 

Mr.  JVIoRRis.  Which  he  read. 

The  Chairman.  It  may  be  inserted  for  that  purpose.  I  do  not 
know  what  else  is  in  here. 

You  are  not  holding  him  responsible  for  what  else  is  in  here,  are 
you? 

Mr.  Morris.  No,  sir. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  550"  and  is  as 
follows.) 

Exhibit  No.  550 

Office  of  the  Chief  Law  Office, 

November  llf,  19J,3. 
The  Commission. 

(Through  Mr.  Smith  and  the  Executive  Director  and  Chief  Examiner.) 

I  am  submitting  herewith  as  a  unit  the  cases  of  Chew  Sih  Hong  and  Dr. 
Kung  Chuan  Chi,  employees  of  the  Office  of  War  Information.  These  cases  are 
being  submitted  together  because  both  individuals  are  serving  in  the  same  sec- 
tion, and  it  appears  that  Mr.  Hong  was  employed  at  the  recommendation  of  Dr. 
Chi  who  in  turn  was  employed  by  Mr.  Owen  Lattimore,  Director  of  Pacific  Opera- 
tions of  the  OfRce  of  War  Information. 

The  case  of  Mr.  Hong  was  previously  before  the  Commission  and  analyses  of 
the  facts  in  his  case  were  furnished  by  the  undersigned  and  by  Mr.  Cannon.  We 
both  took  the  position  that  Hong's  connections  with  the  Chinese  Hand  Laundry 
Alliance,  reputed  to  be  an  organization  affiliated  with  the  Commimist  Party,  and 
the  China  Daily  News,  said  to  l)e  a  publication  by  and  for  Chinese  Communists, 
and  his  references  and  associations,  were  such  as  to  warrant  a  finding  of  in- 
eligibility.    The  Commission  transmitted  to  the  Office  of  War  Information  a 


3512  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

proposed  memorandum  opinion  in  the  case  of  Mr.  Hong  and  under  date  of  Novem- 
l)er  30,  1942,  Mr.  Elmer  Davis  in  a  letter  to  Commissioner  Flemming  stated  that 
in  view  of  the  information  which  we  furnished  him,  Hong  was  terminated  at  the 
close  of  business  November  15,  1942.  The  Commission  thereupon  advised  the 
Office  of  War  Information  under  date  of  December  8,  1942,  that  the  Commission 
has  concluded  that  a  finding  of  ineligibility  is  necessary  and  that  the  Commis- 
sion's records  have  been  noted  to  show  that  Mr.  Hong's  services  were  terminated 
at  the  close  of  business  on  November  15,  1942,  as  reported  in  the  letter  from  Mr. 
Elmer  Davis  of  November  30,  1942.  Previously  the  Commission  had  approved 
the  finding  of  ineligibility  and  this  action  was  recorded  in  Minute  4  of  December 
4,  1942. 

In  a  letter  dated  July  27,  1943,  Rear  Admiral  R.  P.  McCullough  referred  to 
previous  correspondence  regarding  Mr.  Hong  and  stated  that  the  letter  of 
November  30,  1942,  from  the  Office  of  War  Information  to  the  effect  that  Hong 
had  been  terminated  at  the  close  of  business  November  15,  1942,  was  somewhat 
in  error  because  Mr.  Hong  had  been  separated  from  the  New  York  office  of  the 
Office  of  War  information  on  November  15,  1942,  for  duty  with  the  Army  and 
that  when  he  returned  in  the  spring  of  1943  he  was  again  employed  in  the 
New  York  office  of  the  Office  of  War  Information,  that  office  not  knowing  that 
Hong  had  been  declared  ineligil)le  by  the  Civil  Service  Commission.  Admiral 
McCullough  accordingly  requested  that  the  Commission  reconsider  the  case 
of  Mr.  Hong.  Mr.  Moyer  then  sent  the  file  to  the  Investigations  Division  so  that 
an  interview  might  be  had  with  Mr.  Owen  Lattimoi'e,  Head  of  the  San  Fran- 
cisco office  of  the  Office  of  War  Information.  Mr.  Lattimore  was  accordingly 
interviewed  in  San  Francisco  and  on  a  later  date  Mr.  Steely  interviewed  Ad- 
miral McCullough  and  Mr.  Marsh  of  the  Office  of  War  Information  regarding 
]Mr.  flong,  Mr.  Owen  Lattimore  being  also  present  during  this  interview.  Mr. 
Steely  reported  among  other  things  that  Mr.  Lattimore  stated  that  he  wished  to 
keep  Mr.  Hong  on  the  job,  that  Mr.  Lattimore  had  an  efficient  set-up  in  the 
Chinese  section  in  the  New  York  office  of  the  Office  of  War  Information  and 
wanted  to  keep  it  that  way,  that  he  had  explicit  confidence  in  Dr.  Chi,  that 
Mr.  Hong  is  under  careful  supervision  and  even  if  he  were  a  Communist  he 
is  not  in  a  position  where  he  can  do  any  damage,  that  the  selection  of  suitable 
Chinese  was  a  delicate  matter,  and  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  obtain  a  com- 
petent employee  who  does  not  have  connections  which  might  constitute  leaks 
in  the  organization,  that  imder  the  present  set-up  with  Dr.  Chi  and  Mr.  Hong 
there  have  been  no  incidents  of  confidential  information  getting  into  unauthor- 
ized channels  and  that  there  had  been  no  attempts  on  Mr.  Hong's  part  to  use 
his  present  position  for  the  spreading  of  Communist  propaganda.  Mr.  Lattimore 
also  pointed  out  that  Mr.  Hong  was  recently  used  by  the  Army  to  teach  Chinese 
to  224  officers  in  India.  Mr.  Lattimore  stated  that  he  did  not  know  Mr.  Hong 
but  he  did  know  Dr.  Chi  and  is  relying  upon  Dr.  Chi's  recommendation  and 
knowledge  of  Mr.  Hong. 

During  the  interview  in  San  Francisco  Mr.  Lattimore  made  an  extended 
statement  regarding  Mr.  Hong  and  Dr.  Chi  and  also  furnished  the  investigator 
with  a  copy  of  a  letter  which  he  had  written  to  Mr.  Joseph  Barnes  under  date 
of  June  15,  1943.  The  statement  of  ]Mr.  Lattimore  during  the  interview  and 
the  copy  of  his  letter  to  Mr.  Barnes  are  appropriately  identified  in  the  file.  It 
would  be  a  difficult  tiling  to  attempt  to  summarize  Mr.  Lattimore's  lengthy 
statement  or  his  letter  to  Mr.  Barnes.  However,  the  gist  of  his  comments  is 
that  he  does  not  know  Hong  personally  but  based  on  his  knowledge  of  the  situ- 
ation, neither  the  Chinese  Hand  Laundry  Alliance  nor  the  China  Daily  News 
are  Communistic.  He  then  proceeded  to  give  rather  involved  reasons  for  his 
conclusions.  He  said  that  he  had  known  Dr.  Chi,  who  is  about  70  years  of  age,  in 
Cliina,  that  he  was  a  respected  and  cultured  man,  and  that  his  knowledge  of 
Dr.  Chi  is  such  that  he  has  implicit  faith  and  confidence  in  his  integrity  and 
ability.  He  told  Dr.  Chi  to  select  the  person  he  wanted  to  assist  him  and  Dr. 
Chi  selected  Mr.  Hong.  This  was  the  first  time  that  Mr.  Lattimore  had  any 
knowledge  of  Mr.  Hong  at  all. 

Among  other  things  Mr.  Lattimore  said : 

"Of  course,  I  have  no  concrete  proof  that  Hong  is  not  a  Communist  but  in 
the  absence  of  concrete  proof  I  think  there  is  a  prime  facie  case  to  show  that 
he  is  not  a  Communist.  I  know  there  is  a  law  preventing  the  hiring  of  Com- 
munists. Personally  and  frankly  I  would  not  be  too  worried  if  an  individual 
Comnmnist  were  in  Hong's  position.  This  is  becaxise  he  would  not  be  able  to 
form  a  'cell'  and  could  not  get  away  with  anything.  He  could  not  commit 
verbal  sabotage,  and  all  of  the  work  coming  out  of  the  New  York  office  has  to 
clear  through  me." 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3513 

On  a  later  occasion  ]\Ir.  Lattimore  stated  to  our  investigator  in  part : 

"Now  I  know  that  the  various  factions  smear  a  non-Conformist  by  charging 
Him  with  Iteing  a  Communist.     However,  the  Chinese  Government  dare  not 
■come  out  in  the  open  and  intervene  in  such  domestic  problems.     I  merely  say 
this :  If  your  people  have  gone  to  the  Chinese  Ambassador  or  any  other 
Chinese  Government  representative  and  such  Chinese  representative  has  told 
you  that  tliis  man  Hong  is  suspected  of  being  a  Communist,  tlien  I  say  you 
should  discount  such  evidence  and  certainly  should  not  declare  the  man 
ineligible  merely  on  that  kind  of  evidence.     It  is  true  that  I  don't  know  any- 
thing about  Hong  personally  except  wliat  I  have  learned  from  Dr.  Chi.     It 
is  also  true  that  he  could  be  a  Communist  without  my  knowledge.     It  is  also 
true  that  he  could  have  hoodwinked  Dr.  Chi.     However,  until  concrete  evi- 
dence is  presented  that  he  is  a  Communist  then  I  believe  that  based  on  Dr. 
Chi's  standing  and  reputation  and  ability,  his  judgment  that  Hong  is  not  a 
Communist  is  a  prime  facie  case  in  favor  of  Hong  and  should  not  be  reversed 
on  the  testimony  that  you  may  have  received  from  anyone  representing  the 
Chinese  Government  or  for  tliat  matter  on  the  testimony  of  any  Chinese." 
It  will  be  noted  that  the  sum  and  substance  of  Mr.  Lattimore's  testimony  is  that 
lie  does  not  know  Mr.  Hong,  that  he  does  know  Dr.  Chi,  that  he  has  full  faith  in 
Dr.  Chi  and  was  willing  to  employ  Hong  on  Dr.  Chi's  recommendation,  that  he 
does  not  know  whether  Hong  is  a  Communist,  but  does  not  think  he  is  and  that 
even  if  Hong  were  a  Communist,  he  would  still  like  to  retain  Hong  in  the  sei'vice 
because  Hong  could  do  no  harm  in  his  position. 

In  his  letter  to  Mi\  Barnes,  Mr.  Lattimore  outlined  the  entire  situation  as  he 

understood  it,  described  the  relationship  between  Hong  and  Dr.  Chi,  and  then  said  : 

'As  long  as  Dr.  Chi  stands  in  the  relationship  of  loyal  friendship  to  me 

and  the  loyalty  of  an  honest  employee  of  an  American  government  agency, 

there  will  be  no  dif33eulty  with  either  man,  no  irresponsible  playing  with 

Chinese  politics,  and  no  leakage  to  any  Chinese  faction.     The  retention  of 

both  men  is  therefore  a  guarantee  to  the  secrecy  and  security  of  the  woi'k 

of  OWI  as  well  as  a  guarantee  of  tlie  confident  fulfillment  of  directives. 

I  urge  you  not  to  be  high-pressured  into  getting  rid  of  either  man.    I  know 

that  both  men  may  be  subjected  to  attacks.     Given  tlie  time  to  worlv  on  it, 

I  could  undoubtedly  trace  such  attacks  to  their  origin  and  give  you  the  full 

details.     I  doubt  whether  the  Personnel  Security  Conuuittee  of  OWI  would 

be  able  to  trace  such  attacks,  rooted  in  the  intricacies  of  Cliinese  factional 

politics,  to  their  source ;  but  I  should  not  like  to  see  us  placed  in  a  po.sition 

where,  after  getting  rid  of  people  now  attacked,  we  would  be  forced  to  hire 

people  who  would  actually  be  the  nominee  of  factions  not  imder  our  control." 

The  foregoing  letter  from  Mr.  Lattimore  to  Mr.  Barnes  was  written  in  strict 

confidence  and  is  not  to  be  quoted  to  any  outside  source. 

The  evidence  before  the  Commission  at  the  time  unfavorable  action  was 
originally  taken  in  the  case  of  Mr.  Hong  tended  to  indicate  rather  strongly  that 
Hong  is  a  Communist  and  engaged  in  activities  having  for  their  purpose  support 
of  Conmumist  party  interests.  The  recent  investigation  and  interviews  have 
not  changed  the  evidence  and  have,  on  the  contrary,  elicited  some  information 
tending  to  strengthen  the  position  that  Hong  is  pro-Communist.  Thus  it  was 
iirought  out  in  addition  to  all  of  tlie  other  information  that  Hong  was  active  in 
the  American  Student  Union  during  his  school  years. 

The  evidence  indicated  tliat  Hong  is  pro-Communist.  The  question  now  for 
determination  is  wliether  his  em])loyment  should  be  approved  because  of  the 
slronj-  representations  of  Mr.  Lattimore  that  Hong  is  probably  not  a  Communist, 
but  even  if  he  is  a  Commiuiist,  Mr.  Lattimore  still  wishes  to  retain  him  because 
Hong  will  work  under  close  supervision  and  will  not  l>e  able  to  do  any  harm. 

On  tlie  one  hand  it  can  he  argued  that  since  we  are  reasonably  convinced  that 
Ilong  is  pro-Communist,  it  is  our  responsibility  to  require  his  removal  notwith- 
standintr  Mr.  Lattimore's  representations.  On  the  other  hand  the  Commission 
could,  if  it  wished,  take  the  position  that  since  Mr.  Lattimore  has  assumed  re- 
sponsibility, the  Commission  can  afford  to  permit  Hong's  retention  in  the  service. 
If  ttie  Commission  takes  the  latter  position  it  will  be  tantamount  to  saying  that 
although  we  believe  the  individual  is  a  Communist,  we  will  he  willing  to  rate 
him  eligible  provided  the  employing  agency  is  willing  to  assume  the  responsibility. 
I  doubt  that  the  Commission  can  aiford  to  avoid  the  issue  in  this  manner.  If 
we  believe  Hong  is  a  Communist  then  we  should  rate  him  ineligible. 

Do  we  believe  Hong  is  a  Communist?  The  Commission's  original  finding  was 
based  ?in  Hong's  connections  with  the  Chinese  Hand  Laundry  Alliance  and  with 
the  China  Daily  News.     Much  of  the  information  regarding  the  Communistic 
8S348~52— pt.  10 16 


3514  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

nature  of  the  Alliance  and  the  newspaper  came  from  Chinese,  some  of  whom 
were  connected  with  competing  newspapers.  We  ourselves  have  not  read  the 
China  Daily  News.  Mr.  Lattimore  states  he  has  read  some  of  the  issued  and 
has  found  nothing  Communistic  in  them,  although  he  admits  there  might  have 
been  something  Communistic  in  the  issues  which  he  has  not  read.  Mr.  Lattimore 
has  spent  years  in  China  and  from  his  statement  and  letter  to  Mr.  Barnes  it 
would  appear  that  he  is  thoroughly  familiar  with  the  various  political  factions. 
His  conclusion  is  that  Hong's  connections,  in  the  light  of  his  knowledge  of  the 
situation,  do  not  necessarily  point  to  pro-Communism.  In  matters  of  the  Chi- 
nese, Lattimore  is  somewhat  of  an  expert  and  his  opinion  is  entitled  to  consid- 
erable weight. 

Since  we  have  no  direct  evidence  that  Hong  is  a  Communist,  and  since  the 
original  decision  was  based  on  the  circumstances  of  Hong's  connections  and 
in  view  of  Mr.  Lattimore's  representations,  I  am  ready  to  reach  the  conclusion 
that  possibly  we  made  an  eri-or  in  the  case  of  Mr.  Hong ;  I  am,  therefore,  ready 
to  recommend  that  Mr.  Hong  be  rated  eligible  for  retention  in  his  position  in 
the  Office  of  War  Information. 

In  the  case  of  Dr.  Chi,  I  recommended  in  my  memorandum  of  May  7,  1943, 
that  he  be  rated  eligible.  Mr.  Smith  did  not  agree  with  me.  The  Commission 
has  not  yet  acted  on  the  case  of  Dr.  Chi.  For  the  reasons  stated  in  my  memoran- 
dum of  May  7,  1943,  I  again  recommend  that  Dr.  Chi  be  rated  eligible. 

Alfred  Klein, 
Acting  Chief  Law  Officer. 

CX  :  FS  :  ODS. 

September  17,  1943. 

Mr.  Moyeb:  I  do  not  believe  I  clearly  understand  Mr.  Lattimore's  point  of 
view  regarding  the  cases  of  Chi  and  Hong.  It  seems  that  he  is,  in  effect,  sug- 
gesting that  whatever  evidence  we  may  have,  short  of  being  positive  and  direct, 
tending  to  show  the  applicants  to  be  commuiiistically  inclined  is  entitled  to 
very  little  weight  and  that  his  judgment,  based  on  his  personal  knowledge  of 
Chi  and  on  Chi's  appraisal  of  Hong,  should  prevail.  However,  as  pointed  out 
by  Mr.  Klein,  there  is  no  absolute  proof  that  the  applicants  are  Communists 
and  in  view  of  Lattimore's  knowledge  of  the  complicated  Chinese  political  situa- 
tion, gained  through  years  of  residence  in  China,  I  am  also  willing  to  change 
my  previous  recommendation  for  both  applicants  from  ineligibility  to  eligibility. 

Farrar  Smith. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Frank  V.  Coe. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No.  I  knew  ]\Ir.  Coe  very  slig-htly.  I  met  him 
several  times  here  in  Washington  wlien  he  was  a  Government  servant. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  ever  attend  an  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations 
meeting  with  Mr.  Coe? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  believe  that  Mr.  Coe  was  at  one  of  the  interna- 
tional conferences  of  the  IPR. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  attend  that  meeting? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes ;  I  was  also  there. 

The  Chairman.  That  was  the  question. 

I  was  asking  him  to  complete  the  answer,  because  the  question  em- 
braced whether  or  not  he  met  him. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Lattimore,  do  you  recall  attending  a  caucus  meet- 
ing of  the  IPR  at  Hot  Springs,  in  conjunction  with  Mr.  Frank  V. 
Coe? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No;  I  don't  recall  it.  But  if  you  have  a  document 
to  refresh  my  memory,  it  may 

Mr.  Morris.  I  offer  you  now  exhibit  No.  298,  Mr.  Lattimore. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Already  in  our  record. 

Mr.  Morris.  Already  in  our  public  records,  293. 

Senator  Smith.  Which  Hot  Springs  is  it? 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  Virginia. 

The  Chairman.  This  is  with  reference  to  Frank  V.  Coe,  is  it  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Frank  V.  Coe ;  that  is  right,  sir. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3515 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  remember  ever  seeing  this  document  before. 

Mr.  Morris.  Does  that  document  recall  a  caucus  meeting  of  the  IPR 
that  you  attended,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Well,  it  is  headed  "Preliminary  meeting  of  the 
American  delegation." 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  remember  attending  a  preliminary  meeting  of 
the  American  delegation  of  the  IPR? 

]\Ir.  LATriMORE.  No ;  I  don't  remember,  but  such  preliminary  meet- 
ings were  quite  a  common  procedure  before  international  conferences. 

Mr.  Morris.  Does  not  that  document  purport  to  be  the  minutes  of 
that  meeting,  at  which  Mr.  Jessup  presided? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  must  have  been  there,  but,  as  I  say,  I  do  not  recall 
the  meeting. 

Mr.  Morris.  Does  not  that  document  show  that  you  spoke  on  several 
occasions  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  document  indicates  that  I  spoke  on  several 
occasions. 

Mr.  Morris.  Does  not  that  document  indicate  that  Mr.  Frank  V. 
Coe  was  present? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  indicates  that  Mr.  Coe  was  present. 

I  note  also  that  this  is  not  a  stenographic  transcript  and 

The  Chairman.  You  have  not  been  asked  about  that.  I  have  warned 
you  on  several  occasions;  I  have  tried  to  get  you  not  to  interject 
statements  after  the  Chair's  ruling. 

You  were  asked  a  question  as  to  whether  or  not  that  refreshed  your 
recollection  as  to  whether  or  not  you  had  met  Mr.  Frank  V.  Coe. 

^Ir.  Lattimore.  It  does  not  refresh  my  recollection  that  I  met  him 
there,  but,  quite  obviously,  he  and  I  were  there  at  the  same  time. 

May  I  add  that  the  record  is  not  a  stenographic  transcript  and  that 
I  don't  hold  myself  responsible  for  the  way  in  which  I  may  be  quoted 
here. 

The  Chairman.  You  were  not  asked  as  to  that,  or  as  to  whether 
you  were  responsible. 

Mv.  Morris.  Mr.  Henry  Collins,  is  the  next  name. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  place  that  name,  and  I  don't  believe  I  have 
met  him. 

The  Chairman.  What  do  you  want  done  with  this  exhibit  in  the 
hands  of  the  witness  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  That  has  already  been  introduced  as  exhibit  No.  293, 
Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

Mr.  Morris.  Laughlin  B.  Currie. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  answer  is  "No." 

Mr.  Morris.  Hugh  Deane. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  believe  I  ever  met  him.  I  think  he  is  a  man 
who  may  have  been  a  correspondent  for  the  Christian  Science  Monitor, 
but  I  don't  believe  I  have  ever  met  him. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Len  DeCaux. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Mr.  Len  DeCaux  I  have  met  once  or  twice  and  had 
no  reason  to  believe  to  be  a  Communist. 

Mr.  Morris.  Ellen  DeJong. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  met  her  occasionally  over  some  years  in  the  IPR 
and  had  no  reason  to  believe  her  a  Communist. 


3516  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  MoKRis.  She  was  a  staff  meiiiber  of  the  IPK,  was  she  not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  believe  she  was  for  a  short  period. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  she  now  known  as  Ellen  Atkinson  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes. 

Mr.  INIoRRis.  Do  you  know  what  she  is  doing  now  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  don't. 

Mr.  Morris.  Theodore  Draper? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  believe  I  have  ever  met  him. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  have  anv  associations  with  him  in  connection 
with  the  IPR? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No;  I  don't  believe  I  ever  did.  I  don't  recall  his 
name  as  associated  with  the  IPR  at  all. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Laurence  Duggan. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  never  met  Mr.  Duggan. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  James  Dolsen. 

Mr.  Latitmore.  That  is  a  new  name  to  me.    I  can't  place  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Israel  Epstein. 

Mr.  Latitmore.  Mr.  Israel  Epstein  I  knew  slightly  and  did  not 
consider  him  a  Communist,  but  did  believe  him  to  be  an  ardent  sup- 
porter of  Chinese  Communists. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  know  where  he  is  now  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  It  has  been  stated  in  the  press  that  he  has  gone 
abroad. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  he  in  Red  China  now  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  know. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  know  that  he  was  recently  feted  in  Red  China? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  didn't. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  he  the  husband  of  Elsie  Fairfax  Cholmeley  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  he  is. 

Mr.  Morris.  Was  Elsie  Fairfax  Cholmeley  a  staff  member  of  the 
IPR? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  She  was  for  a  period,  I  believe,  3^es. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  she  now  in  Red  China? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  know. 

Mr.  Morris.  Dolly  Eltenton. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes;  I  met  her  several  times  in  California.  I  be- 
lieve she  worked  for  a  while  for  the  California  office  of  IPR.  I  had 
no  reason  to  believe  and  have  no  reason  to  believe  she  is  a  Com- 
munist. 

Mr.  Morris.  John  K.  Fairbank. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Mr.  Morris,  could  I  intrude  at  that  point? 

Have  you,  Mr.  Lattimore,  given  us  your  full  recollection  with  regard 
to  Mi-s.  Eltenton? 

Mr.  Lai'timore.  Yes;  I  believe  I  have.    I  knew  her  very  slightly. 

Mr.  Sodrwine.  Did  you  know  her  husband  ? 

Mr.  Laitimore.  I  think  I  met  him  maybe  once  or  twice  at  the  time 
that  she  was  working  for  the  IPR. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Did  you  ever  visit  in  his  home  ? 

Mr.  Laiitmore.  I  think  my  wife  and  I  may  have  had  dinner  there 
once. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Did  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Eltenton  ever  visit  in  your  home? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  recall. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Did  you  just  ask  your  wife  if  she  recalled? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  risht. 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3517 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Did  she  say  she  did  not  ? 

Mr.  Lattiiniore.  She  said  she  did  not. 

]Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Did  Mr.  Eltenton  alone  ever  visit  in  your  home  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  think  so. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  "\V:is  Mrs.  Eltenton  at  one  time  secretary  to  Jack 
Oakie? 

Mr.  LA'rriMORE.  I  don't  remember  exactly  what  her  position  was. 
She  had  some  secretarial  position  at  the  California  IPE,. 

The  Chairman.  Let's  go  back,  then.  The  question  was  was  she  ever 
sceretary  to  Jack  Oakie. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  couldn't  answer  that. 

The  Chairman.  Why  cannot  you  answer  it  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Because  all  I  remember  is  that  she  worked  at  the 
California  office,  and  precisely  in  what  capacity  I  don't  recall. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Did  she  leave  IPR  to  go  with  the  American-Russian 
Institute? 

Mr,  Lattimore.  Not  to  my  knowledge. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  Was  she  with  the  American-Russian  Institute  as  a 
paid  employee  after  she  left  IPR? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Not  to  my  knowledge. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  At  the  time  that  there  was  a  visit  to  the  home  of  the 
Eltentons  by  you  and  ]\Irs.  Lattimore,  was  she  then  with  the  Ameri- 
•can-Russian  Institute? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  My  recollection  is  that  she  was  with  the  IPR. 

The  Chairman.  At  that  time? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  At  that  time. 

Mr.  FoRTAS.  Mr.  Sourwine,  can  we  have  a  date,  a  year  ? 

Mr.  SouRAViNE.  I  would  be  very  interested  to  have  the  date  and  year 
of  the  household  visit. 

Mr.  Laitimore.  I  think  the  only  time  at  which  we  knew  Mrs.  Elten- 
ton and  her  husband  was  in  the  first  half  of  1938,  when  they  were  living 
in  Berkeley. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Have  you  told  the  committee  all  that  you  know 
about  Mr.  Eltenton  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  told  everything  that  I  can  recall.  I  have 
a  very  shadowy  recollection  of  both  of  them. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  All  right. 

Mr.  Morris.  Are  you  acquainted  with  the  testimony  before  the 
House  Un-American  Activities  Committee  in  connection  with  Dolly 
Eltenton  and  her  husband  George  Charles  Eltenton  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No. 

]\Ir.  ISIoRRis.  You  have  not  read  it  ? 

]\Ir.  Lattimore.  No. 

Mr.  Morris.  The  next  name  on  the  list  is  John  K.  Fairbank. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  answer  is  no. 

Mr.  Morris.  You  do  know  John  K.  Fairbank  well,  do  you  not  ? 

Mr.  Latttmore.  I  know  him ;  yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  know  him  well,  Mr.  Lattimore  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Fairlv  well. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  he  ever  work  for  you  in  the  Office  of  War  Infor- 
mation ? 

Iklr.  Lattimore.  No.    He  never  worked  under  me. 

Mr.  Morris.  Was  he  not  head  of  the  China  Division  of  the  Office  of 
War  Information  ? 


3518  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Mr,  Lattimore.  I  don't  recall  that.  My  recollection  is  that  he 
worked  for  the  Office  of  War  Information — no  that  he  worked  in  the 
American  Embassy  in  Chungking  collecting  documents,  I  believe,  for 
colleges  and  universities  and  research  work  over  here,  and  then  trans- 
ferred to  the  OWI. 

But  the  precise  dates  and  precise  character  of  his  service  in  OWI  I 
didn't  have  anything  to  do  with  and  I  don't  remember. 

Mr.  ISIoRRis.  Elsie  Fairfax  Cholmeley. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes ;  I  remember  her,  and  I  had  no  reason  to  con- 
sider her  a  Communist  at  that  time. 

Mr.  Morris.  Gen.  Feng  Y'hsiang. 

jNIr.  Lattimore.  Gen.  Feng  Y'hsiang,  I  met  first  in  Chungking  when 
he  was  one  of  the  deputies  to  Chiang  Kai-shek,  and  I  met  him  after- 
ward in  this  country. 

Mr.  Morris.  Was  he  ever  a  guest  at  your  home  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  He  stayed  overnight  at  my  house  once. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  ever  travel  in  the  United  States  with  him? 

]\Ir.  Lattimore.  Let  me  see,  I  think  I  traveled  from  Philadelphia 
to  Baltimore  with  him  once.  I  had  gone  up  to  Bryn  INIawr,  where  I 
was  requested  to  act  as  his  translator  in  a  speech  he  made  at  Bryn 
Mawr  College. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  is  it  your  testimony  you  did  not  know  or  had  no 
reason  to  believe  he  was  a  Communist  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Had  no  reason  to  believe  he  was  a  Communist. 
Anything  but. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  ever  introduce  him  to  anybody  as  your  Com- 
munist friend? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No ;  I  am  sure  I  didn't. 

Mr.  Morris..  Did  you  persuade  him  to  go  back  to  Communist  China  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  didn't. 

Mr.  JNIoRRis.  Did  you  ever  discuss  the  prospects  of  his  return  to 
Communist  China,  with  anybody  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No.  I  believe  that  I  may  have  talked  in  general 
terms  about  his  going  back  to  China,  but  I  don't  think  it  was  Com- 
munist China  at  that  time.  My  view  of  him  was  that  he  was  one  of 
the  strongly  democratic  Chinese  who  had  never  joined  the  Reds  and 
was  not  likely  to. 

The  Chairman.  To  come  back  again,  to  whom  are  you  referring? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Gen.  Feng  Y'hsian,  once  known  as  the  Christian 
general  of  China. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  introduce  into  the  record  at  this 
time  two  newspaper  articles  in  connection  with  the  last  man  about 
whom  we  have  been  interrogating  Mr.  Lattimore  ? 

The  Chairman.  Where  do  they  come  from,  and  what  is  their  back- 
ground ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  is  a  photostat  of  the  New  York  Times  of  January 
15,  1948,  page  14,  and  a  photastat  of  another  article  from  the  New 
York  Times,  of  September  6,  1948,  pages  1  and  G,  in  reference  to 
Feng  Yu-hsiang. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Did  you  cause  those  photostats  to  be  made  from  the 
original  papers  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Is  this  the  date  at  which,  or  about  which  the  wit- 
ness knew  this  party  ? 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3519 

Mr.  FoRTAS.  What  is  the  date  of  those  photostats  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  September  1948. 

When  did  you  last  see  Gen.  Feng  Yu-hsiang,  Mr.  Lattimore  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  last  time  I  saw  him  was  when  he  stayed  at  our 
house.  He  and,  I  think,  a  son-in-law  of  his  stayed  overnight  at  our 
house. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  is  his  son-in-law's  luime,  Mr.  Lattimore'^ 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  recall. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  When  was  that,  Mr,  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  can't  recall  the  exact  year.    Perhaps  my  wife  can. 

The  Chairman,  Where  were  you  living?    In  Baltimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes,  outside  of  Baltimore.    Ruxton, 

Mr.  Morris,  It  was  in  connection  with  the  trip  that  he  made  to  the 
LTnited  States,  was  it  not,  obviously,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr,  Lattimore,  In  connection  with  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  The  visit  must  have  been  at  the  same  time  he  visited 
the  United  States. 

]\Ir.  Lattimore.  At  the  same  time,  yes.  He  had  been  appointed  by 
Gen.  Chiang  Kai-shek  to  make  a  study  of  hydroelectric  enterprise  in 
tliisi  country,  and  I  remember  his  telling  me  that  he  hacl  taken 
thousands  of  feet  of  motion-picture  film  in  connection  with  that. 

Mr,  Morris.  He  met  with  a  violent  death,  did  he  not,  Mr.  Latti- 
more ? 

j\Ir.  Lattimore.  He  died  in  a  fire  aboard  a  Soviet  ship,  I  believe, 
in  tlie  Mediterranean  somewhere. 

The  Chairman.  What  is  the  basis  for  the  introduction  of  these 
exhibits? 

Mr.  Morris,  j\Ir,  Chairman,  one  article  describes  the  death  that 
Gen.  Feng  Yu-hsiang  came  to,  and  the  other  was  an  article  indicating 
when  he  ariived,  which  would  tend  to  be  corroborative  of  the  time 
that  Mr.  Lattimore  did  meet  Gen.  Feng  Yu-hsiang. 

Mr.  FoRTAs.  What  is  the  date? 

The  Chairman.  It  is  supposed  to  be  September  1948. 

Mr.  IMoRRis.  Both  are  September  19-18. 

Mr,  FoRTAs.  You  say  that  there  is  a  date  as  to  the  time  when  he  ar- 
rived, whicli  tends  to  corroborate  the  witnesses'  testimony,  and  pre- 
sumably you  are  referring  to  a  date  given  in  the  story. 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  FoRTAs.  I  wondered  if  you  would  state  that  to  the  witness, 
because  we  haven't  seen  the  article. 

The  Chairman,  There  is  one  here  of  the  New  York  Times  of  Jan- 
uary 15,  1918,  page  14;  one  of  the  New  York  Times,  September  6, 
1948,  page  1,  and  another  from  the  New  York  Times  dated  September 
6,  1948,  page  6, 

ISIr,  Sourwine.  That  is  a  run-over  of  the  former  story. 

Senator  Smith.  Could  we  not  clear  it  up,  Mr.  Chairman,  by  letting 
the  witness  and  his  counsel  examine  those  right  now  ? 

The  Chairman.  I  want  to  know  what  is  the  basis  for  the  introduc- 
tion of  them.    They  do  not  refer  to  this  witness,  as  I  understand  it. 

]Mr.  Morris.  But  they  do  refer,  Mr,  Chairman,  to  Gen.  Feng  Yu- 
hsiang,  about  whom  we  have  been  interrogating  this  witness,  and  they 
do  place  the  time  of  his  visit  to  the  United  States  during  the  time  of 
the  visit  when  Mr.  Lattimore  testified  he  did  have  Gen.  Feng  Yu- 
hsiano;  in  his  home. 


3520  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

The  Chaikman.  Did  it  have  any  connection  with  tlie  Institute  of 
Pacihc  Kehitions? 

Mr.  MoRWs.  No,  sir;  not  wliat  we  are  puttino-  in  the  record  at  tliis 
time,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  The  Chair  is  going  to  withhold  the  ruling  on  that 
for  the  time  being. 

You  may  proceed  with  some  other  matter. 

Mr.  Morris.  Julien  R.  Friedman. 

Senator  Smith.  May  I  ask  one  question  before  we  leave  that? 

The  Chairman.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Smith.  Mr.  Lattimore,  with  respect  to  Gen.  Feng  Yu- 
hsiang,  that  he  made  several  thousand  feet  of  moving  picture  film 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Made  or  had  been  given. 

Senator  Smith.  Did  you  see  any  of  those  yourself? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  didn't. 

Senator  Smith.  You  did  not  know  whether  any  of  them  were  made 
of  just  public  utilities,  or  whether  some  of  them  might  have  been 
made  of  military  installations.  Do  you  have  any  information  either 
way? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  no  information  wdiatever. 

This  was  in  the  period  when  there  was  a  great  deal  of  talk  about  a 
possible  TVA  on  the  Yangtze,  and  that  sort  of  thing,  and  the  Chinese 
Government  w^as  very  much  interested  in  large-scale  hydroelectric 
enterprises, 

Mr.  Morris.  Julian  R.  Friedman? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Is  he  a  man  who  worked  for  the  State  Department 
at  one  time? 

Mr.  M(^RRis.  Yes.  He  was  an  assistant  to  John  Carter  Vincent  at 
the  time  he  was  Director  of  the  Far  Eastern  Division  of  the  State 
Department. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Well,  then,  I  knew  him  slightly  and  had  no  reason 
to  believe  him  a  Communist. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  meet  him  in  Mr.  Vincent's  office  in  the  State 
Department  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  can't  recall  meeting  him  there,  no.  I  think  when- 
ever I  met  him  it  was  socially.  If  he  was  in  Mr.  Vincent's  office,  I 
may  well  have  met  him. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  think  the  facts  show  that  he  had  a  desk  in 
the  same  office  with  Mr,  Vincent,  if  that  will  help  you. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  may  quite  well  have  met  him  in  Mr.  Vincent's 
office,  but  if  so  it  was  so  inconsequential  that  I  retain  no  memory 
of  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  You  did  say  whenever  you  did  meet  Mr.  Friedman  it 
was  at  social  gatherings,  Mr.  Lattimore.  Will  you  tell  us  about 
those  ? 

Mr.  Lai'itmore.  Well,  I  -just  remember  meeting  him  occasionally. 
He  may  have  been  at  one  or  more  IPR  conferences,  or  something  of 
that  sort. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  meet  him  as  the  Hot  Springs  convention  in 
1944? 

Mr.  LATriMORE.  If  he  was  there,  then  I  must  have  met  him  there? 

Mr.  Morris.  But  that  is  the  best  you  can  testify  to  about  your  asso- 
ciation with  Julian  Friedman  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3521 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Harry  Gannes  ? 
Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  place  that  name. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  Chen  Han-seng  write  a  review  of  his  book  for 
Pacihc  Affairs  while  you  were  the  editor  of  it  ? 

Mr.  Latt^imore.  I  don't  recall.  He  may  well  have.  Could  you  f^ive 
me  the  year  of  that?  •  " 

Mr.  Morris.  December  1937. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  quite  possible,  but  my  recollection  of  re- 
views m  Pacific  Affairs  is  not  very  good,  partly  because  while  I  was 
editing  Pacific  Affairs  from  abroad  many  reviews  went  in  without 
my  having  seen  the  original  manuscripts. 

Mr.  Morris.  So  it  is  your  testimony  you  did  not  recall  Harry  Gannes 
at  all  ? 

INlr.  Lattimore.  That  is  right. 
Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mark  Gayn « 

Mr.  Lattimore.  jMr.  Mark  Gayn  I  met  at  the  Press  Club  in  Tokyo, 
I  believe,  for  the  first  time.    That  would  be  the  winter  of  1945-46. 
and  I  think  I  saw  liim  once  in  this  country. 
Mr.  Morris.  What  was  that  occasion  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  was  just  before  he  was  going  to  Europe  on 
some  kind  of  writing  assignment,  so  I  was  told. 
Mr.  Morris.  Did  he  ever  confer  with  you  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  it  certainly  wasn't  a  conference.  It  was  a 
casual  meeting. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Just  a  moment,  Mr.  Morris.  If  I  may  interpose, 
the  witness  has  not  yet  answered  the  main  question  about  Mr.  Gayn.' 
The  question  is :  In  your  dealings  with  this  man,  or  in  any  other  way, 
did  you  know  or  have  any  reason  to  belieA-e  that  he  was  a  Communist? 
Mr.  Lattimore.  No ;  T  didn't. 
Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Louis  Gibarti  ? 
Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  place  that  name. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  it  your  testimony  that  you  do  not  recall  havino-  a 
meeting  with  Mr.  Louis  Gibarti?  ^ 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  certainly  don't  recall  it.    If  you  have  a  document 
somewhere,  it  might  refresh  my  memory. 
Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Harold  Glasser? 
Mr.  Lai-timore.  I  don't  place  that  name  either. 
Mr.  Morris.  G-1-a-s-s-e-r. 
Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  place  that  name. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  encounter  him  on  the  Pauley  Keparations 
Mission  ? 

Mr.  Latitmore.  He  wasn't  a  member  of  the  mission. 
The  Chairman.  The  question  is:  Did  you  encounter  him? 
Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  recall  it. 

The  Chairman.  That  is,  on  the  Pauley  Reparations  Mission. 
Mr.  Morris.  It  is  your  testimony  you  did  not  encounter  or  run  into 
Harold  Glasser  in  connection  with  the  Pauley  Reparations  Mission? 
Mr.  Latimer.  I  don't  recall  it.    In  Tokyo? 
Mr.  Morris.  At  any  place. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Or  here  ?    I  just  don't  place  the  name. 
Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Max  Granich  ? 

Mr.  Lattoiore.  Mr.  ]Max  Granich  I  know  from  the  transcript  of 
these  hearings.    I  have  never  met  him,  but  there  is  in  the  record  the 


3522  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

fact  that  I  once  wrote  him  a  letter  declining  to  join  the  board  of  China 
Today,  which  he  edited. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Michael  Greenberg? 

Mr  SouRWiNE.  Jnst  a  moment,  please.  The  Avitness  has  not  yet 
answered  the  question:  Did  he,  in  his  dealings  with  this  man,  know 
him  or  had  any  reason  to  believe  he  was  a  Communist  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  In  my  dealings  with  him,  I  had  no  reason  to  believe 

he  was  a  Communist.  -,.    ,     ,         -,       ^^         .^    ^.      rri  „ 

Mr  SouRWiNE.  The  question  is  a  little  broader  than  that,  ihe 
question  is:  In  your  dealimrs  with  him,  or  in  any  other  way,  clid  you 
have  reason  to  believe  or  did  you  know  him  to  be  a  Communist  i 

Mr  L\TTiMORE.  No,  I  didn't  know  him  to  be  a  Communist,  and  i 
didn't  believe  him  to  be  a  Communist.  China  Today  at  that  time  was 
not  a  magazine  that  I  recognized  as  a  Communist  front. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Michael  Greenberg?  t  ^i  •   i 

Mr  Lattimore.  Mr.  Michael  Greenberg  I  knew  slightly.  1  think 
I  met  him  at  the  New  York  office  of  the  IPR  and,  of  course  I  know 
that  he  later  became  managing  editor,  or  some  such  title,  o±  i^acitic 
Affairs  after  I  had  left.    I  knew  him  very  slightly. 

]\Ir.  Morris.  You  used  his  services,  did  you  not,  m  the  IFK  f 
Mr  Lattimore.  I  don't  recall  using  his  services. 
Mr  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  identify  this  document,  pleased 
Mr    SoiiRwiNE.  If  I  may  interrupt,  please,  before  the  document 
comes  in      Here  again  we  have  a  situation  where  the  major  question- 
that  is,  whether  the  witness  in  his  dealings  or  m  any  other  way  knew 
or  had  reason  to  believe  this  person  was  a  Communist— has  not  been 

Mr  L  vrTiMORE.  No ;  I  had  no  reason  to  believe  he  was  a  Communist. 

Mr*  SouRWiNE.  The  question  is  assuming  that  you  did  have  deal- 
intrs  with  the  person.  There  is,  of  course,  no  objection  to  expatiating 
oifthat,  but  I  keep  coining  back  to  it  because  the  mam  question  is 
whether  you  knew  or  had  reason  to  believe  that  the  person  was  a 

Communist.  ,.  ,  ,,  n  ,     i 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  knew  him  very  slightly  and  had  no  reason 

to  believe  him  a  Communist. 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  Mr.  Mandel.  ^         .i      ci        4= 

I^Ir  ISIandel.  This  is  a  photostat  of  a  document  from  the  hies  ot 
the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  dated  April  28,  1941,  froni  300  Gil- 
man  Hall,  Johns  Hopkins  University,  addressed  to  Mr.  E.  C.  Carter, 
with  the  typed  signature  of  Owen  Lattimore.     It  is  a  photostat  ot  a 

carbon  copy.  ,        ^  .^       i      i 

Mr.  Morris.  INIr.  Lattimore,  I  offer  you  that  document  and  ask  you 

if  you  can  recall  having  written  it.  ,,    ,       .  .,^        -^     i    .    t 

Mr.    Lattimore.  No;    I    don't    recall    having    written    it,    but    i 

obviously  did.  .  ^  -,    nr     t    4^4^-  ? 

Mr  Morris.  Will  you  read  the  second  paragraph,  Mr.  Lattimore_{ 
Mr.  Lattimore.  "The  three  points  raised  by  Greenberg  are,  i 

think,  decisive."  ^         ,       ., 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  remember  what  the  three  points  were  m  con- 
nection with  that  paper  by  Greenberg? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  but  the  first  sentence  of  the  letter  is : 
Herewith  I  am  returning  the  docket  of  uapers  relative  to  Bloch's  proposal 
for  an  analysis  of  the  Russo-  Japanese  Pact, 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3523 

•  "^fi^''\l^'^^J  ^?  ""V"'  the  latter  to  object  to  the  fact  that  the  peoi^le 
111  the  New  1  ork  office  don't  seem  to  realize  that  quarterly  maffiiziAes 
liave^to  deal  iii  rather  long  terms  of  reference,  whereas  the  Fa?  East- 
ern burvey,  which  was  a  fortnightly  publication,  dealt  with  things 
that  were  closer  to  the  neAvs. 

The  Chairman.  Now  get  back  to  the  question 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  that  be  admitted  into  the  record? 

Ihe  Chairman.  It  may  be  admitted  in  the  record. 

(Ihe  document  referred  to  was  marked  ''Exhibit  No.  551"  and  is  as 
loUows :)  ' 

Exhibit  No.  551 

WLH 
ED 

300  GiLMAjy  Hall,  Johns  Hopkins  University 
Mr.  E.  C.  Carter,  Baltimore,  Md.,  April  28,  WJ,1. 

Institute  of  Pacific  Relaticm, 

129  East  Fifty-second  Street,  New  York  City. 

Dear  Carter  :  Herewith  I  am  returning  the  docket  of  papers  relative  to  Bloeh's 
proposal  for  an  analysis  of  the  Russo-Japanese  Pact 

The  three  points  raised  hy  Greenberg  are,  I  thinlv  decisive 

There  is-  another  thing  that  I  think  should  be  borne  in  mind  whenever  pro- 
posals of  this  kind  come  up.  Everybody  at  129  East  Fifty-second  StreeJ  who 
does  any  writing  seems  to  me  to  be  dominated  by  the  routine  and  rhvthm  of 
^ar  Eastern  Survey— and  to  be  unconscious  of  the  fact.  The  old  Far  Eastern 
Survey,  I  should  hastily  add.  There  are  already  signs  that  the  new  Far  Eastern 
Survey  IS  doing  a  Moses  on  them  and  leading  them  out  of  the  wilderness 
,,  ^"t/^f  ^aj^it  f.  m"«l  to  which  I  refer  is  still  there  and  still  dominant  '  It  is 
r  vnf  f, n'i  l^T  thnik'ug  that  the  art  of  writing  something  that  is  a  combination  of 
piotound  philosophy  and  snap  judgment  on  something  that  happened  a  week 
ago  or  at  most  two  weeks  ago.  dpyeiicu  a  ^^eelv 

This  just  won't  do  for  a  quarterly.  You  have  to  drop  the  idea  that  vou  are 
writing  about  something  that  happened  a  week  or  ten  davs  ago.  You  have  to 
cast  your  mmd  forward  at  least  three  months— four  is  safer.  It  is  not  a  ques- 
tion of  what  people  are  guessing  about  the  Russo-Japanese  Pact  now,  but  what 
they  will  be  thinking  about  it  in  September.  The  essential  approach  involves 
the  computing  of  two  factors:  (1)  By  September,  what  impress  willremain  on 
people  s  minds  of  the  actual  wording,  the  diplomatic  and  political  timing  and 
the  immediate  effects  of  the  Russo-Japanese  Pact?  (2)  By  September,  what 
win  be  the  general  character  of  the  consequences  flowing  from  the  Pact'  I  do 
not  mean  sensationally  accurate  prophesies  of  who  will  be  sipping  tea  and  who 
^^  All     /"^^""^  vodka.     I  mean  a  broadly  correct  anticipation  of  main  trends 

All  of  this  means  that  you  cannot  deal  with  foreground  at  all.  You  must 
combine  background  in  the  most  scholarly  sense  of  that  much  abused  word  with 
the  panorama  of  the  future. 

It  is  for  reasons  like  this  that  I  switched  Anna  Louise  Strong  off  the  topic 
of  the  Fourth  Route  Army  and  onto  the  topic  of  the  Eighth  Route  Army 
Yours  very  sincerely, 

Owen  Lattimore. 

Mr.  Morris.  At  the  time,  or  any  time,  did  you  have  any  reason  to 
believe  that  Michael  Greenberg  was  a  Communist  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  had  no  reason  to  believe  he  was  a  Communist. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  while  we  are  on  the  document,  may 
I  go  out  of  order  a  minute  and  ask  Mr.  Lattimore  to  read  the  last 
paragraph  of  this  letter? 

The  Chairman.  That  is  on  the  second  page. 

Mr.  Morris.  It  is  on  the  second  page. 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

It  is  for  reasons  like  this  that  I  switched  Anna  Louise  Strong  oft  the  topic  of 
the  Fourth  Route  Army  and  onto  the  topic  of  the  Eighth  Route  Army. 


3524  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

This  is  apparently  for  reasons  of  time  limit. 

Mr.  Morris.  Would  you  explain  what  you  meant  by  that  reference, 
Mr.  Lattimore? 

The  Chairman.  Read  that  ao;ain,  Mr.  Lattimore,  please. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  May  I  read  the  preceding  sentence  also? 

The  Chairman.  Just  read  what  you  did  read.  I  want  to  get  that. 
What  did  you  read  when  you  were  asked  to  read  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore  (reading)  : 

It  is  for  reasons  like  this  that  I  switched  Anna  Louise  Strong  off  the  topic  of 
the  Fourth  Route  Army  and  onto  the  topic  of  the  Eighth  Route  Army. 

Mr.  Morris.  Read  the  preceding  paragraph,  Mr.  Lattimore. 
Mr.  Lattimore.  The  preceding  paragraph  is  [reading]  : 

All  of  this  means  that  you  cannot  deal  with  foreground  at  all.  You  must 
combine  background  in  the  most  scholarly  sense  of  that  much  abused  word  with 
the  panorama  of  the  future. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  did  you  mean  by  ihe  reference  that  you  were 
switching  Anna  Louise  Strong  off  of  the  topic  of  the  Fourth  Route 
Army  and  onto  the  topic  of  the  Eighth  Route  Army? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  can  only  speculate  on  that,  Mr.  Morris. 

Mr.  Morris.  Was  Anna  Louise  Strong  doing  an  assignment  for  you 
at  that  time? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  don't  recall  whether  she  was  doing  an  assign- 
ment or  had  volunteered  an  article. 

Mv.  Morris.  But  is  it  not  apparent  from  your  reading  of  your  own 
letter,  Mr.  Lattimore,  when  you  say  you  switched  her  off  one  topic  and 
onto  anothei',  that  she  was  obviously  working  for  you  in  some  capacity? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No;  not  necessarily.  She  may  have  volunteered 
an  article  on  one  topic  and  I  suggested  that  she  take  up  another  topic. 

Mr,  Morris.  At  least  to  that  extent  she  was  working  for  you,  if  you 
could  switch  her  from  one  to  the  other,  even  though  she  was  volun- 
teering ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  sir ;  I  think  if  a  correspondent  is  trying  to  place 
an  article  with  a  publication,  that  correspondent  is  working  for  him- 
self or  herself  until  the  article  is  accepted. 

Mr.  MoiiRis.  Were  the  Fourth  Route  Army  and  the  Eighth  Route 
Army  both  Communist  armies? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  The  Eighth  Route  Army  was  a  Communist  army. 
The  Fourth  Route  Army  was  an  army  organized  by  Chiang  Kai-shek 
which  contained  both  Communists  and  non-Communists. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  it  ultimately  became  a  Communist  army;  did  it 
not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Part  of  it  did ;  yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  explain  the  reference  of  taking  Anna  Louise 
Strong  from  the  Fourth  to  the  Eighth  Route  Army  ? 

The  Chairman.  What  is  meant  by  that  language  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  As  I  say,  I  can  only  speculate  on  it  at  this  dis- 
tance, but  in  view  of  the  fact  that  I  was  talking  about  the  subject  of  a 
quarterly  magazine  not  writing  off  the  top  of  the  news,  and  in  view  of 
the  fact  that  this  letter  was  written  in  1941,  it  may  be  that  the  Fourth 
Route  Army  was  known  at  that  time  only  from  recent  newspaper  re- 
ports, and  I  thought  it  was  difficult  to  give  a  balanced  long-term  treat- 
ment of  it,  whereas  the  Eighth  Route  Army  had  been  known  for  a 
long  time,  and  was  a  subject  that  could  be  written  about  in  the  terms 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  3525 

of  a  quarterly  magaziiie,  rather  than  a  subject  for  some  publication 
that  was  staying  close  to  the  daily  headline. 

The  Chairman.  Did  I  understand  you  to  say  that  the  Eighth  Army 
was  a  Communist  army  ? 

Mr.  Lattimoke.  The  Eighth  Army  was  a  Connnunist  army. 
The  Ciiaibman.  And  you  switched  her  from  the  Fourth  Route 
Army  to  the  Eighth  Route  Army;  is  that  right?     Is  that  what  the 
language  says? 

Mr.  Lattimoke.  The  language  says  I  switched  her  off  one  topic 
and  onto  another  topic,  presumably  in  terms  that  she  would  write 
about  one  topic  rather  than  another.  The  Eighth  Route  Army  at  that 
time  was  under  Chiang  Kai-shek's  command,  although  it  was  a  Com- 
munist army. 

Mr.  ]\IoRRis.  Did  you  know  at  that  time  that  Anna  Louise  Strong 
was  a  Communist? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No;  I  did  not. 

Mr.  Morris.  Had  you  any  reason  to  believe  that  she  was  a  Com- 
munist ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No ;  I  had  no  reason  to  believe  that  she  was. 
Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  ever  know  that  she  w\as? 
]Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  never  learned  that  she  was. 
Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  up  to  this  date  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  That  is  up  to  this  date.     I  don't  consider  her  a 
Communist. 
Mr.  Morris.  Dr.  H.  Hatem? 
Mr.  Lattimore.  I  can't  place  that  name  at  all. 
Mr.  Morris.  Is  it  vour  testimony  you  had  no  connection  with  Dr. 
Hatem  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  None  that  I  can  recall.  There  may  be  something 
in  the  files  about  it,  but  I  completely  fail  to  place  the  name. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  just  want  to  know  if  the 
record  shows  what  Mr.  Lattimore's  definition  of  a  Communist  is  in 
these  answers.  He  is  answering  that  he  never  knew  Anna  Louise 
Strong  to  be  a  Communist,  even  up  to  this  date,  and  had  no  reasons  to 
believe. 

What  is  your  definition  in  these  answers  of  the  words  "a  Com- 
munist" ? 

j\[r.  Lattimore.  A  Communist,  I  suppose,  is  a  known  Communist. 
Senator  Ferguson.  A  knoM-n  Communist?     They  did  not  ask  you 
that,  as  I  understood  the  question. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  no  reason  to  believe  that  Anna  Louise  Strong 
is  a  Communist. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  not  the  question. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  I  have  been  trying  to  find  out  now  is  that 
you  have  answered  many  questions  here,  and  one  of  them  was  as  to 
whether  or  not  you  ever  knew  or  had  reasons  to  believe  that  Anna 
Louise  Strong  was  a  Communist. 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No  ;  I  had  no  reason  to  believe  she  was  a  Communist. 
Senator  Ferguson.  But  I  want  to  know-  what  the  word  "Communist" 
means  to  you  wdien  you  are  answering  these  questions. 

]\Ir.  Lattijiore.  I  had  no  reason  to  believe  that  she  was  a  member 
of  the  Communist  Party, 

Senator  Ferguson,  That  was  not  the  question  at  all,  wdiether  or  not 
she  was  a  member  of  the  party.    Is  that  what  you  understood  all  of 


3526  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

these  other  questions  from  No.  1  down  to  mean :  that  you  knew  or  had 
reasons  to  believe  they  were  members  of  the  party  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Are  you  talking  about  card-carrying  Com- 
munists ? 

INIr.  Lattimore.  Senator,  I  am  not  an  expert  on  the  subject  of  card- 
carrying  Communists  versus,  noncard-carrying  Communists. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Lattimore,  would  you  include  at  least,  in 
the  question  with  relation  to  Anna  Louise  Strong,  as  to  whether  or  not 
she  was  under  the  discipline  of  the  Communist  Party  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  To  the  best  of  my  knowledge  of  Anna  Louise 
Strong,  which  is  rather  slight,  I  had  no  reason  to  believe  that  she  was 
under  any  discipline  except  her  own. 

Mr.  Morris.  She  was  the  editor  of  the  Moscow  Daily  News,  was  she 
not,  Mr.  Lattimore  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  don't  think  she  was.    Was  she? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  not  know  she  was  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  No,  I  didn't  recall  that. 

Mr.  Morris.  You  have  reviewed  her  books,  have  you  not,  Mr.  Lat- 
timore ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  have  reviewed  at  least  one  book  of  hers. 

Mr.  Morris.  That  was  in  what  year ;  1935  ? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Possibly. 

Mr.  Morris.  ]\Ir.  Chairman,  along  this  line  of  questioning  we  have 
not  been  putting  documents  into  the  record  for  fear  we  would  not  be 
able  to  finish  this  up  very  quickly. 

The  Chairman.  You  do  not  have  to  be  afraid  about  finishing  up 
very  quickly.  We  are  going  to  go  on  with  this  hearing  until  it  is  con- 
cluded.  Do  not  be  afraid  about  time. 

Senator  Smith.  Mr.  Chairman,  perhaps  we  should  define  what  we 
mean  as  a  Communist  wdien  w^e  ask  the  witness  a  question.  That  is  to 
say,  whether  we  are  referring  just  to  a  card-carrying  Communist,  a 
member  of  the  Communist  Party,  or  whether  we  are  also  including  in 
that  category  those  persons  who  we  know  are  generally  classified  as 
Comnmnists  because  they  follow  the  Communist  line. 

The  latter  would  be  a  much  broader  definition.  Perhaps  we  should 
say  to  the  witness  here  just  which  of  those  two  we  mean,  whether  we 
mean  strictly  a  card-carrying  Communist  or  whether  we  mean  a 
person  that  may  or  may  not  be  a  card-carrying  Communist  but  yet 
does  follow  the  Communist  line.  I  think  that  is  what  Senator  Fer- 
guson is  driving  at. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  what  I  am  driving  at. 

Senator  Smith.  I  am  sure  the  witness  would  rather  have  it  cleared 
that  w^ay. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Whether  or  not  they  were  voluntarily  follow- 
ing the  line. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Would  this  definition  be  acceptable:  In  this  list 
of  questions,  when  we  refer  to  the  word  "Communist,"  the  committee 
means  a  person  who  is,  using  the  Senators  words,  who  is  or  has  been 
willingly  cooperative  or  collaborating  with  Communists  for  the  fur- 
therance of  Communist  purposes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  a  good  definition, 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  3527 

J\lr.  SouRwiNE.  Using  that  as  the  definition  of  Communist,  Mr. 
Lattimore,  are  there  an}^  of  tJie  answers  you  have  given  with